March 10 2009
DA 08-0128
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2009 MT 74N
IN THE MATTER OF
L.K.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Teton, Cause No. DI-07-002.3
Honorable Laurie McKinnon, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Robin A. Meguire; meguirelaw.com, Great Falls, Montana
For Appellee:
Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Tammy K Plubell,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Joe Coble, Teton County Attorney; Choteau, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 19, 2008
Decided: March 10, 2009
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in
this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and
Montana Reports.
¶2 The State of Montana filed a petition for commitment and detention of L.K. As a
result, L.K. was detained at the State Hospital at Warm Springs (hereinafter “Warm
Springs”) pending her commitment hearing. Pursuant to § 53-21-140(2), MCA, L.K.
attended her commitment hearing via video-conference from Warm Springs. The
Professional Person (“Fischer”) was in the same room with L.K. when the hearing began
and was able to observe her behavior. During the hearing, L.K. became disruptive, and
the District Court ordered that L.K.’s end of the video-conference line be muted. As the
hearing continued, L.K. became agitated, and was taken back to her room because her
behavior was compromising her mental state and the safety of the staff and other patients.
The remainder of the hearing was conducted in her absence. When the District Court
became aware that L.K. had been permanently removed from the video-conference area,
the court discussed with L.K.’s attorney, Fischer, and the court-appointed Friend
(“Francetich”) the possibility that L.K. could waive her right to be present pursuant to
§ 53-21-119(2), MCA. L.K.’s counsel ultimately concurred with Fischer and Francetich
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that her continued presence at the hearing would adversely affect her mental condition,
and waived her right to be present on that basis.
¶3 Issues on appeal:
¶4 1. Whether L.K. was committed to the State Hospital in violation of her due
process rights when she was precluded from being present at the hearing?
¶5 2. Whether L.K. was denied effective assistance of counsel?
¶6 3. Whether the District Court erred in authorizing involuntary medication?
¶7 In a previous decision involving the same individual, we held that where a person
is being disruptive while attending the involuntary commitment hearing via video-
conference, it is appropriate for the District Court to order that the individual’s
communication device be muted so that proceedings can continue in an orderly fashion.
In re L.K., 2008 MT 169, ¶¶ 32, 33, 343 Mont. 366, 184 P.3d 353. In that proceeding,
“L.K. could hear each witness’s testimony, observe the entire proceeding, and consult
with her attorney at any time.” L.K., ¶ 33.
¶8 In the present matter, L.K. argues that the court improperly allowed her to be
completely removed from the hearing, which was ultimately conducted in her absence.
L.K. also contends that her attorney’s waiver of her presence was not effective since,
contrary to § 53-21-119(2), MCA, there were no specific findings that “(a) the presence
of the respondent at the hearing would be likely to seriously adversely affect [her] mental
condition; and (b) an alternative location for the hearing in surroundings familiar to the
respondent would not prevent such adverse effects on [her] mental condition.”
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¶9 L.K. also challenges the order that she be involuntarily medicated for the reason
that the District Court did not make a specific finding as to “the reason involuntary
medication was chosen from among other alternatives.” Section 53-21-127(8)(h), MCA.
¶10 This Court has previously addressed the issue of the findings required to support
an order for involuntary medication. In re S.C., 2000 MT 370, 303 Mont. 444, 15 P.3d
861. In S.C., S.C. alleged the district court failed to make a specific finding stating the
reason involuntary medication was chosen among other alternatives. This Court
concluded that it must look at the district court’s findings as a whole, and in so doing
stated: “[a]lthough the District Court did not, in one distinct finding of fact, specifically
state why involuntary mediation was chosen, it is abundantly clear from the court’s other
detailed findings of fact why the District Court concluded that involuntary medication
was the least restrictive and most appropriate alternative.” S.C., ¶ 14.
¶11 This Court also observed in S.C. our adoption of the doctrine of implied findings
for the purpose of reviewing findings of fact. S.C., ¶ 14, citing Interstate Brands Corp. v.
Cannon, 218 Mont. 380, 384, 708 P.2d 573, 576 (1985). The doctrine of implied
findings provides that “where the findings are general in terms, any findings not
specifically made, but necessary to the [determination], are deemed to have been implied,
if supported by the evidence.” S.C., ¶ 14, quoting Interstate Brands, 218 Mont. at 384,
708 P.2d at 576. In the instant case, the evidence, combined with the District Court’s
specific findings of fact, provide a clear rationale for ordering involuntary medication and
for concluding by necessary implication that L.K.’s continued presence at the hearing
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would seriously adversely affect her mental condition and that another alternate location
would not prevent such adverse effects.
¶12 Finally, L.K. contends that her counsel was ineffective, essentially arguing that
counsel did not vigorously advocate on her behalf. We disagree. The record indicates
that counsel cross examined witnesses, including Fischer, only consented to her removal
after Fischer and Francetich concurred that her continue presence would likely cause her
mental condition to further deteriorate. Counsel nonetheless advocated the State had not
met its burden and that L.K. should be released or effectively treated in the community.
Counsel was not ineffective.
¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of
our 1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which provides for
memorandum opinions.
¶14 We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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