NUGENT
v.
THE SUPERVISORS.
Supreme Court of United States.
*246 Mr. T.M. Shaw, for the plaintiff in error; Mr. T.L. Dickey, contra.
*247 Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.
We think the Circuit Court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's replication. The bonds to which the coupons in suit were attached, purport to have been made and issued by the order of the board of supervisors of Putnam County, in payment of the county's subscription to the capital stock of the Kankakee and Illinois River Railroad Company. They are made payable to that company or bearer, and the plaintiff is a bonâ fide holder of the coupons, having paid value for them without notice of any defence. If, then, the bonds are valid obligations, if they were rightfully issued, the right of the plaintiff to a judgment against the county is plain.
That by what it did in the matter the county became in effect a subscriber to the capital stock of the railroad company, and liable for the sums designated, admits of no serious question. The fact that no subscription was formally made upon the books of the company is quite immaterial. In The Justices of Clarke County v. The Paris, Winchester, and Kentucky River Turnpike Company,[*] it was ruled that an order of the County Court, by which it was said that it subscribed for a specified number of shares of road stock, was binding, the court having authority to make a subscription. In this case there was more. There was not only the resolution, declaring the subscription made, but there was an acceptance by the railroad company, and notice of the acceptance. The minds of the parties came together. Both understood that a contract was made, and had nothing subsequently occurred to change their relations the county could have enforced the delivery of the stock, and the company could have compelled the delivery to itself of the bonds, on performance of the conditions stipulated. So the parties regarded their relations to each other. The bonds were delivered. The committee appointed by the board of supervisors to protect the interests of the county, under whose direction the bonds were ordered to be issued, were satisfied *248 that all the prescribed conditions precedent to their delivery had been complied with, and they so decided. The county accepted the position of a stockholder, received certificates for the stock subscribed, voted as a stockholder, and proceeded to levy a tax to pay the interest falling due on the bonds. Were this all of the case, the validity of the bonds, and of their accompanying coupons in the hands of a bonâ fide holder for value, would be beyond doubt.
The Circuit Court, however, was of opinion, and so decided, that the bonds are invalid, because before their delivery the Kankakee and Illinois River Railroad Company had become consolidated with the Plymouth, Kankakee, and Pacific Railroad Company, another corporation. This consolidation was authorized by the general laws of the two States, and by a section in the special charter of the latter company. No claim is made that it was not legally effected. The result necessarily was, that the consolidated company succeeded to all the rights, property, and privileges which belonged to each of the two companies out of which it was formed, before their consolidation. It was not until after this had taken place that the county bonds were handed over and sold, and it was certificates of the stock of the consolidated company which the county received.
What, then, was the legal effect of the consolidation? Did it release the county from its prior assumption to take stock in the Kankakee and Illinois River Railroad Company and give its bonds in payment? Or, did it render unauthorized the subsequent delivery of the bonds, and make them invalid even in the hands of a bonâ fide purchaser? These are the only questions presented by the record that need discussion.
It must be conceded, as a general rule, that a subscriber to the stock of a railroad company is released from obligation to pay his subscription by a fundamental alteration of the charter. The reason of the rule is evident. A subscription is always presumed to have been made in view of the main design of the corporation, and of the arrangements made for its accomplishment. A radical change in the organization or purposes of the company may, therefore, take *249 away the motive which induced the subscription, as well as affect injuriously the consideration of the contract. For this reason it is held that such a change exonerates a subscriber from liability for his subscription; or, if the contract has been executed, justifies a stockholder in resorting to a court of equity to restrain the company from applying the funds of the original organization to any project not contemplated by it. But while this is true as a general rule it has no applicability to a case like the present. The consolidation of the Kankakee and Illinois River Railroad Company with another company was no departure from its original design. The general statute of the State, approved February 28th, 1854, authorized all railroad companies then organized, or thereafter to be organized, to consolidate their property and stock with each other, and with companies out of the State, whenever their lines connect with the lines of such companies out of the State. The act further declared that the consolidated company should have all the powers, franchises, and immunities which the consolidating companies respectively had before their consolidation. Nor is this all. The special charter of the Kankakee and Illinois River Railroad Company contained, in its eleventh section, an express grant to the company of authority to unite or consolidate its railroad with any other railroad or railroads then constructed or that might thereafter be constructed within the State, or any other State, which might cross or intersect the same, or be built along the line thereof, upon such terms as might be mutually agreed upon between said company and any other company. It was therefore contemplated by the legislature, as it must have been by all the subscribers to the stock of the company, that precisely what has occurred might occur. Subscribers must be presumed to have known the law of the State and to have contracted in view of it. When the voters of the county of Putnam sanctioned a county subscription by their vote, and when the board of supervisors, in pursuance of that sanction, resolved to make the subscription, they were informed by the law of the State that a consolidation with another company might be made, that the stock *250 they proposed to subscribe might be converted into stock of the consolidated company, and that the liability they assumed might become owing to that company. With this knowledge and in view of such contingencies they made the contract. The consolidation, therefore, wrought no change in the organization or design of the company to which they subscribed other than they contemplated at the time as possible and legitimate. It cannot be said that any motive for their subscription has been taken away, or that the consideration for it has failed. Hence the reason of the general rule we have conceded does not exist in this case, and, consequently, the rule is inapplicable.
In a multitude of cases decided in England and in this country it has been determined that a subscriber for the stock of a company is not released from his engagement to take it and pay for it by any alteration of the organization or purposes of the company which, at the time the subscription was made, were authorized either by the general law or by the special charter, and a clear distinction is recognized between the effect of such alterations and the effect of those made under legislation subsequent to the contract of subscription. In The Cork and Youghal Railway Company v. Paterson,[*] which was an action to recover a call of one pound per share on one hundred shares subscribed, it appeared that the defendant was one of the subscribers to the agreement for the Cork, Middleton, and Youghal Railroad Company. That agreement authorized the provisional directors to extend the purposes of the organization, to change the termini of the road, and to amalgamate with other companies. The subscriber's agreement for the Cork and Waterford Railroad Company contained similar provisions. After the defendant's subscription was made the two companies executed a deed of amalgamation, without any other assent of the defendant than his signature to the subscriber's agreement for the first-named company. Upon this state of facts all the judges held that he remained liable on his subscription. *251 Its effect was said, by Chief Justice Jervis, to be an authority to the company to tack his subscription to anything else they might see fit, and thus make him a subscriber to that, and therefore, added the judge, by signing the Cork and Youghal he afforded an authority to the directors to apply his signature to the Cork and Waterford, and so make him a subscriber to that. To the same effect are the cases of Nixon v. Brownlow and Nixon v. Green.[*] The American authorities are equally explicit. They uniformly assert that the subscriber for stock is released from his subscription by a subsequent alteration of the organization or purposes of the company, only when such alteration is both fundamental and not provided for or contemplated by either the charter itself or the general laws of the State. In Sparrow v. The Evansville and Crawfordsville Railroad Company,[] where it appeared that after a public act had taken effect authorizing the consolidation of the charters of two railroad companies, the defendant had subscribed for shares in one of them, and a consolidation was afterwards made, he was held liable to the consolidated company for his subscription, and this, though the consolidation took place without his knowledge or consent. The same doctrine was asserted in Bish v. Johnson.[] The Supreme Court of Connecticut recognized the rule in Bishop v. Brainerd,[§] and a subscriber to one company was held to be a debtor to the consolidated company in a case where there was no general authority to consolidate, but the charter of the company was subject to amendment by the legislature, and where the legislature, after the subscription confirmed the consolidation.
Many other citations are at hand, but these are sufficient. *252 No well-considered cases are in conflict with them. Marsh v. Fulton County is altogether a different case. In that it appeared that the people of the county voted in November, 1853, in favor of a subscription for stock in the Mississippi and Wabash Railroad Company, and in April, 1854, the board of supervisors of the county ordered their clerk to make the subscription. It was not, however, then made. Subsequently, in 1857, the legislature made fundamental changes in the organization of the company, dividing it substantially into three companies, with a distinct governing body for each, and with three classes of stockholders. It was after this that the county subscription was made; and made not for the stock of the Mississippi and Wabash Railroad Company, but for the stock of one of the divisions. Necessarily, therefore, we held that there was no authority to make the subscription which was made, that it had not been approved by a popular vote, and hence that the bonds issued in payment for it were invalid. The county had entered into no contract until after the radical changes had been made in the organization of the company. It never assented to such a change, and when the proposed subscription was approved by the popular vote, there was no reason to expect the change afterwards made. There was at that time nothing in the general law of the State, and nothing in the charter, which authorized the company to change its organization, or which looked to its division into several distinct corporations. It needs nothing more to show how unlike that case was to the present.
In the case in hand the county had, under lawful authority, undertaken to subscribe for stock before the consolidation was made, and the undertaking had been accepted. A liability had been incurred, and the business agents of the county, to whom exclusively the law intrusted the management of its affars, consented to and promoted the consolidation. And the subscription was made in full view of the law that allowed an amalgamation with another company. The contract was made with reference to that law. Nothing has taken place which the county was not bound to anticipate *253 as likely to happen, and to which the people in voting for the subscription, and the board of supervisors in directing it, must not be considered as having consented. What was ruled in Marsh v. Fulton County, therefore, does not touch this case. Nor was there anything decided in Clearwater v. Meredith which sustains in any degree the defence set up on behalf of the defendants.
We have, then, in brief, this case: The people of Putnam County, in pursuance of law, voted a county subscription for stock in a railroad company, to be paid for with county bonds. The financial agents of the county agreed to make the subscription, and the company accepted it. The bonds were made payable to the company, or bearer, but before they were delivered, the company became consolidated with another, in pursuance of authority conferred by the law in force when the subscription was voted, and at the instance of the board of supervisors of the county. All the conditions precedent to the delivery of the bonds were complied with to the satisfaction of the county agents, certificates for the stock were received, and the bonds were delivered and sold. The plaintiff is a bonâ fide holder of some of the coupons for value paid. It would, we think, be a reproach to the administration of justice if he cannot enforce the payment of those coupons, and we see no principle of law or equity that stands in the way of his action. He found the bonds and the coupons upon the market, payable to the Kankakee and Illinois River Railroad Company, or bearer. Proposing to buy, he had only to inquire whether the county was, by law, authorized to issue them, and whether their issue had been approved by a popular vote. He was not bound to inquire farther, and had he inquired he would have found full authority for the issue, and if he had also known of the consolidation it would not have affected him.
JUDGMENT REVERSED, and the cause remitted with instructions to
OVERRULE THE DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice DAVIS and Mr. Justice MILLER.
NOTES
[*] 11 B. Monroe, 143.
[*] 37 English Law and Equity, 398.
[*] 3 Hurlstone & Norman, 686.
[] 7 Porter (Indiana), 369.
[] 21 Indiana, 299; see also Hanna v. Cincinnati, 20 Id. 30.
[§] 28 Connecticut, 289; see also Schenectady and Saratoga Plankroad Co. v. Thatcher, 1 Kernan, 102; Buffalo and New York City Railroad Co. v. Dudley, 4 Id. 336; Meadow Dam v. Gray, 30 Maine, 547; Agricultural Branch Railroad Co. v. Winchester, 13 Allen, 32; Noyes v. Spaulding, 27 Vermont, 420; Pacific Railroad Co. v. Renshaw, 18 Missouri, 210; Fry v. Lexington, 2 Metcalfe, 314; Illinois River Railroad Co. v. Beers, 27 Illinois. 189; Terre Haute and Alton Railroad Co. v. Earp, 21 Id. 292.