September 29 2009
DA 07-0751
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2009 MT 321
JAYDON PAULL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
PARK COUNTY, MONTANA, and
STATE OF MONTANA,
Defendants and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Park, Cause No. DV 06-86
Honorable Wm. Nels Swandal, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Courtney Jo Lawellin (argued), Walter Madden, Attorneys at Law,
Livingston, Montana
For Appellees:
Thomas G. Bowe (argued), Assistant Attorney General; Agency
Legal Services Bureau, Helena, Montana (for State of Montana)
Steven R. Milch (argued), Matthew S. Brahana (argued); Crowley,
Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, P.L.L.P., Billings, Montana (for Park
County, Montana)
Argued: January 14, 2009
Submitted: March 24, 2009
Decided: September 29, 2009
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 This is an appeal by Jaydon Paull from the November 26, 2007, order of the
District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Park County, granting summary judgment to
Park County and the State of Montana. We reverse.
¶2 Paull presents issues for review that we restate as follows:
¶3 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in holding that the County did not
have a duty to Paull concerning his transport as a prisoner from Florida to Montana to
respond to a probation revocation.
¶4 Issue Two: Whether the District Court erred in holding that the State did not have
a duty to Paull concerning his transport as a prisoner from Florida to Montana to
respond to a probation revocation.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶5 Paull received a deferred sentence for burglary and theft in 2000 from the Sixth
Judicial District Court, Park County, and was placed on probation. He failed to report to
his probation officer and traveled to Florida without permission. In 2001 the State
commenced probation revocation proceedings and transported Paull from Florida to
Montana using a private prisoner transportation service called Extraditions International.
When Paull arrived in Park County he complained to the Sheriff that the trip from Florida
had been “torture” and that he had been poorly treated.
¶6 The result of the 2001 probation revocation proceeding was that Paull was
sentenced to the Montana Department of Corrections for six years, all suspended, and
2
was placed on probation under the supervision of the Adult Probation and Parole
Division of the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC). Paull obtained permission
from Montana Adult Probation and Parole to move to Florida, where he was subject to
supervision by probation officials of the State of Florida pursuant to the Interstate
Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, § 46-23-1115, MCA.
¶7 In December 2002, Paull’s Florida probation officer informed Montana Adult
Probation and Parole that Paull had violated the conditions of his probation. Based upon
this report, the Montana DOC prepared a report of violation, a recommendation that
Paull’s probation be revoked, and a request that a warrant issue for his arrest. The DOC
report was sent to the Park County Attorney, who prepared and filed a petition in the
District Court to revoke Paull’s probation. The District Court issued a warrant for Paull’s
arrest, and it was executed by authorities in Florida in February, 2003. Paull was held in
custody without bond “for Montana” by Florida authorities.
¶8 The Park County Sheriff’s office then became involved in arranging to transport
Paull to Montana. The Sheriff’s office contacted a private prisoner transportation service
called American Extraditions (AEI), a successor to Extraditions International that had
transported Paull to Montana in 2001. After receiving a price quote for the trip, the
Sheriff’s office followed required State procedure and contacted the Montana Governor’s
office to obtain approval of the expenditure.
¶9 The State of Montana maintains a Prisoner Transportation Fund to reimburse
counties for the costs of transporting prisoners. Beginning in 1993, Gov. Marc Racicot,
as a cost-cutting measure, required that counties obtain prior approval for the use of state
3
prisoner transportation funds. A letter from the Governor announcing this policy
cautioned that only prisoners charged with more serious offenses and with higher bonds
should be considered for interstate transportation. The policy encouraged the use of
private prisoner transportation services for long-distance interstate transport.
¶10 AEI employees picked up Paull from Florida authorities in February, 2003. He
was shackled at the wrists and ankles and placed in a large passenger van with other
prisoners. The van had two uniformed drivers employed by AEI, who were in charge of
the prisoners during the nine-day trip from Florida to Montana. The van was equipped
with a divider between the prisoners and the drivers that allowed the drivers to observe
the prisoners. The prisoners were shackled but the van did not have seatbelts and did not
have toilet facilities for their use.
¶11 Paull’s complaint alleged that he and the other prisoners were mistreated during
the trip primarily by being denied sufficient toilet stops. He alleges that the drivers
would stop to relieve themselves, but would not allow the prisoners to do so, and that this
resulted in the prisoners defecating and urinating on themselves and in the van during the
trip.
¶12 On March 5, 2003, the van was on the interstate highway near Dillon, Montana.
Paull’s complaint alleges that the prisoners had not been provided a bathroom break in
many hours, and that the drivers had told them to urinate into plastic cups or water
bottles. Paull alleges that as the prisoners were urinating into plastic containers the AEI
driver was watching them and laughing, while swerving the van trying to cause them to
spill urine on themselves. In so doing, the driver lost control of the van and it rolled
4
several times, coming to rest on its top. The other AEI driver was killed in the accident
and Paull alleges that he was injured.
¶13 AEI had no insurance and dissolved after the accident, leaving persons with claims
with no practical recourse against AEI for loss or injury. Taking at face value the
defendants’ assertions that they had no knowledge of AEI’s practices, it is clear that
neither undertook to ascertain whether AEI had a safe operation, whether AEI was
bonded or insured, or whether AEI adhered to minimum standards for the care and
custody of prisoners. Both the State and the County adamantly disclaim any control,
oversight, or even knowledge of the practices and procedures of AEI. AEI was therefore
left entirely to its own devices, at least as far as the State and County were concerned.
¶14 Paull brought suit against Park County and the State, alleging that they were
responsible for his injuries. The County and State answered and moved for summary
judgment. After allowing Paull a period in which to conduct discovery and after briefing
and oral argument, the District Court granted summary judgment to the County and State.
Paull appeals.
¶15 The County and the State each argued below that they owed no actionable duty to
Paull because his injuries were inflicted by AEI or its employees. The State contended
that it had no connection to AEI and that neither AEI nor the County was its agent in
transporting Paull. The County made similar arguments, and further contended that it
owed no duty to Paull because it was not foreseeable that injury to him might result from
hiring AEI and seeking approval of the transportation costs.
5
¶16 The District Court held that the State owed no duty to Paull because it did not have
any contractual or agency relationship with AEI. As to the County, the District Court
held that a contractor-independent contractor relationship existed between the County and
AEI, and therefore the County had no duty either.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶17 We review a district court’s rulings on summary judgment de novo, applying the
same criteria as the district court under M. R. Civ. P. 56. Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow
County, 2000 MT 112, ¶ 11, 299 Mont. 389, 1 P.3d 348.
DISCUSSION
¶18 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in holding that the County did not
have a duty to Paull concerning his transport from Florida to Montana to respond to a
probation revocation.
¶19 In Beckman the plaintiff was employed by a company that was excavating and
constructing a water pipe line for Butte-Silver Bow County. Beckman was injured when
the trench where he was working collapsed. Beckman sued the County, which contended
that it was not liable for Beckman’s injuries under the general rule that contractors are not
liable for torts of their independent contractors. This Court noted that there are
exceptions to the general rule, which include (1) where there is a nondelegable duty
based on a contract; (2) where the activity is inherently or intrinsically dangerous; and (3)
where the general contractor negligently exercises a reserved right of control over a
subcontractor’s work. Beckman, ¶ 12.
6
¶20 The primary issue in Beckman was whether the work was inherently dangerous so
as to come within the second exception to the general rule, applying §§ 416 and 427 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Those sections allow a general contractor to be liable
for the acts or omissions of an independent contractor when the work involves a “peculiar
risk of harm” or a “special danger to others.” This Court held that contractors are not
liable for every tort by an independent subcontractor engaged in such inherently
dangerous work, but only those “torts which arise from the unreasonable risks caused by
engaging in that activity.” Beckman, ¶ 22. We abandoned distinctions made in earlier
cases based upon whether dangers could be avoided by standard precautions or required
special precautions. Instead, we adopted a rule that a contractor “is vicariously liable for
injuries to others caused by a subcontractor’s failure to take precautions to reduce the
unreasonable risks associated with engaging in an inherently dangerous activity.” We
concluded that trenching operations are inherently dangerous as a matter of law.
Beckman, ¶ 24. Therefore, Butte-Silver Bow County could be liable for torts committed
by its independent contractor.
¶21 Other activities have been considered under Montana law and held to be inherently
dangerous. Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 12 P.2d 856 (1932) (highway
construction); Stepanek v. Kober, 191 Mont. 430, 625 P.2d 51 (1981) (construction
scaffolding); Cash v. Otis Elevator, 210 Mont. 319, 684 P.2d 1041 (1984) (elevators);
Brewer v. Ski Lift, 234 Mont. 109, 762 P.2d 226 (1988) (skiing); McMillan v. U.S., 112
F.3d. 1040 (9th Cir. 1997) (felling snag trees, applying Montana law); Oberson v. U.S.,
2007 MT 293, 339 Mont. 519, 171 P.3d 715 (snowmobiling). Whether an activity is
7
inherently dangerous is a question of law. Fabich v. PPL Montana, 2007 MT 258, ¶ 32,
339 Mont. 289, 170 P.3d 943.
¶22 The first step in applying this law to the County is determining whether it was in a
contractor-independent contractor relationship with AEI. 1 The County does not contest
the District Court’s determination that there was a contractual relationship between it and
AEI. Rather, the County argues that none of the Beckman exceptions applies and
therefore it is not vicariously liable for any torts of AEI. The District Court so held,
concluding that the activity undertaken by AEI was “driving” and that driving is a
common activity which is not inherently dangerous. We disagree and hold that the
transportation of prisoners is more than just driving and is an inherently dangerous
activity. Therefore, under Beckman, a county or other governmental entity that contracts
to have prisoners transported may be held vicariously liable for injuries caused by an
independent contractor that provides prisoner transport services. Any such claim must
still be established under the ordinary rules of negligence, requiring proof of the existence
of a legal duty, breach of duty, causation and damages, on the part of the contractor.
Causenbary v. Mortensen, 1999 MT 221, ¶ 21, 296 Mont. 25, 987 P.2d 351.
1
None of the parties on appeal discusses why the County was responsible for arranging
transportation of Paull from Florida to Montana. The County Sheriff did not execute the
District Court’s arrest warrant, the law enforcement authorities in Florida did, and the
warrant itself was not made part of the record on appeal. There are statutes that provide
for reimbursement to sheriffs for conveying persons to a “magistrate or to a detention
center” (§ 7-32-2143, MCA) and for reimbursement of expenses incurred in returning
fugitives apprehended outside the county (§ 7-32-2145, MCA). Neither of these statutes
places an express duty on a sheriff to assume responsibility of bringing a State prisoner to
Montana from another state. The County nonetheless assumed the responsibility for
Paull’s transport from Florida, and since no party raised the issue of whether the County
was in fact legally responsible we will not address it further.
8
¶23 We reach this conclusion because there are multiple dangers inherent in prisoner
transportation that separate it from ordinary driving. The transportation of prisoners is,
by its nature, a unique and inherently dangerous activity. The risks arising from that
activity apply not only to the prisoners and transport employees but to the public at large.
The most obvious danger is that those being transported are often persons charged with or
convicted of serious criminal offenses. The 1993 policy by Gov. Racicot expressly
directed that the counties transporting prisoners should choose to transport prisoners with
prior criminal records, more serious offenses, and higher bonds. The policy also
encouraged counties to select private contractors for interstate transport services. The
policy therefore expressly promotes situations in which private non-law enforcement
contractors will be transporting serious offenders across the country. This is not ordinary
driving.
¶24 When such prisoners are transported, especially over long distances over multiple
days that require at least some stops along the way, security concerns make even food
and bathroom stops potentially dangerous events. Prisoner escape is clearly always a
concern and danger. See State v. Savaria, 245 Mont. 224, 800 P.2d 696 (1990) (escape
during transport to a court appearance). Prisoners who escape or attempt to escape
during transport present an inherent danger to themselves, to the guards or others charged
with securing them, and to the public. The County notes that there are Federal
regulations, found at 28 C.F.R. pt. 97 (2008), setting standards for “private companies
that transport violent prisoners on behalf of State and local jurisdictions.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 97.1. The regulations apply only to the transportation of violent prisoners, and set
9
minimum standards for such things as employee training and background checks, driving
times, uniforms and identification. The regulations also specify mandatory restraints for
prisoners (28 C.F.R. § 97.17); notification of local law enforcement 24 hours in advance
of any scheduled stops (28 C.F.R. § 97.18); immediate notification of local law
enforcement if there is an escape (28 C.F.R. § 97.190); and adoption of policies to protect
the health and physical safety of the prisoners (28 C.F.R. § 97.20). The regulations
expressly do not pre-empt any applicable state or local regulations (28 C.F.R. § 97.22).
The federal regulations serve to enforce the conclusion that interstate prisoner
transportation is an inherently dangerous activity.
¶25 When long-distance interstate transportation of prisoners is undertaken, it presents
even higher dangers. In Paull’s case the transported prisoners were restrained with wrist
and ankle shackles and were confined in the van behind a partition that separated them
from the drivers. There was no toilet facility in the van and the complaint alleges that
few toilet breaks were provided. It should come as no surprise that prisoners confined in
squalid and painful conditions, as alleged in this case, would be more likely to become
aggressive and hostile and more likely to attempt escape or engage in other dangerous
activities than if they were treated humanely and were transported expeditiously. Paull’s
trip from Florida to Montana took nine days, getting only as far as the Dillon area before
the accident happened.
¶26 The complaint alleges that AEI provided staff who failed to provide for the basic
physical needs of the prisoners during the trip. Perhaps most importantly, AEI provided
staff who, as alleged in the complaint, built upon that failure by purposely driving in a
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dangerous and erratic manner precisely because there were disgruntled prisoners in the
back of the van. While the defendants describe the accident as resulting from the driver
swerving, the complaint alleges that the driver was taunting the prisoners by deliberately
swerving the van in an attempt to cause them to spill urine on themselves. This alleged
behavior, which at this point has not been proven or disproven, led to death and injury.
¶27 Law enforcement agencies have complex hiring processes with the goal of
selecting well-qualified personnel who are then trained for activities such as prisoner
transport. Law enforcement administrators understand the dangers posed to the public, to
law enforcement personnel and to those in custody by inadequate hiring, training and
supervision of officers. When a similar level of care is not applied to law enforcement
related activities like interstate prisoner transportation, tragic events such as the crash in
this case can occur.
¶28 The conduct of the AEI driver that allegedly led to the crash was not some kind of
innocent “horseplay.” The misconduct alleged by Paull arose because the van was
transporting prisoners on an extended interstate trip, and because those prisoners were
complaining to the driver about the conditions under which they were being held. This
aspect of the event is therefore a result of the inherent risk of the enterprise of prisoner
transportation.
¶29 Long distance prisoner transportation, like the trenching in Beckman, is an
inherently dangerous activity as a matter of law. Here, while the injury to the plaintiff
did not occur as a result of the typical unreasonable or unique risks inherent in prisoner
transport—such as attempted escape or assault by prisoners—it arguably occurred in this
11
case as a result of the failure of the State or the County to take any precaution whatsoever
to provide for the safe and humane transport of the prisoners. Furthermore, as alleged in
the complaint, the accident occurred because prisoners were being transported in
unacceptable conditions. It was foreseeable that those alleged conditions could have
caused unrest among the prisoners, conflicts with the guard drivers and a crash of the
van. It was foreseeable because, in this situation, unlike other activities previously
deemed inherently dangerous (e.g., trenching, scaffolding, log transport) there are two
factions of persons--captors and captives--confined in a small uncomfortable space that
can foster mutual animosity one toward the other. In such a potentially hostile
environment, it is foreseeable that an action by one group can trigger a quick and
potentially dangerous reaction from the other. The mix of these potentially antagonistic
forces is a material factor that makes prisoner transport inherently dangerous.
¶30 We affirm our holding in Beckman that a contractor is not liable for every tort by
an independent subcontractor engaged in inherently dangerous work, but only those torts
which arise from risks caused by engaging in such dangerous activity. Considering the
singular circumstances of this case, we conclude that the risk of driver misconduct was an
inherent danger in the transportation of prisoners, which is inherently dangerous work,
and that it is a part of the peculiar risk of harm which arose from engaging in that
activity. See Beckman, ¶ 22. Thus, the tortious conduct alleged by Paull falls within an
exception to the rule that a contractor may not be held liable for the torts of an
independent subcontractor. Under Beckman, the County may therefore be subject to
vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of its contractor, AEI.
12
¶31 Issue Two: Whether the District Court erred in holding that the State did not have
a duty to Paull concerning his transport as a prisoner from Florida to Montana to
respond to a probation revocation.
¶32 The situation of the State in this case is different. Paull alleges negligence and
asserts an agency relationship. The State emphasizes that there was no direct contact
between it and AEI. Under the facts as alleged and presented to the District Court in the
summary judgment proceedings, the State’s connection to AEI was to constrain and
approve the County’s selection of AEI and to agree to reimburse the County for the cost.
However, AEI, a private enterprise that no longer exists, had no independent authority to
confine Paull and transport him in shackles from Florida to Montana absent authority
from the State of Montana to do so. When Paull was arrested in Florida and held “for
Montana,” the power and responsibility to confine and transport him arose from the State
of Montana. Without some actual or apparent authority derived from the State, AEI had
no basis for shackling Paull, confining him, and transporting him across the country.
¶33 The District Court considered but rejected Paull’s argument that the State had a
duty to transport him safely and humanely. Paull asserted, for example in his
Prediscovery Disclosures filed in the District Court on June 19, 2007, that the State could
not avoid the consequences of that duty by delegating responsibility for transporting him
to the County or AEI. The State concedes that it owes a duty of ordinary care to
prisoners in its actual custody. We disagree that the State’s duty ends when the prisoners
are not in the State’s actual custody. Paull was a person convicted by and sentenced under
the authority of the State of Montana. He was granted probationary status and ordered to
13
live under a set of restrictions imposed by the State District Court, and was supervised by
State employees. He was required to obtain permission from the State of Montana to
travel to Florida. When Florida authorities informed the State that Paull had violated
conditions of probation, the State of Montana commenced a proceeding to revoke his
probation and to have him arrested by Florida authorities. The purpose of bringing Paull
back from Florida was a probation revocation proceeding in State court, the
consequences of which could be to either extend the State’s supervision over him or
incarcerate him in the State prison.
¶34 When Paull was in Florida he was supervised on probation by Florida authorities
pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. Section 46-23-1115,
MCA. The purpose of the Compact is to promote public safety, protect rights of victims
through control and regulation of interstate movement of offenders, to provide for the
supervision of offenders in the member states, and “to equitably distribute the costs,
benefits and obligations of the compact among the compacting states.” Section 46-23-
1115, Article I(2), MCA. The Compact also provides:
The states entering into this compact recognize that they are
responsible for the supervision of offenders who are authorized pursuant to
this compact to travel across state lines to and from the compacting states,
and that the compacting states are responsible for tracking the location of
offenders, transferring supervision authority in an orderly and efficient
manner, and when necessary, returning an offender to the originating
jurisdiction.
Section 46-23-1115, Article I(1), MCA. This subsection of the Compact, which is part of
Montana law, recognizes the State’s responsibility for its probationers, and for returning
offenders when necessary. Moreover, officers of this State may enter another state at any
14
time to apprehend an offender under supervision there. Section 46-23-1115, Article I(4),
MCA.
¶35 Probation is an “act of grace” by the sentencing court, State v. Boulton, 2006 MT
170, ¶ 15, 332 Mont. 538, 140 P.3d 482, that results in a “form of contract” between the
sentencing court and the probationer. State v. Burke, 235 Mont. 165, 171, 766 P.2d 254,
257 (1988). Like incarceration, probation is a restrictive criminal sanction that represents
one point on a continuum of possible punishments. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
874, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3168-69 (1987). Restrictions placed on probationers are imposed
to insure that probation is a period of rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed
by the probationer’s being at large. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875, 107 S. Ct. at 3169.
Probation is a status of conditional liberty depending upon adherence to the state’s
special restrictions and conditions. State v. Boston, 269 Mont. 300, 305, 889 P.2d 814,
816 (1994). The State’s probation supervision system assumes that probationers are
more likely than average to commit crimes in the community. State v. Moody, 2006 MT
305, ¶ 20, 334 Mont. 517, 148 P.3d 662. Contrary to the State’s argument, its
involvement was much more significant than merely approving funds to pay for the
transportation costs.
¶36 For these reasons Paull was in a continuing relationship with the State of Montana
during the time it chose to return him from Florida to face proceedings in the courts of
this State. It was the State that wanted Paull returned to Montana to answer to its
process. Paull was under State authority and supervision. It was the State that caused
him to be arrested in Florida and to be held “for Montana.” Paull was Montana’s
15
prisoner at least from the time he was picked up by AEI from the arresting law
enforcement authorities in Florida. No contractor-independent contractor relationship
between the State and AEI is alleged or shown in the record. AEI was acting as the
State’s agent in transporting Paull.
¶37 Florida authorities surrendered Paull to the officers of AEI, who under the
allegations of the complaint operated as agents of the State of Montana, for whom Florida
was holding the prisoner. The Restatement (Second) Agency provides for liability by a
principal who has a duty to protect another from harm caused by its agent.
A master or other principal who is under a duty to provide protection for or
to have care used to protect others or their property and who confides the
performance of such duty to a servant or other person is subject to liability
to such others from harm caused to them by the failure of such agent to
perform the duty.
Restatement (Second) Agency, § 214. We adopt Restatement (Second) Agency, § 214,
as an appropriate statement of the law in Montana.
¶38 We hold that the State had a duty to exercise ordinary care in returning Paull to
Montana to answer its probation revocation proceeding. This does not mean that the
State may not use a private contractor or other means to transport prisoners like Paull. It
does not mean that the State is strictly liable for any injury that results from prisoner
transportation regardless of fault. It does mean, however, that if the State chooses to
transport prisoners by allowing other entities to do the work, it may be held liable for the
tortious acts or omissions of its agents undertaking the transportation. See Nazareth v.
Herndon Ambulance Service, 467 So.2d 1076 (Fla. App. 1985).
16
¶39 Whether there were acts or omissions of AEI that caused injury to Paull for which
the State or County may be liable will have to be determined by further proceedings in
the District Court. For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the District Court’s
decision to grant summary judgment for the defendants and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
________________________________
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
Justice James C. Nelson concurs.
¶40 I agree that prisoner transport is inherently dangerous for the reasons set forth in
¶¶ 23-25 of the Court’s Opinion. Importantly, this activity is made all the more
dangerous when the government which retains the transporter fails its duty of due
diligence to investigate the contractor before hiring. This duty of due diligence, in my
view, encompasses the government’s obligation to make sure that the contractor is
insured, operates in compliance with applicable federal and state laws and rules, has a
good service record, and utilizes employees who are competent, trained and
professional—employees who are not burdened with personality traits or mental deficits
that predispose them to cruelty and torture. The government, in fulfilling its own duty to
transport prisoners, must not be permitted to hire any fly-by-night or otherwise
17
unqualified contractor for that purpose. Absolving the government from liability for
doing so almost guarantees that, at some point, a prisoner or an innocent member of the
public will be injured or killed by the incompetence, gross neglect or misconduct of the
contractor and its employees in discharging their duties.
¶41 I cannot agree that, in this case, we are dealing with a simple automobile accident
for which there was no fault or for which simple negligence was the cause. Nor do I
agree that we are dealing with an accident caused by horseplay, however it might be
characterized. Rather, this case involves a contractor whose employees, arguably,
intentionally tortured the prisoners in their custody and care. It is alleged that the AEI
guards, over an extended cross-country trip, refused to provide their charges with basic
needs including adequate bathroom breaks. It is also alleged that the driver of AEI’s
transporting vehicle intentionally swerved the vehicle so as to cause the prisoners to spill
urine on themselves when they were forced by their guards to relieve themselves in
whatever containers happened to be available in the back of the van. Opinion, ¶¶ 25-26.
That the tragic crash (which resulted in fatal and non-fatal injuries) occurred as an
apparent consequence of the van driver’s torturous conduct, removes this case from the
realm of negligence and horseplay.
¶42 If the facts of this case are as alleged, then the conduct of AEI’s employees was
little different than the treatment that some prisoners of war have been subjected to over
the last decade. If, as a civilized society, we reject the torture of prisoners of war, then
most certainly we should reject the torture of prisoners who are placed in custody as a
result of the criminal processes of this State. Montana prisoners retain their right to
18
human dignity1 once taken into custody under the authority and power of the State. The
State and its governmental subdivisions must be held to a high standard in dealing with
Montana prisoners. Indeed, in Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d
872 (a prisoner rights case), we determined that the dignity clause provided Montana
prisoners with greater protection from government intrusion than does the United States
Constitution. For example, we stated in Walker: “[T]reatment which degrades or
demeans persons, that is, treatment which deliberately reduces the value of persons, and
which fails to acknowledge their worth as persons, directly violates their dignity.”
Walker, ¶ 81 (quoting Mathew O. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the
Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution’s “Dignity” Clause with Possible
Applications, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 301, 307 (Summer 2000)). We also determined in Walker
that “[t]he plain meaning of the dignity clause commands that the intrinsic worth and the
basic humanity of persons may not be violated.” Walker, ¶ 82. The right of dignity is the
only “inviolable” right in the Montana Constitution. The right is self-executing and is
absolute. The government must not be permitted to blithely wash its hands of its failure
to perform a due-diligence investigation of a prisoner-transport contractor before
retaining it for the inherently dangerous task of inter-state prisoner transport. Here, the
State and County cannot simply disavow the allegedly appalling treatment of a Montana
prisoner under circumstances which the State and County set in motion when it hired AEI
with little or no prior due-diligence investigation.
1
A right guaranteed under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution (“The
dignity of the human being is inviolable.”).
19
¶43 I concur.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
Justice Jim Rice, dissenting.
¶44 The Court’s opinion today results from a fundamental misunderstanding or
misapplication of the “inherently dangerous” activity exception. The opinion disturbs
well-settled principles of tort law, has no foundational authority for its conclusions, and
simply defies logic. Moreover, with regard to the State, the Court sees fit to redraft the
plaintiff’s complaint to address issues neither raised nor addressed in either the District
Court or before this Court. Such disregard of the appellate rules should not be
countenanced. I dissent, and would affirm the judgment entered by the District Court in
favor of the County and the State.
¶45 I. Vicarious Liability of the County for “Inherently Dangerous” Activities
¶46 The Court declares that “the transportation of prisoners is . . . an inherently
dangerous activity.” Opinion, ¶ 22. The Court makes this pronouncement without citing
any precedential authority. This is so because there is none. The Court’s decision not
only disregards settled principles of Montana law based upon the Restatement, but is in
conflict with every other jurisdiction which has considered this issue. As a consequence,
Montana now becomes the first and only state in the United States to impose vicarious
liability for the activity of human transport. And, disconcertingly, the Court’s broad
expansion of the exception is done without any clear test for determining whether an
20
activity is inherently dangerous. This dissent will attempt to succinctly point out the
Court’s analytical errors.
¶47 The “Inherently Dangerous” Activity Exception
¶48 It is well-established that employers are generally not liable for the torts of their
independent contractors. Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow Co., 2000 MT 112, ¶ 12, 299
Mont. 389, 1 P.3d 348 (citations omitted). However, employers may be liable for the
intentional or negligent actions of an independent contractor if the activity is inherently
or intrinsically dangerous. Beckman, ¶ 12. This is so because the employer is aware, at
the time of contracting, of the dangers which are “inherent” in the work, and the law
therefore requires him to oversee implementation of “special precautions” necessary to
“protect workers from the unreasonable, extraordinary, and unusual risks associated
with” an inherently dangerous activity. Beckman, ¶ 15-26; Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 416 cmt. a (1965). Critically, the “inherently dangerous” exception applies only when
the work itself is dangerous when skillfully performed. The Court’s decision to the
contrary—that work can be considered “dangerous” by assuming it will be negligently
performed—is contrary to the purpose of the exception and the reasons underlying the
rule.
¶49 The “inherently dangerous” exception (coined “intrinsically dangerous”) was first
recognized in Montana in Shope v. City of Billings, 85 Mont. 302, 309, 278 P. 826, 828
(1929) (citing Dillon on Municipal Corporations vol. 4, § 1722 (5th ed.); 43 C.J. 947). In
Shope, the defendant, an independent contractor hired by the city to install a metal oil
tank, negligently permitted a cable to sag across a street while he attempted to hoist and
21
set the tank. The plaintiff, driving on the same street, struck the cable and was seriously
injured. The Court, recognizing the “inherently dangerous” activity exception, stated that
the “rule that the municipality is not liable for the negligence or wrongful acts of a
contractor in the execution of the work agreed to be performed ‘does not apply where the
contract directly requires the performance of a work intrinsically dangerous, however
skillfully performed.’” Shope, 85 Mont. at 309, 278 P. at 828 (emphasis added, citations
omitted). However, the case ultimately turned on a critical distinction. The Court found
that the City of Billings was not vicariously liable because the plaintiff’s injury was
entirely the result of the independent contractor’s negligent performance of the work.
Shope, 85 Mont. at 309-10, 278 P. at 828.
¶50 This Court further explained that important distinction in the inherently dangerous
context in Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 345-48, 12 P.2d 856, 859-60 (1932), a
highway construction personal injury case. In Ulmen, the plaintiff sustained serious
injury when she drove into an open excavation and against a concrete culvert. Ulmen, 92
Mont. at 342-43, 12 P.2d at 857-58. The Ulmen Court held the employing party liable for
failing to oversee that special precautions were in place, given the “inherently dangerous
and hazardous” nature of the activity. The Court again recognized the “obvious
difference” between this case and one where “committing work to a contractor to be
executed, from which, if properly done, no injurious consequences can arise . . . .”
Ulmen, 92 Mont. at 348, 12 P.2d at 860 (emphasis added) (citing Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B.
321, 326 (1876)).
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¶51 Thus, from the beginning of our jurisprudence, the critical component of the
inherently dangerous exception has been clear: that a task can be deemed “inherently” or
“intrinsically” dangerous where the danger cannot be alleviated by the skillful
performance of the task. Negligent performance of a task does not turn it into an
inherently dangerous task. See Chainani by Chainani v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 663
N.E.2d 283, 287 (N.Y. 1995) (“the activity involved is ‘dangerous in spite of all
reasonable care’” (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts
§ 71, at 513 (5th ed., West 1984)). Thus, the reliance by the Court and the Concurrence
upon the sadistic misconduct of the van driver to find that transport activity is “inherently
dangerous” is clearly flawed.
¶52 The exception has only been applied to “cases of demolition, excavation, and other
clearly dangerous activities.” Arthur v. Holy Rosary Credit Union, 656 A.2d 830, 832
(N.H. 1995) (citing Carr v. Merrimack Farmers Exch., 146 A.2d 276, 279 (1958)); see
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 71, 512-16 (5th ed.,
West 1984) (identifying inherently dangerous activities as: excavation, construction,
blasting, fireworks, crop dusting, the clearing of land by fire, tearing down high walls or
chimneys, the construction of a dam) (collecting cases); Waite v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 73 F.
Supp. 2d 349, 357 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“inherently dangerous activities typically
include: blasting, pile driving, certain types of excavations, fumigation of buildings with
dangerous gasses such as cyanide, the emission of noxious gasses into densely populated
areas, and the collection of large quantities of explosives or inflammable liquids in a
populous area”) (citations omitted); Chainani, 663 N.E.2d at 287 (“[f]amiliar examples of
23
inherently dangerous activities are blasting, certain types of construction and working
with high tension electric wires”).
¶53 These cases of construction, demolition, excavation, noxious gasses, inflammable
liquids and high tension electric wires logically define these rules because they are
inherently dangerous even if skillfully performed, the employer knows of the dangers at
the time of contracting, and special precautions are required to reduce those certain
dangers. Courts, including this Court, have consistently applied the “inherently
dangerous” activity exception to some form of construction, destruction or volatile
instrumentality. Thus, in Beckman, the Court held that trenching was inherently
dangerous as a matter of law, given that “requiring workers to enter a trench where they
could be buried if a cave-in resulted, requires special precautions.” Beckman, ¶ 25;
Fabich v. PPL Montana, LLC, 2007 MT 258, ¶ 36, 339 Mont. 289, 170 P.3d 943.
¶54 Further, we have been careful to point out that §§ 416 and 427 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts are exceptions to “the general rule that employers are not liable for the
torts of their independent contractors,” and as such should be applied “narrowly.”
Beckman, ¶ 25. Consequently, in both Cunnington and Fabich we held that scaffolding
work was not inherently dangerous, reiterating the Beckman rule that “[a]n inherently
dangerous activity is one, like large-scale trenching, that requires ‘special precautions’ to
prevent injury or death.” Cunnington v. Gaub, 2007 MT 12, ¶ 16, 335 Mont. 296, 153
P.3d 1; see Fabich, ¶ 36.
¶55 Applying these principles, courts have refused to expand this narrow exception to
a broader range of activities, including the transport of humans. The New York Court of
24
Appeals declined to extend the exception to “the activity of transporting children by bus
to and from school.” Chainani, 663 N.E.2d at 287-88. The Chainani Court discussed the
“inherently dangerous” jurisprudence and its application to such dangerous activities of
“blasting, certain types of construction and working with high tension electric wires.”
Chainani, 663 N.E.2d at 287 (citations omitted). In rejecting the argument that the
transportation of school children was inherently dangerous, the court reasoned that,
“[d]emanding though it may be, the activity of transporting children by bus to and from
school—successfully accomplished countless times daily—does not involve that sort of
inherent risk for the nonnegligent driver and is simply not an inherently dangerous
activity so as to trigger vicarious liability.” Chainani, 663 N.E.2d at 287. The New York
Court’s refusal to extend the exception to an activity whose dangerousness is dependent
upon the vagaries of human behavior should give the Court concern about its ruling here.
¶56 The Requirement of Advance Notice of the Danger
¶57 In addition to being inherently dangerous, the exception requires the employer to
be aware of the inherent dangers at the time of contracting. The crux of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, §§ 416 and 427, is “that the risk or danger must be ‘recognizable in
advance,’ i.e., at the time the contract is made, for the doctrine to be invoked.” Bosak v.
Hutchinson, 375 N.W.2d 333, 340 (Mich. 1985) (citations omitted). “Stated another
way, the inherently dangerous exception cannot be applied unless a risk inherent in the
nature of the procedures is apparent or contemplated by the employer.” Rosenberg v. Eq.
Life Assurance Socy. of U.S., 595 N.E.2d 840, 844 (1992); see also McDonald v. Shell
Oil Co., 228 N.E.2d 899, 901-02 (N.Y. 1967); McCall v. Ala. Bruno’s, Inc., 647 So.2d
25
175, 177-79, and n. 12 (Fla. 1994) (“It is sufficient that work of any kind involves a risk,
recognizable in advance, of physical harm to others which is inherent in the work itself . .
. .”) (emphasis added, collecting cases); Arthur, 656 A.2d at 832 (“The inherent danger
doctrine applies only where the alleged danger is ‘naturally to be apprehended’ by the
defendant at the time it engages the independent contractor to perform the work.”)
(citations omitted).
¶58 Our cases have likewise recognized this concept. We said in Ulmen that “the
work was in fact inherently dangerous and hazardous to the public, and known to be so by
the contracting parties, unless properly guarded.” Ulmen, 92 Mont. at 347, 12 P.2d at
859 (emphasis added, citations omitted). Advance notice, of course, satisfies the concept
of foreseeability for purposes of imposing liability on the employer, and demonstrates
why an employer cannot be held liable for an independent contractor’s collateral
negligence in the performance of his duties, even if the activity is inherently dangerous—
precisely because the employer cannot foresee such collateral negligence, and cannot be
held liable for it. This principle undergirds the illustration we provided in Beckman of
which liabilities arising from an inherently dangerous activity could be vicariously
imposed upon the employer:
If a contractor is employed to transport giant logs over the highway, the
contractor’s employer is not liable for torts caused by the contractor driving
in excess of the speed limit. Speeding is not an unreasonable risk particular
to transporting logs, but is an ordinary form of negligence which is usual in
the community and the prevention of which requires ordinary or standard
precautions. However, an employer will be vicariously liable for the
contractor’s failure to take special precautions to anchor the logs to the
contractor’s truck. This is because transporting giant logs creates an
uncommon hazard that the logs will become disengaged, a hazard not
26
ordinarily encountered in the community which calls for particular
precautions to prevent its occurrence.
Beckman, ¶ 22 (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 cmt. d (1965)). The
employer is not liable for the negligence or recklessness of the independent contractor,
i.e., speeding or failing to inspect the brakes, because he was not aware of those dangers
at the time he contracted the work away. Beckman, ¶¶ 22-26. Employers cannot be
expected to know the unforeseeable negligent, reckless, wanton or intentional tortious
conduct of independent contractors at the time of contracting. Rather, the employer is
liable only for those torts which arise from the “peculiar” or “unreasonable risks” which
are “caused by” the dangerous activity, because he was aware of them when he
contracted away the work. Beckman, ¶ 22; see Shope, 85 Mont. at 309-10, 278 P. at 828;
Ulmen, 92 Mont. at 346-48, 12 P.2d at 859-60. Here, the Court requires an employer to
assume that an employee of its independent contractor will engage in misconduct and to
take special precautions to prevent that possibility.
¶59 Application of the Law to Paull’s Case
¶60 The Court today obliterates 80 years of our caselaw applying the exception,
beginning with Shope through Beckman and recently in Fabich, and rejects over 100
years of national jurisprudence, Bower, 1 Q.B. 321 (1876), including the rules of the
Restatement and the decisions of many courts who have considered this issue. Under
these authorities, the Court’s conclusion that the risk of driver misconduct is an inherent
danger arising from the enterprise of prisoner transportation for which the employer
should have known and taken precautions is simply untenable.
27
¶61 First, prisoner transportation does not involve construction, destruction or some
form of inherent volatile or dangerous instrumentality, like dynamite or trenching. It
involves control over human beings. It is axiomatic that the nature of dynamite is to
blow up, and that special precautions are necessary to evacuate people, protect workers,
etc. The nature of trenching is for the ground to collapse after giant holes have been dug
in the earth, and special precautions, like “sloping the banks of a trench, mechanically
shoring a trench bank, or using a trench box” are necessary. Beckman, ¶ 23. The Court
believes that the nature of a prisoner is that he will be “more likely to become aggressive
and hostile and more likely to attempt escape or engage in other dangerous activities.”
Opinion, ¶ 25. However, dynamite is not “more likely” to blow up; it just does. The
point is that human beings do not have an absolute nature that an employer can predict,
unlike dynamite. An employer should not be required to assume either that a prisoner
will act out or that the contractor’s employee will engage in sadistic horseplay.
¶62 Here, the County could not have possibly foreseen the driver’s alleged misconduct
toward the prisoners when it contracted with AEI. The Court faults the County for
knowing what it could not have possibly known—that AEI would employ a driver who
would engage in misconduct, or, in the words of the Concurrence, was “burdened with
personality traits or mental deficits that predispose [him] to cruelty and torture.”
Concurrence ¶ 1. There were no “special precautions” the County could have taken to
prevent what occurred in this case, except hiring a different contractor who did not
employ sadistic drivers—and this point underscores the error of the Court’s Opinion and
the Concurrence.
28
¶63 Paull could well have asserted other claims to properly hold the County
responsible. Paull could have asserted that the County negligently hired AEI as an
independent contractor. See Gurnsey v. Conklin Co., Inc., 230 Mont. 42, 751 P.2d 151
(1988); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 (1986). Indeed, this is the actual basis for
liability advocated by the Concurrence, that the County “fail[ed] its duty of due diligence
to investigate the contractor before hiring . . . to make sure that the contractor is insured,
operates in compliance with applicable federal and state laws and rules, has a good
service record, and utilizes employees who are competent, trained and professional.”
Concurrence, ¶ 1. The Concurrence thus makes out a negligent hiring claim on behalf of
Paull—but not a claim for vicarious liability.
¶64 Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the rollover accident at issue here occurred
because “the driver, Steven Mendoza, was laughing as he repeatedly turned the steering
wheel quickly to the left and to the right thereby causing the urine to spill out of the cups
and all over the prisoners [and] then failed to maintain his lane of travel, and drifted into
the median then overcorrected . . . .” There is nothing in the record to suggest that an
inherent risk of prisoner transport—i.e., attempted escape, assault by a prisoner on the
driver or another prisoner, or prisoner activity of any sort—caused or contributed to this
unfortunate accident. Under questioning during oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel
admitted the obvious—that the driver’s actions here did not constitute a risk which is
inherent in the transportation of prisoners. However, the Court closes its eyes to the
obvious in order to reach the result it desires.
29
¶65 The Court has greatly expanded vicarious liability, on no authority and little to no
guidance for future cases. In holding that prisoner transportation is inherently dangerous,
arguably any activity can now be inherently dangerous, as long as some dangerous
possibilities can be conjured up and “special precautions” imagined. This holding will
expose contracting employers to liability for virtually every negligent or intentional tort
committed by the independent contractor. The exception—once promised to be
“narrow”—has now swallowed the rule. Justice Gray’s special concurrence in Beckman,
warning that we not “allow the exceptions to swallow the general rule,” has now been
realized. Beckman, ¶ 46 (Gray, J., concurring). I would affirm the judgment for the
County.1
¶66 II. The Ostensible Agency Claim Against the State
¶67 I would also affirm summary judgment in favor of the State. The Court states that
“[t]he District Court considered but rejected Paull’s argument that the State had a duty to
transport him safely and humanely.” Opinion, ¶ 33. Not true. Paull not only failed to
1
Clear guidance for the dissent’s position is provided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§
416 and 427, used interchangeably, which stand for the proposition that “the employer remains
liable for injuries resulting from dangers which he should contemplate at the time that he enters
into the contract, and cannot shift to the contractor the responsibility for such dangers, or for
taking precautions against them.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 cmt. a. The Restatement
comments further explain that § 416 is more commonly applied “where the employer should
anticipate the need for some specific precaution, such as a railing around an excavation in a
sidewalk,” while “§ 427 is more commonly applied where the danger involved in the work calls
for a number of precautions, or involves a number of possible hazards, as in the case of blasting,
or painting carried on upon a scaffold above the highway.” Section 427 makes clear that the
employer who employs an independent contractor to complete work involving an inherent
danger to others “which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to
the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract,”
shall be liable for the harm caused by the independent contractor. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 427.
30
argue to the District Court, in either written or oral arguments, that the State had a non-
delegable duty, he, more importantly, did not allege it in his complaint. His complaint
did not mention either “duty” or “contract,” let alone state a claim that the State had
entered an independent contractor relationship with AEI creating contractual duties of the
State which should be declared non-delegable. The Court offers that the issue was
referenced in a discovery disclosure, but a discovery answer cannot preserve a claim or
theory not pled or otherwise presented to the district court.
¶68 “The general rule in Montana is that this Court will not address either an issue
raised for the first time on appeal or a party’s change in legal theory.” Unified Indus.,
Inc. v. Easley, 1998 MT 145, ¶ 15, 289 Mont. 255, 961 P.2d 100 (citing Day v. Payne,
280 Mont. 273, 276, 929 P.2d 864, 866 (1996)); see Akhtar v. Van de Wetering, 197
Mont. 205, 209, 642 P.2d 149, 152 (1982) (“[a]n issue which is presented for the first
time to the Supreme Court is untimely and cannot be considered on appeal”). This rule
“applies to both substantive and procedural matters, as well as to a change in a party’s
theory of the case.” Day, 280 Mont. at 276, 929 P.2d at 866. The Court in Day
explained the principle:
[I]t is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule
correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider.
Furthermore, it is unfair to allow a party to choose to remain silent in the
trial court in the face of error, taking a chance on a favorable outcome, and
subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the trial court is
unfavorable.
Day, 280 Mont. at 277, 929 P.2d at 866 (citing 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 690
(1995)).
31
¶69 The Montana cases regarding preservation of an issue for appellate review are
legion. See Spencer v. Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48 (1968) (Supreme Court
will consider for review only those questions raised in trial court); In re T.E., 2002 MT
195, ¶ 20, 311 Mont. 148, 54 P.3d 38 (the Court has consistently held that it will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal) (collecting cases); Anderson v.
Monforton, 2005 MT 310, ¶ 30, 329 Mont. 460, 125 P.3d 614 (“Since this argument is
raised for the first time on appeal, we do not address it.” (citing State v. Weaselboy, 1999
MT 274, ¶ 16, 296 Mont. 503, 989 P.2d 836)).
¶70 Paull’s failure to assert a claim that the State had a non-delegable duty arising out
of an independent contractor relationship with AEI deprived the State of its ability to
respond, deprived the District Court of its ability to consider the issue, and accordingly
failed to preserve such a claim for appeal. Apparently, the appellate rules are of no
consequence to the Court.
¶71 The Court has essentially rewritten the Plaintiff’s complaint to set forth a claim
against the State which the Plaintiff did not make for himself, a violation of long-held
tenets of appellate review. “[I]t is not this Court’s obligation to conduct legal research on
appellant’s behalf, to guess as to his precise position, or to develop legal analysis that
may lend support to his position.” Pankratz Farms, Inc. v. Pankratz, 2004 MT 180, ¶ 82,
322 Mont. 133, 95 P.3d 671 (quoting In re Estate of Bayers, 1999 MT 154, ¶ 19, 295
32
Mont. 89, 983 P.2d 339). By so doing, the Court violates its duty to be neutral and
impartial to all parties who appear before the Court.2
¶72 The Plaintiff’s claim against the State, to the extent the complaint’s intentions
could be discerned at all,3 was premised upon a vague agency theory, as set forth in a
single sentence: “the defendant Park County, Montana was acting as the agent for and on
behalf of and at the request of the State of Montana.” Even accepting arguendo that this
sufficiently pled a claim based upon agency, the Plaintiff nonetheless decided, on appeal,
to make a non-delegable duty argument instead, and failed to argue his agency theory in
his briefing to this Court. “A party may not raise new arguments or change its legal
theory on appeal because it is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to
rule on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider.” State v. Morrison, 2008
MT 16, ¶ 10, 341 Mont. 147, 176 P.3d 1027 (citations omitted). The Plaintiff ultimately
preserved no claim whatsoever against the State in this case. However, this is of no
import to the Court, which doesn’t even mention these issues, despite the explanation of
them given by the State’s counsel during oral argument. The message given here is that
rules of appellate review do not apply if the Court feels strongly enough about reaching
an issue. If necessary, the Court will even rewrite the plaintiff’s complaint to do so.
2
On appeal, the Plaintiff offers for the first time a non-delegable duty argument against the State,
premised upon a “special relationship” theory.
3
Defense counsel argued to the District Court that “we were trying to figure out [] what theory
the complaint made against the State of Montana . . . . It was a puzzle to look at that complaint
and try to find a connection between the allegations of the complaint and the conduct of the State
of Montana . . . .” Hrg. Transcr. 22:24–23:3 (Nov. 5, 2007).
33
¶73 Because I believe the Court’s decision to reach these issues is error, I will not
analyze at length the substance of the Court’s holding that AEI was an ostensible agent of
the State as to Paull. I only note that the Court’s ruling in this regard is made as a matter
of law, without regard to the factual issues that we have held must be resolved in order to
establish ostensible agency. “[O]ur ostensible agency statute focus[es] on the action or
inaction of the putative principal which caused the third person to believe an employment
relationship existed, and the reasonableness of the third person’s corresponding belief.”
Butler v. Domin, 2000 MT 312, ¶ 39, 302 Mont. 452, 15 P.3d 1189.
¶74 I would affirm the District Court’s judgment in favor of both the County and the
State. I dissent.
/S/ JIM RICE
Justice W. William Leaphart, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶75 I concur with the Court’s resolution of issue two. As to issue one, I concur with
the Court’s conclusion that the transportation of prisoners is an inherently dangerous
activity. Opinion, ¶ 22. To the extent that Justice Rice concludes that driver misconduct
is not, however, one of the dangers “inherent” in the transportation of prisoners, I agree
with his dissent.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
34
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