Bunch v. Lancair International, Inc.

February 3 2009

DA 08-0090

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2009 MT 29

PATRICIA M. BUNCH, individually and as personal representative of the ESTATE OF
JEFFREY BUNCH, and as legal guardian of PAYTON K. BUNCH, a minor,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

LANCAIR INTERNATIONAL, INC., an Oregon corporation; NEICO AVIATION, INC., an
Oregon corporation; LANCE A. NEIBAUER and JANE DOE NEIBAUER, husband and wife,
and the marital community composed thereof; ORIN RIDDELL and JANE DOE RIDDELL,
husband and wife, and the marital community composed thereof; TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL
MOTORS, INC., a Delaware corporation; DUKES, INC., a California corporation; and JOHN
DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Appellees.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. 2005-674
Honorable Mike Salvagni, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Monte D. Beck, Jory C. Ruggiero, Beck, Amsden & Ruggiero, PLLC,
Bozeman, Montana

Jeffrey D. Laveson, Carney Badley Spellman, P.S., Seattle, Washington

For Appellees Lancair International, Inc. and Neico Aviation, Inc.:

Steven W. Reida, Alexander L. Roots, Landoe, Brown, Planalp & Reida,
Bozeman, Montana

For Appellees Neibauer and Riddell:

John H. Tarlow, Margaret C. Weamer, Tarlow, Stonecipher & Steele,
PLLC, Bozeman, Montana
 For Appellees Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.:

Neil G. Westesen, Matthew F. McLean, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson,
Toole & Dietrich, P.L.L.P., Bozeman, Montana

For Appellee Dukes, Inc.:

Guy W. Rogers, Brown Law Firm, Bozeman, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: November 19, 2008

Decided: February 3, 2009

Filed:

__________________________________________
Clerk

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Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Patricia M. Bunch appeals the dismissal of her complaint in the Eighteenth

Judicial District Court against Lancair International, Inc. and Neico Aviation, Inc.

(collectively Lancair), Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc. (Teledyne), Lance and Jane

Doe Neibauer (Neibauers), and Orin and Jane Doe Riddell (Riddells). We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On September 17, 2002, Jeffrey Bunch, a licensed pilot, purchased a Lancair IV-P

aircraft from defendant Orin Riddell in San Diego, California. On November 5, 2002,

Jeffrey Bunch flew the Lancair IV-P aircraft from Minnesota to Montana. As he

approached Gallatin Field in Bozeman, Montana, his plane lost power and he died in the

resulting crash. On October 28, 2005, Patricia M. Bunch (Bunch), an Oregon resident

and the wife of Jeffrey Bunch, filed a complaint in the Eighteenth Judicial District Court

against the above-named appellees individually and in her capacity as the personal

representative of the estate of Jeffrey Bunch and legal guardian of their daughter Payton

Bunch.

¶3 The complaint filed by Bunch states claims for strict product liability, negligence,

and breach of warranty against all appellees, and contains the following general

allegations. Lancair is an Oregon corporation with its principal place of business in

Redmond, Oregon. This corporation is engaged in the business of designing,

manufacturing, and selling aircraft kits and completed aircraft. Bunch alleges Lancair

designed, manufactured and sold the kit for the Lancair IV-P owned by Jeffrey Bunch.

The Neibauers and Riddells are residents of Oregon. Lance Neibauer was the founder of

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Lancair and, according to Bunch, was responsible for the design of the Lancair IV-P

aircraft owned by Jeffrey Bunch. Orin Riddell was a Lancair employee whose duties

included sales manager, factory test pilot, and corporate spokesman. Riddell was

involved in the buying, building, and reselling of aircraft for Lancair.

¶4 Teledyne is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Mobile,

Alabama. Bunch avers that Teledyne is engaged in the business of designing,

manufacturing, and distributing aircraft for sale and use throughout the United States, and

that Teledyne designed, built, and rebuilt the aircraft engine incorporated into the Lancair

IV-P piloted by Jeffrey Bunch. Dukes is a California corporation with its principal place

of business in Northbridge, California. Bunch claims that Dukes is engaged in the

business of designing, manufacturing, selling and distributing fuel delivery system

components for aircraft, and that it designed, manufactured, sold and/or distributed key

components of the fuel delivery system used in Jeffrey Bunch’s Lancair IV-P.

¶5 On December 22, 2005, Teledyne filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack

of personal jurisdiction. On February 7, 2006, Lancair also filed a motion to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction. The defendants submitted affidavits demonstrating that they

had no contacts with Montana, other than the fact that their products were involved in the

crash which occurred here. Teledyne stated that it manufactured the engine used in

Jeffrey Bunch’s airplane in Alabama, and sold and shipped it to Lancair for installation in

Oregon. It does not transact business in Montana, is not registered or licensed here, has

no offices, employees, distributors or dealers here, nor does it have an agent or telephone

listing in this state. Further, Teledyne stated in its affidavit that it does not advertise in

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Montana, has not sold any aircraft engines to Montana residents through its website, has

not shipped or sold any aircraft engines to purchasers in Montana, nor does it maintain

any Montana bank accounts or pay taxes here. Similarly, Lancair averred that it does not

own, use, possess or have any interest in property in Montana, does not have any

employees, dealers or distributors within this state, does not advertise here, and is not

registered with the Montana Secretary of State. Further, Lancair’s affidavit stated that

neither Jeffrey Bunch’s airplane, nor any of its components, were manufactured or sold

here, and further, that Jeffrey Bunch did not purchase his plane directly from Lancair.

¶6 Teledyne and Lancair argued that the mere fact that their products happened to

end up in Montana was not, by itself, sufficient to subject them to personal jurisdiction

given that they had no other contacts with Montana, were not residents here, and had not

purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in this state.

They argued that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Montana would be unreasonable

and would not comport with due process.

¶7 Bunch opposed the defendants’ motions to dismiss. She argued that personal

jurisdiction over the defendants was proper because they established the necessary

minimum contacts with Montana when they distributed their products into the interstate

stream of commerce. Bunch asserted that by voluntarily doing so, both defendants

submitted themselves to jurisdiction in all those states where their products might cause

injury. Bunch noted that there are 14 Lancair aircraft currently registered in the state of

Montana. Additionally, Bunch requested the opportunity to conduct further discovery on

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the issue of personal jurisdiction with respect to the defendants to determine the extent of

their Montana contacts.

¶8 The District Court granted Lancair’s and Teledyne’s motions to dismiss. We will

briefly summarize the salient points underlying the District Court’s decision, and discuss

its reasoning and analysis in greater detail below. The District Court began its analysis of

the personal jurisdiction question by relying on Simmons v. State, 206 Mont. 264, 670

P.2d 1372 (1983), for the proposition that personal jurisdiction over non-resident

defendants “must be assessed in the context of our federal system of government . . . [and

that] we are obliged to give serious consideration to the consequences acquiring

jurisdiction will have on the maintenance of harmonious relations with other states.”

Simmons, 206 Mont. at 271, 670 P.2d at 1376 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980)). The District Court then considered

whether the defendants were subject to jurisdiction under M. R. Civ. P. 4B(1), which

reads in pertinent part as follows:

(1) Subject to jurisdiction. All persons found within the state of Montana
are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. In addition, any
person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim
for relief arising from the doing personally, through an employee, or
through an agent, of any of the following acts:
(a) the transaction of any business within this state;
(b) the commission of any act which results in accrual within this
state of a tort action . . . .

¶9 The District Court noted that these defendants were not “found” in Montana and

that they had not transacted business here, but concluded that long-arm jurisdiction would

be proper under M. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(b) since the tort allegedly accrued in Montana.

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Next, the District Court went on to consider whether jurisdiction over the defendants

would comport with due process and with traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. In their affidavits, the defendants submitted they had no contacts with Montana,

and that their only connections to this state were due to the fortuitous, attenuated, and

unilateral activity of Jeffrey Bunch. Further, the District Court noted that none of the

parties were residents of Montana, whereas all the defendants were subject to personal

jurisdiction in Oregon. The District Court did observe that there were known to be at

least 14 Lancair airplanes in Montana, but concluded that this alone was not sufficient to

demonstrate personal jurisdiction in Montana; all it demonstrated was that some of their

products had ended up here. Thus, the District Court concluded that there was a

presumption that asserting personal jurisdiction over these defendants would not comport

with due process and would be unreasonable since they had not purposefully availed

themselves of Montana law. Further, the District Court found that the defendants’ forum-

related conduct had not given rise to the plaintiffs’ claims since their contacts with

Montana were limited to the fact that they placed products into the stream of commerce

which ended up in Montana. Additionally, the District Court also denied Bunch’s request

to conduct jurisdictional discovery, concluding that Bunch had failed to make a colorable

showing of personal jurisdiction and that no further discovery regarding defendants’

contacts with Montana would be allowed.

¶10 On July 3, 2006, Dukes also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction on the same grounds as Lancair and Teledyne. In its affidavit in support of

its motion, Dukes’ chief financial officer averred that Dukes was a California

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corporation, without any real estate or property interests, business offices, warehouses,

facilities, employees, agents, distributors or dealers located within this state. Further, the

affidavit stated that Dukes was not registered with the Montana Secretary of State, does

not pay taxes in Montana, and does not advertise here. Incorporating its previous order

of dismissal with respect to Lancair and Teledyne, the District Court concluded that

Dukes also had no contacts with Montana, had not purposely availed itself of Montana

law, had no forum-related activities, and that personal jurisdiction over Dukes in

Montana would be unreasonable. Thus, the District Court dismissed the complaint

against Dukes on the same grounds as it had against Lancair and Teledyne. It also denied

Bunch’s request for jurisdictional discovery with respect to Dukes.

¶11 Finally, on July 27, 2007, the Neibauers and Riddells also filed a motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In their affidavits, these defendants all stated

they had never travelled to Montana, did not own any property here, and that they did not

have any business or financial ties to this state. Specifically, Orin Riddell, who sold the

aircraft to Jeffrey Bunch in September 2002, stated the sale was finalized in California,

and that at no time did Jeffrey Bunch discuss any intentions or plans to fly the aircraft in

Montana. Again the District Court found, based on the affidavits submitted by the

parties, that they had no contacts with Montana, and had not purposely availed

themselves of Montana law or engaged in any forum-related activities. The District

Court thus dismissed the complaint against the Neibauers and Riddells on the same

grounds as it had with respect to the other defendants, and denied Bunch’s request for

jurisdictional discovery against these defendants as well.

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¶12 Bunch now timely appeals the dismissal of her complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction. We restate the issues presented by Bunch as follows:

¶13 Issue One: Did the District Court err in granting the defendants’ motions to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction?

¶14 Issue Two: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Bunch’s

motions for jurisdictional discovery?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15 A court’s determination as to its jurisdiction is a conclusion of law, which is

reviewed de novo to determine whether the court’s interpretation of the law is correct.

Stanley v. Lemire, 2006 MT 304, ¶ 52, 334 Mont. 489, 148 P.3d 643. The decision

whether to allow jurisdictional discovery lies within the discretion of the district court.

Minuteman Aviation, Inc. v. Swearingin, 237 Mont. 207, 212, 772 P.2d 305, 308-09

(1989). We review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. See Envtl. Contractors,

LLC v. Moon, 1999 MT 178, ¶ 19, 295 Mont. 268, 983 P.2d 390.

DISCUSSION

¶16 Issue One: Did the District Court err in granting the defendants’ motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction?

¶17 In its decision, the District Court analyzed the propriety of personal jurisdiction

over the defendants under the following two-part inquiry:

For a Montana court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,
two questions must be considered. (1) Does the nonresident defendant
come within the provisions of Montana’s long-arm jurisdiction statute; and
(2) would exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over the nonresident comport
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice? Simmons v.
State (1983), 206 Mont. 264, 271, 670 P.2d 1372, 1376 (citations omitted).

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 If we conclude, as a matter of statutory construction, that the nonresident
did not engage in any of the several activities enumerated in our long-arm
statute, our analysis ends and we must decline jurisdiction. However, if the
non-resident has done something which potentially confers jurisdiction, we
will advance to the due process component which is ultimately
determinative of the jurisdictional question. Simmons, 206 Mont. at 272,
670 P.2d at 1376.

B.T. Metal Works v. United Die & Mfg. Co., 2004 MT 286,¶ 16, 323 Mont. 308, 100 P.3d

127.

¶18 Turning first to M. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(a), the District Court rejected the argument

that any of the defendants were subject to jurisdiction in Montana based on the

transaction of business here. The District Court specifically distinguished the facts at bar

from those in Great Plains Crop Mgmt., Inc., v. Tryco Mfg. Co., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1025

(D. Mont. 1983), a case relied upon by Bunch. In that case, the federal district court

found that jurisdiction was proper over an out-of-state corporation when it conducted

“substantial” activities in Montana, including marketing in Montana, accepting sales calls

and soliciting business here, and consummating sales with Montana residents. Great

Plains, 554 F. Supp. at 1027. No such comparable business activities on behalf of the

defendants were present in this case. While the District Court acknowledged that 14

Lancair aircraft were found within the state of Montana, it concluded this was insufficient

due to the lack of evidence that the presence of those aircraft in Montana was due to any

business conducted here. More specifically, the District Court concluded that even a sale

of such an aircraft to a person in Montana would not be relevant to the aircraft in this

case, since its presence in Montana was due solely to the unilateral activity of Jeffrey

Bunch.

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¶19 However, the District Court did conclude that because the alleged tort accrued in

Montana, Montana jurisdiction would be proper under M. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(b). The

District Court then went on to consider whether the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over

the non-resident defendants comported with traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice. In analyzing this issue, the District Court relied upon B.T. Metal

Works.

In Simmons, we explained that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution limits the power
of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a non-resident
defendant, and that a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident only if minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum
state exist. Simmons, 206 Mont. at 272-73, 670 P.2d at 1376-77 (citations
omitted). We adopted the Ninth Circuit test for determining whether the
exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate
some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
forum, thereby invoking its laws.
(2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the
defendant’s forum-related activities.
(3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.
Simmons, 206 Mont. at 276, 670 P.2d at 1378 (citing Data Disc, Inc. v.
Systems Tech. Assoc., Inc. (9th Cir. 1977), 557 F.2d 1280, 1287).

B.T. Metal Works, ¶ 34.

¶20 The District Court applied this test in granting the defendants’ motions and held

that personal jurisdiction over them would not comport with due process. The District

Court noted that Bunch did not need to satisfy all three elements, but that if she was

successful in showing that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the

privilege of conducting activities in Montana, a presumption would arise that personal

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jurisdiction was reasonable. In considering the first component of this analysis, the

District Court turned again to B.T. Metal Works:

A nonresident defendant purposefully avails itself of the benefits and
protections of the laws of the forum state when it takes voluntary action
designed to have an effect in the forum. Conversely, a defendant does not
purposefully avail itself of the forum’s laws when its only contacts with the
forum are random, fortuitous, attenuated, or due to the unilateral activity of
a third party. The defendant that invokes the laws of the forum state by
purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum
state, and the exercise of jurisdiction over such a defendant is
fundamentally fair.

B.T. Metal Works, ¶ 35 (citation omitted).

¶21 Based on the affidavits submitted in conjunction with their respective motions,

(see ¶¶ 5, 9-11), the District Court concluded that none of the defendants had

purposefully availed themselves of Montana law. Moreover, the District Court

concluded that factor two—whether the claim arose from the defendants’ forum-related

activities—was also not satisfied because Bunch’s claim arose solely from the random,

fortuitous, and unilateral activity of Jeffrey Bunch in flying the plane to Montana.

Accordingly, jurisdiction was presumptively unreasonable.

¶22 The District Court went on to consider whether jurisdiction would comport with

notions of “fair play and substantial justice,” under additional considerations set forth in

World-Wide.

Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the
burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an
appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including
the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, see McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2
L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and

12
 effective relief, see Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra, 436 U.S.
[84, 92], 98 S.Ct. [1690, 1697 (1978)], at least when that interest is not
adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum, cf.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211, n. 37, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2583, n. 37, 53
L.Ed.2d 683 (1977); the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, see
Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra, 436 U.S., at 93, 98, 98 S.Ct., at
1697, 1700.

World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S. Ct. at 564-65.

¶23 The District Court concluded that Montana’s interest in the dispute was greatly

diminished due to the fact that none of the parties were residents of Montana. Moreover,

Montana would be equally inconvenient for all parties, and the most efficient resolution

of the dispute would be in Oregon, where the majority of the parties reside or have their

principal places of business. Additionally, the District Court noted that Bunch had an

opportunity to file suit in Oregon, but instead chose to file in Montana. Thus, Bunch’s

interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief could have equally been served by

filing suit in Oregon, where the parties reside. Although Bunch argued that Oregon was

no longer an available forum because the statute of limitations had run there, the District

Court did not find this argument compelling. Because Bunch had failed to satisfy the

first two factors under Simmons and jurisdiction over the defendants would be

unreasonable and not comport with notions of “fair play and substantial justice,” the

District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction.

¶24 The District Court concluded its order by rejecting Bunch’s argument that

personal jurisdiction over the defendants would be proper based solely on their actions of

13
placing a product into the stream of commerce and having it end up in Montana. The

District Court rejected the proposition that due process was satisfied on the basis that the

defendants should have foreseen that their products (i.e., the airplane and its component

parts) could have ended up in Montana since an airplane can potentially go anywhere at

any time. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court relied heavily upon World-Wide

and its progeny, including Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct.

2174 (1985), and Asahi Metal Indus. Co, Ltd.. v. Sup. Ct. of Ca., 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct.

1026 (1987).

¶25 In World-Wide, the United States Supreme Court considered whether due process

was satisfied if an Oklahoma court exerted personal jurisdiction over a New York

automobile retailer, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway), and its regional distributor,

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. (World-Wide), whose only connection with Oklahoma

was the fact that an Audi automobile sold in New York to a New York resident was

involved in a crash in Oklahoma. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288-89, 100 S. Ct. at 562-63.

World-Wide was a New York corporation which distributed vehicles, parts, and

accessories to retail dealers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Seaway was one

of the dealers, and was located only in New York. Neither defendants had any contacts

whatsoever with Oklahoma, aside from the fact that an accident involving a car sold by

Seaway to a New York resident occurred there. By contrast, the automobile

manufacturer, Audi, and its importer, Volkswagen of America (Volkswagen), were

involved in a nationwide distribution of the Audi automobiles. Neither Audi nor

Volkswagen contested personal jurisdiction before the United States Supreme Court.

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¶26 The plaintiffs argued in part that personal jurisdiction over Seaway and World-

Wide was appropriate because an automobile, by its very design and purpose, is mobile

and thus it was foreseeable that the Audi sold by Seaway and distributed by World-Wide

could cause injury in Oklahoma. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this argument,

stating that “ ‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal

jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.” World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295, 100 S. Ct. at

566.

If foreseeability were the criterion, a local California tire retailer
could be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there, see
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (CA4
1956); a Wisconsin seller of a defective automobile jack could be haled
before a distant court for damage caused in New Jersey, Reilly v. Phil
Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F.Supp. 1205 (N.J.1974); or a Florida soft-drink
concessionaire could be summoned to Alaska to account for injuries
happening there, see Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304
F.Supp. 165, 170-171 (Minn.1969). Every seller of chattels would in effect
appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit
would travel with the chattel. We recently abandoned the outworn rule of
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S.Ct. 625, 49 L.Ed. 1023 (1905), that the
interest of a creditor in a debt could be extinguished or otherwise affected
by any State having transitory jurisdiction over the debtor. Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). Having
inferred the mechanical rule that a creditor’s amenability to a quasi in rem
action travels with his debtor, we are unwilling to endorse an analogous
principle in the present case.

World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 296, 100 S. Ct. at 566-67 (footnote omitted).

¶27 The Supreme Court went on to note that foreseeability was not “irrelevant,” but

that “the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood

that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s

conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably

15
anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S. Ct. at 567.

The Supreme Court applied this rationale to the facts before it as follows:

When a corporation purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, it has clear notice that it is
subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome
litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to
customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the
State. Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such
as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises
from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or
indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable
to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective
merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.
The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State.
But there is no such or similar basis for Oklahoma jurisdiction over
World-Wide or Seaway in this case. Seaway’s sales are made in Massena,
N. Y. World-Wide’s market, although substantially larger, is limited to
dealers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. There is no evidence
of record that any automobiles distributed by World-Wide are sold to retail
customers outside this tristate area. It is foreseeable that the purchasers of
automobiles sold by World-Wide and Seaway may take them to Oklahoma.
But the mere unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum State.

World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297-98, 100 S. Ct. at 567 (citation and quotations omitted).

¶28 In Burger King Corp., the Supreme Court affirmed its holding in World-Wide

stating that “the constitutional touchstone [is] whether the defendant purposefully

established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State. Although it has been argued that

foreseeability of causing injury in another State should be sufficient to establish such

contacts there when policy considerations so require, the Court has consistently held that

this kind of foreseeability is not a ‘sufficient benchmark’ for exercising personal

16
jurisdiction.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S. Ct. at 2183 (citations and

footnote omitted). Similarly, in Asahi Metal, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he

placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the

defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 112,

107 S. Ct. at 1032.

¶29 Relying on this precedent, the District Court distinguished several cases relied

upon by Bunch, including Bullard v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co. Inc., 263 F. Supp. 79

(D. Mont. 1967), Scanlan v. Norma Projektil Fabrik, 345 F. Supp. 292 (D. Mont. 1972),

Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965), Tedford v.

Grumman Am. Aviation Corp., 488 F. Supp. 144 (N.D. Miss 1980), and Bach v.

McDonnell Douglass, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 521 (D. Ariz. 1979). In Bullard, a non-resident

Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois, received orders from

wholesalers and retailers in Montana and shipped its products here. Although the volume

of business the non-resident corporation conducted with Montana was slight, a federal

district court held that the non-resident defendant evinced a general intent to ship its

products to Montana for sale here. Bullard, 263 F. Supp. at 83. This intent, combined

with an alleged tort which occurred here, was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.

Here, by contrast, the District Court noted that Bunch failed to demonstrate any general

intent on behalf of the defendants to sell products in Montana, and further, failed to

demonstrate that they had actually sold any products here.

¶30 In Scanlan, a foreign defendant in the business of selling ammunition had an

American distributor and an Idaho retailer, but no contacts of any kind of Montana. A

17
plaintiff purchased ammunition in Idaho and transported it to Montana where it

malfunctioned and injured the plaintiff. The federal district court held that jurisdiction

over the foreign corporation in Montana was proper in part because “due process is not

denied when a manufacturer who sells good intending that they be generally distributed

and used in any place where a market may be found is forced to defend those products in

the places where the products go.” Scanlan, 345 F. Supp. at 293. The District Court

noted that the most distinguishing feature between Scanlan and the case at bar was the

fact that Scanlan was decided 8 years before World-Wide. As such, it did not address

notions of “fair play and substantial justice” and was in clear conflict with the due

process analysis now employed by this Court and the United States Supreme Court.

Similarly, while Keckler, another case cited by Bunch, also held that the mere act of

placing a product into the stream of commerce would be sufficient to subject a defendant

to personal jurisdiction, see Keckler, 248 F. Supp. at 649, the District Court noted that it

too had been decided many years before World-Wide and is out of step with current due

process jurisprudence. Additionally, Bach, a case with a similar holding as well, was also

decided before World-Wide, and thus held inapplicable by the District Court on the

grounds that it had been superseded by World-Wide.

¶31 In Tedford, two out-of-state manufacturers were sued for negligence after an

accident involving the crash of a crop duster in Mississippi. One of the manufacturers

(Grumman American Aviation Corporation) had built and sold the airplane, while the

other (Engine Support) had manufactured the engine. Engine Support argued that

permitting Mississippi to exercise personal jurisdiction over it would offend “traditional

18
notions of fair play and substantial justice” under Intl. Shoe. The federal district court

disagreed and held as follows:

[The World-Wide] decision by the United States Supreme Court on
the issue before the court in the action sub judice discusses in detail the
problems presented by the question of in personam jurisdiction by a state
court over a nonresident via a state long-arm statute such as the one enacted
by the Mississippi Legislature, Miss.Code, 1972, Ann. § 13-3-57, and
plainly demonstrates that each case must be decided on the facts of the case
then under consideration. The [World-Wide] decision contains this relevant
statement:

The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers in the forum State.

— U.S. at — 100 S. Ct. at 567.

The court holds that the facts reflected by the record in the action
sub judice will support in personam jurisdiction over defendant Engine
Support. This defendant remanufactured the engine in question, and
furnished it to the aircraft manufacturer for incorporation into an aircraft to
be used in agricultural pursuits by the ultimate user. In doing so, Engine
Support delivered the remanufactured engine into the stream of commerce
with the expectation that it would be purchased and used by someone
engaged in agricultural pursuits, in this case, as the plaintiff.

Tedford, 488 F. Supp. at 147.

¶32 The District Court maintained that Tedford, while certainly supportive of Bunch’s

position, had taken the holding in World-Wide out of context and was not reliable. The

District Court observed that in World-Wide, neither Audi nor Volkswagen contested

jurisdiction because they intended to manufacture and distribute their vehicles throughout

the United States. See ¶ 25 (discussing World-Wide). Thus, this statement from World-

Wide would only apply to those entities or persons who actually intend the distribution

19
and purchase of their products in the forum state. By contrast, Seaway and World-Wide,

with their regional and limited range of distribution, were held not to be subject to

personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, on the grounds that to do so would run afoul of due

process concerns. The District Court explained this distinction, as related to the facts at

bar, as follows:

Here, Lancair does not intend sales in every state in the nation.
Specifically as it pertains to Montana, Lancair—and [the] component parts
upon which Lancair relies for its planes manufactured by Teledyne for
example—has taken steps to limit the area of distribution and sale of the
product. Accord Bullard, 263 F. Supp. at 83. Thus here, as in World-
Wide Volkswagen, the transportation of the airplane at issue into Montana
was the result of the unilateral activity of Mr. Bunch whose estate now
claims some relationship with these Defendants in Montana. Such contact
does not satisfy the due process requirements of contact with the State of
Montana to support jurisdiction.

¶33 Bunch maintains the District Court erred in several respects. First, Bunch asserts

that it is unaware whether any of the defendants would be subject to general jurisdiction

in Montana under M. R. Civ. P. 4B(1) due to the fact that the District Court denied its

requests for jurisdictional discovery. Similarly, with respect to specific or long-arm

jurisdiction under M. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(a), based on the defendants’ transaction of

business in Montana, Bunch asserts that she has made a colorable claim that the

defendants do conduct business here, in spite of the fact that she was denied discovery.

In this regard, Bunch notes that Lancair sells home-built aircraft kits, conducting a

substantial portion of its business and advertising by mail-order and an interactive

website, and that there are at least 14 Lancair aircraft owned and registered by Montana

residents. Bunch further asserts that FAA records indicate that at least 1,521 aircraft

20
registered in Montana have engines manufactured by Teledyne, and that its aircraft

engines are distributed throughout the world and Montana, and are incorporated into

aircraft flown in this state.1

¶34 Bunch also maintains that long-arm jurisdiction over the defendants is proper

under M. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(b) based on the commission of acts which resulted in the

accrual of a tort action in Montana. Bunch asserts that the District Court held that most

of the defendants in this case in fact conceded that long-arm jurisdiction could be

satisfied under M. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(b). Accordingly, Bunch argues that the dispositive

issue on appeal is whether acquiring jurisdiction over the defendants in Montana would

satisfy due process concerns.

¶35 As Bunch correctly notes, the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction satisfies due

process concerns so long as the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Intl. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,

316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945). Bunch goes on to correctly observe that the three-factor

due process test employed by the District Court in this case was first enunciated by this

Court in Simmons, and was adopted in Montana from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Data

Disc. See Simmons, 206 Mont. at 276, 670 P.2d at 1378 (quoting Data Disc, 557 F.2d at

1287).

1
Teledyne asserts evidence concerning the presences of its engines in Montana is not properly
part of the record on appeal. Teledyne notes that Bunch submitted this evidence to the District
Court in a supplemental memorandum in response to Teledyne’s motion to dismiss. However,
the District Court subsequently struck Bunch’s supplemental memorandum in an order dated
April 28, 2006. In her reply brief, Bunch does not contest or oppose Teledyne’s assertions in this
regard. At any rate, evidence concerning the presence of Teledyne’s engines in Montana does
not affect our ultimate disposition of Bunch’s appeal.

21
¶36 Bunch then maintains that the three-factor test employed by the District Court has

been superseded by more recent Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, and that the District Court

should have employed this new approach when analyzing whether jurisdiction over the

defendants would comport with due process. Bunch argues that when the Data Disc test

was formulated by the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff had to demonstrate each of the three

elements to establish that jurisdiction comported with due process. Since Data Disc was

decided, however, the Ninth Circuit has relaxed the due process test as evidenced in such

cases as Ochoa v. J.B. Martin and Sons Farms, Inc., 287 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002),

Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1986),

and Robinson Corp. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Haw. 2003).

Bunch urges this Court to adopt the more recent Ninth Circuit test in evaluating whether

jurisdiction over these defendants comports with due process, and reverse the District

Court’s decision.

¶37 Under this approach, Bunch argues that it does not need to show that the

defendants have directly and purposefully availed themselves of Montana law. Instead, it

is sufficient to show purposeful availment in the form of a foreign action having an in-

forum effect. Here, the fact that defendants’ defective products were flown into Montana

and crashed here were sufficient to meet this standard. In this connection, Bunch further

asserts that the presence of Lancair planes and Teledyne engines in Montana

demonstrates a sufficient in-forum effect. Bunch argues that the defendants cannot

credibly claim that they can only be sued in their respective home states of California,

Oregon, and Alabama, and expect to avoid personal jurisdiction in Montana where their

22
products caused injuries, simply because those aircraft and components were built and

sold in another state.

¶38 In addition to her argument for adopting a more flexible approach to the due

process analysis, Bunch also argues that other jurisdictions have held that the requisite

minimum number of contacts to confer personal jurisdiction are established when a

product manufacturer or component part manufacturer distributes its products into the

interstate stream of commerce. Before the District Court, Bunch cited examples of such

cases including Great Plains, Bullard, Scanlan, Keckler, Tedford, and Bach, addressed

above and rejected by the District Court. On appeal, Bunch argues that the District Court

erred, and that the sale of aircraft and their components subjects the defendants to

litigation in a forum other than the originating state.

¶39 In arguing that the District Court erred when it rejected her argument, Bunch now

adds further cases to support her contention, including Continental Oil Co. v. Atwood &

Morrill Co., 265 F. Supp. 692 (D. Mont. 1967), Rockwell Intl. Corp. v. Costruzioni

Aeronautiche Giovanni Augusta, 553 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1982), Miller v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Ky. 1969), Gill v. Fairchild Hiller Corp.,

312 F. Supp. 916 (D.N.H. 1970), and Vibratech, Inc. v. Frost, 661 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. App.

2008). Bunch argues that these cases generally stand for the proposition that in situations

involving aircraft and their component parts, minimum contacts are established in any

state where the manufacturer can expect that its products will go. Given the nature of

aircraft and air travel, Bunch maintains that it was reasonably foreseeable that an aircraft

incorporating the defendants’ alleged defective design, manufacture, or components,

23
could crash in Montana. Furthermore, Bunch argues that none of her authority is affected

by World-Wide and that courts in fact continue to rely on World-Wide as authority for the

proposition that the exercise of jurisdiction over non-resident airplane/component

manufacturers is appropriate even when they attempt to limit their sales to in-state

concerns, but know that the planes will be flown out-of-state.

¶40 We disagree with Bunch, and conclude that the District Court did not err in

determining that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants would not comport with

notions of “fair play and substantial justice” and would be unreasonable under the

circumstances at bar. In this case, the District Court correctly concluded that specific, or

long-arm, jurisdiction would be appropriate over the defendants because the alleged tort

accrued in Montana. The question, therefore, is whether the exercise of jurisdiction

would comport with due process.

¶41 In conducting its analysis of this issue, the District Court correctly relied upon the

three-factor due process test we initially adopted from the Ninth Circuit in Simmons. The

District Court, citing to B.T. Metal Works, ¶ 34, also correctly noted that Bunch did not

need to satisfy all three elements to establish personal jurisdiction. As stated by the

District Court:

The plaintiff need not demonstrate each of the three elements to
establish jurisdiction; once the plaintiff demonstrates that the . . .
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in Montana, a presumption of reasonableness
arises, which a defendant can overcome only by presenting a
compelling case that jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

24
¶42 After concluding that Bunch failed to show either that the defendants purposefully

availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Montana, or that the claim

arose out of the defendants’ forum-related activities, the District Court then when on to

consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable under World-Wide.

The test employed by the District Court tracks the test this Court originally set forth in

Simmons Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 244 Mont. 75, 796 P.2d 189 (1990).

The exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable to comport with due
process. In Simmons [Oil Corp.], 244 Mont. at 87-88, 796 P.2d at 197, we
enumerated several factors to consider when examining the reasonableness
of jurisdiction:
(1) The extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into
Montana;
(2) The burden on the defendant of defending in Montana;
(3) The extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s
state;
(4) Montana’s interest in adjudicating the dispute;
(5) The most efficient resolution of the controversy;
(6) The importance of Montana t o the plaintiff’s interest in
convenient and effective relief; and
(7) The existence of an alternative forum.
Further, we noted that “[t]he above factors are not mandatory tests,
each of which the plaintiff must pass in order for the court to assume
jurisdiction. Rather, the factors simply illustrate the concepts of
fundamental fairness, which must be considered in each jurisdictional
analysis.” Simmons [Oil Corp.], 244 Mont. at 88, 796 P.2d at 197.

Nasca v. Hull, 2004 MT 306, ¶ 32, 323 Mont. 484, 100 P.3d 997.

¶43 Contrary to Bunch’s assertions, the analysis employed by the District Court is

more or less the same due process analysis currently conducted by the Ninth Circuit. As

stated by the Ninth Circuit in Ochoa:

Although Ninth Circuit law formerly required a plaintiff to
demonstrate each of these three factors to establish specific jurisdiction, see
Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir.1977),

25
 this court has, in light of subsequent Supreme Court precedent, adopted a
more “flexible approach.” Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1074
(9th Cir.1986). Jurisdiction may be established with a lesser showing of
minimum contacts “if considerations of reasonableness dictate.” Haisten v.
Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th
Cir.1986); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476,
105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). “Under this analysis, there will be
cases in which the defendant has not purposefully directed its activities at
the forum state, but has created sufficient contacts to allow the state to
exercise personal jurisdiction if such exercise is sufficiently reasonable.”
Brand, 796 F.2d at 1074.

Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1188 n.2.

¶44 Here, the District Court noted that Bunch did not, in fact, have to satisfy all three

factors of the Data Disc test—an approach consistent with the Ninth Circuit case law

cited by Bunch. More importantly, the District Court found that Bunch failed to satisfy

any of the tests whatsoever. Bunch has failed to demonstrate that its conclusions in this

regard were in error.

¶45 On appeal, Bunch cites to cases from other jurisdictions to support the notion that

the defendants’ actions in this case constituted the type of purposeful availment sufficient

to permit personal jurisdiction. However, they are all distinguishable. In Robinson, for

instance, the federal district court of Hawaii held that a non-resident insurer had

purposefully availed itself of activities in a forum based on a coverage policy which

provided coverage in the forum state. Robinson, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. Setting aside

the fact that such a decision is not binding authority on this Court, it is also clearly

distinguishable because it was decided based on concerns unique to the “insurer-

defendant context.” Robinson, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 n. 8. Here, none of the

defendants are insurers with respect to Jeffrey Bunch or his estate.

26
¶46 In Continental Oil, the federal district court in Montana held that the shipment of a

product by an out-of-state defendant to a purchaser in Montana was sufficient to meet the

minimum contacts test and confer jurisdiction upon Montana. Continental Oil Co., 265

F. Supp. at 699. This case was decided many years before World-Wide and the federal

district court did not even conduct a due process analysis in that case. Moreover, it is

factually distinguishable because Bunch has not alleged that the defendants sold products

to Jeffrey Bunch in Montana. In a similar vein, Bach, Miller, Gill, and Scanlan are

distinguishable for much the same reasons.

¶47 In Rockwell Intl., a French manufacturer of custom-made ball bearings for

helicopters (SNFA) was sued in Pennsylvania for negligence and breach of warranty.

SNFA had manufactured ball bearings and shipped them to Rockwell in Pennsylvania for

incorporation into a helicopter. Rockwell Intl., 553 F. Supp. at 329-30. Rockwell

incorporated the custom-made ball bearings into its helicopter, which later

malfunctioned. SNFA contested the assertion of personal jurisdiction over it in

Pennsylvania. The federal district court held due process would not be offended if SNFA

was subject to long-arm jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. The federal district court found that

SNFA purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting business in

Pennsylvania because the ball bearings were specifically manufactured for sale to

Rockwell with the knowledge that its helicopters would be manufactured throughout the

United States. Rockwell Intl., 553 F. Supp. at 331-32. Moreover, SNFA directly shipped

the ball bearings through its distributor to Rockwell in Pennsylvania. In other words, the

27
sale, manufacture, and injury all occurred within Pennsylvania. Rockwell Intl., 553 F.

Supp. at 331.

¶48 Under factor two, whether SNFA purposefully availed itself of the privilege of

conducting business in Pennsylvania, the federal district court noted that SNFA

purposefully availed itself of Pennsylvania law when it worked closely with Rockwell to

develop and design ball-bearings for its helicopters, which it knew would be distributed

throughout the United States. In this regard, the federal district court noted the following:

In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between
a local or regionalized dealer and a manufacturer or major distributor.
Except for a rare sale, the local dealer generally confines the market he
serves to a limited area. However, the marketing territory and the sale of a
product by a manufacturer or distributor is not intended to be so confined.
The sale of its product to a distant state is not simply an isolated
occurrence, but instead, arises from the corporation’s affirmative efforts to
serve, directly or indirectly, the largest possible market for its product.

Rockwell Intl., 553 F. Supp. at 332.

¶49 Although SNFA argued that it could not be subject to personal jurisdiction in

Pennsylvania based solely on the foreseeability that an accident involving its ball

bearings could occur there, the federal district court noted that by choosing “to participate

in a nation-wide marketing chain . . . the sale of products incorporating its bearings . . .

[was] not merely foreseeable, but affirmatively welcomed.” Rockwell Intl., 553 F. Supp.

at 333. Finally, the federal district court found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction

was reasonable under factor three because “SNFA designed and manufactured a

component that was incorporated into a product which was intended to be, and was, in

28
fact, sold in both Europe and the United States. Where that component allegedly fails

and causes injury in the very market in which the product was expected to be sold, it is

not unreasonable or unfair to require the defendant to be subject to suit in that forum.”

Rockwell Intl., 553 F. Supp. at 334.

¶50 Rockwell Intl. is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. First, the District

Court found, based on the affidavits of Lancair, Dukes, the Riddells, and the Neibauers,

that none of these defendants have made any sales in, or have contacts with, Montana.

Thus, these defendants could not reasonably be expected to be haled into court in

Montana due solely to the unilateral act of a consumer. However, Bunch does allege that

Teledyne is involved in a national chain of distribution. Under the analysis in Rockwell

Intl., these allegations would arguably establish that Teledyne has taken acts to

purposefully avail itself of the laws of any state in which aircraft are sold which

incorporate its parts. If the aircraft in this case had actually been sold in Montana, then

Teledyne might expect to be haled into court here. However, even if Teledyne does

participate in a national chain of distribution, including Montana—a set of facts which it

disputes by affidavit—it would be unreasonable in this case to submit it to jurisdiction in

Montana since the aircraft was not purchased here and neither Lancair, the Riddells, nor

the Neibauers have any connections to Montana aside from the unilateral actions of

Jeffrey Bunch. In other words, it would be unreasonable to hold that Teledyne, as a

component part manufacturer, could be subject to personal jurisdiction in Montana while

the other defendants could not. Thus, we find that Rockwell Intl. is distinguishable and

does not support Bunch’s argument for personal jurisdiction in this case.

29
¶51 A more recent case relied upon by Bunch, Vibratech, is distinguishable as well. In

that case, Vibratech, Inc. (Vibratech) was a Delaware corporation with its principal place

of business in New York. Vibratech manufactured a component known as a viscous

damper, a mechanism designed to reduce engine vibration. This damper was sold to

Teledyne, which in turn incorporated it into an engine which was installed in a Cessna

twin engine aircraft that crashed in Tennessee on December 2, 2004, killing several

passengers. Vibratech, 661 S.E.2d at 187. Three of the passengers who were killed in

the crash were residents of Georgia. Vibratech, 661 S.E.2d at 191. The estates of the

decedents killed in the crash filed suit against Vibratech and other defendants in Georgia.

Vibratech moved to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Prior to the accident, Vibratech had declared bankruptcy and ceased to be a functioning

business.

¶52 The Georgia appeals court determined that it had to consider Vibratech’s

“intangible contacts” under Georgia’s long-arm jurisdiction statute, “subject to the limits

of due process,” in order to determine if Georgia had personal jurisdiction. Vibratech,

661 S.E.2d at 189. The appeals court applied a three-factor due process analysis

analogous to that applied by the District Court in the case at bar. See Vibratech, 661

S.E.2d at 189. Under factor one, whether Vibratech had purposefully done some act or

consummated some transaction in Georgia, the appeals court considered this factor

satisfied because: (1) Vibratech sold several hundred dampers per year to Teledyne for

incorporation into its engines; and (2) Teledyne agreed to indemnify Vibratech under an

aviation liability policy which explicitly included a “worldwide” area of coverage.

30
Vibratech, 661 S.E.2d at 190. This demonstrated that Vibratech shipped its products for

incorporation into Cessna engines for re-sale into locales across the country, including

Georgia. Vibratech, 661 S.E.2d at 190. Consequently, because this activity was “directly

connected” to the cause of action in that case, the court of appeals found that factor two,

whether the cause of action arose from or was connected with an act or transaction in

Georgia, was satisfied as well. Vibratech, 661 S.E.2d at 191.

¶53 Finally, turning to factor three, whether the exercise of jurisdiction over Vibratech

would offend traditional fairness and substantial justice, the appeals court held as

follows:

Three of the plaintiffs in this consolidated matter are residents of Georgia,
and the other three are residents of surrounding states. Certainly, Georgia
has an interest in providing an effective means of redress for citizens
whose health and welfare have been injured by defective products which
our commercial laws permit to be imported into the state. And it would
place an undue burden upon the plaintiffs to pursue a separate action
against Vibratech in another state such as New York or Delaware. It
would be no less burdensome for Vibratech to defend a separate action in
New York than to defend this action in Georgia where all other issues and
the alleged joint tortfeasors may be joined. This is especially true as
Vibratech is a defunct corporation, with no officers, directors or
employees, and it has local counsel to represent it in this action. Thus,
judicial economy and efficiency are served by extending jurisdiction over
Vibratech in this case.

Vibratech, 661 S.E.2d at 191 (quotations, alterations, and footnote omitted).

¶54 Vibratech is distinguishable in several important respects. First, of all the

defendants, only Teledyne is alleged to participate in a nationwide distribution of its

products. Because of this, the Vibratech holding would at best be applicable only to

Teledyne. However, as noted above, even if Teledyne arguably availed itself of the

31
privilege of conducting business in Montana by virtue of a nationwide distribution of its

products, it would be unreasonable to subject it to jurisdiction in Montana in this case

because the aircraft which crashed here was sold by Lancair, which does not do business

in or have any contacts with Montana. In a similar respect, we cannot say that

Teledyne’s forum-related activities gave rise to the cause of action in this case simply

because its engine was incorporated into the Lancair IV-P, which again, was sold in a

market that did not include Montana. Finally, returning to an earlier point, unlike the

plaintiffs in Vibratech, the plaintiffs here are not Montana residents, and there is simply

no reason why Montana’s interest in this dispute is greater than Oregon’s, or why it

would be more effective to resolve the dispute here. The fact that the statute of

limitations has run on a claim in Oregon, which would most likely have personal

jurisdiction over all the parties, is simply not a relevant consideration in determining

whether personal jurisdiction in this case would be reasonable.

¶55 We conclude that the District Court properly analyzed the personal jurisdiction

question under M. R. Civ. P. 4B(1), and correctly determined that asserting personal

jurisdiction over these defendants in Montana would not comport with due process.

Further, the District Court correctly distinguished the cases relied upon by Bunch for her

argument that personal jurisdiction was proper based on the mere fact that the defendants

placed a product into the stream of commerce. On appeal, the cases cited by Bunch in

support of this argument are distinguishable as well. Thus, we affirm the District Court.

¶56 Issue Two: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Bunch’s
motions for jurisdictional discovery?

32
¶57 The District Court denied Bunch’s requests for jurisdictional discovery,

concluding that she failed to make a colorable or prima facie showing that Montana’s

long-arm statute applies to the defendants. The District Court, citing Minuteman

Aviation, noted that such discovery would be appropriate if there was a conflict in facts,

or competing affidavits, but that such a situation was not present here. According to the

District Court, the affidavit showing that there were 14 Lancair aircraft in Montana did

not contradict the defendants’ assertions that they had not purposefully availed

themselves of Montana law, or that their contacts bear no relation or causal connection to

the tort at issue. The District Court discounted the significance of the presence of the

defendants’ products in Montana as it relates to the personal jurisdiction question,

because the defendants did not take any actions to bring Jeffrey Bunch’s airplane into this

state, market the plane in this state, or provide sales to consumers in this state.

¶58 Bunch argues the District Court abused its discretion in denying her discovery

request. Bunch notes that both Lancair and Teledyne have products located in Montana.

From this, Bunch suggests that there may be other contacts with Montana which could be

authenticated through depositions or written discovery. In spite of the fact that all

defendants have denied conducting any business in Montana, Bunch nonetheless argues

that it should have the opportunity to test those averments through discovery. In her

reply brief, Bunch argues specifically that Teledyne, as it is in the business of selling

aircraft engines and spare parts, would likely have some additional contacts with

Montana given that there are approximately 1,521 aircraft with Teledyne engines

33
registered in Montana.2 Accordingly, Bunch argues she should be permitted the

opportunity to conduct further discovery with respect to these defendants.

¶59 We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Bunch’s request for jurisdictional discovery. Where material jurisdictional facts are

disputed, the district court has discretion to permit discovery to resolve any factual issues.

Minuteman Aviation, 237 Mont. at 212, 772 P.2d at 308-09. Here, Bunch has not

provided the Court with examples of any material disputed facts related to personal

jurisdiction over the defendants in Montana. Bunch has merely alleged that further

discovery might reveal facts which would contradict the factual assertions in the

defendants’ respective affidavits. Yet, as noted by the District Court, the presence of 14

Lancair aircraft, by itself, does not place the factual contents of those affidavits in dispute

as it relates to the question of personal jurisdiction.

¶60 It bears repeating that the question before us is one of judicial discretion. We do

not decide whether an opposite decision would have been acceptable, or if our decision

might have been different—rather, we only determine if the District Court abused its

discretion. Here, given that there were not materially disputed facts before the District

Court at the time the motions were determined, we conclude that the District Court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Bunch’s request for additional discovery.

CONCLUSION

2
As noted above (see ¶ 33 n.1), Teledyne maintains this evidence is not properly part of the
record on appeal.

34
¶61 The District Court did not err in concluding that it would not comport with due

process and would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice for it to

exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants in Montana. Additionally, the District

Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bunch’s request for discovery. Therefore,

we affirm.

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER

We concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ JIM RICE

35