IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
Nos. 95-10156 and
95-10437
Summary Calendar
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OLLIE DAILEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LTV AEROSPACE & DEFENSE CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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OLLIE DAILEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
VOUGHT AIRCRAFT COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas
(3:91-CV-1327-X & 3:94-CV-325)
_______________________________________________________________
March 13, 1996
Before JOLLY, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Through piecemeal filings with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") over a period of several years on
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
some charges, and failure to file with the appropriate
administrative agency on others, appellant Ollie Dailey created a
legal and procedural morass for the trial court. We find that the
district court maneuvered through that morass with precision, and
therefore affirm in all respects the judgments and rulings of the
district court that are the subject of this appeal.
I
Since 1990, Dailey has brought three suits against Vought and
its predecessor, LTV, for violations of employment-related
statutes.
A
The first, Dailey v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., No. 95-10156
("Dailey I"), alleged Vought discriminated against Dailey on
account of his race and disability, retaliated against him because
he complained of discrimination, and intentionally inflicted
emotional distress upon him. Dailey also sought to recover damages
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the '91 Act). In Dailey
I, the district court:
-dismissed Dailey's claims arising under the '91 Act, holding
that the discriminatory conduct at issue occurred before
passage of the '91 Act (September 7, 1993);
-struck Dailey's final supplemental complaint, filed without
leave of court, on the basis that the discrimination claims
relating to Dailey's July 1993 layoff (the reason for the
supplemental complaint) were too remote in time to the October
1990 actions alleged in the original complaint, and that no
EEOC charge had been filed on those claims (November 4, 1993);
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-denied Dailey's second attempt to file the same supplemental
complaint a few days before the pretrial conference
(December 14, 1993);
-entered summary judgment in favor of Vought on Dailey's
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
violation of the Rehabilitation Act (November 9, 1993);
-dismissed Dailey's claim under the ADA, without prejudice, to
allow completion of the administrative process (November 9,
1993); denied motion for reconsideration of that dismissal
(December 17, 1993);
-removed Dailey's case from the jury docket because Dailey's
remaining claims arose before the effective date of the '91
Act, and Dailey had not made a timely attempt to amend his
previous charge of race discrimination to include his October
1992 attempt to return to work (December 17, 1993);
-after trial on the merits of Dailey's claims, made
findings of fact and conclusions of law dismissing
Dailey's remaining claims and entering final judgment for
Vought (January 6, 1995).1
B
In his second lawsuit, filed on February 18, 1994 ("Dailey
II"), Dailey alleged Vought laid him off as the result of race
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Two
months after he filed the second suit, Dailey attempted to amend
his complaint to include claims that Vought violated the ADA, Title
VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, when it failed to return him to work in
October of 1992. Before the district court could rule on this
motion to amend, Dailey withdrew it and filed a third action
("Dailey III") asserting his ADA, Title VII and § 1981 claims.
1
This court has jurisdiction to hear Dailey's appeal from this
final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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Dailey II and Dailey III were subsequently consolidated, and
transferred to the same judge who had heard Dailey I.
In January 1995, the district court ruled as follows in the
consolidated action (Dailey II and III)2: 1) Dailey presented no
more evidence of discrimination than he had presented during the
trial of Dailey I in support of his layoff claims, and his evidence
was therefore insufficient to demonstrate discrimination; 2) Dailey
and his counsel failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the
facts before filing Dailey II challenging Dailey's layoff, and
sanctions against both Dailey and his counsel were therefore
appropriate; 3) Dailey's Title VII claim challenging the
defendants' refusal to allow him to return to work in October of
1992 (asserted in Dailey III) had already been disposed of in
Dailey I; 4) Dailey's § 1981 claim challenging the defendants'
refusal to allow him to return to work in October of 1992 asserted
in Dailey III was barred as it could have been asserted in Dailey
I; and 5) sanctions under Rule 11 were appropriate against both
Dailey and his counsel for filing Dailey III.
In April 1995, the district court granted Dailey's motion to
sever and entered final judgment in Dailey II and on the claims in
Dailey III alleging Title VII and § 1981 violations. Dailey's
2
These rulings are the subject of Appeal No. 95-10437, the
second of Dailey's two consolidated appeals.
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remaining ADA claim in Dailey III is currently pending before the
district court.3
II
Dailey now appeals, challenging most of the rulings of the
district court over the course of the litigation described above.
Dailey argues that the district court: 1) should have allowed him to
amend his complaint in Dailey I to include additional Title VII claims,
because he either did not need to exhaust his administrative remedies
or, if he needed to exhaust his remedies, he had done so; 2) should not
have dismissed (without prejudice) his ADA claims from Dailey I; 3)
should not have removed Dailey I from the jury docket on the ground
that there were no post-'91 Act allegations properly before the court;
4) should not have denied Dailey the right to a jury trial in Dailey I;
5) should not have dismissed Dailey's Title VII and § 1981 claims in
Dailey II and III; and 6) should not have imposed sanctions for
attempting to bring the claims in Dailey II and III that the district
court held were without merit, or barred by res judicata.
We have reviewed the record, record excerpts, rulings of the
district court, and briefs of the party. Although this litigation has
followed an agonizing (and not yet completed) pathway to reach this
3
Pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Dailey sought and was granted severance and issuance of a final
judgment of the dismissal and sanctions orders in the second and
third suits. See Order of the District Court of April 12, 1995.
This court therefore has jurisdiction over the appeal of those
matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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appeal, in large part because of the careless pleading of the
plaintiff, we find that the district court has committed no reversible
error in its rulings. We therefore AFFIRM.
A F F I R M E D.
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