September 14 2010
DA 10-0071
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2010 MT 196
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
GEORGE WILLIAM PARRISH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC 01-355A
Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
George William Parrish, self-represented, Deer Lodge, Montana
For Appellee:
Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Jennifer Anders, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney; Lori A. Adams, Deputy County
Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 4, 2010
Decided: September 14, 2010
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 A jury in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, convicted George
Parrish of two counts of sexual intercourse without consent and two counts of sexual assault
and the District Court sentenced Parrish accordingly. Parrish moved the District Court to
amend the judgment and remove the requirement that he complete Phase II sex offender
treatment before becoming eligible for parole. Parrish claims that the disclosures required by
Phase II treatment violated his constitutional rights. The District Court denied his motion
because it was time barred. Parrish appeals and we affirm.
¶2 The sole issue is whether the District Court erred when it denied Parrish’s motion to
amend his judgment because it was time barred.
BACKGROUND
¶3 In September 2003, a jury convicted George Parrish of two counts of sexual
intercourse without consent and two counts of sexual assault for an incident involving
Parrish’s stepdaughters, both of whom were under the age of sixteen at the time of the
offense. The District Court sentenced Parrish to sixty years in the Montana State Prison,
with twenty-five years suspended. Parrish was ineligible for parole for ten years and was
required to complete Phases I and II of sex offender treatment prior to becoming eligible for
parole.
¶4 Parrish appealed his conviction on procedural grounds unrelated to his sentence. We
affirmed the conviction but remanded for the limited purpose of reassessing witness costs.
See State v. Parrish, 2005 MT 112, 327 Mont. 88, 111 P.3d 671 (hereinafter Parrish I). The
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District Court entered an amended judgment that complied with this Court’s opinion on
December 13, 2006.
¶5 Parrish completed Phase I and then began Phase II of the sex offender treatment in
2009. Parrish refused to disclose his offending history regarding the four offenses for which
he was convicted—a requirement for completion of the treatment—because, according to
Parrish, “I have maintained since the day I was charged, I did not commit these crimes.”
Parrish was suspended from the program in November 2009 as a result of his refusal to
cooperate.
¶6 After his suspension, Parrish filed a motion to amend the judgment in December
2009, in which he asked the District Court to remove the requirement that he complete Phase
II because it violated his Fifth Amendment, due process, and equal protection rights. The
District Court denied his motion because under § 46-18-116, MCA, a judgment may only be
modified within 120 days of the final pronouncement of sentence, and Parrish filed his
motion more than 120 days after the court entered the amended judgment in December 2006.
¶7 On appeal, Parrish reiterates his arguments that requiring him to admit the actions for
which he was convicted is a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination. He also contends that his due process rights were violated when he was
denied access to a meeting where treatment providers discussed their decision to suspend
him from the sex offender treatment. Finally, he argues that the court treated similarly
situated offenders differently by offering them options other than the Phase II sex offender
treatment which violated his equal protection rights.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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¶8 This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a petition for post-conviction relief to
determine whether the district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its
conclusions of law are correct. State v. Root, 2003 MT 28, ¶ 7, 314 Mont. 186, 64 P.3d
1035.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Did the District Court err when it denied Parrish’s motion to amend his judgment
because it was time barred?
¶10 A legal sentence, once imposed, cannot be amended unless the amendment is
authorized by statute. State v. Hanners, 254 Mont. 524, 526, 839 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1992).
The court may modify a judgment if there is a discrepancy between the written and oral
judgment, as long as the request to modify is made within 120 days after the filing of the
written judgment. Section 46-18-116(2), MCA. The court may also correct a factually
erroneous sentence or judgment at any time and illegal sentences must be addressed in the
manner provided by law for appeal and post-conviction relief. Section 46-18-116(3), MCA.
A defendant who claims that a sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or the
laws of this state or the United States may petition the court that imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. Section 46-21-101, MCA. This petition for relief
may be filed at any time within one year of the date that the conviction becomes final. A
conviction becomes final when, inter alia, the time for an appeal to this Court expires.
Section 46-21-102, MCA. This Court must take an appeal from a judgment entered pursuant
to § 46-18-116, MCA, within 60 days after entry of the judgment from which an appeal is
taken. M. R. App. P. 4(5)(b)(i).
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¶11 Parrish’s motion to amend his judgment is essentially a petition for post-conviction
relief. The latest possible date that Parrish’s conviction was final is February 11, 2007,1 sixty
days after the District Court entered its amended judgment on December 13, 2006. Parrish
filed his motion to amend on December 14, 2009, which is more than a year after Parrish’s
time for appeal to this Court expired. Although our reasoning differs from the District Court,
we affirm its decision to deny Parrish’s motion to amend his judgment because it was
untimely. See State v. Wilkins, 2009 MT 99, ¶ 5, 350 Mont. 96, 205 P.3d 795 (affirming the
district court because it reached the right result for the wrong reason).
CONCLUSION
¶12 The District Court did not err when it denied Parrish’s motion to amend his judgment.
¶13 Affirmed.
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
1
By using the District Court’s amended judgment as a starting point for our calculation for when
Parrish’s conviction becomes final, we are simply assuming a possible date in a light most favorable
to Parrish without making any judgments on whether the amended judgment is the appropriate time
of conviction under § 46-21-102, MCA.
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