Hansen v. GRANITE COUNTY

May 11 2010

DA 09-0572

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2010 MT 107

TOBY HANSEN and KELI HANSEN,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

GRANITE COUNTY, and JOHN DOES 1-10,

Defendants, Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District,
In and For the County of Granite, Cause No. DV-2007-002
Honorable Ray J. Dayton, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellants:

Cory R. Gangle, Milodragovich, Dale, Steinbrenner & Nygren, P.C.,
Missoula, Montana

For Appellees:

Susan B. Swimley, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: March 24, 2010

Decided: May 11, 2010

Filed:

__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 The Granite County Commissioners (the Commissioners) denied an application

for preliminary plat approval of a proposed subdivision filed by Toby and Keli Hansen

(the Hansens). The Hansens appealed the decision to the District Court for the Third

Judicial District, Granite County. The District Court affirmed the Commissioners’

decision and awarded Granite County damages in the amount of $30,197. The Hansens

appealed and Granite County cross-appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

¶2 The Hansens raise the following issues on appeal:

¶3 1. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Commissioners’ denial

of the proposed subdivision application was not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.

¶4 2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in awarding damages to

Granite County.

¶5 Granite County raises the following issue by way of cross-appeal:

¶6 3. Whether the District Court’s denial of every cost in Granite County’s

Memorandum of Costs, except $10 for a witness fee, was an abuse of discretion.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶7 The Hansens own property in Granite County between Drummond and Missoula

that is bordered by a frontage road known as the Beavertail Road. This road is a narrow,

two-lane highway that runs parallel to Interstate 90. To the west of the Hansens’ property

is a parcel of land referred to as the Weston Ranch. Because Beavertail Road cuts

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through portions of the ranch’s agricultural operations, ranch representatives must move

cattle and equipment across the road from time to time.

¶8 In January 2006, the Hansens submitted a preliminary subdivision proposal to

Granite County encompassing the Hansens’ property. The Hansens referred to the

subdivision as the Ryan Creek Major Subdivision. This proposed subdivision would

create 202 residential lots. It would have its own fire and police protection, mail service,

ambulance service and service mall, and it would include land dedicated for parks and

schools as well as 40 commercial lots.

¶9 On February 2, 2006, the Hansens attended a mandatory pre-application

conference with the Commissioners. The purpose of this conference was to discuss the

application process and to identify potential problems with the proposed subdivision.

The Commissioners did not identify any problems with the subdivision at this

conference.

¶10 The Hansens submitted a formal subdivision application to Granite County on

March 18, 2006. Along with the application, the Hansens paid Granite County $12,850

as a non-refundable fee to offset the cost for reviewing their application. In April 2006,

the Hansens held two informal community meetings in which members of the public

were invited to come and learn about the subdivision and to discuss the proposal with the

Hansens. One meeting was held in Drummond, Montana, and the other meeting was held

in Phillipsburg, Montana. According to the Hansens, no one at these community

meetings expressed any concerns as to how the proposed subdivision might affect local

services or local agricultural operations.

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¶11 The proposed subdivision was the largest subdivision Granite County had ever

seen. Since the Commissioners did not have the expertise to review the Hansens’

subdivision application, they hired outside consultants. Susan Swimley was retained to

act as attorney for the specific purpose of assisting the Commissioners in reviewing and

processing the subdivision application. In addition, Matt Smith was hired as an

engineering expert and Jamie Morris was hired as a land-use planning consultant.

¶12 After reviewing the subdivision application, Morris wrote a letter to the Hansens

dated June 7, 2006, stating that their subdivision application was “insufficient.” She

requested that the Hansens provide additional information by June 28, 2006. The

Hansens gathered the requested information and sent it to Morris for review. The

Commissioners deemed the Hansens’ application complete on July 7, 2006, and a public

hearing before the Granite County Planning Board (the Board) was scheduled for

August 31, 2006.

¶13 In preparation for the hearing, Granite County’s planning staff was required to

prepare a report for the Hansens, the Board, and the public. In this report, the planning

staff demanded additional information from the Hansens and indicated that if the Hansens

did not submit the additional information as requested, they would recommend that their

subdivision application be denied. The Hansens did not receive a copy of this report until

a few days before the scheduled hearing. Consequently, they agreed to postpone the

hearing until they could submit the additional information. According to the Hansens,

none of the additional information requested concerned impacts to agriculture, traffic or

educational services.

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¶14 On November 29, 2006, the Board held a public hearing on the proposed

subdivision. A representative of the Weston Ranch made a lengthy presentation in which

he raised concerns about increased traffic from the proposed subdivision impeding the

ranch’s ability to move cattle and equipment across the Beavertail Road. The Weston

Ranch representative provided the Board and the Hansens with a thick packet of

information detailing their concerns. The Hansens now complain that they did not have

an opportunity to review the information and to respond because once the public hearing

was deemed closed, the Board made it clear that no additional information could be

presented.

¶15 The Board issued its findings and recommendations wherein it pointed out the

significant adverse impacts to the Weston Ranch agricultural operations because of the

high volume of traffic from the proposed subdivision that would have to travel the

portion of the Beavertail Road that passed through the ranch. The Board also determined

that this high volume of traffic on the Beavertail Road would create a significant adverse

impact to the public health and safety and that the subdivision application did not identify

any specific improvements that would be made to the Beavertail Road to mitigate those

adverse impacts.

¶16 The Commissioners conducted a public meeting on December 12, 2006, at which

time the Board recommended denial of the subdivision application because of its alleged

impacts to the road system and to the Weston Ranch. The Hansens claim that when they

attempted to address these issues, they were told they could not speak unless spoken to.

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¶17 In January 2007, the Commissioners determined that the subdivision would cause

significant adverse impacts to the public health and safety and to existing agricultural

operations due to the increase in the amount of traffic on the Beavertail Road. They also

determined that the subdivision would cause serious adverse impacts to the local school

district. Consequently, the Commissioners unanimously decided to deny the Hansens’

application for preliminary plat approval for the Ryan Creek Major Subdivision. The

Commissioners did not issue their written findings denying the subdivision application

until May 15, 2007. The Hansens timely appealed that decision pursuant to § 76-3-625,

MCA.

¶18 A four-day bench trial before the Third Judicial District Court was held in

October 2008. Nine months later, the court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order wherein it affirmed the decision of the Commissioners. In addition, the

District Court determined that the Hansens were not entitled to damages resulting from

the decision to deny their subdivision application because they failed to offer credible

proof or documentation supporting their $350,000 damage claim or their claim for

application fees of $15,166.77. The court did award Granite County damages in the

amount of $30,197 for unpaid application fees. It also awarded Granite County costs in

the amount of $10 for witness fees. The Hansens appeal and Granite County cross

appeals.

Issue 1.

¶19 Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Commissioners’ denial of
the proposed subdivision application was not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.

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¶20 “A preliminary plat of a proposed subdivision is subject to the review of the

governing body to determine whether the plat conforms to the master growth plan

adopted for the area and the plat’s effects on the public health, safety, and welfare.”

Madison River R.V. LTD. v. Town of Ennis, 2000 MT 15, ¶ 39, 298 Mont. 91, 994 P.2d

1098 (citing §§ 76-3-604 and -605, MCA).

A person who has filed with the governing body an application for a
subdivision under this chapter may bring an action in district court to sue
the governing body to recover actual damages caused by a final action,
decision, or order of the governing body or a regulation adopted pursuant to
this chapter that is arbitrary or capricious.

Section 76-3-625(1), MCA (emphasis added).

¶21 This Court reviews a district court’s ruling made pursuant to § 76-3-625, MCA,

the same way we review decisions from administrative agencies: “ ‘[T]he standard of

review to be applied by the trial court and this Court is whether the record establishes that

the agency [i.e., governing body] acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully.’ ” Kiely

Const., L.L.C. v. City of Red Lodge, 2002 MT 241, ¶ 69, 312 Mont. 52, 57 P.3d 836

(quoting Madison River, ¶ 30). Moreover,

[w]hen a district court or this Court reviews an action under the “arbitrary
and capricious” standard, a reversal of the appealed ruling is not permitted
“merely because the record contains inconsistent evidence or evidence
which might support a different result. Rather, the decision being
challenged must appear to be random, unreasonable, or seemingly
unmotivated, based on the existing record.”

Kiely, ¶ 69 (quoting Silva v. City of Columbia Falls, 258 Mont. 329, 335, 852 P.2d 671,

675 (1993) (emphasis added)).

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¶22 In this case, the Commissioners denied the Hansens’ application for preliminary

plat approval on the basis that there were significant and immitigable adverse impacts to

agriculture, local schools, public health and safety, and traffic. The District Court, after

hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence presented at the trial in this matter,

concluded that the Commissioners’ decision to deny the Hansens’ subdivision application

was not random, unreasonable, or seemingly unmotivated. Thus, the court affirmed the

Commissioners’ decision to deny the Hansens’ application for preliminary plat approval

of their proposed subdivision.

¶23 On appeal, the Hansens contend that the denial of their application was arbitrary,

capricious and unlawful under § 76-3-625(1), MCA, because there was no evidence of

immitigable and significant adverse impacts to justify denial of preliminary plat approval

for their subdivision and because the Commissioners did not negotiate with them as

required by law. Moreover, the Hansens maintain that the Commissioners did not

support their findings of significant adverse impacts with relevant and significant

evidence.

¶24 Granite County argues on the other hand that the Hansens failed to carry their

burden of demonstrating that the Commissioners’ denial of the subdivision application

was arbitrary and capricious. Granite County further argues that pursuant to our decision

in Kiely, the Hansens failed to demonstrate that, based upon the existing record, the

Commissioners’ decision was random, unreasonable, or seemingly unmotivated.

¶25 As indicated above, the Commissioners determined that the proposed subdivision

would create significant and immitigable adverse impacts to traffic, to agriculture, to

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local schools, and to public health and safety. We hold that, based upon the existing

record, portions of which we have set forth below, the Commissioners’ decision was not

arbitrary and capricious.

Impacts to traffic

¶26 According to the preliminary plat for the Ryan Creek Major Subdivision, the

Beavertail Road would be the main access between the proposed subdivision and

Interstate 90. Beavertail road is a narrow, two-lane highway with a speed limit of 70

miles per hour. In addition, there is no shoulder along the existing road for emergency

pull outs. The Hansens indicated in their application for their proposed subdivision that

the subdivision would generate between 1600 and 2400 vehicle trips per day along the

Beavertail Road.

¶27 Although the Granite County subdivision regulations do not require a developer to

provide a traffic impact study for the area surrounding a proposed subdivision, Toby

Hansen admitted at the trial in this matter that a traffic impact study would have helped

the Commissioners address concerns over impacts to the Beavertail Road. And, Tammy

McGill, the Hansens land-use planning consultant, testified that they knew that the

condition of the Beavertail Road was a problem. In fact, evidence adduced at trial

indicated that representatives of Granite County asked the Hansens several times during

the application review process if they would provide a traffic impact study for the

Beavertail Road or whether they intended to propose other plans for mitigation. Jamie

Morris, the land-use planning consultant hired by Granite County, testified that she told

the Hansens that a traffic impact study could benefit their application. And, county

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planner Linda Bouck testified that a traffic impact study was raised as an issue at least six

times at the various meetings and hearings about the Hansens’ application.

¶28 In addition, both Morris and Bouck pointed out that it is common practice for a

developer to ask for an extension to temporarily halt the review process to allow them

time to bring in whatever information was required so that the developer and the

Commissioners could come to some kind of mitigation. The Hansens, however, did not

do this. Instead, the Hansens chose not to submit any additional information or

mitigations to Granite County regarding traffic on the Beavertail Road. Notably, McGill

stated at the public hearing that the application would “stand on its face.” And, Toby

Hansen testified that when Granite County’s planning staff asked the Hansens to provide

documentation stating that Beavertail Road was capable of supporting the estimated

traffic that would be generated by the proposed subdivision, the Hansens, instead of

providing the requested information, stated that that would have to be worked out with

the Montana Department of Transportation.

¶29 Ultimately, the Commissioners determined that there would be significant adverse

impacts to Beavertail Road due to the added traffic on that road from the proposed

subdivision. The Commissioners also determined that since the Hansens had not

proposed any improvements to the Beavertail Road, those significant adverse impacts

could not be reasonably mitigated.

¶30 Granite County pointed out in its brief on appeal, and we agree, that it is the

developer’s duty to provide all the information to the governing body for its

consideration in reviewing an application for preliminary plat approval. Bouck made the

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same observation at trial in this case. She testified that the planning staff, the Board, and

the Commissioners “all rely on the developer to submit the information in. The job of the

County really is to review the application, not to draft it.” Indeed, McGill admitted at

trial that it is the obligation of the developer of the property “to identify the impacts and

propose a subdivision that mitigates the impacts.”

¶31 In this case, the Hansens bore the sole burden of offering an application that could

be approved. And, in fact, Cory Lang, an engineer hired by the Hansens, testified that he

completed a traffic impact study for the Hansens after the Commissioners denied the

application for preliminary plat approval for Ryan Creek Major Subdivision.

Impacts to agriculture

¶32 The Commissioners determined that the Weston Ranch would be significantly and

adversely impacted by the proposed subdivision because of the increased traffic on the

Beavertail Road. Emery Weston testified that because the ranch facilities are on both

sides of Beavertail Road, they must move livestock across the road to utilize their pasture

and corrals. In addition, they move farm equipment across the road to transport hay for

storage and to feed their livestock. Often times this occurs during the dusk and dawn

hours when visibility is generally limited.

¶33 McGill testified that she and the Hansens were aware early on that the Westons

were raising an issue about the traffic impacts on their ranch from the proposed

subdivision and that it would hinder their ability to cross Beavertail Road. Nevertheless,

while the Hansens included a provision in the covenants for the proposed subdivision

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acknowledging the Weston Ranch’s continued right to farm, they offered no reasonable

mitigation to prevent the increased traffic from hindering the Weston Ranch’s operations.

Impacts to local schools

¶34 The plans for the proposed subdivision included the dedication of 1.12 acres for a

future school site, but construction of a school would depend on student population. The

Commissioners determined that although children in the proposed subdivision would

initially attend school in Drummond, the overall population of the proposed subdivision

would eventually be too large for the Drummond schools to accommodate. Thus, the

Drummond schools would have to expand to support the additional population and

additional staff would have to be added. If a school was later constructed within the

proposed subdivision, the Drummond school district would then experience a serious loss

of school funding and staffing.

¶35 To mitigate this impact, the Hansens proposed to set aside $100 from the sale of

each lot to be held in escrow for the school district to use to subsidize temporary school

facilities. The Commissioners determined that this amount was inadequate to reasonably

mitigate the adverse impact to the local schools from the influx of students it was not

even sufficient to hire one teacher.

¶36 The Commissioners also determined that the 1.12 acres the Hansens proposed to

set aside for a future school site in the proposed subdivision was not large enough to

support both an elementary school and a high school. Thus, the Hansens proposed that

park land could be used by the school for school purposes. However, as the

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Commissioners pointed out, any expansion of the school into park land would have to be

reviewed and approved by Granite County.

¶37 Hence, the Commissioners determined that because of the inadequate land

dedication for new schools within the proposed subdivision and because of inadequate

funding for the existing schools to handle the influx of students from the proposed

subdivision, the adverse impacts to educational services was significant. The

Commissioners also determined that the Hansens had not offered reasonable mitigation

for those adverse impacts.

Impacts to public health and safety

¶38 As already noted, Beavertail Road is a narrow, two-lane road with a speed limit of

70 miles per hour and no shoulder along the existing road surface for emergency pull

outs. The Beavertail Road was to be the main access from the subdivision to

Interstate 90. Although testimony at trial differed on this point, several individuals

testified that there is a “blind corner” at one point on Beavertail Road because a rock

outcropping next to the road limits the sight distance in that section. Morris testified that

there were also concerns about bighorn sheep being in the road near the rock

outcropping. And, Board President Dick Hoehne testified that he had concerns about

joggers, bicyclists and people walking on the Beavertail Road because of the increased

traffic on that road.

¶39 Consequently, the Commissioners determined that the high amount of traffic that

would be generated from the proposed subdivision would create a significant adverse

impact to the public health and safety. Although McGill testified that she and the

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Hansens had notice that there were concerns about the adverse impacts the proposed

subdivision would put on the road, the Hansens did not offer any reasonable mitigation

for these adverse impacts.

¶40 While the record may contain conflicting evidence, as long as a substantial amount

of the evidence supports the governing body’s decision and the governing body explains

why it weighed certain evidence as more credible than other evidence, the governing

body’s decision should be upheld. See Richards v. County of Missoula, 2009 MT 453,

¶ 22, 354 Mont. 334, 223 P.3d 878 (citing Englin v. Board of County Com’rs., 2002 MT

115, ¶¶ 20, 27, 310 Mont. 1, 48 P.3d 39).

¶41 Accordingly, based on all of the foregoing, we hold that the Commissioners’

decision to deny the Hansens’ application for the proposed subdivision was not arbitrary,

capricious, or unlawful. We further hold that the District Court did not err in affirming

that decision.

Issue 2.

¶42 Whether the District Court abused its discretion in awarding damages to Granite
County.

¶43 The District Court awarded Granite County $30,197 in damages that Granite

County claimed the Hansens still owed for their application for preliminary plat approval

for Ryan Creek Major Subdivision. We review an award of damages to determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion. Kiely Const., L.L.C. v. City of Red Lodge,

2002 MT 241, ¶ 102, 312 Mont. 52, 57 P.3d 836 (citing Sletteland v. Roberts, 2000 MT

382, ¶ 36, 304 Mont. 21, 16 P.3d 1062; Edington v. Creek Oil Co., 213 Mont. 112, 127,

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690 P.2d 970, 978 (1984)). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily

without employment of conscientious judgment or so exceeds the bounds of reason as to

work a substantial injustice.” Tin Cup County Water v. Garden City Plumb., 2008 MT

434, ¶ 46, 347 Mont. 468, 200 P.3d 60 (citing McCormack v. Andres, 2008 MT 182, ¶ 22,

343 Mont. 424, 185 P.3d 973). We have also stated that

[i]n all cases, damages must be reasonable. Section 27-1-302, MCA. An
award must be reduced when it substantially exceeds that which the
evidence can sustain. Only when the amount awarded is so grossly out of
proportion to the injury as to shock the conscience will an appellate court
intervene.

Kiely, ¶ 102 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

¶44 The Hansens argue on appeal that Granite County’s claim for damages in this case

is barred by M. R. Civ. P. 13(a) because Granite County failed to file a compulsory

counterclaim and because Granite County’s claim for damages is not reasonable and is

not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

¶45 Granite County argues that the issue of a compulsory counterclaim is not properly

before this Court because the Hansens only raised that issue in a reply brief before the

District Court wherein they failed to cite any authority in support of their argument. In

addition, Granite County asserts that it raised the issue of damages in the Pretrial Order

and that its request for damages was adequately supported. Granite County further

asserts that the Hansens have offered no evidence that the amount of damages claimed

were excessive or unwarranted.

¶46 Compulsory counterclaims are governed by M. R. Civ. P. 13(a) which provides in

pertinent part:

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 A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time
of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

The purpose of compulsory counterclaims is to “ ‘avoid a multiplicity of suits by

requiring the parties to adjust, in one action, their various differences growing out of any

given transaction.’ ” Farmers Co-op. Ass’n v. Amsden, LLC, 2007 MT 287, ¶ 13, 339

Mont. 452, 171 P.3d 684 (quoting Zimmerman v. Connor, 1998 MT 131, ¶ 9, 289 Mont.

148, 958 P.2d 1195). We stated in Farmers that if a counterclaim is compulsory, it must

be pleaded or it will be barred. Farmers, ¶ 13 (citing Zimmerman, ¶ 12).

¶47 In the case sub judice, the Hansens initially argued in the court below that the

amount of damages claimed by Granite County was excessive and they sought to exclude

any mention of Granite County’s damages at trial claiming the amount of Granite

County’s alleged damages were the subject of another matter. Directly contrary to the

Hansens’ current assertion that Granite County’s damages should have been pled in a

compulsory counterclaim, the Hansens argued that the issue of Granite County’s damages

was not relevant to the action at hand. However, in their Reply Brief in support of their

Motion in Limine, the Hansens asserted that Granite County failed to file a counterclaim

for damages pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 13(a) in response to the Hansens’ Complaint, thus

Granite County’s claim for damages should be barred. In making this argument, the

Hansens failed to cite any authority in support. The District Court denied the Hansens’

motion.

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¶48 In the Pretrial Order, Granite County contended that the Hansens “still owe

$12,850.00 or an amount to be determined at trial to Granite County for the application

for Ryan Creek Major Subdivision . . . .” The Hansens’ contentions, on the other hand,

said nothing about Granite County’s claim for damages being barred as a compulsory

counterclaim under M. R. Civ. P. 13(a).

¶49 M. R. Civ. P. 16(e) provides that the pretrial order controls “the subsequent course

of the action unless modified by a subsequent order.”

The purpose of pretrial orders is to simplify issues, prevent surprise and
allow counsel to prepare their cases for trial based on the pretrial order. A
legal theory or factual issue for trial must be at least implicitly included in
the pretrial order; however, pretrial orders should be liberally construed to
permit any issues at trial that are embraced within [their] language.

Weimer v. Lyons, 2007 MT 182, ¶ 20, 338 Mont. 242, 164 P.3d 922 (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

¶50 Because the Hansens did not raise the issue of compulsory counterclaims as one of

their contentions in the Pretrial Order, they effectively waived that argument. Moreover,

as noted earlier in this Opinion, the purpose of compulsory counterclaims is to “ ‘avoid a

multiplicity of suits by requiring the parties to adjust, in one action, their various

differences growing out of any given transaction.’ ” Farmers, ¶ 13. By pursuing their

damage claim in this action, Granite County has complied with that purpose.

¶51 The Hansens also argue on appeal that Granite County’s claim for damages is not

reasonable and is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.

¶52 The Hansens’ application for the Rock Creek Major Subdivision sought to create

the largest subdivision that Granite County had ever seen. In Phase One alone the

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subdivision would be larger than the town of Drummond. In fact, the subdivision was

planned to be a town of its own with residential as well as commercial lots, its own fire

protection, police and ambulance services, mail service, and school district.

¶53 Evidence submitted at trial indicated that because Granite County had only

contract planning staff at the time the subdivision application was submitted and because

that staff lacked the experience and expertise to review a project of this size, Granite

County incurred additional costs related to reviewing the application. These additional

costs totaled $30,197 and included $11,223 for a land planning consultant, $11,239 for an

engineering expert, and $7,735 for an attorney to assist in reviewing and processing the

subdivision application. The Hansens offered no evidence that these additional costs

were incorrect, excessive or unwarranted, or that they had already paid these costs when

they submitted their application.

¶54 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in

awarding damages to Granite County.

Issue 3.

¶55 Whether the District Court’s denial of every cost in Granite County’s
Memorandum of Costs, except $10 for a witness fee, was an abuse of discretion.

¶56 After the District Court issued its August 5, 2009 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order, Granite County filed its Memorandum of Costs in accordance with

§ 25-10-501, MCA, seeking reimbursement of more than $10,000 in costs from the

Hansens. Granite County filed an Amended Memorandum of Costs on August 31, 2009,

reducing the amount of costs to $3,037.71. That same day, the District Court issued an

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order rejecting all but $10 of Granite County’s claimed costs. In its order, the court did

not provide any findings or conclusions indicating how it came to that amount, stating

only:

For the reasons stated in the Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendant’s
Memorandum of Costs, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that costs in the
amount of Ten Dollars ($10.00) are awarded and taxed for the statutory fee
for witness Thomas Stevens. All other costs are Denied.

¶57 “Adequate findings and conclusions are essential for without them this Court is

forced to speculate as to the reasons for the District Court’s decision. Such a situation is

not a healthy basis for review.” Jacobsen v. Thomas, 2006 MT 212, ¶ 19, 333 Mont. 323,

142 P.3d 859 (quoting Jones v. Jones, 190 Mont. 221, 224, 620 P.2d 850, 852 (1980)).

¶58 Because the District Court did not provide us with a reasoned analysis on how it

arrived at its award of costs, we reverse the award of costs and remand to the District

Court for further proceedings to determine Granite County’s costs and for entry of

findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue.

¶59 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this Opinion.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS

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