State v. Spaulding

August 23 2011

DA 10-0582

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2011 MT 204

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

ROSINA SPAULDING,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District,
In and For the County of Carbon, Cause No. DC 10-16
Honorable Blair Jones, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Joslyn Hunt, Chief Appellate Defender, Eileen A. Larkin, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Alex Nixon, Carbon County Attorney, Red Lodge, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: August 3, 2011

Decided: August 23, 2011

Filed:

__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Rosina Spaulding pleaded guilty in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court,

Carbon County, to misdemeanor DUI per se—i.e., driving or being in actual physical

control of a noncommercial vehicle upon the ways of this state open to the public while

the person’s alcohol concentration, as shown by analysis of the person’s blood, breath, or

urine, is 0.08 or more. Section 61-8-406(1)(a), MCA. Spaulding reserved the right to

appeal the District Court’s denial of her motion to suppress. We affirm.

¶2 The parties raise two issues on appeal:

1. Was Spaulding subject to a seizure?

2. Did the community caretaker doctrine apply on the facts presented here?

BACKGROUND

¶3 At approximately 1:25 a.m. on January 10, 2010, Deputy Jonathan Croft of the

Carbon County Sheriff’s Office was driving a marked patrol vehicle (a 2009 Chevy

pickup) westbound on Selmes-Bridger Road between Bridger and Roberts, Montana.

This is a dirt and gravel “back road” through a remote and sparsely populated area.

There are few homes along the road and no businesses, other than the county salvage

yard. There is very little traffic on the road during the wintertime, particularly at night. It

was cold at the time—the wind was blowing and the temperature was in the 20s. Croft

was officially on duty and wearing the uniform of a Carbon County Sheriff’s Deputy.

¶4 As he was traveling along Selmes-Bridger Road, Croft observed the taillights of

another vehicle roughly a quarter mile in front of him. The other vehicle was traveling

somewhat slower than Croft’s vehicle. When Croft was within about 200 yards of the

2
vehicle, the driver (Spaulding) activated her turn signal, moved to the side of the road,

and came to a complete stop. She did so abruptly, not gradually, and Croft found the

sudden stop to be unusual. In his experience, a driver on a county road will slow down

and move over to the side to allow a faster moving vehicle, coming up from behind, to

pass. He acknowledged that moving over to allow faster traffic to pass might have been a

reasonable explanation for Spaulding’s conduct, had he been closer to her vehicle at that

point. But he did not recall having ever seen a vehicle pull over so abruptly and come to

a complete stop when the overtaking vehicle was still 200 yards behind.

¶5 Croft had previously observed vehicles abruptly pull off to the side of the road due

to a flat tire or engine troubles. Thus, he considered the possibility that the driver of the

vehicle here might be experiencing mechanical difficulties and be in need of assistance.

He also had encountered lost motorists in this area on prior occasions. In this regard, the

vehicle’s license plates indicated that it was from Stillwater County. Thus, because it

appeared the vehicle was being driven by an out-of-area driver, using a road that is “in

the middle of nowhere” and is “not a very well-travelled road,” Croft considered the

possibility that the driver was lost. He noted that the nearest residence was between a

half mile and one mile behind, and the next residence was two miles ahead. Croft was

unsure whether the driver might be trying to establish contact with him.

¶6 Croft slowed and pulled in behind Spaulding’s vehicle. The State concedes that he

had no particularized suspicion or reasonable grounds for an investigatory stop, as he had

observed no erratic driving or traffic offenses, and he had no suspicion of any potential

crime. See Brown v. State, 2009 MT 64, ¶ 20, 349 Mont. 408, 203 P.3d 842. Croft’s stop

3
was premised solely on the following: the unusual manner in which the vehicle had

abruptly pulled over and stopped, although he was still 200 yards behind; the conditions

at the time (1:25 a.m. on a January morning, with the wind blowing and the temperature

in the 20s, on a back road in a remote area); and his intent to rule out the possibility of a

lost motorist, car trouble, or a medical emergency. As in all cases when he approaches a

stopped vehicle, Croft considered the possibility that the occupants might have weapons

or be engaged in criminal activity. In this regard, there had been some burglaries in the

area recently. However, while he was concerned for his own safety, there was nothing to

make him suspect any particular criminal activity. His main concern, and the reason he

stopped, was to conduct a welfare check of the vehicle’s occupants. (Spaulding had two

passengers with her, which Croft observed by the time he stopped behind her car.)

¶7 Croft’s vehicle had a front light bar across the top of the windshield, a grill light,

and wig-wag lights in the headlights. There was also a rear light bar across the top of the

rear windshield, which flashed red and blue lights, plus two alley lights on each side of

the vehicle. During a normal traffic stop, Croft activates all of the emergency lights,

which has the effect of automatically activating a camera in his vehicle and a microphone

that he wears on his person. In this instance, as he pulled up behind Spaulding’s vehicle,

Croft activated only his overhead rear lights. He did not activate any of the other lights

or the recording devices and did not inform dispatch that he was conducting a traffic stop.

He was not planning to issue a citation. Croft’s purpose was to “[c]heck to see if they

were okay, if they needed anything. I would get them whatever they needed and if they

didn’t need anything, I was going on my way.”

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¶8 Croft made contact with Spaulding and explained who he was. He asked her if

everything was okay, and Spaulding responded, “Yes. We’re fine. Thank you.” Croft

could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from inside the vehicle. Spaulding

concedes that after Croft made contact with her, he developed particularized suspicion to

conduct a DUI investigation. Ultimately, Spaulding was charged with DUI. The issue in

this case is whether Croft had a valid basis for making the initial welfare check under the

community caretaker doctrine.

¶9 Spaulding appeared in Carbon County Justice Court and filed a motion to suppress

all evidence obtained as a result of Croft’s DUI investigation, on the ground that he

lacked particularized suspicion to stop her and, thus, she had been unlawfully seized.

Spaulding argued that the community caretaker doctrine did not apply. The Justice Court

granted the motion. The State then appealed to the District Court de novo. The parties

re-briefed the suppression issue. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court

issued its findings facts and conclusions of law.

¶10 Given the circumstances existing at the time of the stop, the District Court found

that Deputy Croft had objective, specific, and articulable facts to justify a concern that the

occupants of the car may be in need of assistance. The court observed that the car had

pulled over abruptly on a desolate rural road at 1:25 a.m. on a cold January day. As a law

enforcement officer, Croft had previously observed vehicles pull over in the same abrupt

manner due to engine trouble or a flat tire. Moreover, Croft had previously encountered

lost motorists on remote county roads in this area. The weather was below freezing, there

were no homes in the immediate vicinity, and this particular county road has very little

5
traffic in the early morning hours of a winter day. A stranded motorist, therefore, could

be in a potentially perilous situation without ready access to assistance. Considering the

time, the weather, and the remote location, the District Court found that Croft reasonably

believed the conditions were potentially harmful to anyone stranded in the area.

¶11 Furthermore, the court observed that because it was too dark to make any

observations through the window of his patrol car, Croft pulled in behind the stationary

vehicle with the purpose of inquiring as to the occupants’ well-being. And Croft did, in

fact, inquire into Spaulding’s welfare. If required, he was prepared to render assistance;

if not, he was prepared to resume his patrol. The District Court noted that Croft’s patrol

vehicle was equipped with various emergency lights and that Croft routinely activated all

of those lights when making a traffic stop. Here, however, he activated only his rear

emergency lights, and the court found that Croft did so to warn any approaching

motorists. The court observed that Croft activated neither his video recording device nor

his audio recording device (which must be done manually when not all of the emergency

lights are activated).

¶12 In light of the foregoing, and based on this Court’s community caretaker caselaw,

the District Court concluded that Croft took appropriate action based on articulable facts

to ensure that Spaulding would have assistance if she needed it, and that his actions were

consistent with a welfare check, not a traffic stop. The court stated that his actions “fit

squarely within the ambit of the community caretaker doctrine” and, thus, did not amount

to an unlawful seizure. Accordingly, the District Court denied the motion to suppress.

Spaulding now appeals.

6
 STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress to determine whether

the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the court correctly

interpreted and applied the law to those findings. State v. Hafner, 2010 MT 233, ¶ 12,

358 Mont. 137, 243 P.3d 435; State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 17, 340 Mont. 10, 171 P.3d

731.

DISCUSSION

¶14 Issue 1. Was Spaulding subject to a seizure?

¶15 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II,

Section 11 of the Montana Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches

and seizures. Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable absent a few

carefully drawn exceptions. Lewis, ¶ 21; State v. Graham, 2007 MT 358, ¶ 13, 340

Mont. 366, 175 P.3d 885.

¶16 As an initial matter, the State contends that a welfare check conducted under the

community caretaker doctrine is not a seizure. We have suggested as much in some of

our cases. See e.g. State v. Lovegren, 2002 MT 153, ¶¶ 16, 24-25, 310 Mont. 358, 51

P.3d 471; State v. Seaman, 2005 MT 307, ¶¶ 27, 30, 329 Mont. 429, 124 P.3d 1137; State

v. Wilkins, 2009 MT 99, ¶¶ 6, 11-14, 350 Mont. 96, 205 P.3d 795. Based on Lovegren,

¶ 16, Spaulding likewise asserts that “[a] community caretaker stop does not involve a

seizure.” She therefore dedicates the vast majority of her arguments on appeal to

establishing that she in fact was “seized” on January 10, 2010—evidently under the

assumption that seizures and the community caretaker doctrine are mutually exclusive,

7
and that if she can show a seizure occurred here, then the community caretaker doctrine

cannot apply. Spaulding argues that she was seized either because a reasonable person in

the circumstances would have believed that he was not free to leave, see State v. Merrill,

2004 MT 169, ¶ 10, 322 Mont. 47, 93 P.3d 1227 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446

U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980)), or because Deputy Croft’s objective

actions restricted, interfered with, or deprived Spaulding of her liberty or freedom of

movement, see State v. Murray, 2011 MT 10, ¶ 29, 359 Mont. 123, 247 P.3d 721

(McGrath, C.J., & Nelson, J., specially concurring) (proposing an alternate standard to

replace Mendenhall’s “reasonable person” language).

¶17 In analyzing whether a seizure has occurred, a number of courts and jurists have

criticized the “reasonable person”/“free to leave” standard articulated in Mendenhall.1

One of the difficulties in inquiring whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave is

that there is already a level of pressure or coercion to stay when an officer approaches

and begins questioning. See People v. Castigilia, 915 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Ill. App. 2d Dist.

2009) (“[A] confrontation with a police officer is not a seizure on the basis that the

1
See e.g. Murray, ¶ 28 (McGrath, C.J., & Nelson, J., specially concurring)
(characterizing the standard as “impractical and unrealistic”); United States v. Notorianni,
729 F.2d 520, 522 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that then-existing precedents, holding that an
average person approached by a federal agent in an airport would “feel free to thumb his
nose at the agent,” may be “a wrong guess about what the average person feels in this
situation”); United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 2004) (McKay, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the “reasonable person” is a legal fiction historically defined by
the minds and experience of judges, rather than the record at hand); People v. Spicer, 203
Cal. Rptr. 599, 602 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1984) (characterizing the notion that an individual
is free to disregard an officer’s questions and walk away as possibly “the greatest legal
fiction of the late 20th Century”); State v. Shy, 373 So. 2d 145, 148 (La. 1979) (Dennis,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the “free to walk away” standard as legalistic and unrealistic).

8
officer’s authority produces an inherent pressure to cooperate. Rather, . . . an encounter

between a police officer and a civilian ‘is a seizure only if the officer adds to those

inherent pressures by engaging in conduct significantly beyond that accepted in social

intercourse.’ ” (emphases added) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure vol. 4,

§ 9.4(a), 425 (4th ed. 2004))).2 Moreover, as a result of post-Mendenhall jurisprudence,

the hypothetical “reasonable person” carries a heavy, and at times perhaps
even an intellectually debatable undue burden, in ensuring his or her
individual liberties. In interpreting the scope of the Fourth Amendment,
courts appear to have steadily increased expectations that the “reasonable
person” is one who not only knows the full extent of his rights, but
zealously protects them to the point that he will not hesitate to confront
authority and demand the return of identification so that he may effect his
right to walk away. Accordingly, one may reasonably inquire whether the
“reasonable person” standard has in reality become the “reasonable person
trained in the law” standard. Indeed, if reasonable members of the public
were asked whether they believed that they could terminate an encounter
with a law enforcement officer by simply insisting that the officer return
their license or identification, we suggest most would respond in the
negative. It is not unreasonable to think that only those versed in search
and seizure law may fully understand that the ability of an officer to
conduct an identification check is totally contingent upon the civilian’s
consent to the encounter where no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing
exists.

Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1190 (Fla. 2006).

¶18 Yet, while there are legitimate criticisms of Mendenhall’s definition of “seizure,”

and while we believe the Golphin court’s observations reflect reality, we need not resolve

in the present context whether Murray or some other approach would be preferable. The

2
See also People v. Melton, 910 P.2d 672, 676 (Colo. 1996) (noting that “citizens
may feel an inherent social pressure to cooperate with the police”); State v. Daniel, 12
S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tenn. 2000) (same); State v. Ashbaugh, 244 P.3d 360, 375-76 (Or.
2010) (Walters, J., dissenting) (discussing social science research indicating that people
believe they are required to cooperate with the police and are not free to leave when
subjected to questioning).

9
community caretaker doctrine is operative where law enforcement initiates contact with a

citizen, not to investigate the commission of a crime, but to investigate a potential vehicle

accident or otherwise to ensure the safety of citizens. Graham, ¶ 25; Seaman, ¶ 15. In

the usual case, a welfare check by its very nature necessarily involves a brief seizure—

but a seizure nonetheless—in order for the officer to ascertain whether the citizen needs

assistance or is in peril. 3 Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968)

(“It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains

his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”). As we clarified in Graham, the

community caretaker doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement for seizures,

analogous to the Terry investigative stop. See Graham, ¶¶ 25-26. In the context of a

Terry stop, the seizure is constitutionally “reasonable,” notwithstanding the absence of a

warrant, so long as the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person may be involved

in criminal activity and so long as the stop is limited in scope. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist.

Ct. of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185-86, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004); see also Terry, 392

U.S. at 20-30, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-84. The rationale for allowing the warrantless seizure is

that “necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer

on the beat . . . historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected

to the warrant procedure.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. Analogously, if there

are objective, specific, and articulable facts from which a law enforcement officer would

suspect that a citizen needs help or is in peril, then the officer “may temporarily seize

3
Given our holding here, we take this opportunity to reconcile our nonconforming
jurisprudence. See e.g. Lovegren, ¶¶ 16, 24-25; Seaman, ¶¶ 27, 30; Wilkins, ¶¶ 6, 11-14.

10
[the] citizen, in the absence of a warrant or particularized suspicion, without running

afoul of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the

Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or Article II, Section 11 of the Montana

Constitution.” Graham, ¶¶ 25-26. The criteria of the community caretaker doctrine (set

out in full below), as well as its underlying rationale—namely, that a peace officer has a

duty promptly to investigate situations in which a citizen may be in peril or need some

type of assistance from an officer, Lovegren, ¶ 20—render the seizure constitutionally

“reasonable,” notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. In this respect, the Terry stop

and the community caretaker stop are simply different branches of the same principle—

both are constitutionally “reasonable” warrantless seizures because both are grounded in

the officer’s necessarily swift action or reaction to an on-the-spot situation, limited in

scope to the purpose for which the stop is made.

¶19 There may be fact-specific situations in which a welfare check does not involve a

seizure.4 The present case, however, is not one of them. When Deputy Croft activated

his overhead rear emergency lights, pulled in behind Spaulding’s vehicle, and made

contact with her, she was temporarily “seized” while Croft inquired as to her and her

passengers’ well-being. The critical question in these sorts of cases is whether the

warrantless seizure was constitutionally “reasonable” because it met the criteria of the

community caretaker doctrine—the question to which we now turn.

4
For example, where the officer stops to make a welfare check on a car parked
alongside the highway, but no one is in the car because the driver has left to get gas, there
has been no seizure. But, if the officer observes contraband in plain view on the
floorboard, this might give rise to particularized suspicion or probable cause to seize the
car and its driver upon her return.

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¶20 Issue 2. Did the community caretaker doctrine apply on the facts presented?

¶21 “We use the following test to determine if the community caretaker exception to

the warrant requirement applies in an encounter between government officials and

citizens.” Graham, ¶ 25. First, as long as there are objective, specific, and articulable

facts from which an experienced5 officer would suspect that a citizen is in need of help or

is in peril, then that officer has the right to stop and investigate. Second, if the citizen is

in need of aid, then the officer may take appropriate action to render assistance or

mitigate the peril. Third, once, however, the officer is assured that the citizen is not in

peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, then any

actions beyond that constitute a seizure which must be justified by something other than

the community caretaker doctrine, such as particularized suspicion or probable cause.

See Lovegren, ¶ 25; Graham, ¶ 25. The issue in this case concerns the first prong of this

test—i.e., whether there were objective, specific, and articulable facts from which Deputy

Croft could suspect that a citizen was in need of help or was in peril. Spaulding presents

several arguments in this regard.

¶22 First, Spaulding argues that Croft’s stop fails to meet the first prong of the test

because the stop was not “wholly unrelated to” or “totally divorced from” the detection

and investigation of crime. She quotes this language from two observations made in our

5
Consistent with our decision in Brown v. State, 2009 MT 64, 349 Mont. 408, 203
P.3d 842, the officer’s experience and training “may be a factor in determining what sort
of reasonable inferences he or she is entitled to make from his or her objective
observations,” but experience and training are not necessarily the defining element of the
test. Brown, ¶ 20. Courts must look to the facts and to the totality of the circumstances
of each case. Brown, ¶ 20.

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Lovegren decision: first, that “ ‘[e]ncounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety

of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime,’ ”

Lovegren, ¶ 16 (emphasis added) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 13, 88 S. Ct. at 1876), and

second, that “ ‘[l]ocal police officers . . . frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which

there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may

be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection,

investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,’ ”

Lovegren, ¶ 17 (emphasis added) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93

S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973)). Spaulding interprets these observations in Lovegren as

placing a limitation on the application of the community caretaker doctrine, such that the

doctrine applies only in those situations where the officer’s subjective purpose for

stopping was solely and exclusively to conduct a welfare check. Evidently, in

Spaulding’s view, if the officer also had even the slightest inkling that criminal activity

might be afoot, then the community caretaker doctrine cannot apply and particularized

suspicion for the stop is necessary. Here, she contends, Croft had a “two-fold

motivation” in detaining her that included “his suspicion that Ms. Spaulding and her

passengers might be committing or about to commit a crime in this area which had a

history of burglaries.” Therefore, Spaulding maintains, the stop cannot be justified as a

community caretaker stop.

¶23 We reject this argument on both the facts and the law. For starters, throughout

Spaulding’s briefs on appeal, appellate counsel repeatedly mischaracterizes and distorts

Croft’s testimony, claiming that he “admitted he had a dual purpose in stopping and

13
investigating Ms. Spaulding.” Croft did not testify that he stopped to investigate whether

the occupants of the vehicle were committing a burglary or were involved in some other

criminal activity. What he said was that he stopped to conduct a welfare check, given the

weather, the time of day, the location, and the unusual manner in which the vehicle had

pulled over. Then, as he approached the vehicle, Croft considered the possibility that the

occupants might be dangerous or have weapons. As Croft specifically testified, his

knowledge that there had been some burglaries in the area played no part whatsoever in

his decision to stop. Rather, this knowledge was one of his concerns as he approached

the vehicle, because “[a]ny time I make an approach, there are hundreds of things that are

going through my mind that I’ve been trained to observe and look for.” Indeed, we

acknowledge, what should be obvious, that a law enforcement officer, by training, will

approach a stopped vehicle cognizant and alert to the fact that the occupants may be

armed and dangerous, and that the officer’s wariness will vary depending on the facts and

circumstances of each stop. Accordingly, the contention that Croft “considered [the

burglaries in the area] before he stopped Ms. Spaulding” (emphasis added) and admitted

to having a “dual purpose” in making the stop is inaccurate. The District Court, whose

province it was to assess Croft’s demeanor and credibility, State v. Whiteman, 2005 MT

15, ¶ 15, 325 Mont. 358, 106 P.3d 543, found that he “had the initial concern about

[Spaulding] at heart” and did not use the community caretaker doctrine as a pretext for a

criminal investigation.

¶24 More fundamentally, the requirements of the community caretaker doctrine are set

out at ¶ 25 of Lovegren, and there is no requirement that the officer’s subjective purpose

14
be solely and exclusively to conduct a welfare check. For that matter, in the same way

that it is impractical to analyze a defendant’s belief about whether she was free to leave,

it is likewise impractical to assess the officer’s subjective reasons for stopping and

making contact with the defendant. It is true that the community caretaker doctrine

cannot be used as a pretext for an illegal search and seizure. Lovegren, ¶ 23. For this

reason, we require that a welfare check be based on objective, specific, and articulable

facts from which an officer would suspect that a citizen is in need of help or is in peril,

Lovegren, ¶ 25, and that the stop actually involve a welfare check, see e.g. Graham,

¶¶ 30-31 (the officer’s admitted purpose was not to conduct a welfare check, but rather to

“move [the defendant] along”); State v. Reiner, 2003 MT 243, ¶¶ 21-22, 317 Mont. 304,

77 P.3d 210 (the officer did not stop out of concern for the defendant being in peril or in

need of assistance, but rather to commence an investigation based on a report of a

possibly intoxicated driver); Seaman, ¶ 30 (the officer’s initial questions reflected his

concern for the defendant’s well-being); cf. State v. Nelson, 2004 MT 13, ¶ 9, 319 Mont.

250, 84 P.3d 25 (even if the officer suspected that the defendant’s license was suspended,

the primary purpose of her stop was to determine whether any possible occupants of the

vehicle needed assistance).

¶25 In the present case, there were objective, specific, and articulable facts from which

an officer would suspect that a citizen was in peril or in need of help. The vehicle pulled

over abruptly, while Croft was still 200 yards away. In Croft’s experience, this indicated

that the driver might have a flat tire or car troubles. They were on a back road in a

desolate area, out “in the middle of nowhere,” and the road was “not a very well-travelled

15
road.” Moreover, the vehicle had out-of-area license plates, all of which indicated that

the driver could be lost. It was 1:25 a.m. on a January morning. It was dark, the wind

was blowing, and the temperature was below freezing. There were no homes in the

immediate vicinity, and a stranded motorist would be in a potentially perilous situation.

In these circumstances, it arguably would have been a dereliction of duty for Croft not to

stop. Seaman, ¶ 15 (“Assisting a motorist in peril or in apparent need of aid is often

viewed as an affirmative duty of the police and . . . it would be a dereliction of an

officer’s duty to walk away from an uncertain situation in which a motorist may be in

need of help.”). Croft did stop, activated only his rear emergency lights, made contact

with Spaulding, and inquired as to her well-being.

¶26 Spaulding makes much of the fact that Croft activated his lights, as though this

elevated the stop to something more than a welfare check. We disagree. It was necessary

and prudent for Croft to activate his overhead rear emergency lights for multiple reasons.

Most obviously, it alerted any motorist who might approach from behind to slow down

and pass with care. In this way, the lights served a safety purpose and protected Croft,

Spaulding, her passengers, and any passing motorist from injury. In addition, the lights,

which Spaulding admittedly could see, provided some assurance that the approaching

person was actually a law enforcement officer and not an imposter. Again, for Croft to

have left his rear emergency lights off arguably would have been a dereliction of duty.

The fact that he activated them did not, in itself, convert the situation from a community

caretaker stop into an investigative stop. Indeed, that he turned on only his rear lights is

evidence that this was in fact merely a welfare check, and not a full-blown traffic stop.

16
¶27 Next, Spaulding contends that Croft’s stop fails to satisfy the first prong of the

community caretaker test because, besides stopping to investigate whether the occupants

of the vehicle were committing burglaries or other crimes (which is not actually why he

stopped, as just discussed), Croft’s only other motivation was “his ‘extreme’ practice of

stopping and investigating everyone he sees who has pulled over and stopped on the side

of a road.” This is a reference to Croft’s testimony in the District Court that he “always

check[s] on a vehicle that pulls to the side of the road.” Croft testified that he believes

law enforcement is a community service profession and that much of his communication

with the public is not premised upon the suspicion of or investigation of a crime. As a

law enforcement officer, Croft stated that he has an obligation to provide aid to motorists

that need assistance. To that end, Croft had a policy—which he acknowledged “might

sound extreme”—of checking on any vehicle parked on the side of a road “under any

circumstances,” even if there is no evidence of wrongdoing, peril, or distress. Notably,

the District Court questioned Croft about this practice and applauded his commitment to

help people, but cautioned him that making a stop at every single vehicle pulled off to the

side of the road might not comply with constitutional protections against unreasonable

governmental interference. The District Court pointed out, correctly, that community

caretaker stops “turn on the facts of each case” and require “objective, specific, and

articulable facts” from which an officer would suspect that a citizen is in need of help or

is in peril. We agree with the District Court’s admonishment. Yet, while Spaulding

opines that Croft’s stop in her case was based on nothing more than his policy, the record

belies this contention. The facts cited by Croft were objective, specific, and articulable

17
facts indicating that the occupants of the vehicle that had pulled over in front of him

needed help or were in peril.

¶28 Lastly, Spaulding attempts to distinguish the present case from our decisions in

Lovegren, Nelson, Seaman, State v. Litschauer, 2005 MT 331, 330 Mont. 22, 126 P.3d

456, and State v. Wheeler, 2006 MT 38, 331 Mont. 179, 134 P.3d 38, where we held that

the community caretaker doctrine applied. She points out that she did not turn on her

emergency flashers, that she did not flag down Croft, that she was not slumped over the

steering wheel, that neither of her passengers acted like they were sick, that her car was

still running and the lights were still on, that she was not outside the car holding on for

support or exhibiting an emotionally excited appearance, that Croft had not received a

report regarding an agitated citizen, and that Croft was not ignorant of how long her

vehicle had been parked on the side of the road. Yet, the absence of such circumstances,

while relevant, does not negate the objective, specific, and articulable facts which did

exist: the cold winter weather; the remote and desolate location; the early morning hour;

the unusual and abrupt manner in which Spaulding pulled over, which was indicative of a

possible flat tire or car troubles; and the out-of-area license plate on a vehicle being

driven on a back road with very little traffic, which was indicative of a possibly lost

driver. Moreover, it was dark, which limited Croft’s ability to assess whether assistance

was required, thus necessitating that he stop and make contact with the vehicle’s driver.

¶29 Each community caretaker case turns on its discrete facts. That a particular case is

not, factually, a cookie-cutter copy of another simply proves this point. Given the

foregoing factual circumstances of the present case, which are a quintessential example

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of a situation to which the community caretaker doctrine applies, we hold that Croft was

fully justified in conducting a welfare check.

CONCLUSION

¶30 The District Court correctly denied Spaulding’s motion to suppress.

¶31 Affirmed.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS

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