DA 10-0303
April 12 2011
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2011 MT 70N
ESTATE OF CHRISTINE ANN REEDER,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
STANLEY H. OLSEN and JESSIE MERCAY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR CAPACITIES
AS TRUSTEES, CO-TRUSTEES, SUCCESSOR
TRUSTEES AND/OR SUCCESSOR CO-TRUSTEES
OF THE HAMMER HOLDINGS TRUST,
MILOVICH FAMILY TRUST, REVERE
FAMILY TRUST, CAR HOLDINGS and
CONSOLIDATED CREATIVE VENTURES, LTD,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lincoln, Cause No. DV 09-16
Honorable Michael C. Prezeau, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Stanley H. Olsen, self-represented; Aurora, Colorado
Jessie Mercay, self-represented; Patagonia, Arizona
For Appellee:
Grant S. Snell; Crowley, Fleck, PLLP; Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 16, 2011
Decided: April 12, 2011
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules,
this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as
precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly
list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Stanley H. Olsen (Olsen) and Jessie Mercay (Mercay), individually and in their capacities
as trustees of the Hammer Holdings Trust, Milovich Family Trust, Revere Family Trust, CAR
Holdings, and Consolidated Creative Ventures, Ltd. (referred to collectively as the “Trusts”),
appeal the summary judgment order entered by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln
County in favor of the Plaintiff, Estate of Christine Anne Reeder (Estate), holding that Olsen
violated the Montana Living Trust Act and the Securities Act of Montana and that the Trusts
were invalid under Montana law. Olsen and Mercay, pro se, raise numerous issues on appeal,
which include challenges to the District Court’s jurisdiction as well as to the District Court’s
determination of “undisputed facts” and its legal conclusions.
¶3 Decedent Christine Reeder (Christine), a resident of Lincoln County at the time of her
death, allegedly suffered abuse as a child at the hands of her older brother. As an adult she
befriended Mercay, who identifies herself as the Chancellor of American University of Mayonic
Science and Technology, a philosophy which, as the District Court quoted from a brochure,
‘“derives its history, philosophy, goals, and objectives and teaching from the work of Mamuni
Mayan who was a scholar, scientist, artist and builder approximately 10,000 years ago in the
ancient past of the Kumari continent and South India.’” Christine discussed with Mercay her
abuse and her concern that her brother would someday try to obtain possession of her property.
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¶4 Mercay referred Christine to Olsen, who had previously prepared a trust for Mercay.
Olsen is not a registered investment advisor or a licensed attorney in Montana. Christine and
Olsen had a telephone conversation in early 2007, while Christine was in Lincoln County and
Olsen was in Colorado, which resulted in Olsen preparing five trusts for her. Christine paid
Olsen $10,000 to prepare the Trusts. Christine traveled to Colorado in June or July 2007 to
review and sign the documents, which were back-dated to January 1, 2006. In conjunction with
signing the documents, Christine executed warranty deeds conveying parcels of real property
located in Montana to two of the Trusts, with the deeds also back-dated, and she placed her bank
accounts and personal property in the ownership of the Trusts.
¶5 The Trusts provided for the issuance of certificates of capital units and transfer of the
capital units among individuals and other trusts. Christine was named trustee, with Olsen named
“successor trustee.” The section for “situs” in the Trust documents listed the principal domicile
and place of business as Nevada for the Milovich, CAR Holdings, and Consolidated Creative
Ventures trusts, and Massachusetts for the Hammer Holdings and Revere trusts. The District
Court described the Trust documents as “page after page of pseudo-legal gibberish.” The Estate
contended that the Trusts would ultimately place Christine’s property in the hands of Mercay and
her relatives, an assertion which was not contested. Olsen and Mercay admitted the Trusts were
business trusts, and the District Court observed that this admission was consistent with the
definition of business trusts set forth in Title 35, chapter 5, MCA. The Trusts were not filed with
the Montana Secretary of State nor was a certificate or license obtained for their operation.
¶6 On January 3, 2007, Christine executed a will that named her mother Constance Reeder
(Connie) as the personal representative of Christine’s estate and devised to her the residue of
Christine’s estate. Christine died on December 24, 2008, in Libby. After probate was
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commenced and Connie was appointed personal representative, Connie initiated this action on
behalf of the Estate against the Trusts, Olsen, and Mercay. The Estate prayed that the Trusts be
declared invalid and title to real and personal property purportedly owned by the Trusts quieted
in the name of the Estate, and a permanent injunction be issued precluding the defendants from
accessing, removing, or encumbering property owned by the Trusts. The Estate further alleged a
violation of the Montana Living Trust Act, securities registration violations, securities fraud,
common law fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, deceit, and
sought punitive damages.
¶7 Following filing of the Estate’s motion for summary judgment, the court entered an order
granting partial summary judgment. The court ruled that the Trusts were invalid because they
were business trusts which had failed to comply with the requirements of § 35-5-201, MCA, and
had unlawfully conducted business in the state. The court held that the Trusts were invalid and
the transfers to them void, denying Defendants a grace period to apply for a license. Based on
this holding, the court concluded the Estate’s request for injunctive relief was moot. The court
further determined that Olsen violated the Montana Living Trust Act, which generally prohibits a
person from offering or selling a living trust in this state without licensure, § 30-10-904(1),
MCA, based on notes from Christine’s telephone conversations with Olsen regarding the Trusts.
As a penalty and pursuant to statute, the court directed that the Estate was entitled to recover the
$10,000 Christine paid Olsen to draft the Trusts. The court also found that the Estate was
entitled to summary judgment on its claim of securities registration violation for Olsen’s actions
in selling the Trusts, which it deemed to be securities, and awarded the Estate its attorney fees.
The court declined to rule on the Estate’s other claims because resolution would not increase the
Estate’s recovery, and denied punitive damages. The court subsequently dismissed the
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remaining claims on stipulation of the parties and entered final judgment, ordering that
Christine’s real and personal property be delivered to the Estate and awarding judgment against
Defendants joint and severally for attorney fees and against Olsen for his charged fee and
interest. The court granted a stay of judgment pending Defendants’ appeal to this Court. We
review an appeal from a summary judgment order de novo. Natl. Cas. Co. v. Am. Bankers Ins.
Co. of Fla., 2001 MT 28, ¶ 13, 304 Mont. 163, 19 P.3d 223.
¶8 Mercay and Olsen argue the District Court was without jurisdiction and that the Trusts
were formed properly under the law of Nevada. The Estate argues the court had subject matter
jurisdiction because its claims requested legal and equitable relief under the laws of Montana.
The Estate argues that regardless of what the trust documents state regarding their domicile,
Christine as trustee had the right to change the domicile of the Trusts and did so by living in
Libby her entire tenure as trustee. We conclude that subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate as
these claims are civil matters within the jurisdiction of the District Court, and Christine resided
and her property was situated in Montana. See § 3-5-302(1), MCA; In re Estate of Allen, 237
Mont. 114, 115, 772 P.2d 297, 298 (1989). Lack of personal jurisdiction was not raised below
and was therefore waived. M. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). In any event, personal jurisdiction was
established as to Olsen by the telephone communications with Christine while he was in
Colorado and Christine was in Montana.
¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The District
Court did not err in its determination that the issues in this case are legal and are controlled by
settled Montana law, which the District Court correctly interpreted.
¶10 Affirmed.
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/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
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