DUPASSEUR
v.
ROCHEREAU.
Supreme Court of United States.
*134 Mr. A.C. Story, for the plaintiff in error; Messrs. E. and A.C. Janin (with whom was Mr. Charles Andrew Johnson), contra.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
Where a State court refuses to give effect to the judgment of a court of the United States rendered upon the point in dispute, and with jurisdiction of the case and the parties, a question is undoubtedly raised which, under the act of 1867, may be brought to this court for revision. The case would be one in which a title or right is claimed under an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against the title or right so set up. It would thus be a case arising under the laws of the United States, establishing the Circuit Court and vesting it with jurisdiction; and hence it would be within the judicial power of the United States, as defined by the Constitution; and it is clearly within the chart of appellate power given to this court, over cases arising in and decided by the State courts.
The refusal by the courts of one State to give effect to the decisions of the courts of another State is an infringement of a different article of the Constitution, to wit, the first section of article four; and the right to bring such a case before us by writ of error under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, or the act of 1867, is based on the refusal of the State court to give validity and effect to the right claimed under that article and section.
In either case, therefore, whether the validity or due effect of a judgment of the State court, or that of a judgment of a United States court, is disallowed by a State court, the Constitution and laws furnish redress by a final appeal to this court.
*135 We cannot hesitate, therefore, as to our jurisdiction to hear the case.
The question then arises, did the Supreme Court of Louisiana in deciding against the claim of Dupasseur refuse, as the defendant charged, to give proper validity and effect to the judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States, and decide against such validity and effect?
The only effect that can be justly claimed for the judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States, is such as would belong to judgments of the State courts rendered under similar circumstances. Dupasseur & Co. were citizens of France, and brought the suit in the Circuit Court of the United States as such citizens; and, consequently, that court, deriving its jurisdiction solely from the citizenship of the parties, was in the exercise of jurisdiction to administer the laws of the State, and its proceedings were had in accordance with the forms and course of proceeding in the State courts. It is apparent, therefore, that no higher sanctity or effect can be claimed for the judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States rendered in such a case under such circumstances than is due to the judgments of the State courts in a like case and under similar circumstances. If by the laws of the State a judgment like that rendered by the Circuit Court would have had a binding effect as against Rochereau, if it had been rendered in a State court, then it should have the same effect, being rendered by the Circuit Court. If such effect is not conceded to it, but is refused, then due validity and effect are not given to it, and a case is made for the interposition of the power of reversal conferred upon this court.
We are bound to inquire, therefore, whether the judgment of the Circuit Court thus brought in question would have had the effect of binding and concluding Rochereau if it had been rendered in a State court. We have examined this question with some care, and have come to the conclusion that it would not.
The same general rule of law and justice prevails in Louisiana as elsewhere, to the effect that no persons are bound *136 by a judgment or decree except those who are parties to it, and have had an opportunity of presenting their rights. The only apparent exception to this rule in general, is the effect of a proceeding in rem, which from the necessity of the case is binding on all persons. This exception is only apparent, for indeed in that case all persons having any interest in the thing are deemed parties, and have the right to intervene pro interesse suo; and if after the lawful publications of notice have been made they fail to do so, they are considered as having acquiesced in the exercise of the jurisdiction. A further exception, in Louisiana, arises from the pact de non alienando in mortgages, which dispenses with the necessity of making subsequent grantees or mortgagees parties in a proceeding to enforce payment of the mortgage. They are to take notice at their peril.
In this case, Rochereau was not made a party to the suit of Dupasseur in the Circuit Court of the United States; and the only questions remaining, therefore, are whether that was a proceeding in rem, or whether Rochereau was a subsequent mortgagee to Dupasseur?
The fact that a sequestration was issued does not make the proceeding one in rem, as that was a mere ancillary process for preserving the movables and crops on the mortgaged property from waste and spoliation. It did not, in the slightest degree, change the character of the suit. And, in truth, it was never executed, as the return of the marshal shows. The question then recurs as to the character of the suit itself. It was an action brought against Sauvé on the judgment obtained against him by Jacobs in the District Court for Jefferson Parish, which judgment had been, in effect, assigned to Dupasseur. The petition prayed, besides a sequestration of the crops, &c., that Sauvé might be cited to appear and answer; that judgment might be rendered in favor of the petitioner for the sum of $37,011.99,[*] and interest and costs to be paid by right of special mortgage and with vendor's lien and privilege upon the plantation, slaves, *137 stock, &c., and that the same might be sold for cash for an amount sufficient to pay said judgment by preference, right of special mortgage and vendor's lien and privilege, and before all other creditors. This was, therefore, nothing but the ordinary hypothecary action brought to enforce payment of a special mortgage. It is called a real action in the Code of Practice, because it seeks the sale of particular property liable to the plaintiff's mortgage. But this does not necessarily make it a proceeding in rem in the sense of which we have spoken. It is brought against the person in possession, as well as the property, and the creditor can only seize and sell such property, after having obtained judgment against the debtor in the usual form.[*]
The case is, therefore, clearly not a proceeding in rem properly so called.
Then was Rochereau a subsequent mortgagee to Dupasseur? Was the latter entitled to priority? If so, Rochereau would be bound by the judgment though not made a party. But he contends that his is the prior lien and not the subsequent one.
Now we can find nothing in the Code of Practice or in the judicial decisions of the State of Louisiana, which goes to show that Rochereau or any other person claiming a prior lien to that of Dupasseur on the property in question would be concluded by this judgment and forever estopped from showing that truth. Unless there is something peculiar in the Louisiana laws which makes the effect of the judgment different from what it would be under other systems of jurisprudence, prior mortgagees, and those having elder titles not made parties to the suit, cannot be affected by the judgment.
Indeed the appellant's counsel does not contend that prior mortgagees, or those having prior liens or privileges, were affected, but he insists that subsequent mortgagees are affected, and are entitled only to the surplus proceeds which have been paid into court, and that it was not necessary to *138 make them parties because of the pact de non alienando; and he insists that Rochereau was a subsequent mortgagee.
Now that is the very point in dispute. Rochereau insists that by the non-inscription of the Jacobs mortgage within ten years, it lost its rank, and became the subsequent and not the prior mortgage. Grant that Rochereau was the subsequent mortgagee, and all that the appellant claims would necessarily follow. But that point is not granted; on the contrary it is the very matter in dispute, and on this vital point we think that Rochereau was not concluded by the judgment of the Circuit Court, because he was dnot a party to it. Therefore, the State court, in not regarding the decision of the Circuit Court as decisive of that question, did not refuse to that decision its due and legal effect.
The sections of the Code of Practice which direct the mode of proceeding at sheriff's sales under mortgage or other liens do not affect the question. They simply require, in substance, that the sheriff shall possess himself of the recorder's certificate of the various incumbrances on the property, and shall sell subject to all liens and privileges prior to that under which the sale is made; and if the property is bid off for more that those prior liens and privileges, the purchaser only pays the balance and takes the property subject to them. This shows that prior liens are not to be affected or disturbed. If the sheriff by a mistake of law or fact regards a prior lien as a subsequent one, surely his mistake cannot destroy or postpone the lien which he thus fails to assign to its proper place.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*] The amount of the previous judgment.
[*] Code of Practice, article 64.