IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 36445
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) 2010 Opinion No. 54
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Filed: August 5, 2010
v. )
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
CHRISTOPHER R. SCHULTZ, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia
County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge.
Order of the district court denying motion to withdraw guilty pleas, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Diane M. Walker, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Diane M. Walker argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
________________________________________________
PERRY, Judge Pro Tem
Christopher R. Schultz pleaded guilty to robbery and attempted rape with a sentence
enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. The district court denied Schultz’s post-sentencing
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, brought on the theory that the state had breached a plea
agreement with regard to its sentencing recommendations. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is the second time this case has come before this Court. While at his estranged
wife’s residence in violation of a no-contact order, then seventeen-year-old Schultz told a friend
of his plan to invade the home of a woman who lived in the apartment below in order to rape and
kill her. Armed with a knife and wearing a self-fashioned mask and gloves, he waited until the
victim’s husband left and then forced his way into the apartment. Once inside, he held the knife
to the victim’s throat and demanded money. He also demanded that she show him her breasts.
1
The victim distracted Schultz by throwing her purse at him, fled the apartment, and called the
police. Schultz also fled, taking the victim’s purse with him. Schultz was arrested a short time
later.
The state filed a petition under the Juvenile Corrections Act charging Schultz with four
felonies: battery with the intent to commit a serious felony (rape), burglary, robbery, and
attempted rape. Four sentence enhancements were alleged for using a deadly weapon in the
commission of those crimes. Seeking to prosecute Shultz as an adult, along with the petition, the
prosecution filed a motion to waive juvenile jurisdiction. 1 At the waiver hearing proceeding
before a magistrate judge, defense counsel stated:
[I]n talking with Christopher [Schultz] and previously talking with [prosecutor]
Mr. Schneider, Mr. Schneider agreed that upon waiver [to adult court] and if
Christopher ultimately ends up entering a guilty plea to at least some of the
charges, the State would make a recommendation to the district court judge of a
sentence not to exceed--and certainly it could be less than this depending on
negotiations, but not to exceed a five-year minimum and a 20 year top on the
sentence.
Certainly, without admitting any of the facts or the allegations in this
matter, but after reviewing the report with Christopher, he is prepared to waive his
rights as a juvenile and proceed into adult court. He realizes his situation is such
that certainly it’s very likely that he would be waived, and, therefore, he’s willing
to waive into the adult system, your Honor.
The deputy prosecutor did not respond to defense counsel’s statement. After considering
the factors enumerated in Idaho Code Section 20-508(8), in addition to Schultz’s stipulation, the
magistrate found that waiver of juvenile jurisdiction was warranted and entered an order to that
effect. The matter then proceeded in accord with an adult criminal prosecution. Specifically, the
prosecution filed a complaint in magistrate court, Schultz made an initial appearance before a
magistrate, and a magistrate conducted a preliminary hearing. After Schultz was bound over to
district court, he pleaded not guilty at the arraignment and a trial date was set. As per the
practice of the respective offices, the prosecutor and the defense counsel that attended the
juvenile proceeding no longer handled the case; instead, a different felony prosecutor and
defense counsel were assigned.
On the day the jury trial was set to commence, a plea agreement was placed on the record
before the district court. The agreement called for Schultz to enter a guilty plea to the robbery
1
See I.C. §§ 20-508, 20-509, 1-2208(4); Idaho Juvenile Rule 26.
2
charge, an Alford 2 guilty plea to the attempted rape charge, and to plead guilty to the deadly
weapon enhancement attendant to the attempted rape charge, with the remaining charges to be
dismissed. The agreement further provided that the prosecution would recommend twenty-year
fixed sentences, that it could recommend up to the maximum indeterminate sentences on both
charges, and that the defense was free to recommend any sentence thought appropriate. When
questioned by the trial court, Schultz indicated that this was his understanding of the plea
agreement.
At sentencing, the prosecution recommended a unified life sentence, with twenty years
fixed, for robbery and a concurrent unified thirty-year sentence, with twenty years fixed, for
attempted rape with the weapon enhancement. The defense asked for significantly lesser
sentences and requested retained jurisdiction. The district court imposed a unified life sentence,
with fifteen years fixed, for robbery and a concurrent unified thirty-year sentence, with fifteen
years fixed, for attempted rape with the weapon enhancement.
Schultz appealed from the judgment of conviction and the case was assigned to this
Court. On appeal, Schultz raised an issue that had not been preserved by objection below. He
argued that fundamental error occurred because the “plea agreement” outlined by defense
counsel at the juvenile waiver hearing was final and binding on the state and that the state’s
ultimate sentencing recommendation breached its terms. This Court, deeming the record
inadequate to resolve the issue, declined to decide which of the two plea agreements controlled.
State v. Schultz, Docket No. 33000 (Ct. App. May 13, 2008) (unpublished). We also specifically
noted that Schultz could pursue his claim through appropriate proceedings in the trial court
should he choose to do so. On the other issue presented, this Court affirmed the district court’s
sentences.
After Schultz I was issued, Schultz filed a motion with the trial court seeking to withdraw
his guilty pleas. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, holding,
among other things, that the plea “agreement” referred to by defense counsel at the waiver
hearing was preliminary in nature and that no meeting of the minds occurred until the final plea
agreement was reached later in the district court. Schultz appeals.
II.
2
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement
of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 433 (1971). “Whether a plea
agreement has been breached is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court de
novo, in accordance with contract law standards.” State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71,
73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005) (citing United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000,
1003 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also Puckett v. [United States], ---U.S. ----, ----, 129
S. Ct. 1423, 1430, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266, 276 (2009) (“[P]lea bargains are essentially
contracts. When the consideration for a contract fails--this is, when one of the
exchanged promises is not kept--. . . we say that the contract was broken.”).
In determining whether the State has breached a plea agreement a court
must examine the language of the plea agreement, and where the language of that
plea agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of the
defendant. State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 745, 52 P.3d 886, 890 (Ct. App.
2002). “The burden of proving the existence of a contract and the fact of its
breach is upon the plaintiff.” O’Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 813, 810 P.2d
1082, 1099 (1991); see also Johnson v. Nasi, 50 Wash. 2d 87, 309 P.2d 380, 382
(1957) (“The burden of proving a contract, whether express or implied, is on the
party asserting it, and he must prove each essential fact, including the existence of
a mutual intention.”).
The determination that a plea agreement is ambiguous is a question of law;
however, interpretation of an ambiguous term is a question of fact. State v. Allen,
143 Idaho 267, 272, 141 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Ct. App. 2006). Factual
determinations made by a trial court shall not be set aside on review unless they
are clearly erroneous. Bramwell v. S. Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39
P.3d 588, 590 (2001).
State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010).
III.
ANALYSIS
Schultz asserts that the “plea agreement” set forth on the record in front of a magistrate
judge was complete in its terms, and therefore it was final and binding on the district court and
the prosecutor at the felony sentencing. In support of his position, he relies heavily on our
Supreme Court’s opinion in Peterson. In that case, the defendant was arrested and initially
charged with a number of offenses all stemming from one incident, including one felony drug
charge. At the preliminary hearing on the felony charge, the prosecution moved for a
continuance because the lab testing on the substance had not been completed. The magistrate
denied the motion and dismissed the charge, telling the prosecutor that the charge could be re-
filed as a new complaint if a lab report was obtained. This was done, but the new felony
4
complaint and the original complaint, which now contained only two misdemeanor charges, were
not joined for trial but instead remained separate. At a plea hearing before a magistrate, Peterson
entered into an oral plea bargain wherein he pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor with an agreed-
upon sentence of six months probation and the other misdemeanor was dismissed. During the
hearing, defense counsel also said:
Your Honor, I just want to make sure that everybody knows-this all came from a
bunch of different charges and things, and this will resolve this entire case, just in
case we don’t think it does. I assume it would automatically, but I just wanted to
put that on the record.
The prosecutor said nothing to dispute this articulation, the plea bargain was accepted by the
magistrate, and Petersen was sentenced.
After Peterson completed his misdemeanor probation, the state pursued the felony drug
charge. Peterson moved to dismiss, contending that the charge had been disposed of by the plea
agreement. The district court denied the motion, but on appeal from the defendant’s subsequent
conviction our Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that Peterson met his burden of proving
the existence and content of the plea agreement, that ambiguities regarding the content of a plea
agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the defendant, and that while the general rule is that
silence does not constitute acceptance of an offer, the case fell outside of the general rule. Id. at
596-97, 226 P.3d at 538-39. Specifically, the Court said:
The record shows that Peterson, as the party attempting to enforce the
contract, met his burden of proving the existence and content of that contract
through the introduction of the transcript of the December 1, 2003, plea hearing,
wherein Peterson’s counsel recited the terms of the plea agreement, such terms
being agreed to by the State, and then offered his clarifying statement of the scope
of the agreement, with no objection or response from the State. The record before
us demonstrates that Peterson understood the plea agreement to be in resolution of
all charges arising from his August 20, 2003, arrest. Following Peterson’s
counsel’s clarifying statement, the prosecutor stood silent. Based upon the facts
of this case, where both the prosecution and defense have assented to entry of the
plea agreement contract, and where, immediately following the court’s acceptance
of the plea agreement, defense counsel proffers a description of the scope of the
plea agreement, said description differing from what the prosecutor understands
the agreement to encompass, the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to dispute the
defendant’s representation of the scope of the plea agreement, or to ask for further
time to clarify the agreement. Otherwise silence shall be interpreted as
acceptance of the stated terms.
Here the prosecution understood what Peterson believed the plea
agreement to be, and took the benefit of that contract in allowing Peterson to
5
plead guilty and complete his probation. Having taken that benefit with the
knowledge that Peterson believed the guilty plea was in resolution of all charges
arising from the August 20, 2003, arrest, the prosecution cannot now deny
Peterson his benefits under that contract. As was noted by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1234 (9th Cir. 1980), in
some cases the duty of the prosecutor to act in good faith throughout the plea
bargaining phase includes an obligation to inform the defendant of other charges
which may be filed. In light of the fact that the felony charge had previously been
dismissed, and the statement made by Peterson’s counsel about the scope of the
plea agreement, this was clearly such a case.
Id. On this holding, our Supreme Court vacated the felony conviction.
Schultz’s circumstance is different than was Peterson’s in a material way. In Peterson,
the defendant satisfied his burden of proving the existence of a plea agreement contract and the
issue presented was the scope of that agreement, which was ambiguous, and our Supreme Court
resolved that ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Here, in contrast, the preliminary issue
presented is whether Schultz proved that the parties’ mutual intention was to enter into a binding
plea agreement at the time of the juvenile waiver hearing. In this circumstance, Schultz is not
entitled to resolution of ambiguity in his favor, instead he bears the initial burden of proving the
existence of a contract and each essential fact, including mutual intent to contract. Id. at 595,
226 P.3d at 537.
Here, the district court held, in essence, that the plea “agreement” referred to by defense
counsel at the juvenile waiver hearing was preliminary in nature and that no meeting of the
minds occurred until the final plea agreement was entered before the trial court. The record
supports the district court’s conclusion. At the evidentiary hearing on Schultz’s motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas, it was established that there were four attorneys involved in Shultz’s
case: a juvenile prosecutor and a juvenile defense counsel, who handled only the juvenile waiver
hearing, and a felony prosecutor and a felony defense counsel, who handled the case after
juvenile jurisdiction was waived. The juvenile defense counsel testified that when reciting a
contemplated plea agreement in juvenile court for the magistrate’s information he sometimes
was specific in detailing all the terms and sometimes merely provided a general summary of the
plea agreement, but that he could not remember which occurred here. Juvenile defense counsel
could not remember whether he ever had a conversation with the juvenile prosecutor regarding a
plea agreement at all and the juvenile prosecutor could not remember having any such
conversation. The juvenile prosecutor further testified that, although he was authorized to
6
negotiate plea agreements in criminal cases, he generally would not negotiate plea agreements in
felony cases resulting from a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and that the felony prosecutor would
be responsible for those negotiations. The felony prosecutor testified in concurrence with the
juvenile prosecutor on these points. 3
In addition, at the hearing a written plea offer, prepared by the felony prosecutor prior to
the juvenile waiver hearing, was placed in the record. The offer called for Schultz to waive
juvenile jurisdiction, to waive his right to a preliminary hearing on the felonies, and to plead
guilty at arraignment to battery with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), a deadly weapon
enhancement on that charge, and to robbery. If all of these conditions were met, the written offer
provided that in exchange the prosecution would, at sentencing, recommend concurrent unified
sentences of twenty years, with five years fixed. However, neither the juvenile prosecutor nor
the juvenile defense counsel could remember whether they saw this document or whether the
juvenile defense counsel’s recitation of the “agreement” at the waiver hearing was intended as a
summary of that written offer. If so, it is uncontested that Schultz’s only performance in accord
with that offer was to waive juvenile jurisdiction. He did not waive his preliminary hearing and
he did not plead guilty to the specified charges at the district court arraignment. Instead, pretrial
proceedings continued, including ongoing and numerous plea negotiations between the felony
defense attorney and the felony prosecutor, necessitated largely by the fact that Schultz did not
want to plead guilty to a sex offense.
Further, the parties’ actions at the district court level belie the conclusion that the parties
had reached a final plea agreement resolution early on in the case. At the change of plea hearing
before the district court the terms of the plea agreement were placed in the record as follows:
[PROSECUTOR]: The defendant is going to enter guilty pleas to three
separate counts; robbery, which is Count V of the information; attempted rape,
which is Count VII; along with the enhanced penalty, which is Count VII [sic].
At the time of sentencing the state will recommend a sentence of 20 years
fixed, and then it’s free to recommend up to the maximum for an indeterminate
period of time. And I guess another way of saying that is that the state can
recommend up to 20 to life in this case.
At the time of sentencing the remaining counts would be dismissed.
Additionally, it’s my understanding that with respect to Count VII, the defendant
would be entering an Alford plea, but to the other counts, specifically the robbery,
3
Felony defense counsel did not testify at the motion hearing.
7
the plea would be a straight up guilty plea. I believe that covers our plea
agreement at this time.
THE COURT: All right. If I understand correctly, Mr. Schultz, the state
advises me that you’re going to plead guilty to Count V, and Count V is robbery;
and you’re going to plead to Count VII, and Count VII is attempted rape; and
you’re going to plead to an enhanced penalty.
The state--If you do that, the state’s going to recommend 20 years fixed
and some more, but they haven’t told me how much more that would be
indeterminate; and that you would be entering a North Carolina Alford plea on
Count VII, attempted rape; and you would be pleading straight up to the robbery.
Is that correct, [defense counsel]?
....
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The only other term, the specific term and
condition of the plea negotiations is that the defendant will be free to recommend
whatever sentence he feels is appropriate at the time of sentencing. This is
certainly not a stipulated sentence. I’ll just leave it at that. Thank you, your
Honor.
....
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I did want to add one additional
item for the record, and that is that as part of the plea negotiations, the state had
specifically agreed to not attempt at any point in the future to file attempted
murder charges against this defendant based upon the same set of facts and
circumstances.
After a break in the proceedings, the district court continued:
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Schultz, your lawyer is telling me that
you now intend to enter a guilty plea, a North Carolina versus Alford guilty plea
to Count V, robbery, to Count VII, attempted rape, with an enhanced penalty,
count number eight.
As I remember . . . the prosecutor will be asking for 20 fixed, plus an
unspecified indeterminate term. There’s an agreement that no attempted murder
charge would be filed and that your lawyer can argue to me any sentence you
wish. Is that your understanding of the plea agreement?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
Thus, the felony prosecutor, felony defense counsel, the district court and Schultz all
participated in the discussions. Unlike the prosecutor in Peterson, the felony defense counsel
here did not stand silent, but instead clarified specific terms of the plea agreement, including that
Schultz was free to argue for any sentence he felt was appropriate in recognition of the state’s
sentencing recommendation. Prior to entering his guilty pleas before the district court, Schultz
filed no motion seeking enforcement of the earlier “agreement” that he now contends was final
and binding, including at the felony change of plea hearing where the “contrary” terms of a plea
8
agreement were recited in full and complete detail. 4 In fact, there is no indication in the record
that the earlier “agreement” was ever disclosed to the district court by counsel prior to Schultz
entering his guilty plea. Instead, the juvenile waiver hearing “agreement” first came to light as
an issue raised by appellate counsel during Schultz’s direct appeal. Based on the foregoing, we
affirm the district court’s conclusion that Schultz had failed to meet his burden to show that the
juvenile waiver hearing recitation was intended as a complete and final plea agreement. 5
Schultz has failed to establish error in the district court’s determination that defense
counsel’s juvenile waiver hearing recitation did not constitute a final plea agreement.
Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Schultz’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas is
affirmed.
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
4
Even assuming there was an “agreement” which led to Schultz waiving juvenile
jurisdiction, because Schultz suffered no significant detrimental reliance on the facts of this case,
the parties here were free to continue negotiations and modify the first “agreement” or reach a
second, different plea agreement for a final disposition of Schultz’s case.
5
At oral argument, Schultz contended that under the “plea agreement” entered into at the
juvenile waiver hearing, he was free to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial then change
his mind and “accept” the agreement in the middle of trial by pleading guilty to “some” of the
charges. The inequity of this extreme result is readily apparent, as it defeats the general purpose
of a plea agreement, which is to avoid the necessity of the jury trial in the first place.
9