IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 32637
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) 2007 Opinion No. 15
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Filed: March 13, 2007
v. )
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
MICHAEL SHAWN DAVIS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bonner County. Hon. Steven C. Verby, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction and unified five-year sentence with two-year determinate
term for possession of methamphetamine, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Heather M. Carlson, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
______________________________________________
LANSING, Judge
Michael Shawn Davis was convicted, by jury trial, of possession of methamphetamine,
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1). He appeals, contending that the charging information did not allege
an offense and was therefore jurisdictionally defective. Specifically, Davis argues that the
information was deficient because it omitted an element of the alleged offense--that Davis
knowingly was in possession of methamphetamine.
The statute that Davis was charged with violating, I.C. § 37-2732(c), specifies, “It is
unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance,” including methamphetamine. The
statute does not expressly require that the possession be knowing or intentional but, as Davis
correctly points out, the Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to require “a general
intent, that is, the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance.” State v. Fox, 124 Idaho
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924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993). See also State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356, 360, 900 P.2d
1367, 1371 (1995).
The information filed against Davis alleges that he committed the crime of “Possession of
a Controlled Substance, Methamphetamine, a Felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-
2732(c)(1)” and that he committed that offense by “unlawfully possess[ing] a controlled
substance, to wit: Methamphetamine . . . .” Davis did not object to the sufficiency of this
information in the trial court. On appeal, however, he contends that because the information
contains no allegation that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the substance, the
information does not allege all the elements of the crime and therefore does not charge an
offense sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Idaho courts.
Subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case arises from the filing of a charging
document alleging that an offense was committed within the state of Idaho. Idaho Criminal
Rule 12(b)(2); State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 701-02 (2004); State v.
Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004). A jurisdictional challenge to a charging
document may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. Jones, 140 Idaho at
758, 101 P.3d at 702. Where an objection that a charging document is jurisdictionally deficient
is not made before trial, however, liberal construction standards apply. Id. at 759, 101 P.3d at
703; State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 536 n.3, 148 P.3d 1278, 1282 n.3 (Ct. App. 2006). In that
circumstance, the charging document will be upheld “unless it is so defective that it does not, by
any fair or reasonable construction, charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted.”
Jones, 140 Idaho at 759, 101 P.3d at 703 (quoting State v. Cahoon, 116 Idaho 399, 400, 775 P.2d
1241, 1242 (1989)). This liberal standard confers upon a reviewing court “considerable leeway
to imply the necessary allegations from the language of the Information.” State v. Robran, 119
Idaho 285, 287, 805 P.2d 491, 493 (Ct. App. 1991). Moreover, in Jones and in State v. Quintero,
141 Idaho 619, 115 P.3d 710 (2005), the Supreme Court held that when an objection to a
charging document is tardily made, if the applicable code section is named in the charging
document, the statutory language may be read into the text of the charge to determine
jurisdictional sufficiency.
Davis argues that the information in his case was deficient, even under the liberal
construction rule of Jones and Quintero, because although the statute was cited in the charging
information, the statute does not expressly include the knowledge element for possession of a
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controlled substance, and therefore reading the language of the statute into the charging
document does not cure the asserted deficiency.
We conclude that the charging information in Davis’s case was nevertheless sufficient to
confer jurisdiction. The information specifically alleges that Davis was in “possession” of
methamphetamine and that he “unlawfully” possessed the drug. Each of these terms is sufficient
to imply the missing knowledge element. While it is possible to have an item on one’s person
and be unaware of its presence, the term “possession,” as commonly employed, fairly implies
that a person knows of the item’s presence and intends to hold it. Further, the allegation that
Davis “unlawfully” possessed the drug necessarily implies that he knew of its presence, for
without that knowledge his act would not be unlawful. The inclusion of this modifier excludes
innocent, unknowing possession. Consequently, employing the liberal construction standards
that apply because this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, we hold that the information
was sufficient to charge the crime and to vest the district court with jurisdiction to hear the case.1
Davis also asserts that his unified sentence of five years, with two years determinate, is
excessive. The objectives of sentencing, against which the reasonableness of a sentence is to be
measured, are the protection of society, the deterrence of crime, the rehabilitation of the offender
and punishment or retribution. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App.
1982). In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, we conduct an independent review of the
record, focusing on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. Young,
119 Idaho 510, 511, 808 P.2d 429, 430 (Ct. App. 1991). We will find that the trial court abused
its discretion in sentencing only if the defendant, in light of the objectives of sentencing, shows
that his sentence was excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Charboneau,
124 Idaho 497, 499, 861 P.2d 67, 69 (1993); State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482,
490 (1992).
Applying these standards, and in view of Davis’s extensive criminal record, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion in fashioning the sentence.
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We do not hold or imply that this allegation would be sufficient to put a defendant on
notice of the knowledge element. The court in Jones made clear that adequacy of notice to the
defendant is not the focus in determining jurisdictional sufficiency. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758-59,
101 P.3d at 702-03. See also Murray, 143 Idaho at 535, 148 P.3d at 1281. Concerns about
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The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
Chief Judge PERRY and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR.
notice to the defendant are addressed by the constitutional guarantee of due process, see id., but
no violation of due process is asserted here.
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