dissenting.
I dissent. While the majority correctly states that our task is to examine the contract documents and determine whether or not the provisions within are ambiguous, the majority fails to recognize one of the basic rules of contract interpretation. A contract must be construed as a whole, considering each clause and word with reference to all other provisions and giving effect to each whenever possible. Marcoin, Inc. v. McDaniel, 70 N.C. App. 498, 320 S.E. 2d 892 (1984). With this duty in mind, the provisions of the contract in the case sub judice are unambiguous and the waiver contained in 11.4 prevents plaintiffs from bringing this action.
The owner was required by the contract to purchase “all risk” and property insurance. Knowing this and realizing that the waiver in 11.4 applies only to damages to the work occurring during construction, section 11.5 requires defendants to purchase professional liability insurance covering the following: During construction, defendants were to insure against damages other than to the work itself resulting from defendants’ negligence, including claims for bodily injury, damage to other property and claims made by third parties. After construction was completed, however, defendants were additionally required to obtain insurance covering damage to the work itself.
Reading each clause with reference to the other provisions and giving each effect, it is clear that the owner waived its rights to recover from other parties for damages covered by insurance. See Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. v. H.R.H. Construction Corp., 66 N.Y. 2d 779, 488 N.E. 2d 115, 497 N.Y.S. 2d 369 (1985); South Tippecanoe School Bldg. Corp. v. Shambaugh & Son, Inc., 182 Ind. App. 350, 395 N.E. 2d 320 (1979); Village of Rosemont v. Lentin Lumber Co., 144 Ill. App. 3d 651, 494 N.E. 2d 592 (1986). Thus, I find no error in the trial court’s granting of defendants’ motion to dismiss.