IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 37505/37507
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 312
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: January 10, 2011
)
v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
TONY RICHARD JONES, ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
Defendant-Appellant. ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge.
Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified four-year sentence
with two-year determinate term for fraudulent use of a financial transaction card,
and concurrent unified four-year sentence with two-year determinate term for
forgery, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Erik R. Lehtinen, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J. Spencer, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
Before LANSING, Judge, GUTIERREZ, Judge
and MELANSON, Judge
PER CURIAM
These appeals are consolidated. In Docket No. 37505 Tony Richard Jones was convicted
of fraudulent use of a financial transaction card, I.C. § 18-3124(1), and in Docket No. 37507,
Jones was convicted of forgery, I.C. § 18-3601. The district court withheld judgment in both
cases, placed Jones on probation and admitted him to mental health court. Following several
violations, Jones’s probation was revoked and the district court imposed concurrent unified four-
year sentences with two-year determinate terms, but after a period of retained jurisdiction,
suspended the sentences and placed Jones on probation. Jones again admitted to violating
several terms of the probation, and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered
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execution of the original sentences. Jones appeals, contending that the district court abused its
discretion in revoking probation.
It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122
Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772
P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App.
1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation
is (1) achieving the goal of rehabilitation and (2) consistent with the protection of society. State
v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834
P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation
has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the
court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at
325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). A
decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court
abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327.
Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review
and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well
established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822
P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-
73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id. Applying these standards,
and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion.
Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Jones’s previously
suspended sentences is affirmed.
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