United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
MISCELLANEOUS DOCKET NO. 908
IN RE UNITED STATES,
Petitioner.
Brian C. Toth, Attorney, Appellate Section, Environment and Natural
Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for
petitioner. With him on the petition was John C. Cruden, Acting Assistant Attorney
General.
Steven D. Gordon, Holland & Knight LLP, of Washington, DC, for respondent
Jicarilla Apache Nation.
Alan R. Taradash, Nordhaus Law Firm, LLP, of Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
amici curiae Navajo Nation and Pueblo of Laguna. With him on the brief were
Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear, of Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Donald H. Grove, of
Washington, DC.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States Court of Federal Claims
Judge Francis M. Allegra
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
MISCELLANEOUS DOCKET NO. 908
IN RE UNITED STATES,
Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States Court of Federal Claims
in case no. 02-25L, Judge Francis M. Allegra.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Before LOURIE, FRIEDMAN, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges.
GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
The United States petitions for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Federal
Claims (“trial court”) to vacate its orders requiring the United States to produce
documents that it asserts are protected by the attorney-client privilege. Jicarilla Apache
Nation (“Jicarilla”) opposes. We hold that the United States cannot deny an Indian
tribe’s request to discover communications between the United States and its attorneys
based on the attorney-client privilege when those communications concern
management of an Indian trust and the United States has not claimed that the
government or its attorneys considered a specific competing interest in those
communications. Accordingly, we adopt the fiduciary exception in tribal trust cases.
Under the fiduciary exception, a fiduciary may not block a beneficiary from discovering
information protected under the attorney-client privilege when the information relates to
fiduciary matters, including trust management. Because we find that the trial court
correctly applied the fiduciary exception to the United States’ privileged
communications, we deny the United States’ petition for a writ of mandamus.
BACKGROUND
Jicarilla sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims for a breach of
fiduciary duties, alleging that the United States mismanaged the tribe’s trust assets and
other funds. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 1, 4 (2009). The trial
court divided the case into phases. The first phase only concerns the government’s
management of Jicarilla trust accounts from 1972 to 1992. Id. During this phase, the
tribe moved to compel discovery of documents related to the management of the trust
funds that the United States asserted were protected by the attorney-client privilege, the
work-product doctrine, and the deliberative process privilege. Id. In response, the
United States “agreed to produce 71 of the 226 documents listed in its privilege log
based, in part, upon withdrawing any deliberative process privilege claims,” but
maintained its privilege claims over the remaining 155 documents. Id. Per court order,
the trial court reviewed the remaining 155 documents in camera. Id.
The trial court held that the United States could not deny Jicarilla’s request to
discover communications between the United States and its attorneys based on the
attorney-client privilege because those communications were subject to the fiduciary
exception. Id. at 11–12. The trial court explained that under the fiduciary exception,
“fiduciaries may not shield from their beneficiaries communications between them and
their attorneys that relate to fiduciary matters, including the administration of trusts.” Id.
at 10. According to the trial court, the fiduciary exception applied to the “‘general trust
Misc. 908 2
relationship between the United States and the Indian people,’ which comprises a
‘distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government.’” Id. at 6 (quoting United
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1982)). The trial court opined that “basic trust
principles are readily transferable to” the United States’ fiduciary relationship with Indian
tribes. Id. at 11–12. The trial court noted that Congress had enacted legislation
appointing the United States as trustee over “56 million acres of land and billions of
dollars in tribal assets” and created an Office of Special Trustee “to ensure that each
tribe received as complete a trust fund accounting as soon as possible.” Id. at 5 (citing
25 U.S.C. §§ 4041–44 (2006)). Though statutes undoubtedly “delimit somewhat the
government’s obligations,” the trial court explained that the U.S. Supreme Court had
evaluated the fiduciary relationship using principles of common law and had judged
tribal trust cases with the “‘most exacting fiduciary standards.’” Id. at 6 (quoting
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942)).
With these principles in mind, the trial court applied the fiduciary exception,
requiring the United States to produce many of the documents that were not otherwise
protected as work product. Id. at 13–19. The trial court organized the documents that
Jicarilla requested into five categories, including (1) Department of the Interior
(“Interior”) personnel requests for advice from the Interior Solicitor’s Office (“Solicitor’s
Office”) on administration of tribal trusts, (2) Solicitor’s Office advice to Interior and
Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) personnel, (3) accounting firm Arthur Andersen
LLP documents generated under contracts with Interior, (4) Interior documents
concerning litigation with tribes other than Jicarilla, and (5) miscellaneous documents
such as cover sheets and other documents not falling into the other categories. Id. at 6.
The court applied the fiduciary exception to all the documents in the first category
Misc. 908 3
except for duplicates because the “documents involve matters regarding the
administration of tribal trusts, either directly or indirectly implicating the investments that
benefit Jicarilla.” Id. at 14. With few exceptions, the trial court also applied the fiduciary
exception to documents in the second category because the documents contained
“legal advice relating to trust administration.” Id. at 16. In contrast to the first two
categories, the trial court allowed the United States to withhold most of the documents
in the third category from production as attorney work product. Id. at 17–18. As to the
fourth category, the trial court allowed the United States to withhold most of the
documents as work product, but required the government to produce four documents
with the exception of two footnotes. Id. at 18. According to the trial court, those
documents either did not constitute attorney work product at all or, if privileged, were
subject to the fiduciary exception. Id. Finally, the trial court required the United States
to produce two documents that fell under the fiduciary exception in the fifth category
because the documents concerned trust management and various cover sheets that did
not appear to be protected by either the attorney-client privilege or the work-product
doctrine. Id. at 19.
The United States now petitions for a writ of mandamus to vacate the trial court’s
order requiring production of the above documents under the fiduciary exception. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
DISCUSSION
This court has the authority to issue a writ of mandamus against a lower court
under common law as codified in the All Writs Act. “[A]ll courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
Misc. 908 4
(2006). Mandamus is available only in extraordinary cases to correct a lower court’s
usurpation of judicial power or clear abuse of discretion. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542
U.S. 367, 380 (2004); see also In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1387
(Fed. Cir. 1996). A party seeking a writ of mandamus bears the burden of proving that it
has no other means of attaining the relief desired, Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S.
296, 309 (1989), and that its “right to issuance of the writ is ‘clear and indisputable,’”
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953) (quoting United States ex
rel. Bernardin v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899)). Accordingly, the writ is a “‘drastic and
extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes.’” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380
(quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947)).
Notwithstanding the extraordinary nature of mandamus, this court has issued the
writ in appropriate cases “to prevent the wrongful exposure of privileged
communications.” Regents, 101 F.3d at 1387; see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
Carpenter, 78 U.S.L.W. 4019, 4022 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2009) (noting that an appellate court
may grant a writ of mandamus to correct a “particularly injurious or novel privilege
ruling”). “Specifically, ‛mandamus review may be granted of discovery orders that turn
on claims of privilege when (1) there is raised an important issue of first impression, (2)
the privilege would be lost if review were denied until final judgment, and (3) immediate
resolution would avoid the development of doctrine that would undermine the privilege.’”
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quoting
Regents, 101 F.3d at 1388). Accordingly, mandamus may be appropriate to correct a
lower court that ordered a party to produce documents in violation of the attorney-client
privilege. See id. at 1375–76 (granting mandamus to correct a district court that held a
party had waived the attorney-client privilege protecting trial counsel’s client
Misc. 908 5
communications and work product by asserting the advice-of-counsel defense in patent
infringement suit); Regents, 101 F.3d at 1390–91 (granting mandamus to correct a
district court that misconstrued the community of interest doctrine by ordering patent
licensee’s in-house counsel to testify about advice given to patentee during prosecution
when licensee and patentee entered into an exclusive option contract and in-house
counsel assumed responsibility for patent prosecution).
As a matter of first impression, the United States petitions for a writ of
mandamus, asserting, inter alia, that the fiduciary exception does not apply to it
because its relationship to the tribe is different than a traditional fiduciary relationship.
The United States explains that the fiduciary exception is based on two primary
rationales, including (1) the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries and (2) the
fiduciary’s duty to provide information to beneficiaries. Based on these rationales, the
United States argues the following: First, it argues that the fiduciary exception’s
rationales should not apply to its duties to tribes because the United States has
competing interests to consider when administering the trust. Second, the United
States argues that the attorney-client privilege should protect the documents here
because the payment for the legal services did not come from the trust corpus. Third,
the United States argues that applying the exception to the attorney-client privilege
would improperly impair its ability to seek confidential legal advice. Finally, the United
States argues that it does not have a fiduciary duty to disclose information to
beneficiaries.
The United States’ petition for mandamus thus asks us to interpret the bounds of
the attorney-client privilege. This court interprets privileges on a case-by-case basis
according to “principles of the common law” when federal law is at issue. Fed. R. Evid.
Misc. 908 6
501; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396–97 (1981). Accordingly,
we will begin with a summary of the attorney-client privilege and the fiduciary exception
before examining how the privilege should apply in this case.
I. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Development of the Fiduciary
Exception
The attorney-client privilege is the client’s right to refuse to disclose confidential
“communications between attorney and client made for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice.” Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir.
1997); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (“Confidential
disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance are
privileged.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1235 (8th ed. 2004). The privilege “encourag[es]
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients” and “recognizes that
sound legal advice . . . depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). But the privilege “belongs to
the client, who alone may waive it.” In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). An attorney may not assert the privilege against the client’s
wishes or against the client himself. See Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 828 F.2d
734, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The privilege is that of the client, not that of the attorney.”).
While “[t]he attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law,” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389, it is not “an
ironclad veil of secrecy,” Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the privilege, for example, holding
that it does not protect communications made in the furtherance of a crime or fraud.
See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of the crime-
Misc. 908 7
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege [is] to assure that the seal of secrecy
between lawyer and client does not extend to communications made for the purpose of
getting advice for the commission of a fraud or crime.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 807 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (discussing the crime-fraud exception). Moreover, we have recognized the joint
client or community of interest doctrine: “When the same attorney represents the
interests of two or more entities on the same matter, those represented are viewed as
joint clients for purposes of privilege.” In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386,
1389 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Under this doctrine, “communications between a client and the
attorney may be privileged as to outsiders, [but] they are not privileged” between clients
in a community of interest relationship. Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 482 F.3d 225, 231
(3d Cir. 2007). Several courts have recognized another limitation on the attorney-client
privilege, known as the fiduciary exception.
As early as 1855, English courts required a trustee to produce legal advice to a
beneficiary when the beneficiary sued the trustee for mismanagement and the advice
related to trust administration. Devaynes v. Robinson, 20 Beav. 42, 43, 52 Eng. Rep.
518, 518 (1855) (“[C]ases and opinions taken by the . . . trustees must be produced” to
the beneficiaries as long as the trustee did not obtain them in contemplation of
litigation); Recent Cases, In re Whitworth, 1 Ch. 320 (1919), 33 Harv. L. Rev. 120
(1919). However, the attorney-client privilege still applied to advice that the trustee
sought in anticipation of litigation. Id. After Devaynes, English courts have followed the
so-called exception to the attorney-client privilege in beneficiary suits against a trustee
for trust mismanagement. See, e.g., Talbot v. Marshfield, 2 Dr. & Sm. 549, 551 62 Eng.
Rep. 728, 729 (1865) (“[I]f a trustee properly takes the opinion of counsel to guide him
Misc. 908 8
in the execution of the trust, he has a right to be paid the expense of so doing out of the
trust estate; and that alone would give any [beneficiary] a right to see the case and
opinion.”); Wynne v. Humbertson, 27 Beav. 421, 423, 54 Eng. Rep. 165, 166 (1858)
(“[T]he rule is that, where the relation of trustee and [beneficiary] is established, all
cases submitted and opinions taken by the trustee to guide himself in the administration
of his trust, and not for the purpose of his own defense in any litigation . . . , must be
produced to the [beneficiary].”); In re Mason, 22 Ch. D. 609, 609 (1883) (holding that the
trustees must produce documents containing “communications by and to the trustees
and their solicitors in relation to the trust estate, made before the action was brought”).
These English courts reasoned that a beneficiary was entitled to access the advice of
counsel because the trustee sought the advice on how to execute the trust for the
beneficiary’s benefit and because the trust fund paid for the advice. See Wynne, 27
Beav. at 423–24, 54 Eng. Rep. at 166; Talbot, 2 Dr. & Sm. at 550–51, 62 Eng. Rep. at
729.
Though much later, courts in the United States also adopted the fiduciary
exception. In 1970, the Fifth Circuit held that shareholders could pierce a corporation’s
attorney-client privilege to discover legal advice given to corporate management in a
suit for breach of fiduciary duty upon a showing of good cause. Garner, 430 F.2d at
1103–04. The Fifth Circuit identified nine factors courts should consider in finding good
Misc. 908 9
cause. Id. at 1104. 1 In reaching its conclusion, the court recognized that a corporation
or its managers may sometimes have conflicting interests with shareholders and that
shareholders may have conflicting interests among themselves. Id. at 1101 & n.17.
“But when all is said and done management is not managing for itself,” rather it “has
duties which run to the benefit ultimately of the stockholders.” Id. at 1101. Analogizing
to the crime-fraud exception and the community of interest doctrine, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the attorney-client privilege had limits when the person seeking legal
advice had a superseding obligation to shareholders or some other client was entitled to
the advice. Id. at 1103.
Since Garner, U.S. courts have applied the fiduciary exception in contexts other
than derivative shareholder actions. For example, courts have applied the exception in
trust cases when trustees assert the attorney-client privilege against beneficiaries, as in
the leading American case Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709
(Del. Ch. 1976). Courts have also relied on the exception in other fiduciary
relationships, such as when employers managing plans regulated under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) have asserted privilege against plan
1
The nine Garner factors are as follows:
[1] [T]he number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they
represent; [2] the bona fides of the shareholders; [3] the nature of the
shareholders’ claim and whether it is obviously colorable; [4] the apparent
necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the information and the
availability of it from other sources; [5] whether, if the shareholders' claim
is of wrongful action by the corporation, it is of action criminal, or illegal but
not criminal, or of doubtful legality; [6] whether the communication related
to past or to prospective actions; [7] whether the communication is of
advice concerning the litigation itself; [8] the extent to which the
communication is identified versus the extent to which the shareholders
are blindly fishing; [9] the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other
information in whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for
independent reasons.
Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104.
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beneficiaries and when unions have asserted privilege against union members. See
Becher v. Long Island Lighting Co. (In re Long Island Lighting Co.), 129 F.3d 268, 271–
72 (2d Cir. 1997) (employer acting as an ERISA fiduciary asserting privilege against
plan beneficiaries); Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D. 671, 679–81 (D. Kan.
1986) (union asserting privilege against union members).
The fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege is now well established
among our sister circuits. At least five circuits recognize some form of the exception,
including the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. See, e.g., United States v.
Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1276–79 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); Becher, 129 F.3d at 272 (recognizing the fiduciary exception in the Second
Circuit); Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 645 (5th Cir. 1992); Fausek v.
White, 965 F.2d 126, 132–33 (6th Cir. 1992); cf. Sandberg v. Va. Bankshares, Inc., 979
F.2d 332, 352 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated, No. 91-1873(L), 1993 WL 524680 (4th Cir. Apr.
7, 1993). Though we are aware of some state courts that have expressly rejected the
fiduciary exception, no federal court of appeals has rejected the principle, but have only
declined to apply the exception in cases where the facts did not justify its application.
Compare Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591, 594–96 (Cal. 2000)
(rejecting the fiduciary exception in a trustee-beneficiary case because statutory
attorney-client privilege did not permit judicially created exceptions), and Huie v.
DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 922–25 (Tex. 1996) (rejecting the fiduciary exception in a
trustee-beneficiary case), with Wachtel, 482 F.3d at 236–37 (declining to apply the
fiduciary exception to an insurer who sells, but does not manage, insurance to ERISA-
regulated parties), and Bland v. Fiatallis N. Am., Inc., 401 F.3d 779, 788–89 (7th Cir.
2005) (declining to apply the fiduciary exception to an employer amending or
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terminating an ERISA plan), and Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386,
1415–16 (11th Cir. 1994) (declining to apply the Garner doctrine to a union in a suit
brought by union members because only a tiny percentage of union members were
members of the class and the union class members’ interests conflicted with union
members not in the class).
As developed in the United States, courts have based the fiduciary exception on
two justifications. See Riggs, 355 A.2d at 712–14. First, the fiduciary is not the
attorney’s exclusive client, but acts as a proxy for the beneficiary. See, e.g., Mett, 178
F.3d at 1063 (“[A]t least as to advice regarding plan administration, a trustee is not the
real client and thus never enjoyed the privilege in the first place.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Riggs, 355 A.2d at 713 (“As a representative for the beneficiaries of
the trust which he is administering, the trustee is not the real client in the sense that he
is personally being served.”). Under this justification, the fiduciary exception is but a
logical extension of the client’s control of the attorney-client privilege. Second, the
fiduciary has a duty to disclose all information related to trust management to the
beneficiary. See e.g., Becher, 129 F.3d at 72 (“[An] ERISA fiduciary must make
available to the beneficiary, upon request, any communications with an attorney that are
intended to assist in the administration of the plan.”); Riggs, 355 A.2d at 714
(“[T]rustees . . . cannot subordinate the fiduciary obligations owed to the beneficiaries to
their own private interests under the guise of attorney-client privilege.”). Under this
second justification, “the fiduciary exception can be understood as an instance of the
attorney-client privilege giving way in the face of a competing legal principle,” the duty to
disclose. Mett, 178 F.3d at 1063.
Misc. 908 12
No federal court of appeals has addressed whether the fiduciary exception
applies to the United States as trustee over tribal assets and funds. However, federal
trial courts have previously applied the fiduciary exception to the United States in at
least three tribal trust cases—twice in the Court of Federal Claims and once in a district
court. See Osage Nation v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 244, 247–53 (2005); Cobell v.
Norton, 212 F.R.D. 24, 27–29 (D.D.C. 2002); Shoshone Indian Tribe of Wind River
Reservation, Wy. v. United States, Nos. 458-79 and 459-79 (Fed. Cl. May 16, 2002),
attached at Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 1, 35 (2009). With this
background in mind, we now turn to the question that the United States raises in its
petition.
II. The Fiduciary Exception Applied to Indian Trusts
The United States’ relationship with the Indian tribes is sufficiently similar to a
private trust to justify applying the fiduciary exception. Therefore, we hold that the
United States cannot deny an Indian tribe’s request to discover communications
between the United States and its attorneys based on the attorney-client privilege when
those communications concern management of an Indian trust and the United States
has not claimed that the government or its attorneys considered a specific competing
interest in those communications. The United States’ general assertion that the
Secretary of the Interior’s other statutory obligations “may occasionally be in tension
with interests regarding tribal lands or other non-monetary assets,” does not diminish its
exacting responsibilities as a trustee so as to warrant shielding the trust beneficiary from
legal advice on trust management. Accordingly, we adopt the fiduciary exception in
tribal trust cases. We do not address whether the fiduciary exception applies when the
government or its attorneys considered a specific competing interest in those
Misc. 908 13
communications, such as statutes governing endangered species or natural resources.
Nor do we address whether the fiduciary exception applies to documents privileged as
attorney work product. In the case before us, however, both justifications for the
fiduciary exception support its application.
A. A. Identity of the Client
As the Court of Federal Claims described, the attorney-client communications at
issue here were for the benefit of Jicarilla and other Indian tribes. Jicarilla Apache
Nation v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 1, 6, 13–19 (2009). Interior was seeking advice on
behalf of the tribes on how to manage trust funds and other tribal assets, and the
attorneys were giving advice on trust management ultimately for the benefit of the
tribes. Accordingly, Interior was not the government attorneys’ exclusive client, but
acted as a proxy for the beneficiary Indian tribes.
Jicarilla’s status as the “real client” stems from its trust relationship with the
United States. Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 713 (Del. Ch.
1976). The Supreme Court has affirmed “the undisputed existence of a general trust
relationship between the United States and the Indian people.” United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983); see also Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,
17 (1831) (describing the relationship of the Indian tribes to the United States as “ward
to his guardian” and clearly establishing the now longstanding and accepted basis of the
trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes). “All of the necessary
elements of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary
(the Indian allottees), and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds).” Id. This
general trust relationship rests on a long history of asset management and statutory
mandates to Interior. As the trial court noted, “‘Nearly every piece of modern legislation
Misc. 908 14
dealing with Indian tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust relationship between
tribes and the federal government.’” Jicarilla, 88 Fed. Cl. at 5 (quoting Felix Cohen,
Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 5.04(4)(a) (2005)). We think that the statutes that
the trial court cites amply demonstrate that relationship. See id.; see also 25 U.S.C.
§ 162(a) (2006) (trust investment); § 450j (contract administration); § 458cc (funding
agreements); § 3120 (forest resources); § 3303 (education); § 3701 (agricultural
resources); § 4021 (trust fund management); §§ 4041–43 (special trustee). Indeed, like
the fiduciary duties in other statutory trusts, the United States’ trust duties to tribes
“draw much of their content from the common law of trusts.” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (comparing fiduciary duties under ERISA to the common law of
trusts). Accordingly, common law trust principles should generally apply to the United
States when it acts as trustee over tribal assets. See United States v. White Mtn.
Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003) (applying the common law principle that a
trustee must preserve the trust corpus to the United States as trustee of tribal assets);
Shoshone Indian Tribe of Wind River Reservation v. United States, 364 F.3d 1339,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying the common law principle of trustee repudiation to the
United States as trustee of tribal assets). Moreover, the general trust relationship
justifies straightforward application of the fiduciary exception in this case, instead of the
multifactor balancing test that courts apply in derivative shareholder actions. Compare
Wynne v. Humbertson, 27 Beav. 421, 423, 54 Eng. Rep. 165, 166 (1858) (fiduciary
exception applied in trust case), and Riggs, 355 A.2d at 712–14 (same), with Garner,
430 F.2d at 1104 (shareholder derivative action identifying nine factors for good cause
to pierce attorney-client privilege). We find the government’s arguments to the contrary
unpersuasive and address each in turn.
Misc. 908 15
1. Duty of Loyalty to the Tribes
The United States relies primarily on Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110
(1983) for its argument that its relationship with the tribes is very different from a
traditional fiduciary’s relationship to beneficiaries.
In Nevada, the Supreme Court held that res judicata barred an action by the
United States in 1973 seeking additional water rights on behalf of the Pyramid Lake
Indian Reservation because the United States had already sued in 1913 to adjudicate
those same water rights. Id. at 143. The Court also addressed the United States’
obligations to the reservation and its obligation to comply with the Reclamation Act of
1902. The Reclamation Act “required the Secretary of the Interior to assume substantial
obligations with respect to the reclamation of arid lands in the western part of the United
States.” Id. at 128. The Court explained that the United States would not violate its
trust obligations to a tribe by performing another task also required in the Reclamation
Act. The Court noted that Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Interior “both the
responsibility for the supervision of the Indian tribes and the commencement of
reclamation projects in areas adjacent to reservation lands.” Id. Based on this dual
responsibility, the Court wrote that “it is simply unrealistic to suggest that the
Government may not perform its obligation to represent Indian tribes in litigation when
Congress has obliged it to represent other interests as well.” Id. The Court thus
reasoned that this dual responsibility altered the government’s duties as a fiduciary:
“[T]he Government cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary, who
would breach his duties to his single beneficiary solely by representing potentially
conflicting interests without the beneficiary’s consent.” Id.
Misc. 908 16
The United States’ reliance on Nevada and its argument that other statutory
duties undermine application of the fiduciary exception are not relevant in this case. To
be sure, Nevada recognizes that the Secretary of the Interior may at times be required
to balance fiduciary duties with other statutory duties. However, the government does
not argue in its petition that it in fact had to balance competing interests, such as land or
mineral rights, in the communications at issue here. We note that this is the trust funds
phase of the case. According to the parties, this phase involves only the management
of accounts, not of other assets such as land or mineral rights, where the Secretary of
the Interior might have other statutory duties. The Navajo Nation and Pueblo of
Laguna, as amici curiae, correctly note that “[s]ince the documents at issue relate only
to trust funds, potential privilege claims for unspecified documents regarding other types
of trust assets based on other statutory regimes are beyond the scope of the petition.”
Thus, we do not reach the issue whether the fiduciary exception applies when the
government or its attorneys considered a specific competing interest in those
communications.
2. Source of Payment for Legal Advice
The United States also argues that because its attorneys are paid “out of
congressional appropriations, not the trust corpus,” their relationship with the tribes
should not allow application of the fiduciary exception. The United States explains that
“[w]hile the source of payment [for legal advice] may not, by itself, determine whether
the fiduciary exception applies, it does serve as another factor counseling against
application of the exception in this context.”
The United States correctly identifies the source of payment as one factor in
determining whether a beneficiary can access attorney-client privileged information.
Misc. 908 17
See, e.g., Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 482 F.2d 225, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a
trustee pays counsel out of trust funds, rather than out of its own pocket, the payment
scheme is strongly indicative of the beneficiaries’ status as the true clients.”); Riggs, 355
A.2d at 712 (“[W]hen the beneficiaries desire to inspect opinions of counsel for which
they have paid out of trust funds effectively belonging to them, the duty of the trustees
to allow them to examine those opinions becomes even more compelling.”). In contrast
to a private trust case, we do not think the source of payment is helpful when the trustee
imposes the trust on the beneficiaries. The fact that the United States does not use
trust funds to pay for legal advice on how to manage a trust it imposed on the Indian
tribes does not suggest that the tribes should be barred from accessing that advice.
Moreover, the government’s fiduciary duties of providing Jicarilla “with complete and
accurate information overrides any implication that must arise from the fact that the
[g]overnment pays its own legal fees.” Osage Nation v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 244,
249 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in the original).
3. Secretary of the Interior’s Ability to Obtain Confidential Legal Advice
The United States also argues that applying the fiduciary duty in this case would
impair the Secretary of the Interior’s ability to obtain confidential legal advice. Because
this phase of the litigation involves only the United States’ duties regarding trust fund
accounts, we disagree with the government’s position. Of course, the basic concern
could be stated by any trustee. The trustee may feel that its ability to obtain legal
advice is impaired because the advice is not shielded from its beneficiary. But the
exception applies because the fiduciary is not the exclusive client of the attorney
rendering advice and because a fiduciary has a duty to keep the beneficiary informed of
issues related to trust administration. Though the United States argues that it would not
Misc. 908 18
be able to obtain legal advice about other statutes that may require it to take action
related to property that is not a trust fund account, those arguments are not relevant in
this case and it has failed to allege any actual conflict.
B. Duty of Disclosure
The fiduciary exception’s second justification also supports applying the doctrine
in this case. As a general trustee, the United States has a fiduciary duty to disclose
information related to trust management to the beneficiary Indian tribes, including legal
advice on how to manage trust funds. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 82(2) (2007)
(“[A] trustee also ordinarily has a duty promptly to respond to the request of any
beneficiary for information concerning the trust and its administration, and to permit
beneficiaries on a reasonable basis to inspect trust documents, records, and property
holdings.”); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173 (1959) (“The trustee is under a duty
to the beneficiary to give him upon his request at reasonable times complete and
accurate information as to the nature and amount of the trust property, and to permit
him or a person duly authorized by him to inspect the subject matter of the trust and the
accounts and vouchers and other documents relating to the trust.”). In addition to that
basic duty, Congress has created an Office of Special Trustee “to provide for more
effective management of, and accountability for the proper discharge of, the Secretary’s
trust responsibilities to Indian tribes.” 25 U.S.C. § 4041(1) (2006).
The United States argues that it does not have a fiduciary’s duty to disseminate
information to the tribes because Congress has required Interior to provide only specific
types of information to tribes. The United States cites the 1994 Indian Trust Fund
Management Reform Act, which required, inter alia, that Interior must provide certain
information to tribes, including quarterly statements of performance and a letter
Misc. 908 19
reporting the results of an audit. The United States did not identify the pertinent
language of the statute, which states that “proper discharge of the trust responsibilities
of the United States shall include (but are not limited to) . . . [p]reparing and supplying
account holders with periodic statements of their account performance and with
balances of their account which shall be available on a daily basis.” 25 U.S.C.
§ 162a(d)(5) (emphasis added). Congress expressly recognized the possibility of trust
responsibilities outside the statute. Therefore, the United States’ arguments in this
regard are completely without merit.
The D.C. Circuit came to a similar conclusion based on the United States’
arguments that statutes have limited the United States’ fiduciary duties to the tribes.
That court wrote, “The fundamental problem with [the government’s] claims is the
premise that their duties are solely defined by the 1994 Act. The Indian Trust Fund
Management Reform Act reaffirmed and clarified preexisting duties; it did not create
them.” Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
In sum, “the government has other trust responsibilities not enumerated in the
1994 Act.” Id. Those other responsibilities include the common law duty to disclose
information.
CONCLUSION
The United States has not shown that the Court of Federal Claims erred in
determining that the government could not withhold documents related to the
management of trust fund accounts from Jicarilla based on the attorney-client privilege.
The United States’ right to issuance of the writ is far from “clear and indisputable,”
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953) (internal quotation marks
omitted), because the government improperly asserted the attorney-client privilege as a
Misc. 908 20
trustee against the trust beneficiaries. We thus decline to grant a writ of mandamus.
Instead of “avoid[ing] the development of doctrine that would undermine the [attorney-
client] privilege,” In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1387 (Fed. Cir.
1996), the trial court correctly demarcated the privilege’s limits.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.
(2) The motion for leave to file a reply is granted.
(3) The motion for leave to file a shortened brief amicus curiae is granted.
The original motion for leave to file a brief amicus curiae is moot.
(4) The temporary stay of the order of the Court of Federal Claims that
required production is lifted.
FOR THE COURT
December 30, 2009 /s/ Jan Horbaly
Date Jan Horbaly
Clerk
cc: Brian C. Toth, Esq.
Steven D. Gordon, Esq.
Alan R. Taradash, Esq.
Judge, Court of Federal Claims
Clerk, Court of Federal Claims
Misc. 908 21