concurring.
I arrive at the result reached by the majority but, because I do so by a somewhat different route, I find it necessary to write separately.
The record here reveals a problem confronting American hospitals with increasing frequency: an aging physical plant, escalation of health care costs and maldistribution of services have combined to create a health care crisis.1 Deteriorating physical facilities threatened the Wilmington Medical Center with a loss of accreditation. Such a loss would further erode the quality of the hospital’s medical care and its financial foundation by triggering a loss of qualification for the Center’s teaching program and a termination of Medicare and Medicaid funds. In addition, without the construction of new facilities, the community would suffer a shortage of acute care beds. See NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F.Supp. at 290, 297-98 (D.Del.1980).
Faced with these demographic and fiscal pressures, the Center concluded that rehabilitation of some of its facilities in downtown Wilmington and construction of new facilities in the suburban area, to prevent paying patients from gravitating to a potential competitor, would most appropriately fulfill the hospital’s needs. See 491 F.Supp. at 310. The Center considered approximately 50 proposals before arriving at a final plan that was denominated “Omega.” Plan Omega was approved first by a state designated planning agency, which ensured that the project conformed to local needs for adequate health care, and then by the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and Human Services). See Wilmington United Neighborhoods v. United States Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, 615 F.2d 112, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1980).
Under Plan Omega, the Center proposed to invest approximately $18-24 million in the rehabilitation of certain of the inner city facilities; to make a substantial investment in facilities in the suburbs; and to provide transportation for center city residents in need of specified services located at the suburban installation. See 491 F.Supp. at 325-27, 343, 319. The plaintiffs maintain that the proposed program violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, because it adversely affects the quality of care and access to that care for the handicapped, the elderly and certain minority groups.2 The Center, however, contends that, as a whole, the physical rehabilitation, new construction and consolidation of services will result in improved care for all patients, and that the availability of a shuttle service will minimize any transportation barriers for the handicapped, elderly and minority groups.
Because I would affirm the district court on different grounds than the majority, I find it unnecessary to decide whether Lau *1339v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974), in which the Supreme Court construed Title VI to prohibit disparate impacts, is still the relevant governing law. Although the Supreme Court has recently suggested in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978), and Board of Education of New York City v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 147 n.10,100 S.Ct. 363, 62 L.Ed.2d 275 (1979), that Title VI might incorporate the constitutional standard of specific intent to discriminate, it should be noted that, because of the wide range of activities and conduct that Title VI covers, the concerns raised in those two cases do not parallel the issues here. As the majority explains, Bakke focused on the intentional use of racial criteria in the context of voluntary remedial actions. The Supreme Court did not deal with the type question present in this case, namely whether Title VI may impose requirements on recipients of federal funds that are broader than the Constitution demands when faced with disparate impacts resulting from facially neutral actions. Moreover, the concern voiced in Harris — that because a violation of Title VI may result in a cutoff of funds, it is likely that Congress desired this drastic sanction only when discrimination is intentional — would also appear to be inapplicable here. The plaintiff’s private cause of action against the Center, seeking an injunction to prevent future discrimination, involves no immediate prospect of a fund cutoff. In fact, it is attempting to ensure against such a possibility.3
Nonetheless, whether hospital relocations and renovations such as the present one should be subjected to judicial scrutiny aimed not only at preventing intentional discrimination but also at forestalling any relocation which may occasion unintentional, adverse effects on protected groups is, from my perspective, a troublesome question. Courts may not be the most competent forums for determining the effects of hospital relocations on racial minorities. Admittedly, we earlier acknowledged the desirability of judicial review by finding a private cause of action under Title VI. See NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1254 (3d Cir. 1979). And courts are often well-situated to address the concerns of relatively unorganized, politically weak consumer groups whose interests may be insufficiently recognized in administrative proceedings. But I would defer deciding until a later day, the level of scrutiny, and the extent to which courts consequently might intrude upon a better-informed regulatory process.
As the district court held, and the majority here agrees, the record is devoid of proof of intentional discrimination. But, even assuming that a disparate impact test is an appropriate one under Title VI, I believe that a fair reading of the evidence in this case, and especially of the extensive findings made by the trial court, indicates that the plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case under any of the statutes involved. A plethora of findings underlies the trial judge’s ultimate conclusion that the plaintiffs have shown only a slight disparate increase in travel time, a modest decrease in the ability of inner city residents to visit patients at the suburban site, and consequently a minimal negative effect *1340which the decrease in visitors may have upon the quality of care for the elderly. 491 F.Supp. at 333. The district court also determined that the possibility of a few minority high risk patients missing an appointment at the speciality clinics, and the extremely rare chance of an obstetrical emergency patient receiving inadequate treatment in the inner city division constituted such unlikely effects that they failed to establish a prima facie case under Title VI. 491 F.Supp. at 337. I cannot find that the trial court clearly erred in holding that plaintiffs “failed to meet their initial burden of proving disparate impact under the civil rights statutes invoked.” See 491 F.Supp. at 339.
Moreover, these specific findings are part of a larger mosaic: the trial court’s overarching finding that the level of care for all population groups will improve as a result of the benefits that greater consolidation, better-trained residents and upgraded facilities will confer. Measured against HEW regulations which define Title VI violations as actions which have “the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objective of the program as respect [sic] individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin,” 45 C.F.R. § 80.-3(b)(2) (emphasis added), these de minimis impacts simply do not pass muster. Unless a -threshold is created for prima facie cases under Title VI, questions regarding hospital relocations and similar, complex socioeconomic decisions will be open to protracted court challenge, for each significant community undertaking affects slightly differently the various protected population subgroups in our country’s localities.
Because I am unable to find that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, it is unnecessary for me to resolve whether the defendants carried a burden of production or burden of proof in rebutting an initial showing of disparate impact with evidence of legitimate medical needs.
. For a history and critique of health care planning, see Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 Yale L.J. 243 (1978).
. The majority and I agree with the district court that the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case with respect to the handicapped under section 504. See maj. op. supra at 1331, 1332.
. The broad spectrum of federally funded programs in which Title VI challenges occur may account for the divergent resolutions of the intent vs. impact question among and within the circuits. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1981) (based on belief that a violation of Title VI requires an intentional discriminatory act, the court adopted the intent standard for Title IX); Guardians Association of the New York City Police Dept., Inc., etc. v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980) (intent required for Title VI); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980) (unnecessary to decide whether intent or effects standard applies to Title VI); Board of Education v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 589 (2d Cir. 1978) (effects test for Title VI), aff’d on other grounds, 444 U.S. 130, 100 S.Ct. 363, 62 L.Ed.2d 275 (1979); Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1029 n.6 (9th Cir. 1978) (impact is proper standard for Title VI).