IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: 2009-NMSC-043
Filing Date: August 25, 2009
Docket No. 31,106
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,
v.
NICOLE ANAYA,
Defendant-Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
William C. Birdsall, District Judge
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Petitioner
Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender
Vicki W. Zelle, Assistant Appellant Defender
Albuquerque, NM
for Respondent
OPINION
MAES, Justice.
{1} Nicole Anaya (Defendant) filed a motion to suppress evidence arising from an
investigatory stop initiated after she made a lawful U-turn within sight of a DWI checkpoint.
The district court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the stop was supported by
reasonable suspicion. Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor (DWI), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102 (2005, prior to
amendments through 2008), but reserved the right to appeal the reasonableness of the stop.
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that, because evading a checkpoint
is not an illegal act, the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. State v. Anaya, 2008-
NMCA-077, ¶ 19, 144 N.M. 246, 185 P.3d 1096. The Court of Appeals further held that the
DWI checkpoint was constitutionally unreasonable under the guidelines set forth in Las
Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 658-59, 735 P.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Ct. App. 1987), and
therefore, could not substitute for the absence of reasonable suspicion. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-
077, ¶ 14. We conclude, however, that Defendant’s actions and the surrounding
circumstances evinced an attempt to evade the checkpoint, which gave rise to a reasonable
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suspicion that she was driving while intoxicated. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of
Appeals and affirm Defendant’s conviction and sentence.
FACTS
{2} The district court could have found the following facts. The San Juan County
Sheriff’s Department set up a DWI checkpoint, which operated between the hours of ten in
the evening on Saturday, November 19, 2005, and three in the morning on Sunday,
November 20, 2005. Officers placed the checkpoint at the top of a hill on NM516 between
Farmington and Aztec, New Mexico. Cones, droplights, and flashing emergency lights were
visible to the surrounding area, indicating police activity to approaching motorists. The
officers also placed signs that alerted motorists to the upcoming checkpoint. In particular,
one sign was placed in the median visible to motorists traveling from Farmington toward the
west side of the checkpoint. The arresting officer testified that he had traveled toward and
away from the west side of the checkpoint several times that night and that the sign was
illuminated by headlights and was visible to approaching vehicles.
{3} The arresting officer testified that he was given a briefing packet, which directed him
to stop any vehicles that displayed a clear intention of avoiding the checkpoint. Pursuant to
that directive, the officer was stationed in his patrol car, in the median, a short distance
behind the sign indicating the checkpoint, and he was to “watch[] for vehicles turning
around, . . . trying to avoid the roadblock.”
{4} The arresting officer testified that at approximately two in the morning he saw
Defendant’s vehicle approaching the west side of the checkpoint, traveling away from
Farmington. Then, as the vehicle approached, it made a U-turn and began traveling in the
opposite direction. According to the officer’s testimony and a diagram of the area entered
into evidence, the sign indicating the upcoming DWI checkpoint was situated at the
intersection where Defendant made a legal U-turn. The officer testified that he believed the
vehicle was trying to avoid the checkpoint. The officer immediately followed Defendant’s
vehicle, engaged his emergency lights, and stopped the vehicle for a suspected DWI.
Defendant failed all the field sobriety tests and was ultimately arrested for DWI. Results of
a breath test indicated that Defendant had a blood-alcohol content of .11 and .10.
{5} Defendant was originally tried in magistrate court, where she filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, arguing that the officer did not have
reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant had committed or was going to commit a
crime. The magistrate court denied the motion to suppress, and Defendant entered a plea of
nolo contendere to DWI, reserving the right to challenge the stop in the district court.
{6} The motion filed in district court concerned whether the officer had reasonable
suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. The court held a hearing and conducted a thorough
review of the relevant case law. The district court noted that, as to the validity of the
checkpoint plan, “no attack as to its propriety was mounted by Defendant.” Nonetheless,
the court stated that because the plan “removes the officer’s discretion that is problematic
with sobriety checkpoints . . . the stop can be justified as part of the checkpoint plan.”
However, because the validity of the checkpoint plan was not argued, the district court’s
analysis focused on the reasonableness of the stop based on the totality of the circumstances.
The court found that “[t]he defendant, [was] driving at around 2 A.M. in the morning, [and]
ma[de] a U-turn on the highway at an intersection right in front of a visible sign announcing
the checkpoint just after cresting a hill where the checkpoint lights would have been visible.”
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The court stated that it “sid[ed] with [State v. Foreman],” which held that “[a]lthough a legal
turn, by itself, is not sufficient to establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion, a legal turn
in conjunction with other circumstances, such as the time, place and manner in which it is
made, may constitute a reasonable, articulable suspicion which could justify an investigatory
stop.” 527 S.E.2d 921, 923 (N.C. 2000). Accordingly, based on the facts available to the
officer, the court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle
and denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.
{7} Following the district court’s denial of her motion, Defendant entered a conditional
guilty plea to DWI. In her plea, Defendant reserved the right to appeal “the reasonableness
of the stop to a higher court.”
{8} Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the denial of
Defendant’s motion to suppress. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-077, ¶ 20. The Court of Appeals
questioned the constitutionality of the officer’s directive to stop vehicles attempting to avoid
the checkpoint under the guidelines set forth in Betancourt. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-077, ¶ 10.
Relying on the officer’s testimony, the Court construed the officer’s directive under the
checkpoint plan as follows: “[I]f an officer evaluates a driver’s behavior and concludes that
the driver had an intention to evade the checkpoint, that officer is deemed to have reasonable
suspicion.” Id. ¶ 14. The Court held that the directive did not sufficiently restrict the
officer’s discretion, as required under Betancourt, and therefore, the checkpoint plan was a
constitutionally inadequate substitute for reasonable suspicion. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-077,
¶ 10.
{9} The Court then addressed whether the officer had an independent reasonable
suspicion to stop Defendant. The Court summarized the relevant facts, stating that “it was
two in the morning, Defendant crested a hill from which the lights of the checkpoint were
visible, and Defendant made a U-turn in front of a visible sign that announced the
checkpoint.” Id. ¶ 19. The Court held that, because these facts involved only legal acts, they
did not create a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was committing a crime:
There is no statute that prohibits a driver from evading a checkpoint. The
facts upon which the district court relied are thus legal acts. We conclude .
. . that [t]hese circumstances amount to nothing more than a generalized
suspicion that there was a possibility that [Defendant] might have been
breaking the law.
Id. ¶ 19 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
Court of Appeals reversed the district court and granted Defendant’s motion to suppress.
{10} We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section
34-5-14(B) (1966, as amended through 1972) and Rule 12-502 NMRA to determine: (1)
whether the Court of Appeals erroneously held that the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop Defendant; (2) “[w]hether the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to
address the validity of the DWI checkpoint plan, because Defendant did not reserve that
issue in her conditional guilty plea”; and (3) “[w]hether the Court of Appeals erroneously
held that Defendant was not stopped in accordance with a valid DWI checkpoint plan.”
State v. Anaya, 2008-NMCERT-005, 144 N.M. 332, 187 P.3d 678.
DISCUSSION
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{11} Stopping motor vehicles for the purpose of investigating suspected drunk driving
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, to be justified at its
inception the stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion. State v. Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-
023, ¶ 19, 143 N.M. 749, 182 P.3d 130. “Questions of reasonable suspicion are reviewed
de novo by looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detention
was justified.” State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 5, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). However, we review the district court’s factual
findings under a substantial evidence standard. Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-023, ¶ 16.
{12} “Reasonable suspicion arises if the officer can point to specific articulable facts . .
. that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity
occurred or was occurring.” Id. ¶ 19 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). However, reasonable suspicion does not require the officer to observe
illegal activity. Cf. State v. Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, ¶ 34, __ N.M. __, __ P.3d __
(“[A]lthough Defendant’s conduct was lawful, . . . the facts and circumstances alleged in the
affidavit, when viewed together, made it reasonable to infer that, more likely than not, the
package contained illegal narcotics.”).
{13} There is no state law prohibiting evading a DWI checkpoint, and the U-turn
Defendant made within sight of the checkpoint was legal. Therefore, the question in the
present case is whether the totality of the circumstances allowed the officer reasonably to
conclude that Defendant was committing the crime of driving while intoxicated.
{14} To answer this question, we must consider the perimeters of the checkpoint as part
of the circumstances of the officer’s observations. As the Foreman court stated, “it is clear
that the perimeters of the checkpoint or ‘the area in which checks are conducted’ would
include the area within which drivers may become aware of its presence by observation of
any sign marking or giving notice of the checkpoint.” 527 S.E.2d at 924. That court
concluded:
[W]e hold that it is reasonable and permissible for an officer to monitor a
checkpoint’s entrance for vehicles whose drivers may be attempting to avoid
the checkpoint, and it necessarily follows that an officer, in light of and
pursuant to the totality of the circumstances or the checkpoint plan, may
pursue and stop a vehicle which has turned away from a checkpoint within
its perimeters for reasonable inquiry to determine why the vehicle turned
away.
Id.
{15} Evading a marked DWI checkpoint is a specific and articulable fact that is sufficient
to predicate reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. See, e.g., Foreman, 527 S.E.2d
at 923 (concluding that where “the officer observed a ‘quick left turn’ away from the
checkpoint at the precise point where the driver of the vehicle would have first become
aware of its presence,” the officer observed “sufficient activity to raise a ‘reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity’” (citation omitted)). To conclude otherwise would
permit drivers to flagrantly avoid DWI checkpoints without consequence, thereby
undermining the efficacy of such checkpoints in deterring DWI. Steinbeck v.
Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993); see Snyder v. State, 538 N.E.2d
961, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (“The alternative is to tell police officers that in spite of their
experience, they may not infer from a driver’s attempt to avoid a roadblock that the driver
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is very likely engaged in the commission of a crime. Such a rule would seem to tell police
officers to ‘ignore reality.’”); Foreman, 527 S.E.2d at 924 (“Certainly, the purpose of any
checkpoint and the above statute would be defeated if drivers had the option to ‘legally
avoid,’ ignore or circumvent the checkpoint by either electing to drive through without
stopping or by turning away upon entering the checkpoint’s perimeters.”).
{16} We agree with the Court of Appeals that “‘a legal turn, by itself, is not sufficient to
establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion, [but] a legal turn in conjunction with other
circumstances . . . may constitute a reasonable, articulable suspicion which could justify an
investigatory stop.’” Anaya, 2008-NMCA-077, ¶ 17 (quoting Foreman, 527 S.E.2d at 923).
We disagree, however, with the Court’s statement that, because Defendant’s acts were legal,
“[t]hese circumstances amount to nothing more than a generalized suspicion that there was
a possibility that [a d]efendant might have been breaking the law.” See id. ¶ 19 (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If a driver is on notice that the
checkpoint is ahead, then, where the driver turns away from the checkpoint and the
circumstances lead the officer reasonably to believe that the driver is attempting to evade the
checkpoint, the officer may form a reasonable suspicion that the driver is driving while
intoxicated.
{17} We emphasize that whether a stop is supported by reasonable suspicion should be
determined on a case-by-case basis. See State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 34, 138 N.M.
414, 120 P.3d 836. The conclusion that a driver is attempting to avoid a checkpoint may be
unreasonable in light of the circumstances of the stop—the time of day, the proximity of the
turn to the checkpoint, or whether the driver’s actions were typical considering the layout
of the area and the normal flow of traffic. See Steinbeck, 862 S.W.2d at 914 (“We believe
that appellant’s turn away from the sobriety checkpoint, coupled with the deputy sheriff’s
experience in similar instances, the time of day, and the nature of the roadway onto which
the appellant turned, constitute specific, reasonable, and articulable facts which allowed the
police officer to draw an inference sufficient to form a reasonable suspicion that the driver
might have been engaging in criminal activity.”).
{18} Approaching the checkpoint, Defendant was in a position to observe police
emergency lights and other lights illuminating the checkpoint. Additionally, the district
court found that Defendant made a U-turn “at an intersection right in front of a visible sign
announcing the checkpoint,” such that Defendant was on notice of the approaching
checkpoint. Defendant then proceeded in the opposite direction of travel, which was
inconsistent with typical driving patterns given the location of the highway. In light of these
facts, the officer reasonably could have believed that Defendant was attempting to evade the
checkpoint. Accordingly, we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate
the stop.
{19} Because we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant, we
need not determine whether Defendant properly reserved a challenge to the validity of the
DWI checkpoint in her conditional guilty plea or whether the Court of Appeals erroneously
held that Defendant was not stopped in accordance with a valid DWI checkpoint plan. See
State v. Duarte, 2007-NMCA-012, ¶ 33, 140 N.M. 930, 149 P.3d 1027 (“[T]he
reasonableness of a roadblock provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for the
reasonable suspicion that would otherwise be required to justify the detention of vehicles and
the questioning of their occupants.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)).
CONCLUSION
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{20} For these reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm Defendant’s
conviction and sentence.
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Chief Justice
____________________________________
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
____________________________________
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
____________________________________
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
Topic Index for State v. Anaya, No. 31,106
CT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CT-FA Fourth Amendment
CL CRIMINAL LAW
CL-DG Driving While Intoxicated
CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CA-RS Reasonable Suspicion
CA-RK Roadblocks
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