IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: 2009-NMSC-026
Filing Date: May 26, 2009
Docket No. 31,097
CITY OF LAS CRUCES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STEVEN SANCHEZ,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DONA ANA COUNTY
Jerald A. Valentine, District Judge
Office of the City Attorney
Jared Abrams
Las Cruces, NM
for Appellant
Lilley Law Offices
Marc A. Lilley
Law Cruces, NM
for Appellee
OPINION
MAES, Justice.
{1} This is the second time this case has come before us for review. See City of Las
Cruces v. Sanchez, 2007-NMSC-042, 142 N.M. 243, 164 P.3d 942. The sole issue in the
first appeal was “whether a district court has jurisdiction to entertain a city’s appeal from a
municipal court’s dismissal of charges against a defendant on grounds other than the
constitutionality of an ordinance or the sufficiency of a complaint.” Id. ¶ 7. We held that
a municipality has a constitutional right to appeal a final judgment or decision from
municipal court and remanded the case to the district court for a trial de novo. Id. ¶ 21.
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{2} In the district court following our remand, Steven Sanchez (Defendant) filed a motion
to suppress evidence arising from his arrest for the violation of several municipal ordinances,
including aggravated driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI). See
Las Cruces, N.M., Municipal Code (LCMC) § 27-12-6-12.1(D)(1) (2004), available at
http://www.las-cruces.org/legal/city_clerk/codes-dir/. The district court granted the motion
and dismissed the case with prejudice on the ground that the warrantless misdemeanor arrest
was illegal, because the offense did not take place in the presence of police officers and the
presence requirement for the misdemeanor arrest was not otherwise excepted by a valid
arrest under NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-125 (1978). We hold that the arrest was valid under
Section 66-8-125(A)(1), because the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that
Defendant had been present at the scene of the accident and had committed the crime of
DWI. Therefore, the legality of Defendant’s arrest did not require the offense to be
committed in the presence of an officer. Because the validity of the arrest under Section
66-8-125 was the sole issue decided by the district court, we reverse the court’s suppression
order and remand the case for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
{3} Officers received a report that a vehicle had crashed into a house, and that the
vehicle’s driver and passengers had fled the accident scene on foot. Arriving five to ten
minutes after the crash, the officers did not encounter either a driver or passengers at the
accident scene.
{4} Officer Felix Guerra, who did not report to the scene of the accident, searched the
surrounding neighborhood and found one of the passengers of the vehicle hiding in the
general area of the accident. The passenger identified Defendant as the driver, but he gave
no other information concerning Defendant’s location. Officers at the scene, including the
arresting officer, Robert Benevidez, checked the vehicle’s license plate number and
registration, which provided the officers with Defendant’s address and led them to conclude
that Defendant was the driver.
{5} Defendant’s name and address were relayed to Sergeant Kevin Renn who took
several officers with him to Defendant’s home. The officers knocked on the door, which
was answered by some unidentified people who claimed that Defendant was not home, but
gave the officers permission to search the residence. The officers found Defendant
unconscious on the floor of a bathroom. Sergeant Renn testified that Defendant had visible
injuries that could have been caused by the deployment of an air bag, which was consistent
with the condition of the vehicle found at the accident scene.
{6} After Defendant had been taken into custody, Officer Benevidez arrived from the
scene of the accident to investigate Defendant for a possible DWI. Officer Benevidez
testified that Defendant appeared visibly intoxicated and that he noticed the odor of alcohol
on Defendant’s person and breath. Officer Benevidez arrested Defendant for leaving the
scene of the accident and DWI. After the arrest, Defendant submitted to a breath test, which,
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according to the municipal court criminal complaint, showed that Defendant’s blood-alcohol
content was .16 or greater.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{7} The City of Las Cruces (City) first filed the charges against Defendant in Las Cruces
municipal court. The court, however, dismissed the charges against Defendant. Handwritten
on the court’s disposition form is the apparent reason for the dismissal: “Crime not observed
by officers—no statutory exception to warrant requirement.” The City appealed, but the
district court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the City did not have a right to appeal
from the municipal court’s dismissal, which resulted in this Court’s first review of this case.
We reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the district court for a trial de novo.
Sanchez, 2007-NMSC-042, ¶¶ 20-21.
{8} After remand, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence arising from his
warrantless misdemeanor arrest, asserting that the arrest was invalid under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution. Defendant argued that the arrest violated New Mexico’s misdemeanor arrest
rule, because the offense was not committed in the presence of an officer. The City argued
that the arrest was valid under Section 66-8-125, which provides an exception to the
misdemeanor arrest rule by permitting an officer to arrest without a warrant any person
“present at the scene of a motor vehicle accident” when the officer has reasonable grounds
to believe that person has committed a crime. Section 66-8-125(A)(1), (B). The district
court found that “[Section] 66-8-125 does not provide an exception for the warrant
requirement for arrest unless the law enforcement officer encounters the person at the scene
of the accident,” and therefore, the court concluded that “the ‘accident scene’ exception to
the general misdemeanor arrest rule does not apply and Sanchez’ warrantless arrest was
illegal.” The district court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress and dismissed the case
because the City could not proceed with the prosecution absent the evidence stemming from
the arrest.
{9} The City appeals directly from the judgment of the district court to this Court. See
NMSA 1978, § 35-15-11 (1959), invalidated in part by Sanchez, 2007-NMSC-042. The City
argues that Section 66-8-125 permits officers to arrest, without a warrant, any individual who
was present at the scene of an accident and does not require that officers encounter the
individual at the scene of the accident. Therefore, the City argues, the district court erred
by suppressing the evidence on the ground that the offense was not committed in the
presence of an officer.
DISCUSSION
{10} The issue before us is whether Section 66-8-125 permits officers to arrest an
individual who has fled the scene of an accident before the officers arrived, when the officers
did not encounter the individual at the scene of the accident. Section 66-8-125 provides, in
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relevant part:
A. Members of the New Mexico state police, sheriffs and their salaried
deputies and members of any municipal police force, may arrest without
warrant any person:
(1) present at the scene of a motor vehicle accident;
....
B. To arrest without warrant, the arresting officer must have reasonable
grounds, based on personal investigation which may include information
from eyewitnesses, to believe the person arrested has committed a crime.
This is a question of statutory interpretation that we decide de novo. Cook v. Anding,
2008-NMSC-035, ¶ 7, 144 N.M. 400, 188 P.3d 1151. Our goal in the interpretation of
statutes is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute. Id.
{11} Generally, in New Mexico, an officer may execute a warrantless misdemeanor arrest
only if the offense was committed in the officer’s presence. State v. Ochoa,
2008-NMSC-023, ¶ 11, 143 N.M. 749, 182 P.3d 130; see Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478, 482
83, 152 P.2d 886, 888 89 (1944). “[A] crime is committed in the presence of an officer when
the facts and circumstances occurring within his observation, in connection with what, under
the circumstances, may be considered as common knowledge, give him probable cause to
believe or reasonable grounds to suspect that such is the case.” Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-023,
¶ 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{12} Section 66-8-125 creates an exception to this general rule by allowing officers to
arrest “without a warrant any person . . . present at the scene of a motor vehicle accident.”
See Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-023, ¶ 12 (“The legislature has created specific exceptions to the
‘presence’ requirement.” (citing § 66-8-125(B)). Defendant argues that for the arrest to be
valid under Section 66-8-125, the officers first had to encounter Defendant at the scene of
the accident. We disagree.
{13} “An officer has two immediate concerns upon arriving at an accident scene—care
for the injured and traffic safety.” State v. Calanche, 91 N.M. 390, 393, 574 P.2d 1018, 1021
(Ct. App. 1978). After attending to those duties, Section 66-8-125(B) requires that an officer
establish reasonable grounds through personal investigation that an individual committed a
crime, before the officer can execute a warrantless arrest under the statute. See Calanche,
91 N.M. at 393, 573 P.2d at 1021. In Calanche, the Court of Appeals held that when the
defendant was taken to the hospital during the arresting officer’s investigation and the officer
developed subsequent reasonable grounds on which to arrest the defendant, the defendant’s
arrest at the hospital was valid under Section 66-8-125. Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned
that the arrest was valid because officers are required to investigate an accident prior to
making an arrest under the statute: “We do not believe the Legislature intended that a person
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involved in an accident could avoid a valid warrantless arrest by leaving the accident scene
before the officer’s investigation developed grounds to arrest that person.” Id. Therefore,
Section 66-8-125(A) (permitting warrantless arrest of a person “present at the scene of a
motor vehicle accident”) and Section 66-8-125(B) (requiring an investigation) must be read
in accordance with one another to effectuate the statutory authority to arrest and to satisfy
officers’ statutory duty to investigate. See Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation
Comm’n, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶ 17, ___ N.M. ___, 206 P.2d P.3d 135 (“Thus, the meaning
of the term is ambiguous, and we will look to the Act’s related provisions to determine what
the Legislature intended.” (citing Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 76,
703 P.2d 169, 173 (1985) (“[This Court] read[s] the act in its entirety and construe[s] each
part in connection with every other part in order to produce a harmonious whole.”) (citation
omitted)).
{14} We agree with Defendant that Calanche is distinguishable from the present case on
its own facts. In Calanche, the arresting officer encountered the defendant at the scene of
the accident, and the defendant was then involuntarily removed from the scene to receive
medical treatment. In the present case, Defendant left the scene of the accident voluntarily.
{15} We believe, however, that limiting officers’ authority to arrest under Section
66-8-125, by prohibiting the arrest of an individual who is removed from the scene of the
accident before officers arrive to investigate, would be inconsistent with the legislative intent
of the statute. The ineffectual result of such a limitation is especially pernicious in DWI
investigations. Because evidence of intoxication fades over time, officers must promptly
locate and investigate an individual suspected of DWI. If officers are required to encounter
an individual at the scene of an accident for an arrest to be valid under Section 66-8-125,
then the officers’ authority to arrest without a warrant would be defeated by an individual’s
mere absence from the scene prior to the investigating officers’ arrival. This would create
the added delay of requiring a warrant for the individual’s arrest and would provide an
intoxicated individual with a potential means of avoiding a DWI charge where the added
delay of obtaining a warrant allows evidence of the individual’s level of intoxication at the
time of driving to dissipate. Such a limitation would provide an intoxicated individual with
an enticing incentive to flee. Therefore, we hold that the Legislature intended to authorize
officers to arrest without a warrant individuals who either are or were present at the scene
of a motor vehicle accident, when the arresting officer has developed reasonable grounds,
through personal investigation, to believe the individual committed a crime. The Legislature
did not intend to predicate this authority on whether the officer first encountered the
individual at the accident scene.
{16} The arrest, however, must take place with reasonable promptness from the time of
the accident. “The requirement of reasonable promptness is designed to prevent too great
an inroad on the rule requiring a warrant of arrest if practicable.” Calanche, 91 N.M. at 393,
573 P.2d at 1021 (citation omitted). Once the arresting officer’s investigation satisfies
Section 66-8-125(B), the subsequent arrest of an individual pursuant to the officer’s
investigation is valid if the arrest is made with reasonable promptness. See Id.
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{17} In the present case, the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest Defendant
without a warrant under Section 66-8-125(B). During his investigation of the accident
scene, Officer Benevidez checked the abandoned vehicle’s registration and license plate
number, which revealed Defendant’s name and the address at which he was eventually
arrested. This evidence was corroborated by the passenger’s identification of Defendant as
the driver. Officer Benevidez also interviewed witnesses at the accident scene, and he spoke
with and observed Defendant after Defendant was taken into custody. Officer Benevidez
developed grounds to believe that Defendant was the driver of the vehicle and had been
driving under the influence of alcohol. Thus, Officer Benevidez’s personal investigation
provided adequate grounds to believe that Defendant had committed the crime of DWI.
{18} Evidence at the suppression hearing established that officers arrived at the scene of
the accident within five to ten minutes of the accident. Officers’ testimony indicated that the
house at which Defendant was located and arrested was near to the scene of the accident.
Therefore, the evidence established that the arrest was made with reasonable promptness
following the accident. Accordingly, we hold that Defendant’s warrantless arrest was valid
under Section 66-8-125, and therefore, the offense need not have been committed in the
presence of an officer.
CONCLUSION
{19} The sole basis for the district court’s suppression order was that the offense was not
committed in the presence of an officer. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand the case for further proceedings.1
{20} IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Chief Justice
____________________________________
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
____________________________________
1
We need not decide whether Defendant’s arrest under Section 66-8-125 comports
with the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. This argument was
not presented in the district court and was not argued before this Court.
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RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
____________________________________
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
Topic Index for Las Cruces v. Sanchez, No. 31,097
AE APPEAL AND ERROR
AE-ST Standard of Review
CL CRIMINAL LAW
CL-DG Driving While Intoxicated
CL-MS Misdemeanor
CL-MH Motor Vehicle Violations
CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CA-AT Arrest
CA-MR Motion to Suppress
CA-WA Warrantless Arrest
ST STATUTES
ST-IP Interpretation
ST-LI Legislative Intent
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