Rodriguez v. PERMIAN DRILLING CORP.

I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
New Mexico Compilation
Commission, Santa Fe, NM
'00'04- 13:45:54 2011.08.22

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2011-NMSC-032

Filing Date: July 19, 2011

Docket No. 32,311

PETE RODRIGUEZ, JOSE TURRUBIATES, BILL
and NORMA CORSAUT, as guardians of minor children,
DRAVEN C. and DEVAN W., natural children of
ELOY DOPORTO, JR., deceased, and MIKE LUCAS,

Workers-Petitioners,

v.

PERMIAN DRILLING CORPORATION and
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE,

Employer-Insurer-Respondents.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Helen L. Stirling, Workers’ Compensation Judge

Trenchard & Hoskins
Royce E. Hoskins
Josephine Lue
Roswell, NM
Trenchard & Hoskins
Paul G. Tellez
El Paso, TX

Chavez Law Office
Gonzalo Chavez
Roswell, NM

for Petitioners

Butt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C.
Carlos G. Martinez
Emily A. Franke
Albuquerque, NM

1
for Respondents

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} This Opinion addresses an exception in the Workers’ Compensation Act, NMSA
1978, §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (1987) (as amended through 2006) (the Act), that permits
compensation for injuries incurred in travel by employees when those injuries “aris[e] out
of and in the course of employment.” Section 52-1-19. Eloy Doporto, Jr.,1 Mike Lucas, Jose
Turrubiates, and Pete Rodriguez (collectively, Workers), oilfield workers employed by
Permian Drilling Corporation (Permian), insured by American Home Assurance, were
involved in an automobile accident while traveling to their work site, resulting in the death
of Doporto and injuries to the others. We conclude that the injuries suffered by Workers
arose out of and in the course of their employment because the travel was mutually
beneficial to employees and employer and Workers encountered special hazards unique to
their employment while traveling, thus rendering Workers “traveling employees” whose
injuries are compensable under the Act.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{2} Our review of the whole record developed before the Workers’ Compensation Judge
(WCJ) supports the following statement of the factual background. Permian operates mobile
drilling rigs throughout southeastern New Mexico and western Texas. The rigs are mobile
and are moved to a new location after the drilling of a well is complete, generally every
seven to eight days. The drill sites typically are located in rural areas, far from any town,
making travel necessary. Crews travel to and from the drill site daily; if the site is extremely
remote, however, the drilling company provides lodging. The rigs, operated twenty-four
hours a day, are staffed by three crews working eight-hour shifts and a relief crew that
replaces the others on their respective days off.

{3} Each crew consists of a driller and three to four crew members. The driller is
responsible for hiring and supervising his crew, subject to Permian’s approval. The driller
is obligated to have a full crew present at the drilling site at the beginning of the shift; an
insufficient number of crew members results in an idle rig and imposes a significant financial
burden on the company. To meet this responsibility, the industry practice is for drillers to
transport their crews to the rig site, though Permian has no written policy requiring such.
Permian requires drillers to maintain a valid driver’s license and automobile insurance, and
compensates the drillers at the rate of twenty-five cents for each mile traveled to a rig site.
Individual crew members are not compensated for their travel time, even if they choose to
travel individually; they are paid hourly once they begin their scheduled shift. Permian’s

1
Petitioners concerned with Doporto’s claim are Bill and Norma Corsaut as guardians
of Doporto’s minor children.

2
crews may travel up to 4000 miles per month, or as much as 200 miles per day, to reach the
mobile drilling rigs to which they are assigned, though Permian does not dictate the route
they must travel nor the mode of transportation.

{4} Workers were members of an oil well drilling crew employed by Permian.
Rodriguez, the driller, customarily picked up the members of his crew—Doporto, Lucas, and
Turrubiates—at their homes in Hobbs to transport them to the rig site in his vehicle.
Rodriguez led weekly safety meetings with his crew on topics that included travel safety.
The crew had been working extra shifts in the days prior to the accident. In the early
morning of November 10, 2006, Rodriguez picked up his crew at their homes, and they set
forth from Hobbs to the rig site, a distance of approximately sixty to seventy miles. The
crew stopped at a gas station to fill their water cooler. A short time later, the vehicle was
involved in a single-car accident in which Doporto was killed and the others were injured.

{5} Workers filed workers’ compensation claims under the Act, arguing that they were
traveling employees injured in the course of their employment. Their claims were
consolidated before a WCJ. The WCJ bifurcated the trial to decide the issue of
compensability before determining benefit entitlements. After a trial on the merits and the
submission of proposed findings of fact by each party, the WCJ entered written findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and a compensation order. The WCJ concluded that Workers were
commuters, that the mileage payments to Rodriguez did not make him a traveling employee,
and that the travel to the rig site was “not an incidental or integral part of Workers’
employment.” As a result, Workers’ claims were dismissed because their injuries did not
occur within the course and scope of their employment and thus the injuries were not
compensable under the Act.

{6} Workers appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in a memorandum opinion, upheld
the WCJ’s dismissal of Workers’ claims. Rodriguez v. Permian Drilling Corp., No. 29,435,
slip op. at 13 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2010). The Court of Appeals concluded that
substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s conclusion that Rodriguez was not fulfilling a duty
of his employment in transporting his crew, id., and that Workers were not traveling
employees under the Act when the accident occurred, id. at 12-13.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{7} “All workers’ compensation cases are reviewed under a whole record standard of
review.” Moya v. City of Albuquerque, 2008-NMSC-004, ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 258, 175 P.3d 926.
As a general matter, we defer to the expertise of the administrative judge and “[w]e will not
. . . substitute our judgment for that of the agency; although the evidence may support
inconsistent findings, we will not disturb the agency’s finding if supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.” Herman v. Miners’ Hosp., 111 N.M. 550, 552, 807 P.2d
734, 736 (1991).

{8} If the facts are largely undisputed, as in this case, whether Workers’ injuries are

3
compensable under the Act is a question of law. See Edens v. N.M. Health and Soc. Servs.
Dep’t, 89 N.M. 60, 62, 547 P.2d 65, 67 (1976); Ramirez v. Dawson Prod. Partners, Inc.,
2000-NMCA-011, ¶ 14, 128 N.M. 601, 995 P.2d 1043. “When an agency that is governed
by a particular statute construes or applies that statute, the court will begin by according
some deference to the agency’s interpretation.” Morningstar Water Users Ass’n v. N.M.
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 120 N.M. 579, 583, 904 P.2d 28, 32 (1995). The court, however, “is not
bound by the agency’s interpretation and may substitute its own independent judgment for
that of the agency because it is the function of the courts to interpret the law.” Id. Because
our review of this case requires us to construe the Act, our primary goal is to give effect to
legislative intent. See El Paso Elec. Co. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n,
2010-NMSC-048, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 174, 246 P.3d 443; see also State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-
032, ¶¶ 9-10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (summarizing our canon of statutory
construction).

III. ANALYSIS

{9} New Mexico’s workers’ compensation scheme, codified in the Act, is designed “to
compensate workers for injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” Flores v.
McKay Oil Corp., 2008-NMCA-123, ¶ 9, 144 N.M. 782, 192 P.3d 777. Claims under the
Act are to be resolved with due consideration for the rights of both employees and
employers. NMSA 1978, § 52-5-1 (1990). The Act provides the exclusive remedy for an
employee to receive compensation for an injury “arising out of and in the course of his
employment.” Section 52-1-9(B). This includes

accidental injuries to workers and death resulting from accidental injury as
a result of their employment and while at work in any place where their
employer’s business requires their presence but shall not include injuries to
any worker occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his
employment or after leaving such duties.

Section 52-1-19. An injury arises out of and in the course of employment if the injury was
sustained “during the commission of an activity that is reasonable and foreseeable both as
to its nature and manner of commission.” Ramirez, 2000-NMCA-011, ¶ 17; see § 52-1-28
(A)(1) & (2) (requiring proof that the injury was “arising out of and in the course of [the]
employment” and “reasonably incident to [the] employment”).

{10} The Act excludes injuries incurred by an employee “while on [the] way to assume
the duties of . . . employment or after leaving such duties,” Ramirez, 2000-NMCA-011, ¶ 7,
commonly referred to as the “going and coming” rule. See, e.g., id.; Garcia v. Phil Garcia’s
Elec. Contractor, Inc., 99 N.M. 374, 376, 658 P.2d 449, 451 (Ct. App. 1982). “This rule
arises from the recognition that, while admittedly the employment is the cause of the
workman’s journey between his home and the factory, it is generally taken for granted that
workmen’s compensation was not intended to protect him against all the perils of that
journey.” Ramirez, 2000-NMCA-011, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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That is, injuries incurred during a commute are not covered under workers’ compensation
law.

{11} Recognized exceptions to the going and coming rule are numerous; we limit our
discussion, however, to the single exception at issue in this appeal, that of the traveling
employee. This exception was adopted, and thoroughly explained, by the Court of Appeals
in Ramirez. Id. ¶ 11. Ramirez defined traveling employees as “employees for whom travel
is an integral part of their jobs, such as those who travel to different locations to perform
their duties, as differentiated from employees who commute daily from home to a single
workplace.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{12} Traveling employees are distinct from “mere commuters” whose injuries are
excluded from compensation under the Act. See Flores, 2008-NMCA-123, ¶ 27. We
imagine a commuter as one who chooses to live in Albuquerque or Tesuque but works in
Santa Fe. The commuter has the option of living and working in the same city, but for any
number of reasons chooses to travel some distance between home and work. In Flores, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the oil rig workers injured while traveling to the rig site
were commuters, not traveling employees. The Court of Appeals found that the injuries did
not arise out of the employment because the rig was in a fixed location, relatively close to
the workers’ residences, and because the employer did not provide any reimbursement or per
diem specifically for transportation costs nor require any of the workers to maintain valid
licenses or insurance. Id. ¶¶ 22-24, 27. Traveling employees, in contrast, are those who
encounter special hazards on the road that could be avoided were travel not a necessary
component of the employment. Anyone for whom travel is an integral, avoidable part of the
job is a traveling employee. See Chavez v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc., 2001-NMCA-039,
¶ 15, 130 N.M. 524, 27 P.3d 1011 (noting that the truck driver “was on the road, serving his
employer’s interests, and it was the fact that he was on the road that exposed him to hazards
he would not have faced at home”).

{13} The primary reason for the distinction between a commuter and a traveling employee
is that travel undertaken by a traveling employee provides substantial benefit to both
employee and employer. “[T]he activity giving rise to the injury must confer some benefit
on the employer.” Ramirez, 2000-NMCA-011, ¶ 16; see also Kurtis A. Kemper, Application
of the “Mutual Benefit” Doctrine to Workers’ Compensation Cases, 11 A.L.R.6th 351 Table
(2006) (compiling cases). “The benefit to the employer need not be pecuniary, and may be
as intangible as a well-fed and well-rested employee.” Ramirez, 2000-NMCA-011, ¶ 17.

The rationale behind the traveling employee rule is that an employee who is
required to travel away from home is furthering the business of his employer
as he eats, sleeps, and performs other acts necessary to his health and comfort
during his travels. In addition, where the employment requires travel, the
employee is consequently exposed to hazards she would otherwise have the
option of avoiding. Thus the hazards of the route become the hazards of
employment. But, it is not merely travel on a highway that creates a risk of

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 compensable injury; if that were so, every ordinary commuter would be
covered under the Act. Rather, it is the job’s requirement of travel and the
employer’s authority and control in assigning its employees to different work
sites that increase the normal risk and render compensable injuries suffered
during such travel.

Id. ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted).

{14} To determine whether an injury incurred while en route to the place of employment
falls within the traveling employee exception to the going and coming rule, the Court of
Appeals has utilized various factors. Ramirez set forth certain considerations relevant to
determining whether an employee is a traveling employee for purposes of the Act. These
considerations include “that an injury . . . takes place within the period of employment, at
a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is reasonably
fulfilling the duties of employment or doing something incidental to it.” Id. ¶ 16 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). In Flores, the Court of Appeals quoted as persuasive
authority certain factors used by the Colorado Supreme Court to determine if an injury falls
within the traveling employee exception:

(1) whether the travel occurred during working hours, (2) whether the travel
occurred on or off the employer’s premises, (3) whether the travel was
contemplated by the employment contract, and (4) whether the obligations
or conditions of employment created a “zone of special danger” out of which
the injury arose. Whether meeting one of the variables is sufficient, by itself,
to create a special circumstance warranting recovery depends upon whether
the evidence supporting that variable demonstrates a causal connection
between the employment and the injury such that the travel to and from work
arises out of and in the course of employment.

2008-NMCA-123, ¶ 14 (quoting Staff Adm’rs, Inc. v. Reynolds, 977 P.2d 866, 868 (Colo.
1999) (en banc)).2 All of the considerations listed in Ramirez and Flores are sound
guideposts for analyzing whether a worker was a traveling employee at the time of the
injury, which, in turn will determine whether an injury arose out of and in the course of
employment.

{15} A review of New Mexico caselaw reveals that our appellate courts have used two of
the above-listed factors in particular to decide whether the traveling employee exception to

2
The Colorado Supreme Court articulated these factors in Madden v. Mountain West
Fabricators, noting that contractual travel requirements could be express or implied, but that
a key factor is “when such travel confers a benefit on the employer beyond the sole fact of
the employee’s arrival at work.” 977 P.2d 861, 864-65 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (citing, inter
alia, Loffland Bros. v. Baca, 651 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Colo. App.1982)).

6
the going and coming rule applies: the express or implied employment contract terms and
the zone of special danger created by the required travel. In Barrington v. Johnn Drilling
Co., we stated that the going and coming rule did not apply “where hazards of the journey
may fairly be regarded as hazards of the service to be performed and are dependent on the
nature and the circumstances of the particular employment; also where the employer
contracts to and does furnish transportation to and from work.” 51 N.M. 172, 177, 181 P.2d
166, 169-70 (1947). The decedent in Barrington was a driller who transported his crew
sixty-five miles round-trip daily between Hobbs and the oil rig, where no lodging was
available, and was compensated at the rate of seven cents per mile; he died in a car accident
between Hobbs and the rig site. 51 N.M. at 174-75, 181 P.2d at 167-68. The Court
determined that the decedent was killed in the course of his employment because the
employer had agreed to provide transportation by an “express agreement or . . . course of
dealing,” and paid for the cost of transportation. Id. at 177-78, 181 P.2d at 169-70 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 480 (1947)). The
decedent’s travel to the rig site “was not a case of employees traveling in the same city
between home and work. Extended cross-country transportation was necessary. And it was
transportation of a type that an employer might fairly be expected to furnish.” Id. at 179,
181 P.2d at 171 (quoting Cardillo, 330 U.S. at 484); see also Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co.,
55 N.M. 81, 87, 227 P.2d 365, 368-69 (1950) (concluding that an injury incurred by a driller
while transporting his crew arose out of and in the course of employment because the driller
was contractually required to ensure he had a fully staffed crew when his shift commenced
and throughout the shift).

{16} Ramirez’ analysis focused on the terms of the employment contract, although its
definition of a traveling employee indicated the special hazards faced by oil rig workers were
given due consideration. The three plaintiffs in Ramirez were oil field workers assigned to
a job site in western Texas, approximately 90 miles from Hobbs. 2000-NMCA-011, ¶ 2.
As a condition of their employment, they were provided with per diem for lodging near the
job site and travel between the hotel and the site, and initially were provided with
transportation between the site and Hobbs on their days off. Id. ¶ 3. Later, however, the
employer provided an extra crew member in exchange for the employees providing their
own transportation between the work site and Hobbs. Id. ¶ 4. The three plaintiffs were
injured while traveling to Hobbs from the work site. Id. ¶ 5. Ramirez concluded that two
workers were covered: the worker who took the trip to transport a colleague who was
scheduled to begin his time off and to transport dirty uniforms for laundering at the request
of the site supervisor, id. ¶ 18, and the worker who was scheduled to take time off and
arranged to travel in his colleague’s vehicle, id. ¶ 19. The third worker, however, took the
trip to keep his colleague company and thus “conferred no benefit” upon the employer and
did not qualify for benefits. Id. ¶ 20; see also Martinez v. Fidel, 61 N.M. 6, 9, 293 P.2d 654,
656 (1956) (concluding that slipping on ice while taking one of many possible routes
between the office and the employer’s parking lot was not an accident incurred in travel
“peculiar to [plaintiff’s] work”); Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 70 N.M. 99, 101, 370 P.2d
816, 818 (1962) (finding that the fact that a driller participated in a car pool with his crew,
occasionally using company gas, was not enough to bring the deceased driller within the

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traveling employee exception); Arias v. AAA Landscaping, 115 N.M. 239, 240, 849 P.2d
382, 383 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the worker was not entitled to workers’ compensation
because, although the employer typically provided transportation for the employees and paid
them during the travel time, on the date of the injury the worker had received permission to
leave early, was not paid for the rest of the day, and traveled in a private vehicle).

{17} Other jurisdictions likewise review the circumstances of employment when
determining whether an injury incurred en route to an oil rig falls within the traveling
employee exception to the going and coming rule. See Loffland Bros., 651 P.2d at 433
(“[W]here the employer required the employees to travel a considerable distance to their job,
where there was a benefit to the employer in having a full crew on hand, and where they had
made arrangements to pay the driller to collect the crew and bring them to the drill site so
as to make it more probable that a full crew would be on hand, the accident did occur within
the course of and arise out of the employment of these claimants.”); Messenger v. Sage
Drilling Co., 680 P.2d 556, 560 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the trial court did not err
in concluding that the employee’s travel was of substantial benefit to the employer, and thus
covered by workers’ compensation, when the oil rig workers had no set place of
employment, were required to travel long distances daily, and were compensated for their
mileage); Lassabe v. Simmons Drilling, Inc., 743 P.2d 568, 570-71 (Mont. 1987) (concluding
that the employer’s policy required the driller to transport his crew to the rig at the start of
a shift, rendering the accident compensable by the workers’ compensation scheme);
Christian v. Nicor Drilling Co., 653 P.2d 185, 186, 188 (Okla. 1982) (noting that, “[w]hen
drilling sites are at locations remote from population centers, transportation is commonly
provided by the employer for the mutual benefit of all parties,” and concluding that workers
traveling in their private vehicle because they missed the employer-provided transportation
were covered by the traveling employee exception); Texas Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Byrd, 540
S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (“[H]olding . . . that the requirement of the
employees being in the course and scope of their employment in the furtherance of the
employer’s affairs is satisfied by the undisputed facts as to the plan of getting them to and
from the job location in a remote area and the benefits which such plan conferred upon the
employer.”).

{18} Some courts have focused their analysis specifically on the special hazards
encountered by oil rig workers. The Ohio Supreme Court, in Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling,
Inc., applied a special hazard test to a workers’ compensation claim by oil rig workers who
worked at a fixed site3 and concluded that their injuries incurred when traveling to the rig
site were covered. 689 N.E.2d 917, 924 (Ohio 1998). Ruckman stated that travel to a rig site

3
Ruckman’s definition of “fixed situs” distinguishes it from a situation in which travel
is the job, e.g., traveling salesman, stating that a fixed-site employee “may be reassigned to
a different work place monthly, weekly, or even daily.” 689 N.E.2d at 920-21. This
definition is consistent with that utilized by Flores, 2008-NMCA-123, ¶ 27 (“The rig itself
was a fixed work site.”).

8
is a special hazard of oil rig workers’ employment because: (1) the rig sites are temporary
in nature and constantly changing; (2) workers are unable to “fix their commute in relation
to these remote work sites”; and (3) workers are required to travel vast distances as
conditions of their employment. Id. The court held that “because of the combination of all
these factors, the riggers have established a risk quantitatively greater than risks common to
the public,” and accordingly were entitled to recovery under the workers’ compensation
scheme. Id.; see also Falls v. Union Drilling Inc., 672 S.E.2d 204, 212-13 (W.Va. 2008)
(concluding that a “special hazard or increased risk” existed in the scope of the employment
when an oil rig worker worked an extra shift and then fell asleep during his lengthy trip
home, thus precluding a negligence cause of action against the employer).

{19} While we believe all of the above-stated factors are important considerations to be
undertaken by the WCJ and reviewing courts, we find the “zone of special danger” or
“special hazard” factor to be most significant to resolving this case.4 See Barrington, 51
N.M. at 177, 181 P.2d at 169-70. As discussed above, the traveling employee exception to
the going and coming rule permits recovery under the Act for employees injured while
traveling when that travel is an integral part of the employment. For an employee to be a
traveling employee due to a special hazard of employment, two factors are required: (1) “but
for the employment, the employee would not have been at the location where the injury
occurred”; and (2) “the risk is distinctive in nature or quantitatively greater than risks
common to the public.” 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers’ Compensation § 284 (2003). This
analysis, along with the requirement that the travel provide some benefit to the employer,
helps determine whether travel is an integral part of employment, which, in turn, ensures that
only those individuals whose injuries arose out of and in the course of employment receive
compensation, maintaining the balanced approach to the Act intended by the Legislature.
See §§ 52-1-19 and 52-5-1. It ensures that not every employee who is injured on the road
receives benefits under the Act but that those who must be on the road as an “integral part
of their jobs” are covered.

{20} We now return to the record in this appeal and conclude that the facts of this case
indicate Workers fall squarely within the traveling employees exception because their travel
provided a mutual benefit to the employer and employee and the conditions of employment
placed the employees in a zone of special danger out of which the injury arose. The rig site
to which Workers were traveling when the accident occurred was some sixty or seventy
miles away from Workers’ residences in Hobbs, and lodging was not available at the rig site.
Workers did not have a stationary work site but were required to move to another site every
seven to eight days, preventing them from fixing their commute in relation to the rig site.
Permian benefitted from having a mobile work crew that resided in a central location and

4
Although certain states appear to apply the special hazard or special danger as a
separate exception to the going and coming rule, see, e.g., Parks v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd., 660 P.2d 382, 384-85 (Cal. 1983), we approve of the doctrine only as a tool to interpret
the traveling employee exception.

9
could travel to different sites weekly without having to change residences. Permian incurred
a substantial benefit by having its employees provide their own transportation, while
subsidizing only the driller’s transportation, rather than providing daily transportation for
all employees. Rodriguez, the driller, was compensated for his mileage and was expected
to arrive at the drilling site with a full crew and for having a valid license and proof of
insurance on file with Permian. His crew was not compensated for their travel, but this is
not required if the circumstances indicate the travel was for the purpose of fulfilling their
duties of employment and benefit of the travel was incurred by the employer.5 We conclude
that these special characteristics attendant to employment in the oil rig field satisfy the
requirement that travel be mutually beneficial to employer and employee.

{21} The conditions of employment placed Workers in a zone of special danger from
which arose their injuries. The long hours, long and varied travel time, and lack of choice
in decreasing the commute gave rise to risks distinct from those of an average traveler on a
public highway. Extensive travel is an integral part of the work of oil rig drillers and crew
members, particularly for mobile rigs such as the ones on which Workers were employed,
and as such distinguishes the travel to the rigs from a commute. The special hazards faced
by Workers in their travel to and from the rig site were a requirement of their employment,
and the accident giving rise to their claims would not have occurred but for the required
travel. We conclude that the WCJ erred in its application of the traveling employee
exception of the going and coming rule to Workers, and that substantial evidence in the
whole record supports the conclusion that Workers were injured in the course of their
employment.6

IV. CONCLUSION

{22} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals and WCJ erred in
their conclusion that Workers’ injuries are non-compensable under the Act. We reverse the
Court of Appeals’ memorandum opinion and remand to the WCJ for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.

5
Permian argues that the stop at a local gas station en route to the rig site to purchase
food and water when Workers were not directed to do so by their employer mandates
affirmance of the WCJ’s order denying compensation. Even if the stop at the gas station
were an unauthorized deviation, a point on which we pass no opinion, see, e.g., Parr v. N.
M. State Highway Dep’t, 54 N.M. 126, 131, 215 P.2d 602, 605-06 (1950), Workers were
injured on the road, not at the gas station, so the stop does not affect our analysis.
6
Because we conclude the injuries to Workers arose out of and in the course of their
employment under the traveling employee exception, we do not address Rodriguez’ separate
claim that the mileage payment meant that he was fulfilling a duty of his employment at the
time he was injured. We note simply that the mileage payment adds further support to the
conclusion that Rodriguez’ injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.

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{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________________
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice

______________________________________
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice

______________________________________
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice

______________________________________
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice

Topic Index for Rodriguez v. Permian Drilling Corp., Docket No. 32,311

AL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PROCEDURE
AL-AA Administrative Appeal
AL-JR Judicial Review

NR NATURAL RESOURCES
NR-OG Oil and Gas

WC WORKERS COMPENSATION
WC-BC Basis for Compensation
WC-CC Causal Connection
WC-CR Coming and Going Rule
WC-CE Course of Employment
SC-SE Scope of Employment

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