Hunnicutt v. Sewell

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2009-NMCA-121

Filing Date: September 3, 2009

Docket No. 28,343

CRYSTAL HUNNICUTT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

REGINA RYANCZAK SEWELL, Individually; and
REGINA RYANCZAK SEWELL, Attorney at Law, P.C.;
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; and
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS FOR
THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, as primary contracting
parties with Regina Ryanczak Sewell and/or Regina
Ryanczak Sewell, Attorney at Law, P.C.; and LYNNE
JESSEN, in her individual and official capacity; IDA
LUJAN, in her individual capacity; ANGELA ADAMS,
in her individual and official capacity; MARY DALE
BOLSON, in her individual capacity; JOHN AND JANE
DOES 1-10, in their individual capacities; JOHN DOE
11; JOHN DOE 12; and NEW MEXICO CHILDREN,
YOUTH & FAMILIES DEPARTMENT,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
James A. Hall, District Judge

Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C.
Nancy L. Simmons
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Michael Dickman
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellees Twelfth Judicial District Court,

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Administrative Office of the Courts,
John Doe 11, and John Doe 12

OPINION

CASTILLO, Judge.

{1} Plaintiff appeals the district court’s order dismissing the case against the
Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), the Twelfth Judicial District Court (TJDC), and
John Does 11 and 12 (John Does) (collectively Defendants). Because we hold that each of
these Defendants were entitled to judicial immunity, the complaint was properly dismissed
as to them, and we affirm the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} The following facts are drawn from the pleadings filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff was the
subject of an abuse and neglect proceeding that resulted in her placement with adoptive
parents. Plaintiff’s adoptive mother relinquished custody of Plaintiff to the Children, Youth
and Families Department (Department) in October 2005. In May 2006, the Department
initiated a petition for court-ordered family services on Plaintiff’s behalf. The district court
appointed an attorney (Attorney) to represent Plaintiff during that proceeding pursuant to a
youth-attorney contract. In November 2006, Attorney moved to withdraw as Plaintiff’s
counsel, and the district court entered an order of withdrawal. On January 5, 2007, the
matter was dismissed because Plaintiff reached the age of eighteen.

{3} Plaintiff originally filed a complaint for damages against Attorney and injunctive
relief against AOC. She alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, legal
malpractice, violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, and abandonment. AOC filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted with permission for Plaintiff
to file an amended complaint within seven days. In her first amended complaint, Plaintiff
sought damages against AOC and added defendants, including the Department, the TJDC,
various state employees, and John Does 1 through 10. Sometime later, Plaintiff filed a
second amended complaint with additional claims that included yet more
defendants—among them John Does 11 and 12.

{4} Specific to the appeal before us are the allegations regarding the youth-attorney
contract and the allegations regarding constitutional violations. In her second amended
complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she was a third-party beneficiary to the youth attorney
contract and that TJDC and AOC breached that contract by failing to oversee Attorney’s
performance and by failing to ensure that substitute counsel was provided after Attorney was
allowed to withdraw. As to the John Does, Plaintiff alleged that they violated her
constitutional rights by failing to (1) arrange for competent counsel for Plaintiff, (2) oversee
Attorney’s representation of Plaintiff, and (3) secure substitute counsel for Plaintiff after
Attorney was allowed to withdraw.

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{5} Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint and argued that
they were protected from Plaintiff’s allegations by absolute judicial immunity and by
qualified immunity or, in the alternative, that the complaint failed to state a contract claim
against AOC and TJDC. After a hearing on Defendants’ motion, the district court granted
the motion and entered an order dismissing the complaint as to Defendants. Plaintiff appeals
from that order.

{6} The district court’s order did not affect Plaintiff’s complaint against Attorney.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s current appeal relates only to the allegations brought against
Defendants.

II. DISCUSSION

{7} On appeal, both parties maintain the positions that were developed below. Plaintiff’s
appeal is based on the two sets of allegations contained in the second amended complaint:
the breach of contract claim against TJDC and AOC and the constitutional claims against
John Does. Defendants maintain that they are immune from Plaintiff’s allegations or, in the
alternative, that the complaint failed to state a contract claim against AOC and TJDC.
Because we conclude that Defendants are entitled to judicial immunity, we do not need to
consider Defendants’ remaining arguments.

A. Standard of Review

{8} “In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 1-012(B)(6)
NMRA . . ., we take the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as true and test the legal
sufficiency of the claims.” Envtl. Control, Inc. v. City of Santa Fe, 2002-NMCA-003, ¶ 6,
131 N.M. 450, 38 P.3d 891 (filed 2001). We also review questions of immunity de novo.
See Starko, Inc. v. Gallegos, 2006-NMCA-085, ¶ 11, 140 N.M. 136, 140 P.3d 1085 (“The
applicability of qualified immunity is a question of law that we review de novo.”);
Candelaria v. Robinson, 93 N.M. 786, 789, 606 P.2d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1980) (identifying
issues of absolute immunity as questions of law). We begin by examining whether
Defendants are immune from suit: if immunity is applicable in the present case, it is a bar
to suit and therefore a threshold issue. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)
(“[T]he essence of absolute immunity is its possessor’s entitlement not to have to answer for
his conduct in a civil damages action.”); Leach v. N.M. Junior Coll., 2002-NMCA-039, ¶¶
11, 19, 132 N.M. 106, 45 P.3d 46 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment and qualified
immunity protect not only against liability, but from the burden of litigation).

B. Judicial Immunity

{9} Judicial immunity was developed to preserve the “autonomy and integrity of the
judiciary” so that “persons who are integral to the judicial process [are] able to perform their
functions without the intimidating effect of potential lawsuits.” Collins ex rel. Collins v.

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Tabet, 111 N.M. 391, 398, 806 P.2d 40, 47 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Over time, judicial immunity has been extended to “various persons whose
adjudicatory functions or other involvement with the judicial process have been thought to
warrant protection from harassment, intimidation, or other interference with their ability to
engage in impartial decision-making.” Id. at 396, 806 P.2d at 45. These persons are
absolutely immune “from liability for their actions taken in performance of their roles as
integral parts of the judicial process.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Thus, in order to determine whether Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity,
we apply a functional test to determine whether the acts alleged by Plaintiff were judicial
functions. See id. We recognize that there are two causes of action—breach of contract
against AOC and TJDC and constitutional claims against John Does. These claims arise
from the same alleged functions: finding counsel, ensuring counsel’s compliance with the
youth-attorney contract, and securing replacement counsel after Attorney was allowed to
withdraw. These functions, Plaintiff argues, are purely administrative—not judicial—in
nature. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (stating that “[a]dministrative
decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not
similarly been regarded as judicial acts”). We are not persuaded that the alleged functions
in the present case are merely administrative acts.

{10} According to the Children’s Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-1-1 to -24-5 (1993, as
amended through 2009), the appointment, oversight, and withdrawal of counsel are within
the control of the court. Section 32A-3B-8(C) provides that “[i]n proceedings on a petition
alleging a family in need of court-ordered services, the court shall appoint . . . an attorney
for a child fourteen years of age or older at the inception of the proceedings.” In an abuse
and neglect proceeding, the court is specifically required to oversee an appointed attorney’s
performance: “The court shall assure that . . . the child’s attorney zealously represents the
child.” Section 32A-4-10(F). In addition, “[a]n attorney who has entered an appearance or
who has been appointed by the court to represent a party in a children’s court proceeding
shall continue such representation until relieved by the court, unless a substitution of counsel
is filed not less than fifteen . . . days prior to the adjudicatory hearing.” Rule 10-165(B)
NMRA. Unless such substitution of counsel is filed, “no attorney or firm who has entered
an appearance in a children’s court proceeding may withdraw as counsel without a written
order of the court.” Rule 10-165(C). Thus, the court bears the statutory responsibility in
children’s court proceedings for appointing counsel, ensuring the competence of counsel,
and for permitting counsel to withdraw. As a result, these are judicial and not administrative
functions.

{11} Despite the language of the statutes and rules, Plaintiff argues that the alleged acts
are not judicial functions because the Legislature appropriates funds to AOC, in
collaboration with local district courts, to maintain the system. Specifically, Plaintiff
contends that her allegations have no “direct relationship to the judge’s order of
appointment[] and cannot be properly considered a judicial function that would entitle
[Defendants] to judicial immunity.” In this way, Plaintiff argues that AOC is similar to the
Public Defender Department, which receives appropriations to implement the public

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defender system. For support, Plaintiff cites State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar (Quintana),
115 N.M. 573, 855 P.2d 562 (1993). In Quintana, our Supreme Court considered whether
the courts have the authority to order the Public Defender Department “to represent a
particular ‘indigent’ defendant when [that d]epartment decides that a particular defendant
is not indigent and therefore not entitled to its legal services.” Id. at 574, 855 P.2d at 563.
Plaintiff states that Quintana stands for the proposition that “the Public Defender, not the
court, was responsible for implementing the indigent defense system.” Nowhere, however,
does Quintana suggest that appointing and overseeing counsel is not a judicial function. In
fact, Quintana does not consider the doctrine of judicial immunity at all. Further, Quintana
appears to support Defendants’ position. Although the Court acknowledged that the Public
Defender Department is responsible for adopting standards for determining whether a
defendant is indigent, the Quintana Court further concluded that the district courts are free
to depart from those standards in order to “ensure the fundamental right to counsel through
its inherent authority to safeguard constitutional requirements.” Id. at 578, 855 P.2d at 567.
Thus, Quintana affirms that the district courts are responsible for safeguarding the
constitutional right to counsel.

{12} Instead of relying on Quintana for direction with regard to judicial immunity, we
look to Collins, which addresses the question of absolute judicial immunity and adjudicatory
function in the context of the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Collins, 111 N.M. at 393,
806 P.2d at 42. The Collins Court concluded that a guardian ad litem benefits from absolute
judicial immunity under certain circumstances, depending on the function. Id. at 395, 806
P.2d at 44. Absolute immunity attaches to a guardian ad litem when the appointment
“contemplates investigation on behalf of the court into the fairness and reasonableness of the
settlement in its effect on the minor.” Id. If the appointment of the guardian “does not
contemplate actions on behalf of the court but instead representation of the minor as an
advocate, or if the guardian departs from the scope of appointment as a functionary of the
court and instead assumes the role of a private advocate for the child’s position, then the
guardian is not immune.” Id.

{13} In the present case, there is no allegation that Defendants departed from the scope
of their duties as functionaries of the court. Plaintiff appears to argue that because she has
alleged that Defendants acted unconstitutionally or breached the youth-attorney contract, the
actions could not have been judicial and do not bear “any direct relationship to the judge’s
order of appointment.” We are unpersuaded. When evaluating whether judicial immunity
applies, we do not examine the allegations of improper or illegal conduct. Rather, we focus
on the role that the individual claiming immunity played and evaluate whether that role was
integral to the judicial process. See id. at 396, 806 P.2d at 45 (citing cases that utilize a
“functional approach” to immunity); see also Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200
(1985) (noting that judicial immunity applies to judicial acts “however erroneous the act may
have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Having already determined that
Defendants’ functions were judicial, we hold that Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial
immunity.

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{14} Plaintiff cites Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004), but Plaintiff’s
argument related to Mitchell is unclear. Nevertheless, we observe that this case outlines two
tests under which the question of judicial immunity may be evaluated. According to the
Mitchell Court, a defendant is entitled to absolute judicial immunity when a defendant’s role
is “functionally comparable to that of a judge” or when a defendant’s action is “integrally
related to an ongoing judicial proceeding.” Id. at 172 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). We have already considered judicial function, and now we turn to evaluate
whether Defendants’ actions were integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding. “In
order to be entitled to absolute immunity under this test, the official must be engaged in acts
that are integrally related not simply to the judicial process in general but to a concrete
judicial case or controversy.” Id. at 174.

{15} In Mitchell, the plaintiff—an attorney—sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages
based on the defendants’ refusal to recertify the plaintiff to act as court-appointed counsel
for indigent defendants. Mitchell, 377 F.3d at 159. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the defendants, who served on a committee to screen applicants, were not
entitled to judicial immunity. Id. at 161, 172. Regarding the integrally related action
analysis, the court determined that the defendants’ function of formulating a list of qualified
attorneys was “not related to any particular criminal prosecution” and that even the rejection
of the plaintiff’s particular application for certification did not affect a particular case, as the
plaintiff was permitted to conclude the cases to which he had already been assigned. Id. at
174. As a result, the court determined that the defendants’ function was not “integrally
related to any specific judicial proceeding.” Id.

{16} In the present case, Defendants’ functions were inherently related to a specific
judicial proceeding. The district court had already appointed Attorney to represent Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s claim was premised on acts and omissions related to that appointment, specifically
that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with effective counsel and failed to provide
replacement counsel after Attorney was allowed to withdraw from service. Thus, Plaintiff
is arguing that Defendants were responsible for monitoring the effectiveness of Attorney and
the status of Plaintiff’s representation for the duration of the case. Unlike the Mitchell
committee’s obligation to provide a general list from which the court could—but was not
required—to make selections at the appropriate time, Plaintiff contends that Defendants had
an obligation in this judicial proceeding to take specific oversight actions. We conclude that
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants were based on actions integrally related to Plaintiff’s
particular case and, therefore, under the second test in Mitchell, Defendants were entitled to
judicial immunity.

{17} Based on either theory—judicial function or integrally related actions—we conclude
that Defendants are shielded from suit by judicial immunity for the actions alleged in
Plaintiff’s complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

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{18} We affirm the district court.

{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________
CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge

____________________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge

Topic Index for Hunnicutt v. Sewell, No. 28,343

AT ATTORNEYS
AT-LM Legal Malpractice

CU COURTS
CU-JI Judicial Immunity

DR DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DR-GI Guardians ad Litem

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