Certiorari Denied, No. 31,788, July 17, 2009
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: 2009-NMCA-091
Filing Date: June 3 , 2009
Docket No. 26,593
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY REYES,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRANT COUNTY
J.C. Robinson, District Judge
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender
Joseph P. Walsh, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
OPINION
KENNEDY, Judge.
{1} Defendant presents to us a novel argument, seeking suppression of the evidence
under the Fourth Amendment, on the ground that the police officer, who performed the
traffic stop and subsequent arrest of Defendant, was without the authority to do so because
he had failed to obtain his officer certification within the statutory time limit prescribed by
NMSA 1978, Section 29-7-6(B) (1993), of the Law Enforcement Training Act (the Act),
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NMSA 1978, §§ 29-7-1 to -13 (1969, as amended through 2003). Due to the specific
arguments presented and developed below and on appeal, we limit our review to the narrow
question of statutory construction. Under the facts presented by this case, we are not
persuaded that the Legislature intended to preclude the officer from performing the duties
of his employment with the police department. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} Defendant entered a conditional plea agreement in which he pleaded no contest to
the offenses of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, admitted to being
a habitual offender, and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
{3} The facts are undisputed. Defendant does not challenge the officer’s conduct during
the stop and arrest. On May 30, 2005, Officer Gomez pulled Defendant over for speeding
on his motorcycle in Hurley, New Mexico. In the course of the traffic stop, Officer Gomez
discovered that Defendant’s driver’s license had been revoked and arrested him. Officer
Gomez asked Defendant if he had anything in his pockets, to which Defendant responded
that he had a glass pipe. During the search of Defendant’s pockets incident to his arrest,
Officer Gomez found the glass pipe and a substance that Defendant admitted was
methamphetamine.
{4} Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, however, and argued that Officer Gomez
was not a certified officer and that his position should have been forfeited because the Act
requires an officer who does not obtain certification within one year to forfeit his position.
See § 29-7-6(B). Therefore, Defendant argued that Officer Gomez had no more authority
than an ordinary citizen to stop and arrest Defendant and that the officer’s actions in this case
exceeded the scope of permissible law enforcement by ordinary citizens. The State argued
that Officer Gomez was not required to forfeit his position and therefore had the authority
to stop Defendant, because his employment history with police agencies where he had been
employed complied with the statutory time frame contemplated by the Legislature in
enacting the applicable provision of the Act.
{5} The district court held a hearing on the motion, at which Defendant and the State
asserted conflicting interpretations of the statutory provision, both relying upon the plain
meaning of the language and the policies underlying the Act. The district court denied
Defendant’s motion to suppress and ruled that Officer Gomez had worked reasonably and
in good faith toward completing all relevant training and that the policies underlying the
statute would not be furthered by granting Defendant’s motion.
{6} In addition to addressing the parties’ arguments interpreting the statute, the district
court expressed doubt that the Legislature contemplated invalidating an arrest for a technical
violation of the Act. The court noted the lack of injury suffered by Defendant or the public
as a result of Officer Gomez’s lack of certification at the time of the arrest and observed that
“Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were never violated [by the o]fficer.”
{7} We share the concerns that caused the district court to question Defendant’s ability
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to challenge Officer Gomez’s certification status and his authority to act in an official
capacity. We also recognize a question concerning the applicability of the exclusionary rule
to a technical violation of the Act in the absence of officer misconduct. The district court,
however, never expressed its concerns in terms of whether Defendant had standing to
question these facts or whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for a
violation of the Act. In fact, the court commented at the hearing that there is no problem
with the exclusionary rule in this case.
{8} In addition, the parties never addressed Defendant’s standing to enforce the statute
or whether suppressing the evidence was an appropriate remedy for an alleged technical
violation of the statute. Defendant’s brief in chief makes no argument that the Legislature
intended to empower members of the public to enforce the statute and makes no argument
that enforcement of the Act by suppressing the evidence is appropriate. The State raises
these matters for the first time in its answer brief. Defendant’s reply brief responds to these
issues only to argue that the State may not raise standing for the first time on appeal. We see
no reason to address these questions.
{9} We do not further analyze this case as presented by the parties and interpret the
statutory provision at issue, assuming without deciding that Defendant has an enforceable
right under the statute that may be enforced by the exclusionary rule.
DISCUSSION
{10} We treat a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress as a mixed question of fact
and law, reviewing the factual findings for substantial evidence and reviewing legal
conclusions de novo. State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 27, 138 N.M. 1, 116 P.3d 72.
Because resolution of this appeal only requires us to interpret the Act, the question is purely
legal, and our review of the district court’s decision is de novo. See State v. Padilla, 2008-
NMSC-006, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299.
{11} “The primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature's
intent.” State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. Of course, we
begin with the plain language of the statute to determine whether to enforce the statute as
written. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7. “If the language of the statute is ‘doubtful [or]
ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity,
or contradiction,’ the court should reject the plain meaning rule in favor of construing the
statute ‘according to its obvious spirit or reason.’” Id. (citation omitted); see State v. Smith,
2004-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 8, 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (stating that not only is it our
“ultimate goal . . . to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature,” but the court
will “reject[] a formalistic and mechanical statutory construction when the results would be
. . . contrary to the spirit of the statute” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{12} Defendant’s challenge to Officer Gomez’s authority to pull him over is based on
Section 29-7-6(B) which provides:
A person employed as a police officer by any law enforcement
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agency in this state shall forfeit his position unless, no later than twelve
months after beginning his employment as a police officer, the person
satisfies the qualifications for certification set forth in Subsection A of this
section and is awarded a certificate attesting to that fact.
Defendant argues that Officer Gomez violated the Act because he failed to obtain
certification within this one-year time frame and that he was therefore required to forfeit his
position as an officer and, therefore, did not have the authority to pull him over for a minor
traffic offense.
{13} The parties have stipulated to and the district court found Officer Gomez’s
employment history to be as follows. Starting on December 10, 2002, Officer Gomez was
employed by the Santa Clara Police Department and attended the police academy. On
February 4, 2003, after two months of employment he dropped out of the police academy
due to traffic violations. For about two years thereafter, he obtained different employment,
including work as a detention officer and as a member of the Army National Guard, for
which he did not need police training. In January 2005, Officer Gomez restarted his career
as a police officer by re-enrolling in the police academy and obtaining a job as an officer
with the Hurley Police Department. On May 30, 2005, after four months of employment
with the Hurley Police Department and while he was still in the police academy, Officer
Gomez stopped Defendant for speeding and arrested him for riding his motorcycle with a
revoked license. Officer Gomez completed his training in the police academy in June 2005
and received his police certification on December 14, 2005, within twelve months of his
employment with the Hurley Police Department but more than two years after he had first
been employed as a police officer with the Santa Clara Police Department.
{14} Defendant reads the statute narrowly to require that Officer Gomez receive his
certification within twelve months of his initial employment with law enforcement in Santa
Clara back in December 2002 or forfeit his position as an officer.1 Because Officer Gomez
did not obtain his certification within that time, Defendant argues that Officer Gomez had
no more authority to stop and arrest Defendant than would an ordinary citizen and argues
that a citizen could not have stopped and arrested him for a minor traffic offense. Defendant
argues that his interpretation and application of the statutory provision serves the policy
behind the Act: “to have trained law enforcement officers out on the streets patrolling the
area and protecting the community.”
{15} Initially, we observe that the facts of this case do not fit squarely within a literal
reading of the statute. Officer Gomez was not employed by any police department and had
no position to forfeit twelve months after he began his employment with the Santa Clara
Police Department. Our obligation is to apply the statutory language to the facts in a manner
that best effectuates the legislative intent. See Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 10. We agree
1
It is unclear whether Defendant sees this forfeiture as permanent or just precluding
active duty employment until training could be completed. Our opinion draws no such
distinction.
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with Defendant that the legislative purpose of the statute is to have trained law enforcement
personnel performing the duties of police officers. See § 29-7-2 (establishing the “‘New
Mexico law enforcement academy’ . . . to provide a planned program of basic law
enforcement training and in-service law enforcement training for police officers and to
furnish instruction and seminars to constantly upgrade law enforcement within the state”).
We also agree with the district court that the legislative intent was to provide a reasonable
but definite time by which police officers must be trained and certified, without frustrating
police departments’ recruitment of certifiable officers.
{16} The State points out that an application of Defendant’s interpretation of the statute
to these facts would have prohibited the Hurley Police Department from hiring Officer
Gomez because of his two-month long employment with the Santa Clara Police Department
two years earlier. We agree that applying Defendant’s arguments would have this effect.
In addition, Defendant’s arguments would either prohibit Officer Gomez from ever working
in law enforcement or require him to have obtained certification before he could have been
employed by the Hurley Police Department. We are not persuaded that the Legislature
intended to cripple the ability of police departments to hire officers in this manner,
particularly under these circumstances. See Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7 (“If the language
of the statute is doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal meaning of the words
would lead to injustice, adsurdity, or contradiction, the court should reject the plain meaning
rule in favor of construing the statute according to its obvious spirit or reason.” (Internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Had the Legislature intended such a dramatic result,
we believe it would have explicitly provided for it.
{17} The State argues that a more reasonable application of the statute, which would
effectively accomplish the intent of the Legislature, would provide “a new twelve-month
period” to obtain certification beginning when Officer Gomez was hired as an officer in
Hurley. As the State points out, Defendant’s narrow interpretation of the statute and its
application to the facts of this case defeats the obvious spirit of the Act and would preclude
a person who begins a career as a police officer, leaves for a short period of time, and then
resumes a career as an officer from ever obtaining certification within the twelve months
required by statute. See Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 8, 10 (noting that we will reject a
formalistic construction of a statute when doing so would be contrary to the obvious spirit
of the statute). While we are mindful of Defendant’s argument that this interpretation would
permit an officer, not fully trained and qualified, to move from one police department to
another to avoid the statutory certification requirement, this is not the situation with which
we are faced in this case. There is no indication that Officer Gomez left his position with
the Santa Clara Police Department in an attempt to circumvent the twelve-month
certification requirement. Instead, after Officer Gomez left his position with the Santa Clara
Police Department he did not work in any capacity that demanded police officer certification
for two years. When he resumed service as a law enforcement officer, he obtained his
training through the police academy and became a certified officer within the statutorily
required twelve-month period. We are not persuaded that the Legislature intended to
prohibit Officer Gomez from executing the powers and responsibilities of a police officer
at the time of Defendant’s stop and arrest merely because he started working as an officer,
changed careers for a short time, and then again became a police officer. We therefore hold
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that an officer like Officer Gomez who becomes employed as a police officer after a break
in service that was not intended to circumvent the certification requirement is provided
twelve months from the date of his or her new employment to obtain certification under
Section 29-7-6(B).
CONCLUSION
{18} For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to
suppress the evidence.
{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge
____________________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
Topic Index for State v. Reyes, No. 26,593
CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CA-PO Peace Officer
CT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CT-PR Privacy
EV EVIDENCE
EV-SU Suppression of Evidence
GV GOVERNMENT
GV-CT Certification
ST STATUTES
ST-IP Interpretation
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