1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
3 Plaintiff-Appellee,
4 v. NO. 28,255
5 CARLOS J. MALDONADO,
6 Defendant-Appellant.
7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY
8 Don Maddox, District Judge
9 Gary K. King, Attorney General
10 Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General
11 Santa Fe, NM
12 for Appellee
13 Templeman and Crutchfield
14 C. Barry Crutchfield
15 Lovington, NM
16 for Appellant
17 MEMORANDUM OPINION
18 WECHSLER, Judge.
19 Defendant Carlos Maldonado appeals the district court’s judgment and
20 sentence, convicting him of voluntary manslaughter and tampering with evidence.
1 The district court instructed the jury on Defendant’s claim of self-defense. It did not,
2 however, as requested by Defendant, instruct the jury in the elements instruction for
3 voluntary manslaughter that Defendant did not act in self-defense. State v. Parish,
4 118 N.M. 39, 43-44, 878 P.2d 988, 992-93 (1994), requires such instruction. The
5 State argues on appeal that Parish does not require reversal and retrial of this case
6 because the evidence did not entitle Defendant to a self-defense instruction.
7 An entitlement to a jury instruction involves questions of law and fact, and we
8 afford it de novo review on appeal. See State v. Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, ¶ 5, 126
9 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143. A defendant is entitled to jury instructions based on the
10 defendant’s theory of the case when supported by evidence. Id. “Whenever there is
11 evidence, however slight, that the defendant acted in self-defense, the instruction
12 should be given.” State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, ¶ 22, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d
13 72. No instruction is necessary if the evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt that
14 the defendant acted in self-defense. Id. Thus, in this case, we must determine whether
15 the evidence of self-defense was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable belief that
16 Defendant acted in self-defense.
17 The district court instructed the jury that Defendant acted in self-defense if:
18 1. There was an appearance of immediate danger of death or
19 great bodily harm to the defendant as a result of the approach of the
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1 Black Durango at a high speed with belief of defendant that such
2 Durango was occupied by Sammy Pinon; and
3 2. The defendant was in fact put in fear of immediate death or
4 great bodily harm and defendant shot at such vehicle because of that
5 fear; and
6 3. The apparent danger would have caused a reasonable person
7 in the same circumstance to act as the defendant did.
8 Thus, the defense embraces both the requirement of a subjective belief of Defendant,
9 as well as the requirement that Defendant act as an objectively reasonable person
10 would have acted in Defendant’s place. See State v. Duarte, 1996-NMCA-038, ¶ 8,
11 121 N.M. 553, 915 P.2d 309 (stating that “there must have been some evidence that
12 an objectively reasonable person, put into [the d]efendant’s subjective situation, would
13 have thought” that action was necessary).
14 The State argues that there is insufficient evidence that Defendant “personally
15 perceived a risk of danger of death or great bodily harm as a result of the approaching
16 black Durango driven by Oswaldo Juarez, or that even if he did, any such fear would
17 have been objectively reasonable.” According to the State, Defendant left the house
18 after arguing with Harris Lee and opened fire with two guns in the direction of Harris
19 Lee and the black Durango. It argues that the ballistics evidence was clear that no one
20 shot at Defendant from the Durango and that Defendant knew that Oswaldo Juarez
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1 was driving the Durango because Defendant saw him in it earlier that evening. The
2 State thus concludes that Defendant did not or could not have perceived any danger
3 from the Durango. The State further argues that there was no evidence that Defendant
4 acted because he believed that Sammy Pinon was present, that someone thought that
5 Sammy Pinon was present, or that someone shot at Defendant from the Durango.
6 However, there was evidence that Sammy Pinon had shot at Defendant in the
7 past, that Sammy Pinon had previously shot Defendant’s cousin Donald Trujillo, and
8 that Sammy Pinon had driven a black SUV. When the Durango arrived at the scene,
9 someone yelled “It’s Sammy.” When Defendant exited the house, there were multiple
10 shots from at least two, and as many as three, shooters. Harris Lee testified that there
11 were as many as thirty gunshots, and he could not testify as to who had shot first.
12 Oswaldo Juarez testified that there were three shooters when the shooting began and
13 also could not testify about who began shooting first. He gave the same information
14 to Detective J.B. Hardy. Donald Trujillo stated that there were multiple shots at the
15 same time from multiple weapons. Defendant was shot in the chest, apparently while
16 facing the Durango.
17 From this evidence, it would not be unreasonable for a jury to have a belief that
18 Defendant, having been previously shot at by Sammy Pinon and associating him with
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1 a black SUV, thought that Sammy Pinon was approaching or had approached. Indeed,
2 someone else had the same belief and called it out. The Durango approached quickly.
3 Because there was testimony about multiple shots from different directions and lack
4 of clarity as to who was the first shooter, it would not be unreasonable for the jury to
5 have a belief that Defendant was shot at before he opened fire. In addition, even
6 though the ballistics evidence may show that no one shot from or exited the Durango
7 to shoot, at the time, with shots in the air, one of which hit Defendant in the chest, it
8 would not have been unreasonable for the jury to have a belief that Defendant could
9 have thought shots were coming from the direction of the Durango. Defendant was
10 entitled to a self-defense instruction if there was even slight evidence that he
11 reasonably acted in self-defense. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, ¶ 22. The district court
12 concluded that there was such evidence. In our de novo review, we reach the same
13 conclusion.
14 CONCLUSION
15 We reverse the judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial.
16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
17 _______________________________
18 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
19 WE CONCUR:
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1 _________________________________
2 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
3 _________________________________
4 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
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