State v. Ybarra

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2010-NMCA-063

Filing Date: June 3, 2010

Docket No. 28,829

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PETER FRANCISCO YBARRA,

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY
Mike Murphy, District Judge

Gary K. King, Attorney General
Farhan Khan, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

Kelly O’Connell
Las Cruces, NM

for Appellee

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} In this DWI case, Defendant consented to a chemical test and provided one sample
that resulted in a reported breath alcohol value. Because the officer believed that Defendant
may have had physical difficulty completing the breath test, the officer terminated the test,
and used the result of the single completed sample to prove Defendant’s intoxication. The
applicable standard requires that a test subject be “physically incapable of consent” before
the test may be terminated. Terminating a breath test and using the result from the single
completed sample must be based on more than a police officer’s belief that the willing test
subject has physical difficulties blowing into the machine. Applying the clear language of
the regulation, we hold that the circumstances of this case do not, under the Scientific
Laboratory Division (SLD) of the State Department of Health regulation, justify the
officer’s termination of the test. When a willing subject provides breath samples, it is
incumbent upon the officer administering the test to comply with applicable regulations.
The district court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress the breath tests because it
concluded that the police officer failed to comply with 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC (3-14-01)
(requiring multiple breath samples be taken unless the test subject “declines or is physically
incapable of consent”). Concluding that the district court is correct, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} On August 18, 2007, after being arrested for inter alia, driving while intoxicated,
Defendant consented to take a breath test. The circumstances of the arrest and other pre-test
events are not at issue here. Defendant was advised of his rights under the Implied Consent
Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 66-8-105 to -112 (1978, as amended through 2007), and the
arresting officer directed that Defendant submit to a breath alcohol test. Section 66-8-107(B)
(stating that a test of breath, blood or both shall be administered at the direction of a law
enforcement officer).

{3} The first sample provided by Defendant registered .22 grams of alcohol in a sample
of 210 liters of breath. Defendant seemed to have difficulty giving enough breath on the first
test. After indicating he had asthma and requesting the use of his inhaler, the officer was
concerned whether Defendant would be able to give a second sample. Defendant was
therefore allowed to use his Albuterol inhaler prior to the second test. As Defendant was
handcuffed and unable to hold the inhaler himself, the officer held the inhaler up for
Defendant to use. The officer administered two doses from the inhaler directly to Defendant.

{4} Approximately two minutes later, Defendant provided a second sample, which
resulted in the breath machine registering an error message indicating “Range Exceeded.”
The officer testified that he believes such a reading appears when the amount of alcohol in
the breath sample exceeds the machine’s measurement capability, which is .40 grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The officer testified that at that time, he decided to
discontinue testing and concluded that he had gathered enough evidence to prove
Defendant’s level of intoxication. The officer testified that the results of the first test, along
with Defendant’s admission (not at issue in this case) that he had consumed ten beers, was
enough. The officer further stated he did not consider re-starting the breath test sequence
and concluded at that time that a blood draw was unnecessary.

{5} Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the breath tests. Specifically, he
argued that a complete breath test was never conducted, and as such, the arresting officer
failed to strictly comply with 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC as required under State v. Gardner,
1998-NMCA-160, 126 N.M. 125, 967 P.2d 465. After considering the evidence, which
consisted primarily of testimony from the arresting officer and Defendant, the district court
granted Defendant’s motion. It found that the “Range Exceeded” result on the second test
was most likely the result of the inhaler and that the police officer could have either begun
another breath test or provided a blood test, but chose to do neither. Likewise, we infer from

2
the district court’s order that it concluded that Defendant fully consented to testing, and
because 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC requires strict compliance, any results must be suppressed.
We observe that the court made no finding as to whether Defendant could have provided a
sample without the use of his inhaler.

{6} On appeal, the State argues that the court improperly suppressed the breath test. It
claims that the arresting officer complied with the requirements of 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC:
(1) because one sample was sufficient after Defendant demonstrated he was physically
incapable of submitting another, and (2) because the arresting officer made a good faith
effort to take and analyze two samples. We discuss each contention below.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

{7} Motions to suppress present mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Urioste, 2002-
NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. We view the facts in the light most favorable
to the judgment below and determine whether the district court’s factual determinations are
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Boeglin, 100 N.M. 127, 132, 666 P.2d 1274,
1279 (Ct. App. 1983). “The interpretation of an administrative regulation is a question of
law that we review de novo.” State v. Willie, 2009-NMSC-037, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 481, 212 P.3d
369. There is no difference between our review of the Administrative Code and statutes, and
we determine and effectuate the intention of the administrative agency using the plain
language of the regulation as the primary indicator of its intent. Id. “When the language in
a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to that language and refrain from further
statutory interpretation.” State v. Duhon, 2005-NMCA-120, ¶ 10, 138 N.M. 466, 122 P.3d
50. Statutes defining criminal conduct must be strictly construed. Santillanes v. State, 115
N.M. 215, 221, 849 P.2d 358, 364 (1993).

B. The Arresting Officer Failed to Comply With 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC

1. Statutes and Regulations

{8} The Act provides that any person who holds a New Mexico driver’s license impliedly
consents to chemical testing of “his breath or blood or both” administered for the purpose
of determining intoxication. Section 66-8-107(A). A driver may refuse to consent to such
testing, but the penalty for doing so is the revocation of the driver’s license “for a period of
one year or until all conditions for license reinstatement are met, whichever is later.”
Section 66-8-111(A), (B). If the driver “is dead, unconscious or otherwise in a condition
rendering him incapable of refusal,” police retain the authority to perform chemical testing,
and the driver may not be deemed to have “withdrawn the consent” under the Act. Section
66-8-108 (emphasis added). Incapacity to refuse a test leaves a citizen’s implied consent to
be tested fully operative. Similarly, once a test subject consents to be tested, SLD has
provided that he shall be tested unless physically incapable of consenting. The words are

3
not meaningless and promote the operation of chemical testing under the Act.

{9} Where a driver consents to testing, the police must administer any tests in accordance
with regulations approved by SLD. Section 66-8-107(A); see State v. Vaughn, 2005-
NMCA-076, ¶ 35, 137 N.M. 674, 114 P.3d 354 (describing SLD’s responsibility for test
development). SLD “is authorized to promulgate and approve satisfactory techniques or
methods to test persons believed to be operating a motor vehicle . . . under the influence of
drugs or alcohol.” NMSA 1978, Section 24-1-22(A) (2003). SLD promulgated a regulation
governing the conduct of breath tests. 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC. The regulation provides:

(1) Two breath samples shall be collected and analyzed by
certified Operators or Key Operators only, and shall be end expiratory in
composition. Breath shall be collected only after the Operator or Key
Operator has ascertained that the subject has not had anything to eat, drink
or smoke for at least 20 minutes prior to collection of the first breath sample.
If during this time the subject eats, drinks or smokes anything, another 20
minutes deprivation period must be initiated. The two breath samples shall
be taken not more than 15 minutes apart. If the difference in the results of
the two samples exceeds 0.02 grams per 210 liters (BrAC), a third sample of
breath or blood shall be collected and analyzed. If the subject declines or is
physically incapable of consent for the second or third samples, it shall be
permissible to analyze fewer samples.

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, as a general rule, in order for a breath test to meet SLD’s
requirements, police must obtain at least two individual samples; if the results of those
samples are not within .02 grams of one another, police must obtain a third. The only time
police may take less than two samples occurs when a defendant “declines or is physically
incapable of consent[ing]” to the second. Id.; Vaughn, 2005-NMCA-076, ¶ 38. As this
Court held in Vaughn, “It is clear from the SLD definitions and procedures that a correctly
administered breath test will consist of two samples or, in some cases, three samples.” Id.
Such a requirement for multiple samples, each within a predetermined, acceptable range of
accuracy is crucial to the scientific foundation of breath testing. Yet the requirement is
subject to the limits of necessity. For instance, if a suspect refuses to provide a second
sample or is physically unable to consent to doing so, fewer than two may be used; “[t]his
is in order to allow for effective prosecution of those drunk drivers who will provide only
one sample.” Id. Thus, although the collection of two breath samples effectuates greater
accuracy in the testing process, id., 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC nevertheless makes clear that
accuracy must give way to useable data in the case of one “who, without reasonable
justification, provide[s only] one sample.” Vaughn, 2005-NMCA-076, ¶ 41.

2. Inability to Blow Is Not Incapacity to Consent to a Test

{10} The State argues that Defendant satisfied the requirements of 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC
when he provided the first breath sample. Because of Defendant’s asthma, the State

4
contends, it was impossible for him to submit a second without the use of his inhaler, thus
rendering him “physically incapable of consent for the second” sample. 7.33.2.12(B)(1)
NMAC. We disagree with the State. First, insufficient evidence supports this contention.
The officer testified that Defendant consented to be tested.

{11} There is no evidence before us to support the State’s contention that Defendant was
unable to complete a breath test, or that the inhaler had any effect on the test device.
Further, there was no evidence before the district court concerning the effect of Defendant’s
asthma on his performance on the breath test, although he gave one sufficient sample. The
evidence shows only that the officer assumed Defendant was unable to complete the breath
test and, based on that assumption, decided to terminate the test procedure.

{12} The State presented no evidence as to the effect of an asthma inhaler on a breath test.
A key operator may be trained that an error message means a test was beyond the analytical
limit of the test device. Linking that to the inhaler involves nothing more than supposition.
See e.g., Barry K. Logan, Sandra Distefano & Glenn A. Case, Evaluation of the Effect of
Asthma Inhalers and Nasal Decongestant Sprays on a Breath Alcohol Test, J. Forensic Sci.
1998;43(1):197-99 (finding no effect of an Albuterol inhaler as used here on an infrared
breath test device reading). Thus, the evidence shows that despite difficulty, Defendant
provided one complete sample. Second and more importantly, the State’s argument ignores
the plain language of the SLD regulation and unreasonably confuses ability to give a breath
sample with consenting to do so. Since the evidence is unequivocal that Defendant did not,
without justification, fail to provide a breath sample and that he had actively consented to
do so throughout the testing procedure, the regulation does not allow the use of the single
sample that resulted in a breath alcohol value. See Vaughn, 2005-NMCA-076, ¶ 41.

{13} The pertinent language of 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC concerns a subject’s consent.
Accordingly, it embraces a subject’s willingness to participate in testing and not his physical
capacity to complete the breath test itself. If the completion of a breath test is impeded by
a willing subject who cannot blow, the Act allows the officer to direct a blood test. Section
66-8-107(A). The regulation identifies two ways consent may not be forthcoming. First,
if the subject “declines” to participate in a second or third test, he has withheld his consent,
and the police may legally use the first sample alone. 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC (emphasis
added). Second, when a subject is “physically incapable of consent,” police may likewise
proceed with only one sample. Willie, 2009-NMSC-037 (emphasis added). The regulation
is specifically worded to recognize a physical impediment that would render a test subject
incapable of consent and specifically does not include a physical impediment to providing
a sample. As Willie instructs us, we will not add language to change SLD’s contrary
intentions. Id. ¶ 15. In short, we conclude that as long as a subject is willing to be tested,
it is the officer’s obligation under the regulation to continue the test to its required
completion. 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC. Thus, as long as a subject consents to testing, under
the regulation it is irrelevant that he might be physically incapable of providing a useable
breath sample.

5
{14} The opinion of the Washington Supreme Court in City of Kent v. Beigh, 32 P.3d 258
(Wash. 2001), supports this interpretation and takes it one step further. In that case, the
defendant was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Id. at 259. At the station,
police took three separate breath samples, and each time, the machine registered the message
“interference detected.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a message, an officer
testified, indicated the presence of an alcohol-like substance disrupting the sample. Id.
After three such results, police concluded that the defendant “was physically unable to give
a breath sample because of the interfering substance on his breath” and transported the
defendant to the hospital, where a blood test was done. Id. On appeal, the city argued that
the defendant’s submission of an invalid sample amounted to a physical incapability of
providing any sample. Id. at 262. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an inability
to provide a valid breath sample does not necessarily indicate a physical incapability of
providing any sample at all. Id. at 263. All that is required, the court concluded, is that a
defendant be capable of filling the machine with air. Id. at 264. Our holding today does not
require us to go that far. Nevertheless, a similar logic applies: physical inability to consent
is not the same thing as physical inability to provide a valid sample. Stated differently, a
subject may be perfectly capable of consent yet physically incapable of providing a valid
sample, and such are the facts in the present case.

{15} Defendant neither declined consent nor demonstrated any physical incapability to
consent. See 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC. As both he and the arresting officer testified,
Defendant willingly participated in and delivered two breath samples. On both occasions,
he filled the machine with air and triggered a result. Furthermore, although Defendant stated
he had asthma and requested his inhaler, and although the officer expressed worry as to
whether Defendant possessed enough breath for the second test, no evidence was presented
at the hearing that Defendant would have been unable to give a second sample without the
use of his inhaler. Such evidence, even if presented, would have proven only an inability
to complete a test, not an incapacity to consent to one. The language of the regulation is
clear; we assume it to be intentional. The officer prematurely ended the test cycle based on
his unfounded supposition regarding both Defendant’s condition and the condition of the
machine. At any rate, the regulation clearly requires subsequent samples be taken unless
Defendant had refused to provide them or had become incapable of doing so.

3. The Officer’s Decision to Terminate the Test Was Unwarranted

{16} In this case, the arresting officer decided to discontinue testing based upon his
subjective determination that Defendant was incapable of completing the test, not incapable
of consenting to it. That decision was inappropriate, given the language of the regulation;
7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC provides a clear guideline for police conduct that does not include
consideration of a subject’s physical capability to provide a useable sample. See, e.g.,
Sedlmayer v. Charnes, 767 P.2d 754, 755-56 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that where an
officer believes a test subject to be physically incapable of completing the test, the officer’s
unilateral decision to discontinue testing is unreasonable; an officer must make an attempt
to follow the guidelines); Douglas v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 385 N.W.2d 850, 853-54

6
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that an incapacitated subject had not declined to consent and,
therefore, that an officer’s decision to discontinue testing was inappropriate, and stating that
such “subjective decisions, made in good faith, are often scrutinized in subsequent legal
proceedings [and] the officer must seriously consider the applicability of [the statute] to the
circumstances at hand”).

{17} Nowhere does the State assert that Defendant expressed an unwillingness to be
tested. At bottom, Defendant consented to both the first and second tests, and the possibility
that his second sample was subsequently tainted by the use of an inhaler cannot retroactively
retract that consent. 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC does not require a defendant’s consent to give
a good sample; it requires only that he consent, in good faith, to give a sample. Yet, this
interpretation should not be understood to shield a defendant who half-heartedly blows with
the intent to frustrate the testing process. The State cites Vaughn as dispositive, but that case
only illustrates the distinction between defendants who truly consent to provide samples and
those who commit subterfuge. In Vaughn, the defendant gave a second sample but was
found to have intentionally given an insufficient one. Vaughn, 2005-NMCA-076, ¶¶ 2, 5.
Thus, the defendant in that case declined to consent, and the use of one sample was
permissible. Id. ¶ 40. The district court in this case made no such findings, and indeed,
there was no evidence at the hearing to support such a notion. The facts of this case indicate
that Defendant cooperated fully with police by giving two samples, and as such, the holding
in Vaughn is fully distinguishable. As this Court stated in Vaughn, the defendant gave the
arresting officer “full and unequivocal consent.” Id. ¶ 41. Any defendant who intentionally
gives a bad sample has, a fortiori, withheld consent. See id. ¶ 40.

{18} We also observe that it was the arresting officer, not Defendant, who allowed the use
of an inhaler in the first place. Indeed, because Defendant was handcuffed, the officer held
the device while Defendant used it, although the evidence does not speak to whether a
double dose was proper. Furthermore, when the officer identified that the second sample
was inconsistent with the first, the officer should have taken a third as required by the
regulation. See 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC (requiring a third breath sample when the difference
between the first and second exceeds .02 grams). If the third sample had been tainted like
the second, the officer would have borne no further duty under the regulation. Likewise, he
could have required Defendant to give the second sample without the use of the inhaler, and
what is more, after identifying error in the second test, he could have transported Defendant
to the hospital for a blood draw. See, e.g., Vaughn, 2005-NMCA-076, ¶ 40 (suggesting the
propriety of a blood draw when a second sample cannot be taken). In this case, the officer
pursued none of these reasonable alternatives and failed to comply with the regulation.
When an officer has a consenting subject and a functioning machine, it is his obligation to
conduct a complete breath test, and such a test must include two or three samples, as the case
may require.

C. Gardner Demands Strict Compliance With 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC

{19} The State argues that the requirements of 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC are met when

7
officers make a good faith effort to comply. We disagree. Gardner clearly demonstrates the
error of this position. In Gardner, this Court considered a case quite similar to the one
before us today. Officers pulled over a vehicle for erratic driving, and upon making contact
with the driver, noted signs of intoxication. 1998-NMCA-160, ¶ 3. The defendant was
transported to the station for breath testing. However, during the twenty minutes prior to
administering the first test, officers allowed the defendant to make an unsupervised visit to
the bathroom. Id. When she was tested, the defendant’s breath samples registered .18 grams
and .19 grams, respectively. Id.

{20} The defendant moved to suppress the breath tests. She argued that under
33.3.12.12.2.1 NMAC (a previous version of 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC), police failed to
continuously observe her “for at least 20 minutes prior to collection of the first breath
sample.” Gardner, 1999-NMCA-160, ¶ 1. The district court disagreed. It allowed the
evidence, and the defendant was convicted. Id. ¶ 4. This Court reversed. Id. ¶¶ 5, 22. The
“test results were improperly admitted into evidence due to the violation . . . of the twenty-
minute continuous observation period.” Id. ¶ 5. This Court held that the waiting and
observation period in the regulation “ensure[s] the accuracy of these tests,” and when police
do not strictly comply “with the waiting-period rule, the results of the breath . . . tests are
considered sufficiently questionable as to preclude their admissibility.” Id. ¶ 12.

{21} Thus, the State’s argument that a good faith attempt to comply with 7.33.2.12(B)(1)
NMAC must fail. The regulation clearly provides that when a second breath sample is not
within .02 grams of the first, a third sample must be obtained. 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC. As
stated above, the only time fewer than two samples may be taken occurs when a defendant
declines to consent or is physically incapable of doing so. Id. The officer in this case
complied with neither provision, and based on the reasoning of Gardner, we affirm the
district court’s decision to exclude Defendant’s breath samples.

CONCLUSION

{22} For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of the district court granting
Defendant’s motion to suppress breath tests on the basis that police failed to comply with
the provisions of 7.33.2.12(B)(1) NMAC.

{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge

8
____________________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge

Topic Index for State v. Ybarra, Docket No. 28,829

CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CA-IC Implied Consent
CA-MR Motion to Suppress

CL CRIMINAL LAW
CL-DG Driving While Intoxicated

CT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CT-SU Suppression of Evidence

EV EVIDENCE
EV-BT Blood/Breath Tests

9