UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6566
CARLOS WOODS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:12-cv-01260-WDQ)
Submitted: May 30, 2013 Decided: June 5, 2013
Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Carlos Woods, Appellant Pro Se. Edward John Kelley, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Woods appeals the district court’s order
denying his motion for an extension of time to appeal or,
alternatively, to reopen the period to appeal the dismissal as
time-barred of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. We affirm.
Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of
the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal,
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends
the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the
appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely
filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court’s judgment of dismissal was entered
on the docket on December 3, 2012. Woods did not file a notice
of appeal. On March 15, 2013, the district court received
correspondence from Woods requesting that the December 3
judgment be “recalled” so that he could appeal it. Woods
claimed in this and in ensuing correspondence that he learned of
the judgment on March 7, 2013. Woods had been transferred
between facilities in the Bureau of Prisons on November 5, 2012
and claims that, at some unspecified point after he arrived at
the United States Penitentiary Lewisburg (“USP Lewisburg”), he
“wrote the court to inform [it] of [his] address change.”
2
The docket in this case, however, shows no correspondence from
Woods between October 13, 2012 and January 29, 2013. The copy
of the district court’s judgment sent to Woods on
December 3, 2012 had been returned as undeliverable.
The district court construed Woods’ March 15
correspondence as a motion for an extension of time to appeal
or, alternatively, to reopen the period to appeal. The court
denied the motion, determining that Woods was not entitled to
relief under Rule 4(a)(5) and that, even if Woods met the
requirements for reopening the appeal period under Rule 4(a)(6), 1
it would not exercise its discretion to reopen the appeal
period.
On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised
in the Appellant’s brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because
Woods’ informal brief does not challenge the district court’s
determination that he was not entitled to relief under Rule
4(a)(5), he has forfeited appellate review of that ruling.
Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 607
(4th Cir. 2009).
1
Under Rule 4(a)(6), a district court may reopen the appeal
period for fourteen days if it finds that: (1) a party entitled
to notice of entry of judgment did not receive notice within
twenty-one days after entry; (2) the party moved to reopen the
appeal period within 180 days of judgment or within fourteen
days of receiving notice of judgment, whichever is earlier; and
(3) no party would be prejudiced. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).
3
With respect to the district court’s ruling denying
Woods relief under Rule 4(a)(6), the rule is permissive and
allows a district court to deny a motion to reopen even if the
movant meets the rule’s three requirements. See In re Jones,
970 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that Rule 4(a)(6) is
discretionary). Because Woods’ failure to keep the district
court apprised of his address change led to his not receiving
the dismissal order in a timely manner, 2 the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying him relief under Rule
4(a)(6). See Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 79 F.3d 1211, 1214
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“If in a particular case the movant is at
fault-if the movant negligently failed to notify the clerk of
his change of address, for example-then the district court may,
in its discretion, deny relief under Rule 4(a)(6).”); Jones,
970 F.2d at 39 (stating standard of review).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
2
Although Woods was transferred to USP Lewisburg on
November 5, 2012, he did not notify the district court clerk of
his change of address until January 30, 2013, when the court
received correspondence from Woods bearing the USP Lewisburg
address. Woods does not suggest any reason for the nearly
three-month delay.
4
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5