State v. Candelaria

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integrity of this document
New Mexico Compilation
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'00'04- 14:56:32 2011.04.26

Certiorari Denied, November 15, 2010, No. 32,655

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2011-NMCA-001

Filing Date: September 23, 2010

Docket No. 28,565

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

VINCENT CANDELARIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Carl J. Butkus, District Judge

Gary K. King, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender
Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} We hold in this case that officers, informed that the owner of a car observed under
suspicious circumstances had a suspended driver’s license, have reasonable suspicion to
initiate a traffic stop. Subsequent events during the stop permitted an expansion of the scope
of the stop without creating a constitutional problem. We therefore affirm the denial of

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Defendant’s motion to suppress.

BACKGROUND

{2} Both arresting officers testified at the suppression hearing and, despite minor
conflicts in their testimony, the facts on which the district court relied are undisputed. On
the evening of November 2, 2005, Officers Sullivan and Gutierrez of the Albuquerque Police
Department were patrolling in Albuquerque’s Westgate neighborhood. As the two passed
the Westgate baseball fields, they noticed two vehicles in the parking lot: a Monte Carlo
driven by Defendant Vincent Candelaria and a white pickup truck. Officer Gutierrez
recognized the Monte Carlo from a previous investigation. Police pulled into the parking
lot and, upon doing so, both vehicles sped away. Police chose to follow the Monte Carlo.
They ran a search on the license plate that indicated the car was owned by Michael Martinez,
and a subsequent search of Martinez’s driving record revealed that his driving privileges had
been suspended. Concluding Martinez was the driver of the Monte Carlo, Officers Sullivan
and Gutierrez pulled it over.

{3} Officer Sullivan approached on the driver’s side, and Officer Gutierrez approached
on the passenger side. Upon seeing Defendant, Officer Sullivan became aware that he was
not, in fact, the owner of the car. As Officer Sullivan testified, based on a “prior law
enforcement-related setting . . . I knew he was not . . . Martinez.” Nevertheless, Officer
Sullivan continued the detention and asked Defendant to produce his driver’s license, along
with vehicle registration and proof of insurance. Defendant cooperated and, while doing so,
stated he had been stopped earlier in the day by police while in possession of a firearm.
Concerned for his safety, Officer Sullivan asked Defendant to step out of the car so he could
conduct a pat-down for weapons, and Defendant complied. The search revealed that
Defendant was unarmed.

{4} As these events took place, Officer Gutierrez approached the vehicle on the
passenger side and inspected the passenger compartment from the outside. On the back seat,
Officer Gutierrez saw an empty handgun holster, a wallet full of cash, and a box of
ammunition. Both windows of the vehicle were down, and Officer Gutierrez smelled the
odor of marijuana emanating from inside. When Officer Sullivan completed his pat-down
search of Defendant’s person, Officer Gutierrez asked Defendant “if he was smoking
marijuana in the car.” Defendant replied that he had smoked marijuana six hours earlier in
the day. The officers then asked Defendant’s permission to search the vehicle, and
Defendant consented both verbally and in writing. After discovering illegal drugs hidden
under the car’s center console, police arrested Defendant. They found no gun in the vehicle.

{5} A grand jury indicted Defendant on August 17, 2006, for drug trafficking and
possession of drug paraphernalia, and Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
gathered during the stop. He argued the stop was improper because police could not have
predicated their detention of him on their conclusion that Martinez was the driver of the car
based solely on the fact that he was its owner. In the alternative, presuming the validity of

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the stop, Defendant contended police failed in their duty to terminate the stop the moment
they ascertained that Martinez was not the driver.

{6} The district court convened a hearing on February 22, 2007, and after considering
the testimony of Officers Sullivan and Gutierrez and the arguments of counsel, the court
denied Defendant’s motion. Entering extensive written findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the court concluded: (1) the initial stop was supported by the reasonable suspicion that
Martinez, an unlicensed driver, was operating the vehicle; and (2) the officers’ subsequent
interactions with Defendant met constitutional standards as they led up to Defendant’s
voluntary consent to the police search.

{7} Defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking a controlled substance in violation of NMSA
1978, Section 30-31-20 (1990) (amended 2006), on the condition that he could reserve his
right to appeal the motion to suppress. On appeal, he reasserts his arguments made before
the district court. He argues, first, that the initial stop was unsupported by reasonable
suspicion and, second, that his continued detention exceeded the scope of the officers’
suspicion once they became aware that no traffic violation had occurred. We discuss each.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{8} Motions to suppress present mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Vandenberg,
2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 17, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. We review them in two steps. Id. First,
we assess the district court’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party and ensure that those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Id. ¶ 18
(reviewing courts “do not sit as a trier of fact [because] the district court is in the best
position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses”) (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, we consider de novo
whether the disputed police activity was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.
Id. Such inquiries extend beyond fact-finding, and we abide by the principle that “appellate
courts [are] to shape the parameters of police conduct by placing the constitutional
requirement of reasonableness in factual context[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Accordingly, any inferences made by the district court pursuant to its
findings of fact are likewise reviewed de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

{9} The constitutions of both the United States and New Mexico prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.M. Const. art. II, § 10. This Court has held
that “[a] traffic stop constitutes a seizure of the vehicle and its occupants.” State v. Rubio,
2006-NMCA-067, ¶ 11, 139 N.M. 612, 136 P.3d 1022. We analyze whether such a seizure
is reasonable, first, according to whether the initial stop was valid and, second, according to
“whether the officer’s actions . . . were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
initially justified the stop.” Id. As the situation develops, officers may expand an
investigation to answer any new reasonable and articulable suspicions that arise during the
course of their lawful activity. State v. Romero, 2002-NMCA-064, ¶ 10, 132 N.M. 364, 48
P.3d 102.

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{10} In order to validly stop an automobile, police officers must possess, at a minimum,
reasonable suspicion that a law has been violated. Such suspicion arises only when officers
can detect “specific articulable facts . . . that, when judged objectively, would lead a
reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring.” Vandenberg,
2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 21 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). It is not enough for police to rely upon “[u]nsupported intuition [or] inarticulate
hunches.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Any questions asked by
police officers during the course of a stop must be either reasonably related to the reason for
the stop or supported by reasonable suspicion. State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 34, 138
N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836.

A. The Initial Stop

{11} Defendant argues police possessed no reasonable suspicion to stop him. We
disagree. At the time he was pulled over, police knew only that the Monte Carlo was
registered to Martinez, whose license had been suspended. Thus, Defendant argues, to
conclude based on such information that Martinez was the driver represents an unreasonable
leap of logic and could not have given officers individualized, particularized suspicion to
believe Defendant had broken the law. See State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129
N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. The issue is one of first impression in New Mexico, but it is
somewhat common in other jurisdictions. Therefore, we look to those jurisdictions for
guidance.

{12} At least two jurisdictions have issued opinions supporting Defendant’s argument.
See State v. Cerino, 117 P.3d 876, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005); Holly v. State, 888 N.E.2d
338, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), vacated by 918 N.E.2d 323 (Ind. 2009). In Cerino, for
instance, police stopped the vehicle driven by the defendant with knowledge that it was: (1)
registered to a male who did not possess an Idaho driver’s license, and (2) driven by a male.
117 P.3d at 877. “In these circumstances,” the court concluded, “there was little basis to
infer that the male registrant was driving; it was as plausible and perhaps more likely, that
the driver was someone else.” Id. at 878. People frequently drive vehicles registered in the
names of others, under a variety of legal circumstances; and so, as the court held, “the mere
observation of a vehicle being driven by someone of the same gender as the unlicensed
owner is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.” Id. Any
other result “would endorse the sort of arbitrary invasions of personal liberty and privacy
that the Fourth Amendment [was] designed to hold in check.” Id. What is more, it would
allow officers to troll for vehicles driven by anyone matching the gender of an unlicensed,
registered owner. Id. This view, however, represents but a small minority. In fact, Cerino
is the only case we have found in this regard that still bears the force of law.

{13} In contrast, an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions hold that police have
reasonable suspicion to effect a stop when the registered owner’s license is suspended. See,
e.g., Vill. of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 591 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that
knowledge that the owner’s license was revoked constituted reasonable suspicion for the
stop); State v. Tozier, 905 A.2d 836, 839 (Me. 2006) (finding that the registered owner’s
revoked license supported reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. Muckle, 814 N.E.2d 7,

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11 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that suspension of a registered owner’s driving privileges
provides an objective basis for a stop); State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1996)
(concluding that “[w]hen an officer observes a vehicle being driven, it is rational for him or
her to infer that the owner of the vehicle is the current operator”); State v. Halvorson, 997
P.2d 751, 753 (Mont. 2000) (stating that knowledge that the vehicle’s owner had a revoked
license satisfied reasonable suspicion); State v. Richter, 765 A.2d 687, 689 (N.H. 2000)
(holding that without any evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to infer that the driver of
a vehicle is also its registered owner); State v. Hess, 648 S.E.2d 913, 916-17 (N.C. Ct. App.
2007) (holding that absent evidence to the contrary, an officer may reasonably conclude that
the driver is also the registrant); State v. Penfield, 22 P.3d 293, 294 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(concluding that a statute is constitutional where it allows police to stop any vehicle
registered to an owner with a suspended license); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 9.5(d) (4th ed. 2009) (“[A]bsent additional facts suggesting otherwise, on grounds
to arrest the registered owner of a specific vehicle, there exists a reasonable suspicion the
present driver is the registered owner to justify a stop and inquiry.”).

{14} The North Carolina Court of Appeals most recently considered this question in Hess.
There, the court surveyed a host of authorities and held, “because [the police] knew [the
d]efendant was the owner . . . and that [the d]efendant’s license had been suspended, it was
reasonable for [the police], in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to infer that [the
d]efendant was driving the automobile.” 648 S.E.2d at 917. The court concluded, “our
research reveals that when an officer knows that a vehicle being operated is registered to an
owner with a suspended or revoked driver’s license, the majority of jurisdictions have held
that an officer has reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, absent evidence that
the driver is not the owner.” Id. at 916. The court considered the possibility that the actual
driver of the vehicle could be someone other than the owner. Even still, “it is reasonable for
an officer to suspect that the owner is driving the vehicle, absent other circumstances[.]” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree with the Massachusetts Supreme
Court when it held that, “[t]he standard of reasonable suspicion does not require that an
officer exclude all possible innocent explanations of the facts and circumstances.”
Commonwealth v. Deramo, 762 N.E.2d 815, 818-19 (Mass. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

{15} Our holding should come as no surprise. Indeed, New Mexico’s civil law has long
recognized a presumption that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the registered
owner of a vehicle is that vehicle’s driver. Trujillo v. Chavez, 93 N.M. 626, 631, 603 P.2d
736, 741 (Ct. App. 1979). Trujillo considered a civil jury instruction in a dispute involving
an automobile accident. This Court held that the instruction, as given, failed to properly
inform the jury as to the defendant’s burden. Id. We recommended the following instruction
as a legally sufficient alternative:

Because the evidence is undisputed that [the decedent] was the owner
of the car in which he was riding at the time of the accident, you must find
that [the decedent] was the driver unless [his] estate has proved that it is more

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 probable that he was not driving than that he was driving.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A similar logic applies to reasonable suspicion in the
traffic stop context. When police observe a vehicle registered to an owner whose license has
been suspended, it is reasonable to conclude that the driver is the registrant—that is, until
officers become aware of facts to contradict their assumption. The concept of reasonable
suspicion has always embraced a certain degree of uncertainty. In the case before us, because
Officers Sullivan and Gutierrez were aware of no facts to contradict their inference that Martinez
was driving the car for which he was the registered owner, we follow the approach of the
majority of jurisdictions and hold that police possessed reasonable suspicion to affect a traffic
stop.

{16} In a closely-related argument, Defendant contends pursuant to Jason L. that police did
not possess “particularized suspicion, based on all the circumstances that a particular individual,
the one detained, is breaking, or has broken, the law.” 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20 (emphasis added).
Applying only that sentence to the facts of this case, Defendant’s conclusion seems almost
plausible, since upon stopping the car, police quickly determined he was not Martinez.
Nevertheless, Defendant’s narrow application of Jason L. ignores the constitutional standard we
must apply in vehicle stop cases. See State v. Bolton, 111 N.M. 28, 32, 801 P.2d 98, 102 (Ct.
App. 1990) (concluding that officers may not detain a vehicle unless they “have probable cause,
or at least reasonable suspicion, to believe that the vehicle or its occupants are subject to
seizure” (emphasis added)). In the case before us, police reasonably believed the registered
owner of the vehicle, Martinez, who had a suspended driver’s license, to be the driver of the
Monte Carlo. Thus, they possessed reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle, as well as
its occupant, Martinez, were subject to seizure. See id.

B. Scope of the Subsequent Investigation

{17} Defendant next argues that Officers Sullivan and Gutierrez should have sent him on his
way the instant they discovered he was not the registered owner. He contends that “nothing in
the court’s findings of fact . . . indicate[s] that criminal activity was afoot.” We disagree.
Several facts relied upon by the district court contradict Defendant. Furthermore, at each step
of the investigation, the actions of Officers Sullivan and Gutierrez met constitutional muster.

{18} After conducting a valid traffic stop, police approached Defendant’s vehicle and asked
for his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Such inquiries do not implicate a
suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. As stated in State v. Reynolds, “individuals have no
legitimate subjective expectation of privacy in their license, registration, or insurance documents
when they are operating a motor vehicle and an officer requests to see such documents.” 119
N.M. 383, 386, 890 P.2d 1315, 1318 (1995). As long as the vehicle has been validly stopped,
for whatever reason, police may always ask the driver to produce them. Id. at 384, 890 P.2d at
1316. In fact, as long as the original stop is supported by reasonable suspicion, police may
legally request such documents even after the original suspicion evaporates. Such was the case
in Vandenberg, where police stopped the defendant’s vehicle because of an improperly affixed

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rear license plate. 2003-NMSC-030, ¶¶ 40-42. As the officer approached the vehicle, however,
he determined that the plate was, in fact, legally displayed. Id. ¶ 40. Yet, he proceeded to ask
the driver for license, registration, and proof of insurance. Our Supreme Court, citing Reynolds,
endorsed the officer’s actions. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 42. An identical analysis
applies here. Accordingly, we hold that Officer Sullivan was within his authority to ask for
Defendant’s driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance; it makes absolutely no
difference that Officer Sullivan had already dispelled his initial suspicions for the stop. See In
re Forfeiture of ($28,000), 1998-NMCA-029, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 661, 954 P.2d 93 (filed 1997)
(holding that police may properly continue a detention for the limited purpose of inspecting a
driver’s documents after the initial reasonable suspicion subsides).

{19} Had police not acquired additional reasonable suspicion during the exchange of
documents, the encounter might have ended without a consensual search and Defendant’s
subsequent arrest. Instead, while handing over his documents to Officer Sullivan, Defendant
stated he had been stopped by police earlier in the day with a firearm. Officer Sullivan then
asked Defendant to exit the vehicle and, with Defendant’s permission, conducted a pat-down for
weapons. Defendant does not dispute that he consented to the pat-down. Officer Sullivan’s
mere request for Defendant to exit the vehicle was not impermissible on these facts because, as
we held in State v. Lowe, “an officer can require the driver and passengers to exit a vehicle out
of a concern about weapons.” 2004-NMCA-054, ¶ 13, 135 N.M. 520, 90 P.3d 539. “Even in
routine traffic stops, police may adopt precautionary measures addressed to reasonable fears.”
Id. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has observed that police take “inordinate risks . .
. when they approach cars with persons seated in them, and [the Court has] approved the practice
of requiring . . . persons to get out of the car and be subject to a protective frisk even in the
absence of individualized suspicion.” State v. Lovato, 112 N.M. 517, 522, 817 P.2d 251, 256
(Ct. App. 1991) (discussing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977), in which the
Court held that any intrusion occasioned by ordering a suspect out of a vehicle is “de minimis.
The driver is being asked to expose to view very little more of his person than is already
exposed. The police have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be briefly detained; the
only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting in the driver’s seat of his car or
standing alongside it. Not only is the insistence of the police on the latter choice not a serious
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, but it hardly rises to the level of a petty indignity. . .
. What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate
concerns for the officer’s safety.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

{20} We must defer to the undisputed factual findings of the district court, which indicate that
based on Defendant’s statement and the circumstances known to Officer Sullivan at the time,
Officer Sullivan believed Defendant to be both armed and a threat to officer safety. Because
Officer Sullivan’s testimony is undisputed, it is impossible for us to say that a reasonable officer
under the same circumstances would have inevitably reached a different conclusion. Under such
circumstances, Officer Sullivan’s pat-down, conducted with Defendant’s consent, was not per
se improper. We hold only that Officer Sullivan legally ordered Defendant out of the vehicle
and obtained his consent to conduct a pat-down. Our holding should not be read to give the
officers carte blanche to conduct pat-downs whenever they conclude a gun is present within an

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automobile. That has never been the law in New Mexico. Simply possessing a firearm within
a vehicle has always been a right guaranteed by our state’s constitution. N.M. Const. art. II, §
6; cf. State v. Gutierrez, 2004-NMCA-081, ¶¶ 13-15, 136 N.M. 18, 94 P.3d 18 (observing that
although it is lawful to carry a gun in a vehicle, mere “lawful possession of a gun has no bearing
on the reasonableness of the officer’s action to separate a suspect from a firearm within his
possession” for purposes of officer safety (emphasis added)).

{21} Yet, even if we presume the impropriety of Officer Sullivan’s pat-down, the officers still
had reasonable suspicion to continue the detention in this case on the basis of the marijuana odor
detected by Officer Gutierrez. After smelling the odor, Officer Gutierrez asked Defendant “if
he was smoking marijuana in the car,” and Defendant replied that “he had smoked about six .
. . hours earlier.” At that point, the officers asked Defendant’s permission to search the vehicle,
and Defendant consented both verbally and in writing. Thus, similar to this Court’s holding in
State v. Pacheco, we conclude, based on the odor of marijuana and Defendant’s admission of
having recently smoked it, that the officers were justified in requesting Defendant’s consent to
search the vehicle. 2008-NMCA-131, ¶¶ 15-17, 145 N.M. 40, 193 P.3d 587 (citing factors
permissibly considered); see State v. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 1, 5, 16, 138 N.M. 408,
120 P.3d 830 (holding that the driver’s alleged permissive use of a rental vehicle, his
nervousness, and his inconsistent descriptions of travel plans were sufficient to support the
expansion of the investigation such that the officer was justified, based on his experience and
training, in inquiring about the presence of drugs and seeking permission to search the vehicle).
Finally, once Defendant consented to the search, any evidence acquired therefrom satisfied
constitutional standards. See State v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 582, 158 P.3d
1025 (“Recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include exigent circumstances,
searches incident to arrest, inventory searches, consent, hot pursuit, open field, and plain view.”
(emphasis added)).

CONCLUSION

{22} Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that both the initial stop as well as subsequent
detention in this case were supported by reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.

{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.

________________________________________
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge

WE CONCUR:

________________________________________
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge

________________________________________

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ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge

Topic Index for State v. Candelaria, Docket No. 28,565

CT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CT-FA Fourth Amendment

CL CRIMINAL LAW
CL-CL Controlled Substances
CL-MH Motor Vehicle Violations

CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CA-CN Consent
CA-RS Reasonable Suspicion
CA-SZ Search and Seizure
CA-WS Warrantless Search

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