IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2013 Term
FILED
June 5, 2013
released at 3:00 p.m.
RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
No. 12-0037 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant Below, Petitioner
V.
MICAH A. CURTIS AND ANGELA L. CURTIS,
Plaintiffs Below, Respondents
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County
Honorable J.D. Beane, Judge
Civil Action No. 08-C-157
AFFIRMED
AND
No. 12-0522
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant Below, Petitioner
V.
JERRY LEE RHODES AND BONNIE M. COCHRAN
Plaintiffs Below, Respondents
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
Honorable James C. Stucky, Judge
Civil Action No. 10-C-592
AFFIRMED
Submitted: April 17, 2013
Filed: June 5, 2013
Thomas V. Flaherty Daniel F. Hedges
Flaherty Sensabaugh Bonasso PLLC Mountain State Justice, Inc.
Charleston, West Virginia Charleston, West Virginia
Archibald Wallace, III Scott S. Blass
WallacePledger, PLLC Bordas & Bordas, PLLC
Richmond, Virginia Wheeling, West Virginia
Attorneys for Petitioner Hartford Attorneys for the Respondents
in case No. 12-0037
Archibald Wallace, III Gene W. Bailey, II
Thomas J. Moran Jill E. Hall
WallacePledger, PLLC Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love LLP
Richmond, Virginia Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Petitioner Hartford Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
in case No. 12-0522 The Surety & Fidelity Association
of America
JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
CHIEF JUSTICE BENJAMIN and JUSTICE KETCHUM dissent and reserve the right
to file dissenting opinions.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “A judgment against a principal does not bind the surety conclusively,
as a general rule, but it is prima facie evidence of liability and its extent. If, however, the
instrument binds its makers to abide the result of certain litigation, or to satisfy any judgment
therein, or to indemnify against it, a judgment against the principal is conclusive upon the
sureties, so that they cannot contest the liability, in the absence of fraud or collusion.”
Syllabus point 4, State v. Nutter, 44 W. Va. 385, 30 S.E. 67 (1898).
2. The surety on a judgment bond is conclusively bound by a default
judgment entered against its principal, even when the surety did not have notice of the prior
suit against the principal, so long as the judgment is the type of judgment contemplated by
the bond and the surety cannot establish collusion or fraud.
3. “Defendants in a civil action against whom a verdict is rendered are
entitled to have the verdict reduced by the amount of any good faith settlements previously
made with the plaintiff by other jointly liable parties. Those defendants against whom the
verdict is rendered are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for payment of the
remainder of the verdict. Where the relative fault of the nonsettling defendants has been
determined, they may seek contribution among themselves after judgment if forced to pay
more than their allocated share of the verdict. Syllabus point 7, Board of Education of
i
McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 182 W. Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796
(1990).
4. “‘“Where a payment is made, and release obtained, by one joint
tort-feasor, the other joint tort-feasors shall be given credit for the amount of such payment
in the satisfaction of the wrong.” Point 2, Syllabus, Hardin v. The New York Central
Railroad Company, 145 W. Va. 676[, 116 S.E.2d 697 (1960)].’ Syllabus Point 1, Tennant
v. Craig, 156 W. Va. 632, 195 S.E.2d 727 (1973).” Syllabus point 5, Board of Education of
McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 182 W. Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796
(1990).
ii
Davis, Justice:
In these two consolidated cases, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. (hereinafter
“Hartford”) appeals from two separate summary judgment orders entered against it in two
separate cases. Each case involved a bond for which Hartford was the surety. The principals
under the bonds, a mortgage lender and a mortgage broker, are both now defunct. Each bond
principal was sued and failed to file a response to the complaint filed against it, which
resulted in the entry of default judgments in both cases. Hartford was not given notice of
either lawsuit against its principals, or notice that default judgments were being sought.
Hartford was notified of the default judgments only after the same had already been entered,
when the plaintiffs in those cases sought payment under the bonds. In each case, Hartford
ultimately was found liable on the bond notwithstanding Hartford’s lack of notice or an
opportunity to present a defense. On appeal, Hartford asserts that the circuit courts erred in
finding the bonds to be judgment bonds and in holding Hartford liable on the bonds under
the circumstances presented in these cases. In addition, Hartford complains that the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County erred by refusing to grant Hartford credit for a settlement the
plaintiffs reached with other defendants named in the case before that court. For the reasons
set out in the body of this opinion, we conclude that the two bonds at issue in these
consolidated cases are judgment bonds; therefore, the circuit courts correctly found that
default judgments entered against the bond principals are conclusive and binding against
Hartford. We further conclude that the Circuit Court of Kanawha County correctly declined
to grant Hartford credit against a default judgment for a settlement that did not exist at the
1
time the default judgment was entered. Accordingly, both of the instant cases are affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For purposes of this opinion, this Court has consolidated two cases that, in part,
raise the same issues. We set forth the relevant facts of each case separately below.
A. Appeal No. 12-0037: Curtis History
Micah A. Curtis and Angela L. Curtis (hereinafter “the Curtises”), residents of
Jackson County, West Virginia, brought the suit underlying the instant dispute that is the
subject of Appeal Number 12-0037. The Curtises had obtained refinancing of the mortgage
on their home from Calusa Investments, LLC (hereinafter “Calusa”), a mortgage lender
licensed and operating in West Virginia. In order to obtain and maintain its license to
conduct business in West Virginia, Calusa was required, under W. Va. Code § 31-17-4
(2002) (Repl. Vol. 2003),1 to obtain a mortgage lender bond. Accordingly, Calusa obtained
a mortgage lender bond from Hartford, the petitioner in this appeal. Hartford was the surety
on the $100,000 mortgage lender bond issued to Calusa as its principal.
On October 1, 2008, the Curtises filed a complaint against several defendants,
1
See infra note 6 for a discussion of W. Va. Code § 31-17-4.
2
including Calusa, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. The claims made by the Curtises
against Calusa essentially were that Calusa had made certain misrepresentations and taken
certain actions that caused the Curtises to refinance the mortgage on their home on
unfavorable terms. At that time, Hartford was not made a party to the lawsuit and was not
informed of the suit or a potential claim against its principal.
Calusa apparently had become defunct and failed to respond to the complaint.
Due to Calusa’s failure to respond to the complaint, the Curtises obtained a default judgment
against Calusa in the amount of $99,795.05, plus post-judgment interest. Calusa failed to
satisfy the judgment. Hartford, as surety on Calusa’s mortgage lender bond, was
subsequently notified, on January 12, 2009, of the Curtises’ claim against Calusa. The
Curtises requested Hartford to satisfy the judgment they had obtained against Calusa. On
March 26, 2010, the circuit court granted leave to the Curtises to file an amended complaint
adding Hartford as a party defendant. Meanwhile, after the entry of default judgment against
it, Calusa attempted to enter the case late, filing motions seeking to have the trial court either
set aside the default judgment or grant Calusa a hearing on the issue of damages. The circuit
court denied both motions and reaffirmed the judgment against Calusa by its orders dated
December 21, 2010, and January 10, 2011.
The Curtises then filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the
circuit court to find, as a matter of law, that Hartford was liable for the entirety of the
3
judgment under the terms of the bond it issued to Calusa. Hartford opposed the motion on
the grounds that it had not been notified of the action against Calusa and that it had been
denied an opportunity to present defenses or challenge the amount of damages claimed.
Following arguments on the motion, the circuit court entered an order, on July 13, 2011,
granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Curtises and finding Hartford was
obligated to satisfy the default judgment awarded against Calusa. In this regard, the circuit
court examined the language of the bond and concluded that said language
clearly establishes that the condition that the Plaintiffs needed
to satisfy in this case is a judgment against Calusa involving
conduct violating the provisions of Article 17, Chapter 31 of the
West Virginia Code. There is no other language in the Bond to
indicate that the Plaintiffs should first be required to try their
case against Calusa, determine if Calusa will pay any judgment
obtained, and then, upon Calusa’s failure to pay such a
judgment, try their case a second time against Hartford. Instead,
the Bond provides that once the Plaintiffs obtain a judgment
against Calusa, they can proceed against the Bond and Hartford,
as surety on the bond, is obligated to pay the judgment as it
contracted.
The circuit court entered a “Final Judgment Order Regarding Count IV of the Complaint”
on December 5, 2011, in which it awarded final judgment in favor of the Curtises against
Hartford in the amount of $99,795.05 plus accrued statutory interest. The circuit court
included in the order the appropriate language rendering the judgment final and appealable
to this Court in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
4
It is from this order that Hartford appeals.2 Finding commonality in the issues herein raised
and those raised in the case of Hartford v. Jerry Lee Rhodes and Bonnie M. Cochran, Appeal
Number 12-0522, we have consolidated the two cases for purposes of our review.
B. Appeal Number 12-0522: Rhodes/Cochran History
The suit underlying the dispute in this case was brought by Jerry Lee Rhodes,
the sole owner of real property at issue in the case, and Bonnie M. Cochran, Mr. Rhodes’
former live-in girlfriend (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Rhodes/Cochran”), against
Equity South Mortgage, LLC (“Equity South”), and others. Equity South was a residential
mortgage broker licensed to operate a mortgage brokering business in West Virginia. To
obtain and maintain its license to conduct business in West Virginia, Equity South was
required to obtain a mortgage broker bond pursuant to W. Va. Code § 31-17-4.3
Accordingly, Equity South obtained a mortgage broker bond from Hartford, the petitioner
in this appeal. Hartford was the surety on the $50,000 mortgage broker bond issued to
Equity South as principal.
On March 3, 2008, Rhodes/Cochran filed their suit against Equity South and
2
Also appearing before the Court in this proceeding is the Surety and Fidelity
Association of America as Amicus Curiae in support of Hartford’s position in this case. We
appreciate the appearance of Amicus Curiae and will consider its arguments in conjunction
with those of Hartford.
3
See infra note 6 for a discussion of W. Va. Code § 31-17-4.
5
others in the Circuit Court of Putnam County, West Virginia, seeking damages in connection
with two allegedly oppressive home improvement loans brokered by Equity South
(hereinafter “the Putnam County case”).4 Rhodes/Cochran alleged, in relevant part, that
Equity South had obtained an inflated appraisal of the home, misrepresented critical facts in
writing the loan, and engaged in other improper and predatory lending practices. Hartford
was not made a party to the lawsuit and was not, at that time, informed of the suit or a
potential claim against its principal, Equity South.
Equity South apparently had become defunct and failed to file a response to
the complaint. Due to Equity South’s failure to respond to the complaint, Rhodes/Cochran
obtained a default judgment against Equity South, on October 14, 2008, in the amount of
$56,300 plus post-judgment interest.5 Claims against the other defendants in the case
remained pending for resolution. Equity South failed to satisfy the judgment.
Thereafter, Rhodes/Cochran presented Hartford with a claim for payment under
4
Plaintiff Jerry Lee Rhodes owns and resides in the home against which the two
loans were secured. Plaintiff Bonnie M. Cochran moved out of the home in 2006 when her
relationship with Mr. Rhodes ended. Ms. Cochran does not hold an interest in the property
at issue and never has. However, it was alleged in the Putnam County case that Equity South
misrepresented that Ms. Cochran was an owner of the home for purposes of including her as
a debtor on the home improvement loans.
5
The circuit court’s order states that the default judgment was for the amount
of $50,000; however, both parties to this appeal agree that the amount of the default
judgment was $56,300.
6
the mortgage broker bond issued to Equity South. Hartford refused to pay, and, on March
29, 2010, Rhodes/Cochran filed their complaint against Hartford in the case sub judice in the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia (hereinafter “the Kanawha County case”).
Hartford filed its answer to the complaint in May 2010, and no further action was taken in
the case for some time. Meanwhile, Rhodes/Cochran pursued settlement with the remaining
defendants in the Putnam County case. On August 4, 2010, Rhodes/Cochran entered into a
formal settlement agreement with some of the remaining defendants in the Putnam County
case. Under the terms of the settlement, the settling defendants agreed to (1) void the loan,
(2) release the deed of trust on the real property owned by Plaintiff Rhodes, and (3) delete
the trade line for the account to cure all negative credit reporting against Rhodes/Cochran
relating to their default under the loan.
On December 19, 2011, Rhodes/Cochran filed a motion for summary judgment
in the Kanawha County case asking the circuit court to hold Hartford, as surety on the Equity
South mortgage broker bond, liable for the default judgment entered against Equity South
in the Putnam County case. Hartford opposed the motion on the grounds that it had not been
notified of the Putnam County case against Equity South and that it had been denied an
opportunity to present defenses or challenge the amount of damages claimed. Following
arguments on the motion, the circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of
Rhodes/Cochran, by final order entered on March 27, 2012, and entered judgment against
Hartford in the amount of $50,000, which represented the amount of the bond. In reaching
7
this conclusion, the circuit court found that the bond was a judgment bond and observed that,
“[u]nder West Virginia law, a surety on a judgment bond is conclusively obligated to pay any
judgment rendered against the principal.” (Citation omitted). In addition, the circuit court
denied Hartford’s request for a credit against the judgment in an amount equal to the funds
paid in settlement by some of the defendants in the Putnam County case. It is from this order
that Hartford now appeals. Finding common issues in this case and the case of Hartford v.
Curtis, Appeal Number 12-0037, we have consolidated the two cases for purposes of our
review.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The instant consolidated cases are both before this Court on appeals from
circuit court orders granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the actions below.
Therefore, our review is de novo. “A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed
de novo.” Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). This Court
has further explained that “[w]hen undertaking our plenary review, we apply the same
standard for granting summary judgment as would be applied by a circuit court.” Subcarrier
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Nield, 218 W. Va. 292, 296, 624 S.E.2d 729, 733 (2005). Accordingly,
we observe that
“‘[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted
only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be
tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify
8
the application of the law.’ Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W. Va.
160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).” Syllabus point 1, Andrick v. Town
of Buckhannon, 187 W. Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992).
Syl. pt. 2, Painter, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755. Finally, we note that “[t]he circuit
court’s function at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter, but is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Syl. pt.
3, id. With these standards in mind, we now address the issues raised in these consolidated
appeals.
III.
DISCUSSION
Hartford, who is the surety on the two bonds at issue (hereinafter “the Hartford
bonds”), challenges the circuit courts’ rulings requiring it to pay default judgments rendered
against its principals when Hartford was not provided notice of the claims against the
principals until after the judgments were rendered. To resolve this issue, it is necessary to
first ascertain whether the Hartford bonds were judgment bonds, as determined by the circuit
courts, or in the nature of performance bonds, as characterized by Hartford. After making
this determination, we will resolve the question of whether Hartford was entitled to notice
of the proceedings against its principals. Finally, we will address the issue of whether
Hartford is entitled to a credit equal to the amount of a settlement reached with some of the
defendants in the Rhodes/Cochran litigation.
9
A. Type of Bonds
In order to resolve the central issue in this case, we first determine whether the
bonds issued by Hartford were judgment bonds. In this regard, it has been explained that
[t]he type of bond involved is not material unless it is an
injunction or judgment bond. With this type of bond, the surety
is obligating itself to pay a particular judgment rendered against
a principal, even though the surety had no notice, so long as the
judgment is one within the purview of the agreement between
surety and principal. 74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship § 153 (1974).
See also 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 553 (1969). In a judgment
or injunction bond, the judgment against the principal is
conclusive against the surety if it is free of fraud and collusion.
74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship § 153 (1974).
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Natural Res. & Envtl. Prot. Cabinet, 722 S.W.2d 290, 292
(Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
Hartford argues, essentially, that the surety in a judgment bond explicitly grants
the right to recover against the bond immediately upon a judgment against the principal.
Hartford urges that the clear language of the bonds establishes that Hartford never agreed to
pay unquestioningly any judgment rendered against its principals. Hartford claims that the
obligation it bonded was the principals’ compliance with state laws, rules, and orders relating
to mortgage lenders, and the principals’ payment of any moneys due to the State or persons
designated by the State pursuant to a lawsuit brought by the Commissioner of Banking.
Thus, Hartford argues, the bonds are in the nature of performance bonds. Directing this
10
Court’s attention to State v. Myers, 74 W. Va. 488, 82 S.E. 270 (1914), a case involving a
judgment bond, Hartford submits that, while the Myers opinion does not quote language from
the bond therein being considered, the deciding factor in the case was that the surety
“expressly stipulated” that paying a judgment or fine “shall be the condition of his bond.”
State v. Myers, 74 W. Va. at 492, 82 S.E. at 272.
Respondents, the Curtises and Rhodes/Cochran (hereinafter collectively
referred to as “Respondents”), note that, through a performance bond, the surety guarantees
the performance of an underlying contract. A judgment bond, on the other hand, is one in
which the surety agrees to be liable for a judgment based on a specific violation covered by
the bond. Respondents argue that the language used in the instant bonds demonstrates that
Hartford agreed to be liable for judgments based upon its principals’ violations of “Article
17, Chapter 31, of the Code of West Virginia.” Thus, Respondents contend, the language of
the bonds issued by Hartford is clear in expressing that the bonds are, in fact, judgment
bonds.
In conducting our analysis, we are mindful that “[t]he liability of a surety is
generally measured by his or her contract or bond.” 72 C.J.S. Principal and Surety § 81 at
222 (2005) (footnotes omitted). See In re Microwave Prods. of Am., Inc. 118 B.R. 566, 570
(W.D. Tenn. 1990) (“The liability of the surety is measured by the terms of his contract.”
(citation omitted)); State ex rel. Duckett v. Pettee, 50 N.C. App. 119, 121, 273 S.E.2d 317,
11
319 (1980) (“The principal and his surety are liable under a contract expressed in definite
terms and their liability cannot be carried beyond the fair meaning of those terms.” (internal
quotations and citation omitted)). In addition, consideration should be given to the statute
requiring the bond: “The scope of a statutorily required surety bond is determined by the
language and purpose of the bond and the terms of the statute it is given under.” 72 C.J.S.
Principal and Surety § 82 at 223.
To identify the type of bonds that were issued by Hartford, we will contrast
judgment bonds with performance bonds, insofar as Hartford has argued that the Hartford
bonds are in the nature of performance bonds.
A judgment bond has been described as a bond “‘in which the surety agrees to
be liable for a judgment based on a specific statutory violation covered by the bond.’
Lawyers Sur. Corp. v. Riverbend Bank, N.A., 966 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1998, no pet.).” Old Republic Sur. Co. v. Bonham State Bank, 172 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2005). See also Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Natural Res. & Envtl. Prot.
Cabinet, 722 S.W.2d at 292 (explaining that “judgment bond” is a bond in which “the surety
is obligating itself to pay a particular judgment rendered against a principal, even though the
surety had no notice, so long as the judgment is one within the purview of the agreement
between surety and principal. 74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship § 153 (1974).”).
12
A performance bond, on the other hand, has been defined as: “1. A bond given
by a surety to ensure the timely performance of a contract. . . . 2. A third party’s agreement
to guarantee the completion of a construction contract upon the default of the general
contractor. Also termed completion bond; surety bond; contract bond.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1158 (7th ed. 1999).
Both of the Hartford bonds6 utilized a mandatory bond form prepared by the
West Virginia Commissioner of Banking.7 The bonds are basically identical and state:
THE CONDITION OF THE ABOVE OBLIGATION IS
SUCH THAT; WHEREAS, the above bound principal, in
pursuance of the provisions of Article 17, Chapter 31, of the
Code of West Virginia, as amended, (hereinafter the “Act”) has
obtained, or is about to obtain, from the Commissioner of
6
The principals on the two bonds were required by law to obtain the same prior
to being issued a license to conduct their business in West Virginia. W. Va. Code § 31-17-4
(2002) (Repl. Vol. 2003) is the version of the statute in effect at the time the Hartford bonds
were issued. While the statute has been amended over the years, the past and current
versions of W. Va. Code § 31-17-4 still require license applicants to “[f]ile with the
commissioner a bond in favor of the state for the benefit of consumers.” See W. Va. Code
§ 31-17-4(b)(3) (2002) (Repl. Vol. 2003) (requiring bond in connection with application for
lender’s license); W. Va. Code § 31-17-4(c)(3) (2002) (Repl. Vol. 2003) (requiring bond in
connection with application for broker’s license); W. Va. Code § 31-17-4(e)(3) (2010) (Supp.
2012) (requiring bond in connection with application for lender’s license); W. Va. Code §
31-17-4(f)(3) (2010) (Supp. 2012) (requiring bond in connection with application for
broker’s license).
7
Because Hartford did not draft the bond, in considering its terms we will not
apply the general rule that “when the surety is a corporation and supplies bonds for a
consideration, the courts will construe the obligations of the bond most strongly against the
surety. See, Hicks v. Randich, 106 W. Va. 109, 144 S.E. 887 (1928).” Cecil I. Walker Mach.
Co. v. Stauben, Inc., 159 W. Va. 563, 567-68, 230 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1976).
13
Banking of the State of West Virginia, a license to conduct a
Mortgage Lender[/Broker] business.
NOW, THEREFORE, if the said principal [specific
principal named here] shall conform to and abide by the
provisions of said Act and of all rules and orders lawfully made
or issued by the Commissioner of Banking thereunder, and shall
pay to the State and shall pay to any such person or persons
properly designated by the State any and all moneys that may
become due or owing to the State or to such person or persons
from said obligor in a suit brought by the Commission on their
behalf under and by virtue of the provisions of said Act, then
this obligation shall be void, otherwise it shall remain in full
force and effect. If any person shall be aggrieved by the
misconduct of the principal, he may upon recovering judgement
[sic] against such principal issue execution of such judgement
[sic] and maintain an action upon the bond of the principal in
any court having jurisdiction of the amount claimed, provided
the Commissioner of Banking assents thereto.
(Emphasis added).
The above-quoted language from the bonds requires, as Hartford contends, that
the principals comply with Article 17, Chapter 31, of the West Virginia Code, which is
known as the Mortgage Lender, Broker, and Servicer Act, and pay money due to the State
or persons designated by the State under circumstances outlined in the bonds. Relevant to
the instant cases, however, and as also quoted above, the bonds go on to specify that an
aggrieved person “may upon recovering judgement [sic] against such principal issue
execution of such judgement [sic] and maintain an action upon the bond of the principal[.]”
(Emphasis added). Thus, the language of the Hartford bonds grants an aggrieved person who
has obtained a judgment against the principal the right to execute said judgment through an
14
action upon the bond.8 Reading this plain language in light of the definition of a judgment
bond quoted above, it is clear that the Hartford bonds are judgment bonds.9 The foregoing
bond language plainly demonstrates that Hartford has “agree[d] to be liable for a judgment
based on a specific statutory violation covered by the bond,” i.e., a violation of the West
8
In arguing the Hartford bonds are not judgment bonds, Hartford places
significance on the fact that the bonds require an aggrieved person to “maintain an action
upon the bond.” We find this argument unpersuasive. An action on the bond would provide
Hartford an opportunity to adjudicate the potential existence of collusion or fraud, or to
challenge whether its principal’s conduct violated a condition of the bond. See Syl. pt. 4, in
part, State v. Nutter, 44 W. Va. 385, 30 S.E. 67 (1898) (holding, for purposes of a judgment
bond, that “a judgment against the principal is conclusive upon the sureties, so that they
cannot contest the liability, in the absence of fraud or collusion” (emphasis added)). See also
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Natural Res. & Envtl. Prot. Cabinet, 722 S.W.2d 290, 292
(Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (“In a judgment or injunction bond, the judgment against the principal
is conclusive against the surety if it is free of fraud and collusion.” (emphasis added; citation
omitted)); Old Republic Sur. Co. v. Reyes, No. 05-01-01881-CV, 2002 WL 1772976, at *3
(Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2002) (“[A] surety may contest in litigation based on a claim on a
judgment bond whether the principal’s conduct violated a condition of the bond and whether
the judgment was obtained by fraud or collusion.” (citation omitted)).
9
Where contractual language is plain, it must be applied without construction:
“A valid written instrument which expresses the intent of
the parties in plain and unambiguous language is not subject to
judicial construction or interpretation but will be applied and
enforced according to such intent.” Syl. pt. 1, Cotiga
Development Company v. United Fuel Gas Company, 147
W. Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 ([1962]).
Syl. pt. 1, Sally–Mike Props. v. Yokum, 175 W. Va. 296, 332 S.E.2d 597 (1985). In other
words, “[i]t is not the right or province of a court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear
meaning and intent of the parties as expressed in unambiguous language in their written
contract or to make a new or different contract for them.” Syl. pt. 3, Cotiga Dev. Co. v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W. Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1962).
15
Virginia Mortgage Lender, Broker, and Servicer Act. Old Republic Sur. Co. v. Bonham State
Bank, 172 S.W.3d at 214 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
In addition, we find the Hartford bond language to be similar to the statutory
language that applied to the bond that was described as a judgment bond in State v. Myers
74 W. Va. 488, 82 S.E. 270. The bond in Myers was required by the West Virginia Code of
1913, sec. 1144 (ch. 32, para. 28), which stated, in relevant part, that
No county or license court nor town council shall
authorize the issuing of any license to sell spirituous
liquors . . . until the applicant shall have given bond with good
security . . . in the penalty of at least [$3,500], conditioned that
he will not permit any person to drink to intoxication on any
premises under the control of such applicant; and will not
knowingly sell or furnish any intoxicating drink to any person
who is intoxicated at the time, or who is known to him to have
the habit of drinking to intoxication, or whom he knows, or has
reason to believe, is under the age of twenty-one years, and that
he will not sell or furnish such drink to any person on Sunday;
and with the further condition, that he will pay all such damages
and costs as may be recovered against him by any person under
any of the provisions of chapter thirty-two of the code of West
Virginia, as amended. And such applicant and his securities in
said bond shall be liable, in a suit or suits thereon, for the fine
and costs which may be recovered against him for any offence
under this chapter which is a violation of any of the conditions
of said bond, as well as for the damages hereinbefore provided
for, until the penalty of such bond is exhausted.
Much like the Hartford bonds, the statute requiring the bond at issue in Myers stated that the
bond would be conditioned upon the principal’s compliance with the statutory provisions
relating to the sale of intoxicating drink, which included the condition that the principal
16
would pay “all such damages and costs as may be recovered against him by any person under
any of the provisions” of the referenced code. Also similar to the Hartford bonds, the statute
goes on to require that “such applicant and his securities in said bond shall be liable, in a suit
or suits thereon, for the fine and costs which may be recovered against him for any offence
under this chapter which is a violation of any of the conditions of said bond[.]” As will be
discussed in more detail below, the Myers Court observed that the surety on a judgment bond
is bound by a judgment against its principal. Thus, by treating the bond at issue in that case
as a judgment bond, the Myers Court clearly did not consider the foregoing language holding
the principal and his surety liable “in a suit or suits” for damages that may be recovered
against the principal as making the bond anything other than a judgment bond.10
Furthermore, we note that other courts interpreting similar language have
reached the same result. For example, the Supreme Court of Texas addressed the question
of whether a particular bond was a general undertaking bond or a judgment bond in Howze
v. Surety Corp. of America, 584 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1979). The Howze court determined that
the bond was a judgment bond in which the surety agreed “to be liable for a judgment against
the principal.” Howze, 584 S.W.2d at 265. The bond at issue in Howze stated: “‘[the
principal and surety are] firmly bound unto THE STATE OF TEXAS in the sum of
$25,000.00 dollars payable at Austin, Travis County, Texas for the use by a consumer, the
10
Compare note 8, supra.
17
State, or any political subdivision thereof who establishes liability against a dealer for
damages, penalties, or expenses . . . .’” Id. (latter emphasis added). In concluding that this
language created a judgment bond, the Howze court reasoned that
[t]he Act and bond both state specifically that the surety is not
liable until the State, political subdivision or consumer
establishes liability. It is implicit that one establishes liability
by obtaining a judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction. A
consumer can only make a claim upon the surety when he has
obtained a judgment against the principal, or when he sues them
together in the same suit. These bonds are, therefore, judgment
bonds; and the surety is bound despite the fact that it was neither
notified nor joined as a party.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Axess Int’l, Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., 183 F.3d 935, 940
(1999) (finding bond was judgment bond based on language stating that “the condition of this
obligation is that the penalty amount of this bond [$50,000] shall be available to pay any
judgment for damages against the Principal arising from the Principal’s transportation related
activities” (internal quotations omitted)).
Having found that the Hartford bonds are judgment bonds,11 we find no error
11
Hartford also has argued that the Commissioner of Banking had no authority
to require a judgment bond insofar as a judgment bond ignores a surety’s rights under
W. Va. Code § 45-1-3 (1923) (Repl. Vol. 2010) to notice of a proceeding before a judgment
arising therefrom is binding on said surety, or, in the absence of such notice, an opportunity
to present defenses its surety would have had. We find this argument to be without merit.
The statute directing the Commissioner of Banking to prepare a bond form to be used by
mortgage lender and mortgage broker license applicants simply states that the “[a]pplication
for a lender’s or broker’s license shall each year be submitted in writing under oath, in the
form prescribed by the commissioner . . . .” W. Va. Code § 31-17-4(a) (2002) (Repl. Vol.
(continued...)
18
in the findings of the circuit courts of Jackson and Kanawha Counties reaching the same
conclusion.
B. Right to Assert Defenses
Hartford additionally submits that, because it did not receive notice of the
actions against its principals, the circuit courts further erred in concluding that it was
automatically responsible for paying the default judgments rendered against said principals.
Hartford contends that, in the absence of notice, the default judgments are not binding against
it and that it is entitled to present any defense that would have been available to its principals
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 45-1-3 (1923) (Repl. Vol. 2010). Hartford acknowledges that the
case of State v. Myers, 74 W. Va. 488, 82 S.E. 270, created an exception to W. Va.
Code § 45-1-3. Nevertheless, Hartford argues that Myers created a narrow exception that
should be applied only where the surety explicitly grants the right to recover against the bond
11
(...continued)
2003) (emphasis added). Accord W. Va. Code § 31-17-4(e)(3) (2010) (Supp. 2012)
(requiring mortgage lender license applicant to “file with the commissioner a bond . . . in a
form and with conditions as the commissioner may prescribe” (emphasis added));
W. Va. Code § 31-17-4(f)(3) (2010) (Supp. 2012) (applying same requirement to mortgage
broker license applicant). The foregoing statutes specifying that the Banking Commissioner
prepare a bond form places no limitations on the Commissioner’s authority to prescribe the
terms applicable to said bonds, and are more specific to the Commissioner’s authority than
W. Va. Code § 45-1-3. See Syl. pt. 6, Carvey v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 206
W. Va. 720, 527 S.E.2d 831 (1999) (“The general rule of statutory construction requires that
a specific statute be given precedence over a general statute relating to the same subject
matter where the two cannot be reconciled.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). For
further treatment of W. Va. § 45-1-3, see Section III. B., infra.
19
immediately upon a judgment against the principal.
Respondents argue that the circuit courts properly declined to apply W. Va.
Code § 45-1-3, which is a general statute governing sureties, guarantors, indorsers, and
others who may be secondarily liable for a debt. Respondents assert that the circuit courts
were correct in concluding that they had satisfied the condition of the bond by obtaining
default judgments against Hartford and, therefore, that they were entitled to judgment against
Hartford. Respondents rely on State v. Myers for the proposition that the protections of
W. Va. Code § 45-1-3 do not apply to judgment bonds. According to Respondents, obtaining
a judgment in the absence of fraud or collusion is the only requirement for collecting on a
judgment bond.
Our analysis of this issue is simplified by the fact that we have identified the
Hartford bonds as judgment bonds. Thus, the issue for our resolution is whether the surety
on a judgment bond who does not receive notice of an action prior to the entry of a default
judgment against its principal is obligated to pay the judgment without the opportunity to
present defenses that would have been available to its principal.
The statute upon which Hartford bases its claim of entitlement to present
defenses that would have been available to its principals is W. Va. Code § 45-1-3, which
states:
20
Whether the surety, guarantor or indorser (or his
committee or personal representative) shall have given notice as
provided in the first section of this article or not, no judgment,
decree or recovery rendered, entered, or had in any suit, action,
prosecution or proceeding, to which the surety, guarantor or
indorser (or his committee or personal representative) was not
a party regularly served with process, shall be in any wise
binding on such surety, guarantor or indorser (or his committee
or personal representative), and, notwithstanding such decree,
judgment or recovery, the surety, guarantor or indorser (or his
committee or personal representative) shall be allowed to make
any such defense in any action, suit or proceeding instituted
against him, as could have been made in the suit in which such
decree, judgment or recovery was had.
As Hartford has acknowledged, this Court recognized an exception to W. Va.
Code § 45-1-3 in State v. Myers, 74 W. Va. 488, 82 S.E. 270. The Myers Court interpreted
an earlier version of W. Va. Code § 45-1-3 that also contained the language requiring notice
to a surety before it could be bound by a judgment, and further allowing a surety who had
not received notice to assert any defense that could have been made in the suit that resulted
in the judgment.12 Based upon its analysis of that statute, the Myers Court concluded that the
Legislature had not intended the statute to apply to judgment bonds. In this regard, the Court
stated that,
[p]rior to this statute, the surety on a bond, conditioned to pay
any judgment that might be recovered against his principal, was
bound by the judgment when so recovered. The judgment
against the principal bound the surety, in the absence of fraud,
12
See Chapter 37, Acts 1907. See also State v. Myers, 74 W. Va. 488, 490-91,
82 S.E. 270, 271 (quoting Chapter 37, Acts 1907).
21
and determined his liability. State v. Nutter, 44 W. Va. 385[, 30
S. E. 67 (1898)], and State[, to Use of Beard] v. Abbott, 63 W.
Va. 189[, 61 S. E. 369 (1907)]. We think this is still the law.
Myers, 74 W. Va. at 491, 82 S.E. at 271. Thus, under the Myers decision, judgment bonds
are not subject to W. Va. Code § 45-1-3. If the West Virginia Legislature had disagreed with
the opinion, it could have amended the statute to plainly include judgment bonds. The
Legislature has made no such amendment. Therefore, the traditional rule stands:
A judgment against a principal does not bind the surety
conclusively, as a general rule, but it is prima facie evidence of
liability and its extent. If, however, the instrument binds its
makers to abide the result of certain litigation, or to satisfy any
judgment therein, or to indemnify against it, a judgment against
the principal is conclusive upon the sureties, so that they cannot
contest the liability, in the absence of fraud or collusion.
Syl. pt. 4, State v. Nutter, 44 W. Va. 385, 30 S.E. 67 (1898) (second emphasis added). In
adopting this rule, the Nutter Court explained that if a bond “undertakes to pay such
judgment as may be recovered, that judgment is conclusive, because that judgment is the
event on the happening of which the surety agrees to pay.” 44 W. Va. at 389, 30 S.E. at 69.
See also State, to Use of Beard v. Abbott, 63 W. Va. 189, 193, 61 S.E. 369, 371 (1907) (“This
bond not only covenants for faithful discharge of duties according to the decree, but it
contains the additional covenant that the receiver should pay over all moneys that might
come to his hands by virtue of the decree as the court shall direct. It contains both
covenants. . . . [T]he authorities are overwhelming, and almost without exception, that upon
such a bond as we have in hand the judgment is conclusive.”).
22
The foregoing cases are dissimilar from the instant actions insofar as none of
them have involved a default judgment. Thus, we must also decide whether the general rule
that sureties on judgment bonds are bound by judgments rendered against their principals is
applicable to default judgments. While the question is novel for this Court, it has been
resolved in other jurisdictions that have concluded that the rule does apply to default
judgments. See Axess Int’l, Ltd. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., 183 F.3d at 940 (“Generally, a default
judgment obtained by an obligee against a principal obligor does not have preclusive effect
in a subsequent action against a secondary obligor. See Restatement (Third) of Suretyship
and Guaranty § 67(3). Where a judgment bond is involved, however, such as the one at issue
here, a different rule applies: ‘Where the very condition of the bond is the performance of
a judgment against the principal, or that the surety will pay all damages that may be awarded
in an action brought against the principal, . . . there is no question as to the conclusiveness,
as against the surety, of a judgment against the principal, if binding upon the latter and free
from fraud and collusion, assuming, of course, that it is the kind of judgment contemplated
by the surety’s undertaking.’ 74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship § 153 (1974).” (footnote omitted));
Sargeant v. Starr, 102 Ga. App. 453, 459, 116 S.E.2d 633, 637 (1960) (“It is well settled,
beginning with Jackson v. Guilmartin, 61 Ga. 544 [(1878)], that the surety is bound by the
judgment entered against the principal on the bond. And this is so where the judgment
rendered was with the consent of the principal. . . . Such a bail or security takes the fortunes
of his principal, and is bound equally with him by the judgment in the main action. . . . The
bail can no more go behind the judgment, or attack it, by affidavit of illegality, after it is duly
23
entered up against both, than can the principal.” (internal quotations and citations omitted));
Martiniello v. Robitaille, 293 Mass. 200, 202, 199 N.E. 534, 535 (1936) (“The judgment in
the original action against the principals on the bond, though obtained by default, being ‘the
final judgment in said action,’ . . . and having been entered in the lawful exercise of the
power of the court, . . . was conclusive on the sureties, by reason of their contract with the
plaintiffs.” (emphasis added)); R & L Lumber Co. v. Summit Fid. & Sur. Co., 284 Minn. 489,
494, 170 N.W.2d 594, 598 (1969) (“It is clear, however, that where a surety has undertaken
to pay ‘any judgment rendered’ in an action, the surety has neither a right to notice of such
an action or a right to reopen a judgment entered against its principal, even though it was
obtained by consent or default.”); Valencich v. TMT Homes of Oregon, Inc., 193 Or. App.
47, 55, 88 P.3d 300, 303 (2004) (holding surety liable for default judgment against principal
obtained in an action in which the surety was neither named as a party nor served, and
commenting that “Oregon endorses the traditional rule followed by a majority of
jurisdictions, discussion of which is found in Suretyship, 74 Am. Jur. 2d 115–16, §§ 129, 130
(2001): ‘Generally, where the liability of a surety is dependent on the outcome of litigation
in which his principal is involved, a judgment against the principal is binding and conclusive
on the surety, who may not interpose defenses which should have been set up in the action
in which the judgment was recovered. When the obligation of the principal has been
determined, the extent of the liability on the bond becomes fixed; the sureties on the bond
are not entitled to relitigate, separately, the question of the principal’s obligation, at least in
the absence of a charge of fraud or collusion.’”); Ward v. Federal Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 561,
24
564-65, 106 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1958) (finding default judgment conclusive against surety and
observing that, “‘[a]s a general rule, in all cases where the liability of a surety is dependent
on the outcome of litigation in which his principal is or may be involved, a judgment against
the principal is binding and conclusive on the surety, and the surety may not interpose
defenses which should or might have been set up in the action in which the judgment was
recovered, or require proof of the facts on which the judgment rests, or attack the validity of
the judgment, except for fraud or collusion or want of jurisdiction. The rule is applicable
even though the surety had no notice of the suit or opportunity to defend[.]’” (quoting 72
C.J.S. Principal and Surety § 261 at 706)); Old Republic Sur. Co. v. Bonham State Bank, 172
S.W.3d at 214 (“Whether a default judgment is conclusive of the surety’s liability or only
prima facie evidence depends on what type of bond is at issue. . . . [I]f the bond is a
judgment bond, the Texas Supreme Court has held that a surety is bound by the default
judgment against the principal even if the surety did not have notice of the prior suit against
the principal absent proof of collusion or fraud.” (footnote omitted)).
With regard to the fairness of the rule, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has
observed that
[t]his rule is not unfair to the surety. Assuming a surety
pays a judgment pursuant to its bond under a contract to pay any
judgment upon default by its principal, it is subrogated to
whatever rights the judgment creditor had against its principal.
Carr Hdwe. Co. v. Chicago Bonding & Surety Co., 190 Iowa
1320, 181 N.W. 680 [(1921)]; Western Cas. & Surety Co. v.
Meyer, 301 Ky. 487, 192 S.W.2d 388, 164 A.L.R. 769 [(1946)].
25
See, Anchor Cas. Co. v. Bird Island Produce, Inc., 249 Minn.
137, 82 N.W.2d 48 [(1957)]; Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Dahl,
202 Minn. 410, 278 N.W. 591 [(1938)]. Consequently, the
surety, upon payment of the judgment, may seek reimbursement
from its principal. It is only equitable that the surety which has
contracted to pay any judgment, rather than the judgment
creditor who relied on the bond, should be burdened with the
expense and risk of such an action.
To protect itself against an insolvent principal, a surety
can and usually does require the principal to post collateral up
to the full amount of the bond. In this case, defendant took [its
principal’s] stock as collateral. Obviously this was not a prudent
choice in view of the fact that [its principal] is now insolvent
and the stock is quite likely worthless. It is not because of any
act of plaintiff that defendant is not fully protected and finds
itself in no better position than a general creditor of [its
principal] on its subrogation claim. Had defendant required [its
principal] to post sufficient collateral, its effort to intervene in
[its principal’s] dispute with plaintiff would have been
unnecessary.
R & L Lumber Co. v. Summit Fid. & Sur. Co., 284 Minn. at 495-96, 170 N.W.2d at 598-99.
Based upon the foregoing discussion, we now expressly hold that the surety
on a judgment bond is conclusively bound by a default judgment entered against its principal,
even when the surety did not have notice of the prior suit against the principal, so long as the
judgment is the type of judgment contemplated by the bond and the surety cannot establish
collusion or fraud.
Applying this holding to the instant consolidated cases, we conclude that
Hartford, as surety on the two judgment bonds at issue, is conclusively bound by the default
26
judgments entered against its principals. Accordingly, the circuit courts in both of these
cases properly granted summary judgment in favor of the respective plaintiffs as to this issue.
C. Credit for Settlements
As an additional issue in only the case involving the Rhodes/Cochran plaintiffs,
Appeal Number 12-0522, Hartford assigns error to the circuit court’s refusal to grant
Hartford a credit equal to the amount of settlements that plaintiffs received from other
defendants.
In this regard, Hartford argues that the circuit court erred in holding that a
surety and its principal are not entitled to a setoff or credit against a judgment rendered
against the principal despite the fact that the plaintiffs have already received one full
recovery for their alleged injury. Hartford notes that the plaintiffs are entitled to only one
satisfaction for their alleged injury. As a result of the settlement agreement with other
defendants named in the action below, Rhodes/Cochran’s loan was voided, the deed of trust
on the property was released, and the trade line for the account was deleted for the purposes
of reporting to credit bureaus. Thus, Hartford contends that if the plaintiffs obtain an
additional recovery of $50,000 from Hartford, they will receive a windfall.
Respondents argue that Syllabus point 7 of Board of Education of McDowell
County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 182 W. Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (1990), makes
27
clear that, in order to obtain a credit, a settlement must be entered prior to the judgment:
Defendants in a civil action against whom a verdict is
rendered are entitled to have the verdict reduced by the amount
of any good faith settlements previously made with the plaintiff
by other jointly liable parties. Those defendants against whom
the verdict is rendered are jointly and severally liable to the
plaintiff for payment of the remainder of the verdict. Where the
relative fault of the nonsettling defendants has been determined,
they may seek contribution among themselves after judgment if
forced to pay more than their allocated share of the verdict.
(emphasis added). Respondents Rhodes/Cochran note that they settled with some of the
remaining defendants nearly two years after the default judgment was entered against
Hartford’s principal, Equity South.
This issue is easily resolved. We have explained earlier in this opinion that,
because the bond issued by Hartford to Equity South is a judgment bond, the judgment
against Hartford’s principal, Equity South, is binding on Hartford. In this regard, Hartford
is not entitled to re-litigate defenses available to its principal. Similarly, Hartford would not
be entitled to any credit that was not available to its principal in connection with the default
judgment. In the instant case, the default judgment against Equity South, Hartford’s
principal, was entered on October 14, 2008. Rhodes/Cochran entered into a formal
settlement agreement with Nationstar and the Bank of New York, two of the remaining
defendants in the case, on August 4, 2010. Clearly then, at the time of the default judgment
against Equity South, there was no settlement in existence upon which to base a credit.
Consequently, Hartford is entitled to no credit for the settlement that was executed almost
28
two years after the default judgment. This result is in accordance with Syllabus point 7 of
the Zando opinion, which is quoted above and grants a credit for “good faith settlements
previously made.” Board of Ed. of McDowell Cnty. v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 182
W. Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (emphasis added). It is also in accordance with Syllabus point
5 of Zando, which states:
“‘Where a payment is made, and release obtained, by one
joint tort-feasor, the other joint tort-feasors shall be given credit
for the amount of such payment in the satisfaction of the
wrong.’ Point 2, Syllabus, Hardin v. The New York Central
Railroad Company, 145 W. Va. 676[, 116 S.E.2d 697 (1960)].”
Syllabus Point 1, Tennant v. Craig, 156 W. Va. 632, 195 S.E.2d
727 (1973).
182 W. Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (emphasis added). Simply put, no credit can be given for
a settlement that is not yet in existence.
To the extent that Hartford complains that failing to grant it credit for the
settlement violates the one recovery rule,13 we note the circuit court’s finding that “the
settlement was reached over [nineteen] months after the default judgment was entered against
Equity. The amount of the settlement was influenced, at least in part, by the existence of the
default judgment.” We find nothing to contradict this conclusion.
13
See Syl. pt. 3, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schatken, 230 W. Va. 201,
737 S.E.2d 229 (2012) (“‘It is generally recognized that there can be only one recovery of
damages for one wrong or injury. Double recovery of damages is not permitted; the law does
not permit a double satisfaction for a single injury.’ Syl. Pt. 7, in part, Harless v. First Nat’l
Bank in Fairmont, 169 W. Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d 692 (1982).”).
29
For the reasons set out above, we find the circuit court did not err in failing to
grant Hartford, as surety, credit for a settlement that was not executed until nineteen months
after entry of the default judgment against Hartford’s principal.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the rationale set out in this opinion, in Appeal Number 12-0037,
we conclude that the Circuit Court of Jackson County did not err in granting summary
judgment in favor of the Curtises in their action against Hartford. Accordingly, the circuit
court’s order of December 5, 2011, is affirmed. Likewise, in Appeal Number 12-0522, the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
Rhodes/Cochran in their action against Hartford. Consequently, the March 27, 2012, order
of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appeal No. 12-0037, Affirmed.
Appeal Number 12-0522, Affirmed.
30
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Micah A. Curtis & Angela L. Curtis and Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Jerry Lee Rhodes & Bonnie M. Cochran
Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
Date filed: 2013-06-05
Citations: 231 W. Va. 596, 748 S.E.2d 662
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