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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14603
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:12-cr-80045-DMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
SERGIO MIRALLES,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(June 6, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sergio Miralles pleaded guilty to one count of knowing possession of 15 or
more unauthorized access devices with intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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§§ 1029(a)(3) and (c)(1)(A)(i), and was sentenced to a term of 30 months’
imprisonment. He now appeals his sentence as procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
In September 2009, Miralles downloaded 26,418 unique stolen credit card
numbers from the internet. As relevant to this appeal, some of the accounts
associated with the stolen numbers had been closed because of fraud as early as
2007, before Miralles downloaded them. Prior to sentencing, the probation officer
prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI), setting Miralles’s base offense
level at 6. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(2). The PSI stated that Miralles was responsible
for a total loss of $13,449,377.04, which included loss amounts for the accounts
that had been closed before Miralles downloaded the numbers. See id. § 2B1.1,
cmt. (n.3(F)(i)). This amount increased Miralles’s offense level by 20. Id.
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(K). After other adjustments, Miralles’s total offense level was 31,
resulting in a guidelines range of 108 to 120 months’ imprisonment. See id.
§ 5G1.1(c)(1).
Ultimately, after stating that it had “considered the [PSI] which contains the
advisory guidelines and the statutory factors,” the district court sentenced Miralles
to 30 months’ imprisonment, a 78-month downward variance from the bottom of
his guidelines range. The court concluded that “a major factor in . . . varying from
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the guidelines is [the] issue of who actually caused the loss and whether [the credit
card numbers in Miralles’s possession] had been previously used and whether they
were able to be used for the purposes intended.” This is Miralles’s appeal.
II.
Miralles first contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.
Because Miralles did not raise in the district court either of the procedural
challenges he now asserts, we review only for plain error. 1 See United States v.
Johnson, 694 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2012) (reviewing for plain error a district
court’s failure to make a specific factual finding necessary to support the
application of a guidelines enhancement); cf. United States v. Daniels, 685 F.3d
1237, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012) (characterizing an argument that the district court
failed to “make sufficient factual findings to support [a guidelines] enhancement”
as a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of a sentence). To demonstrate
plain error, Miralles must show that: “(1) an error occurred; (2) the error was
plain; (3) it affected his substantial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness
of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1151 (11th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 859 (2013).
1
The government argues that Miralles invited any procedural error with respect to loss amount.
But our review of the record indicates that although Miralles failed to properly object to the way
the district court calculated his guidelines range so that plain-error review is appropriate, he did
not “induce[] or invite[] the district court into making an error.” United States v. Brannan, 562
F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Miralles first asserts that the district court’s statement that it “considered . . .
the presentence report which contains the advisory guidelines” did not sufficiently
indicate the district court independently calculated his guidelines range, thereby
rendering his sentence procedurally unreasonable. The sole case Miralles cites in
support of this contention is United States v. Crawford, which provides that district
courts must consult the guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.
407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005). Crawford cannot be read to suggest that the
district court’s statement in this case indicates that it did not satisfy that obligation.
Therefore, Crawford does not provide a basis for Miralles’s challenge to the
court’s calculation of his guidelines range. See United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d
1254, 1266 n.3 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a defendant waives an argument by
failing to provide adequate citation to support it).
Miralles next argues that the district court incorrectly calculated the loss
amount. The commentary to the guidelines provides that, “[i]n a case involving
any . . . unauthorized access device, loss . . . includes any unauthorized charges
made with the . . . unauthorized access device and shall be not less than $500 per
access device.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. (n.3(F)(i)). An “access device” is defined,
in relevant part, as “any . . . account number . . . that can be used, alone or in
conjunction with another access device, to obtain . . . any . . . thing of value.” 18
U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1). And “the term ‘unauthorized access device’ means any
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access device that is lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled, or obtained with
intent to defraud.” Id. § 1029(e)(3).
Miralles contends that, for an account number to be an “unauthorized access
device,” the plain language of the statute requires it to be usable. Some of the
credit card numbers in Miralles’s possession were associated with accounts that
had been closed before Miralles downloaded the numbers. Accordingly, Miralles
argues, these numbers were not “unauthorized access devices” because the
government offered no evidence that they could “be used . . . to obtain . . . any . . .
thing of value. Id. § 1029(e)(1).
Even assuming the district court plainly erred by not requiring proof of
usability, however, Miralles is not entitled to relief because he cannot show the
error affected his substantial rights. To make this showing, Miralles bears the
burden of demonstrating “that there is a reasonable probability that there would
have been a different result had there been no error.” United States v. Bennett, 472
F.3d 825, 831-32 (11th Cir. 2006). Yet he points to nothing in the record to
indicate that the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence if it had
excluded the unusable account numbers from the loss amount. Indeed, as Miralles
concedes, the district court explained that questions about whether some of the
numbers “were able to be used for the purposes intended” was a “major factor” in
its decision to vary downward from the guidelines range. Thus, the record
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indicates that the district court already factored into its choice of sentence the fact
that many of the numbers may not have been usable. And Miralles does not
dispute that his guidelines range would still have exceeded his actual sentence even
had unusable numbers been excluded. Miralles therefore cannot meet his burden
of showing a reasonable probability of a different result had the court insisted that
the government prove all of the account numbers on Miralles’s computer were
usable. See id.
III.
Finally, Miralles contends that his 30-month sentence, which was less than
one-third of his lowest possible guidelines-range sentence, was substantively
unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.
2013). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford
consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives
significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error
of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d
1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
district court in this case did not abuse its discretion. The record reflects that the
district court considered the statutory factors and specifically discussed the nature
and circumstances of the offense; Miralles’s history and characteristics, including
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his age and employment history; and the desire to avoid unwarranted disparities
with the sentences of Miralles’s codefendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because
Miralles has not otherwise shown that his sentence, which was a significant
downward variance from the bottom of the guidelines range, is unreasonable in
light of the § 3553(a) factors, we uphold his sentence. Cf. United States v. Tobin,
676 F.3d 1264, 1310 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n light of the significant downward
variance[] . . . , we are simply unable to say that the sentence[] [is] substantively
unreasonable.”).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Miralles’s sentence is
AFFIRMED.
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