IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 95-60547
(Summary Calendar)
_________________________
LORI LEBLANC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHIRLEY S. CHATER,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________________________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(4:95CV9LN)
__________________________________________________
March 21, 1996
Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Lori LeBlanc appeals the district court’s judgment, which adopted the magistrate judge’s
decision that substantial evidence supported the denial of LeBlanc’s request for disability insurance
benefits. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that LeBlanc had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since January 4, 1993 and was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act because her seizure disorder, arteriovenous malformation (AVM), and complaints of fatigue,
headaches, and tingling noises in her ears did not constitute a severe impairment. LeBlanc challenges
the legal standard which the ALJ used to reach the conclusion regarding her impairment. Finding that
the ALJ employed the correct legal standard and agreeing that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s decisions, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
FACTS
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Lori LeBlanc, born July 25, 1961, is a single mother, has a tenth-grade education, and last
worked as a sewing machine operator. LeBlanc applied for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. She alleged that
she became disabled as of September 21, 1987, based on a brain aneurysm. Her application was
disapproved initially and on reconsideration because LeBlanc was working and earning more than
$500 per month at the time she filed the application. LeBlanc requested and received a hearing before
an administrative law judge (ALJ).
At the first step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that LeBlanc had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since January 4, 1993. However, at step two, the ALJ found that LeBlanc
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act because her seizure disorder,
arteriovenous malformation (AVM), and complaints of fatigue, headaches, and tingling noises in her
ears did not constitute a severe impairment. The Appeals Council denied LeBlanc's request for a
review of the ALJ's decision, and LeBlanc sought review in the district court.
The magistrate judge determined that the decision of the Commissioner was supported by
substantial evidence and recommended that the district court affirm the decision. Upon LeBlanc's
objections to the magistrate judge's report, the district court revi ewed the record and adopted the
magistrate judge's report as the opinion of the district court. LeBlanc filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
"This Court limits its review of a denial of disability insurance benefits to two issues: (1)
whether the Secretary applied the proper legal standards, and (2) whether the Secretary's decision is
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292
(5th Cir. 1992). Evidence is considered “substantial” when it allows a reasonable person to accept
the evidence as adequate to support a conclusion. See Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir.
1985). The claimant bears the burden of showing that she is disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991).
2
There is a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled:
1) Claimant is not presently working;
2) Claimant's ability to work is significantly limited by a physical or mental
impairment or combination of impairments;
3) Claimant's impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in the appendix to
the regulations (if so, disability is automatic);
4) Impairment prevents claimant from doing past relevant work;
5) Claimant cannot perform any other work.
Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. "A finding that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in the
five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis." Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th
Cir. 1987).
LeBlanc does not dispute the application of the sequential steps per se. She argues that the
Commissioner applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that her impairment is not severe and
that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. LeBlanc contends that she suffers from
more than a slight abnormality, that the medical evidence corroborates her assertions of pain, and that
the ALJ erred in finding that her testimony at the hearing was not credible.
A. Legal Standard For Determining Disability.
This Court has set out the correct legal standard for determining whether an impairment is
severe: "an impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality [having] such
minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability
to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience." Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101
(5th Cir. 1985). The court held that it will be assumed that the wrong standard was applied "unless
the correct standard is set forth by reference to this opinion or another of the same effect, or by an
express statement that the construction [this court] give[s] to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) is used." Id.
at 1106; see also Anthony, 954 F.2d at 294-95 (holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen
v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987) did not alter the standard announced in Stone).1
1
The standard under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) provides that an impairment is not severe if it does
not “significantly limit[] [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” See
also Hampton, 785 F.2d at 1311.
3
The record indicates that the ALJ did not expressly state that LeBlanc was not under a
disability as defined in Stone. The ALJ cited 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c) but did not
indicate if he used the "slight impairment" construction which Stone gives to the regulations. See
Hampton v. Bowen, 785 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1986). In this case, the medical evidence raises
a question of whether a remand in light of the "slight impairment" standard would be a waste of
judicial resources. See id. ("A case will not be remanded simply because the ALJ did not use `magic
words.'"). We conclude that where the evidence supports the ALJ's findings under either standard,
it is imprudent to remand solely for the district court to chant the magical “slight impairment”
incantation in its opinion. The result will not change and neither the court nor the parties benefit from
this mechanical act. On the other hand, if the record is not clear, or if there is any doubt whether the
evidence can satisfy both standards, remand is appropriate and necessary. Therefore, we hold that
where the record in a disability insurance case clearly establishes that both the Stone and CFR
standard is satisfied, remand is not necessary even though the district court’s decision fails to
expressly articulate the “slight impairment” standard established in Stone.
B. Substantial Evidence.
The issue remaining before us is whether LeBlanc’s record contains substantial evidence that
satisfies both standards. "If the [Commissioner's] findings are supported by substantial evidence, they
are conclusive and must be affirmed." Anthony, 954 F.2d at 295. "Substantial evidence is that which
is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it must
be more than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance." Id. The determination of the severity
of the impairment may be based on substantial medical evidence alone. See Lofton v. Schweiker, 653
F.2d 215, 217-18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1089 (1981). "A medical condition that can
reasonably be remedied either by surgery, treatment, or medication is not disabling." Lovelace, 813
F.2d at 59. It is the task of the ALJ to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to make credibility
determinations. Id.
4
We find that the ALJ's decision, using the CFR standard, was supported by substantial medical
evidence that LeBlanc's condition was remedied by medication. The ALJ considered LeBlanc's
medical records and witness testimony at the hearing. The medical evidence reflects that LeBlanc had
been diagnosed in 1987 with a seizure disorder and an AVM of the parietal lobe. The seizure
disorder was treated with Tegretol and Phenobarbital, and LeBlanc reported no seizure activity
through January 1990.
LeBlanc became pregnant and, because of her seizure disorder and AVM, elected a Cesarean
section for the delivery of a healthy male infant in August 1990. Throughout the pregnancy, LeBlanc
reported no seizures. She suffered from headaches, but she chose not to use potent medication
because she was pregnant. During follow-up examinations, LeBlanc complained of mild fatigue, but
she had no seizure activity and no problems with the Tegretol and Phenobarbital.
LeBlanc quit her job in January 1993 because she claimed that she was regularly experiencing
headaches and a ringing noise in her ears. LeBlanc’s doctor had informed her that the ringing was
a sign that LeBlanc would have a seizure if she did not cease the activity and calm down. LeBlanc’s
doctor did not order her to cease employment activity; she took this action on her own. There is no
evidence in the record showing that LeBlanc attempted to obtain less stressful employment.
After leaving her job in 1993, LeBlanc visited her physician in March and October 1993. She
reported that she continued to take her medication and that she had not experienced seizure activity.
Testimony at the hearing and a background questionnaire indicate that LeBlanc cared for her young
child and that she was able to drive. We conclude that the ALJ’s decision is supported by the
record.
We also find no error with the conclusion that LeBlanc exaggerated her condition because
we agree that the evidence and testimony contradict LeBlanc’s claims. The frequency of LeBlanc’s
headaches has diminished while she has taken her medication. At the hearing LeBlanc admitted that
she had not had a migraine in eight months and had only two headaches in the previous six month
5
period. This coupled with evidence that during her pregnancy she entirely discontinued the
medication without experiencing seizures proves that LeBlanc’s impairment is not severe.
Likewise, we find that the reco rd equally supports the ALJ’s conclusions using the “slight
impairment” standard articulated by this court in Stone. The testimony and medical evidence establish
that LeBlanc’s condition is merely a slight abnormality that has not interfered with her ability to work.
Since LeBlanc began taking Tegretol and Phenobarbital, she has not experienced anyseizure activity.
LeBlanc has been able to give birth, provide child care, drive, and work without experiencing
seizures. We are convinced that if LeBlanc takes the medication as prescribed, the medication will
continue to minimize her headaches, migraines, and fatigue. There is nothing in the record indicating
that LeBlanc has had difficulty obtaining her medication. We find that LeBlanc’s impairment, which
has been readily treatable with medication, does not constitute a “disability;” it is only a slight
impairment as defined in Stone.2
We can only conclude that upon remand the district court’s conclusion would remain the same
after expressly citing and applying the Stone standard. Under these circumstances, remand is not
necessary.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
2
We need not address LeBlanc's assertion that the ALJ erred in its credibility determinations
because we are not permitted to reweigh the evidence. See Anthony, 954 F.2d at 295. Equally
unavailing is LeBlanc's argument that the ALJ erred in failing to elicit the testimony of a vocational
expert. The ALJ need not address each of the five steps in the sequential evaluation process after
determining that the claimant is not disabled. See Lovelace, 813 F.2d at 58.
6