UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2386
ANNE COLLINS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
BALTIMORE CITY BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:09-cv-02020-MJG)
Argued: January 31, 2013 Decided: June 10, 2013
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion
in which Judge Wilkinson joined. Judge Diaz wrote a separate
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
ARGUED: John B. Stolarz, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Leslie Robert Stellman, PESSIN & KATZ, PA, Towson, Maryland, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Tammy L. Turner, CITY BOARD OF SCHOOL
COMMISSIONERS, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
Anne Collins appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of the Baltimore City Board of School
Commissioners (“School Board”) on her claims for race and age
discrimination. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
Collins, the non-moving party. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404,
415 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 1 Collins, an African American
who was over 60-years old at all relevant times, worked as a
teacher and administrator in the Baltimore City Public School
System from 1966 until she retired just before the 2006-07
academic year. During her final year of employment, Collins
worked as the Foreign Language Department Head at Patterson High
School. Collins also served as Director of Patterson’s Twilight
1
Collins argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
required the district court to accept the facts found by a
Hearing Examiner who took evidence in a grievance that Collins
filed after her retirement. The district court found that
collateral estoppel did not apply, and we agree. Even if
Maryland law requires courts to give preclusive effect to an
administrative agency’s decision, Neifert v. Dep’t of Env’t, 910
A.2d 1100, 1112 (Md. 2006), the facts that Collins contends have
preclusive effect are contained in a Hearing Examiner’s
recommendation that the School Board eventually rejected.
Therefore, the facts do not represent an administrative agency’s
decision, and they have no preclusive effect.
2
Program, an evening program offered at several schools in the
district.
After the 2005-06 school year concluded, Collins wrote to
Patterson’s principal, Laura D’Anna, in response to an inquiry
about teaching summer school. Collins informed D’Anna that she
did not wish to teach summer school, and she also expressed her
opinion that she was overworked and underappreciated at
Patterson and that she needed “to take this chance to have a new
beginning.” J.A. 274. Though Collins did not intend for the
letter to be a transfer request, D’Anna interpreted it that way
and informed Human Services Specialist David Bonn that Collins
wished to be transferred. She also told Bonn that Collins had
taught French in the past, which led Bonn to assume that Collins
was certified to teach the subject. Accordingly, Bonn
transferred Collins to a French teaching position at Forest Park
High School, which paid approximately $3000 per year less than
the Department Head position Collins held at Patterson.
Although Bonn understood that Collins had requested the
transfer, he checked the “demotion” box on the School Board’s
Human Resources Change Form because Collins’s new position paid
less than her old one. Further, he did not check the box to
indicate that the transfer was “voluntary” because Collins had
not completed the paperwork required for Bonn to classify the
transfer as “voluntary.”
3
The School Board did not replace Collins as Department Head
at Patterson because Patterson phased out that position at the
time of Collins’s transfer. Tiffany Clark, an African American
in her 30s, replaced Collins as Director of the Twilight
Program.
When Collins arrived at Forest Park to begin the 2006-07
academic year, two problems arose. First, Collins was upset
that she was assigned to a teaching position instead of a
Department Head position. Second, Bonn’s assumption that
Collins was certified to teach French was incorrect, and Forest
Park had no available positions in subjects Collins was
certified to teach. Both Bonn and the Forest Park principal,
Loretta Breese, encouraged Collins to file a grievance, and they
agreed to allow her to teach French at Forest Park during the
pendency of the grievance. Collins declined this offer and
retired. She then filed a grievance with the School Board
seeking reinstatement to her previous position at Patterson, but
the School Board did not reinstate her. 2
Collins then filed suit in federal district court, alleging
race and age discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., and the
2
The grievance did not allege race or age discrimination
but merely claimed that the action was “arbitrary and
capricious.” J.A. 627.
4
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621
et. seq., respectively. After discovery, the School Board moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and
entered judgment in favor of the School Board. Collins appeals
that judgment.
II.
A.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008).
Summary judgment is appropriate where, viewing the evidence in
the light favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Id.
B.
As did the district court, we analyze Collins’s claims
under the framework developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (analyzing race discrimination
claim); see also Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc.,
354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying McDonnell Douglas
framework to age discrimination claim). Under this framework,
Collins bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case by producing evidence that (1) she is a member of a
5
protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, 3
(3) she was performing satisfactorily at the time of her adverse
employment action, and (4) the adverse employment action
occurred “under circumstances which give rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination.” Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480,
484-87 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). If Collins establishes a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the School Board to set
forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action. Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th
Cir. 2004). Then, to avoid summary judgment, Collins must
produce evidence that the School Board’s stated reason for the
adverse action is pretextual. Id. However, “[t]he ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the [School Board]
intentionally discriminated against [Collins] remains at all
times with [Collins].” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000), quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at
253.
3
Collins argues that the transfer constituted a
constructive discharge. We need not address that contention
because, for our analysis, we will assume that the transfer,
along with the accompanying pay decrease and failure to be
reappointed as Director of the Twilight Program, was an adverse
employment action within the meaning of Title VII and the ADEA.
6
In analyzing the School Board’s motion, the district court
began by assuming that Collins established a prima facie case of
age and race discrimination. The court then found that the
School Board offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the adverse action: it transferred Collins because D’Anna
interpreted Collins’s letter as a request for a transfer.
Finally, the district court concluded that Collins failed to
produce evidence that the School Board’s explanation was
pretextual and thus granted summary judgment in favor of the
School Board.
On appeal, Collins contends that the district court erred
by concluding that she failed to produce evidence that the
School Board’s explanation for transferring her was pretextual.
Collins also contends that the district court improperly applied
a “pretext-plus” standard by requiring that she produce evidence
that the School Board’s stated reason for the transfer was
pretextual and evidence that discrimination was the actual
reason for the transfer. As explained below, none of these
contentions requires reversal. Accordingly, we affirm.
1.
We first address Collins’s race discrimination claim. With
regard to that claim, we conclude that Collins failed to
7
establish a prima facie case, and, for that reason, we affirm
the district court’s entry of summary judgment. 4
As explained above, to establish the fourth element of her
prima facie case, Collins must show that her transfer occurred
“under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Usually, a
plaintiff does so by showing that she was replaced by an
individual outside her protected class, Miles, 429 F.3d at 486,
which is what Collins attempts here. Specifically, Collins
contends that she was replaced as Department Head by Kelly
Flores, a Caucasian. However, the record evidence does not
support that contention. The evidence Collins cites for her
contention is testimony from another teacher, Erika Edwards, who
stated that it “seemed” that Flores had replaced Collins as
Department Head because Flores began working out of the office
Collins had occupied and became “kind of the go-to” teacher when
other teachers had questions. J.A. 769. However, Flores denied
that she took on the responsibilities of a Department Head, and
D’Anna testified that Patterson did not fill the position after
Collins transferred. This record is insufficient to support an
4
We may affirm for any reason appearing on the record, even
if that reason was not the basis of the district court’s
opinion. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952
(4th Cir. 1992).
8
inference that Flores replaced Collins as Department Head.
Therefore, Collins failed to establish the fourth element of her
prima facie case of race discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s entry of summary judgment on the race
discrimination claim.
2.
We next turn to Collins’s age discrimination claim. On
this claim, she has established a prima facie case of
discrimination by producing evidence to establish all elements
of her prima facie case, including that she was replaced as
Director of the Twilight Program by a person outside the
protected class. However, we agree with the district court’s
conclusion that Collins produced no evidence that the School
Board’s explanation for its action was pretextual. Accordingly,
we affirm.
Collins asserts that a number of factors support her claim
of pretext, but we discuss only one. 5 Collins contends the
School Board’s explanation that she requested a transfer is
inconsistent with the Human Resources Change Form which
indicated the transfer was a demotion and did not indicate that
5
Collins’s other claims here either address her race
discrimination claim or are otherwise irrelevant to her age
discrimination claim.
9
the transfer was voluntary. However, the administrative record
of the transfer does not support an inference of pretext.
D’Anna has consistently asserted that she interpreted
Collins’s letter as a transfer request, an interpretation that
we consider a reasonable one under the circumstances. Thus,
even if the School Board mistakenly interpreted the letter as
such a request, this mistake is not evidence of pretext or
discrimination. Price, 380 F.3d at 215 n.1 (“[M]ere mistakes of
fact are not evidence of unlawful discrimination.”); see also
Jordan v. Summers, 205 F.3d 337, 344 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Pretext
is a lie, not merely a mistake.”). The Human Resources Change
Form which Bonn completed is not inconsistent with this
explanation. Bonn believed that Collins had requested the
transfer, but Bonn still marked the “demotion” box on the Human
Resource Change Form because of the pay decrease. 6 Further, he
did not mark the “voluntary transfer” box because he lacked the
requisite paperwork. There is no testimony that either of these
boxes was marked as it was because anyone associated with the
school thought the transfer was not voluntary. Given this
uncontradicted explanation, the form is not inconsistent with
the School Board’s explanation for the transfer and is not
6
We note that a demotion is not itself proof that the
transfer is not voluntary.
10
evidence of pretext. See Hearn v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
739 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1984) (no inference of pretext where
defendant gave uncontradicted explanation of potentially
“‘suspicious circumstances’” surrounding personnel documents).
Accordingly, we conclude that Collins failed to produce evidence
of pretext. 7
7
The dissent misconstrues our opinion in a number of ways.
For instance, the dissent asserts that we “proclaim the School
Board’s rationale ‘uncontradicted’.” We do not; we merely point
out that the School Board’s explanation of its administrative
record is uncontradicted, which is true. Further, we do not
“credit[] the School Board’s side in this dispute.” We have not
weighed the School Board’s explanation against Collins’s
allegations and decided which is more credible. Under our
analysis, which is appropriate whenever there is a question of
possible pretext, we take the explanation offered by the
employer and examine it in light of any contrary evidence in the
record. That process does not “credit,” but instead tests, the
School Board’s rationale.
The dissent uses what it sees as inconsistencies by the
School Board to help create an inference of age (but not race)
discrimination. Even if we were to find those “inconsistencies”
in the record, they would be insufficient to create such an
inference. The ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the
plaintiff, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, and such inconsistency
without more is not enough. Id. at 148 (“Certainly there will
be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the
defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude
that the action was discriminatory.); see also Price, 380 F.3d
at 217 n.5 (“although Reeves will allow a plaintiff to survive
summary judgment without presenting independent evidence of
discrimination . . ., it will permit this only where the other
evidence of discrimination . . . ensure[s] that the employer is
held liable for unlawful discrimination and not merely for
inconsistent statements.”); Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d
1169, 1183 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that, even if the
plaintiff had produced evidence of pretext, that evidence alone
(Continued)
11
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
entry of summary judgment in favor of the School Board.
AFFIRMED
would not entitle the plaintiff to a jury determination because
“[t]here is absolutely no other evidence of intentional
discrimination—not one racist comment, nor any harassment.”);
Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 94 (2d
Cir. 2001) (assuming that the plaintiff had produced evidence of
pretext but still affirming summary judgment for the defendant
because the evidence of pretext alone was “not enough to permit
a jury to find that the real reason [plaintiff] was fired was
his age” in light of evidence to the contrary).
12
DIAZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with my colleagues that the district court properly
granted summary judgment to the Baltimore City School Board on
Collins’s Title VII race discrimination claim because Collins
failed to establish a prima facie case. But given the multiple
flaws and inconsistencies in the School Board’s
nondiscriminatory rationale, I cannot agree that Collins has
failed to offer adequate evidence of pretext with regard to her
separate Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claim, 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
It is simply not our place to deem the School Board’s
explanation--that it believed Collins requested reassignment--
“reasonable” or genuine, for Collins has produced sufficient
evidence to discredit that justification and create a triable
issue as to pretext. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000). Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent from the majority’s adjudication of the ADEA claim (Part
II.B.2).
I.
The Baltimore City School Board hired Collins in 1966 as a
foreign language teacher at Patterson High School. In 1973,
Collins was promoted to Foreign Language Department Head. In
2002, Collins was appointed as director of the evening “Twilight
School” program for older students seeking a high school
diploma. Both positions entailed additional supervisory
responsibilities for which Collins received a stipend.
In June 2006, Collins and Principal Laura D’Anna had a
conversation in which Collins expressed interest in the
assistant principal position at Patterson. After D’Anna
explained that she lacked the authority to hire Collins for that
position, Collins supposedly conveyed her desire for a “new
beginning.” J.A. 345. Collins later wrote a letter to human
resources expressing her dissatisfaction with the school’s
criticism and under-appreciation of her performance. The letter
concluded that “I have to take this chance to have a new
beginning. I can only hope that this September will be
different and that my worth will be realized.” J.A. 274.
D’Anna claims that she misinterpreted Collins’s suggestion
for a “new beginning,” both in the conversation and the
subsequent letter, as a formal request for reassignment to a
different school. As a result, D’Anna informed Human Resources
Specialist David Bonn that Collins had requested a transfer.
Bonn prepared a Human Resources Change Form to authorize the
reassignment, which he admitted constituted a demotion, and
designated the transfer as an administrative, involuntary
reassignment to Forest Park High School. Neither Collins nor
the School Board submitted a “Transfer Request Form,” which the
14
Collective Bargaining Agreement required for voluntary
transfers, and which directed teachers to “list their choices of
new assignment in order of priority.” J.A. 354.
Collins received a notification of reassignment on August
19, 2006, which ordered her to report for work at Forest Park
four days later. The reassignment resulted in a $3,000
reduction in salary because Collins would not serve as the
Foreign Language Department Head or Twilight Director at Forest
Park. D’Anna appointed Tiffany Clark, a substantially younger
employee, to replace Collins as Twilight Director at Patterson.
II.
A.
Plaintiffs asserting ADEA claims may, just as with Title
VII claims, establish liability through direct evidence of
discrimination or through the circumstantial proof scheme
delineated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 430 (4th Cir. 2006)
(en banc). Because the majority concedes that Collins has
satisfied the prerequisites for a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas for her ADEA claim, the question becomes
whether a jury could find that the School Board’s alleged
nondiscriminatory rationale for its adverse employment action
15
was pretext for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 804-05.
My colleagues here improperly penalize Collins because at
the summary judgment stage she had nothing to show in the way of
discriminatory animus except the falsity of the
nondiscriminatory explanation offered by her employer. Yet in
Reeves, the Supreme Court explained that a plaintiff can create
a triable issue of discrimination simply by discrediting the
employer’s nondiscriminatory rationale:
Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of
credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence
that is probative of intentional discrimination, and
it may be quite persuasive. In appropriate
circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer
from the falsity of the explanation that the employer
is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.
Such an inference is consistent with the general
principle of evidence law that the factfinder is
entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a
material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt.
Moreover, once the employer’s justification has been
eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely
alternative explanation, especially since the employer
is in the best position to put forth the actual reason
for its decision. Thus, a plaintiff’s prima facie
case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that
the employer’s asserted justification is false, may
permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
unlawfully discriminated.
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Reeves did qualify its holding with the following proviso:
“This is not to say that such a showing will always be adequate
16
to sustain a jury’s finding of liability. Certainly there will
be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the
defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude
that the action was discriminatory.” Id. at 148. Yet the
majority mistakenly cites this exception as the rule, omitting
the representative “instances” that the Court highlighted as
sufficient to take the case away from a jury.
So, for example, it may well be appropriate for a district
court to grant summary judgment to an employer, even when the
plaintiff has provided evidence of pretext, (1) where “the
record conclusively reveal[s] some other, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employer’s decision,” or (2) “if the plaintiff
create[s] only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s
reason was untrue and there [is] abundant and uncontroverted
independent evidence that no discrimination ha[s] occurred.”
530 U.S. at 148. Neither circumstance though applies to
Collins’s claim.
The majority also cites two circuit cases, apparently for
the principle that there must be some affirmative evidence of
unlawful animus to create a triable issue of discrimination.
But to the extent either Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169,
1183 (7th Cir. 2002), or Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am.
Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2001), stand for such a
17
proposition, they are wrong and we should not follow suit. The
singular legacy of Reeves was the demise of the “pretext-plus”
proof regime that the majority now resurrects and applies.
The holding in Reeves reflects a practical reality. An
employer is not likely to leave behind direct evidence of
intentional discrimination, in which case the only available
proof of unlawful animus will be the lie that covers it.
Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th
Cir. 2005) (“The pretext framework advances that interest by
compensating for the fact that direct evidence of intentional
discrimination is hard to come by.” (internal quotations
omitted)). This is why “the factfinder is entitled to consider
a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative
evidence of guilt.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (internal
quotations omitted).
Of course, liability ultimately requires the trier of fact
to not only find an employer’s justification to be false, and
thus pretextual, but also find the explanation to be pretext for
discrimination. See Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 217 n.5
(4th Cir. 2004). At summary judgment, however, Reeves only
requires the plaintiff to prove the former for the jury to have
a “legally sufficient basis” to find the latter at trial. See
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48.
18
B.
Collins has sufficiently discredited the nondiscriminatory
explanation, accepted by the majority, that the School Board
mistakenly believed that she requested a transfer. As an
initial matter, the School Board’s straight-faced assertion that
it actually believed an employee would want to suffer an adverse
employment action is “inherently suspect.” Barnes v. GenCorp
Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1469 (6th Cir. 1990).
Further discrediting this assertion is the School Board’s
failure to ensure that such a significant action, predicated
upon an ambiguously expressed request for a “new beginning,” was
what Collins truly desired--a step that the School Board at oral
argument acknowledged a reasonable employer would have pursued.
Instead, after D’Anna informed Bonn that Collins wished to
transfer, Bonn immediately initiated the reassignment process,
without anyone within the Baltimore City school system checking
with Collins to confirm her supposed request. In particular,
D’Anna never followed up to ensure that Collins’s desire for a
“new beginning”--which could have just as easily connoted a
figurative “fresh start” at Patterson the next year--was
actually a request for reassignment.
Collins denies that she ever requested a transfer,
explicitly or implicitly, and points to the fact that the School
Board never asked her to file a “Transfer Request Form” as
19
required by the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Among other
things, the form would have allowed Collins to “list [her]
choices of new assignment in order of priority.” J.A. 354.
More importantly, the School Board itself designated the
reassignment as an involuntary, administrative transfer. The
School Board insists this was a clerical error, and that it did
not check the “voluntary” box on the reassignment paperwork
because it did not receive a “Transfer Request Form.” Yet, no
one from the School Board (1) requested that Collins fill out
such a form to comply with its own internal policies, or (2)
inquired what schools Collins preferred for reassignment, when
she wanted to start, or what classes she wanted to teach.
Instead, by way of an involuntary administrative transfer, the
School Board unilaterally removed and reassigned Collins to
Forest Park High School and notified Collins of her reassignment
just four days before she was to report for work.
On this record, a reasonable jury could find that this was
not a voluntary transfer, thereby impugning the School Board’s
explanation that it actually believed that it was. At the very
least, the notion that Collins’s reassignment was a genuine
response to an employee’s request seems questionable as a
factual matter. The School Board’s unilateral conduct--
including its own designation of the reassignment as
“involuntary”--simply does not square with a supposedly
20
voluntary transfer. The rash mistake by D’Anna, the clerical
discrepancy on the reassignment form, the breach of the School
Board’s own reassignment policies, and the serial failures by
the School Board to follow up on any of the aforementioned signs
that the transfer was a mistake, together belie the School
Board’s story that it transferred Collins because it actually
and mistakenly believed that is what she wanted.
Further diminishing the credibility of the School Board is
its inability to offer a coherent explanation for this sequence
of errors. Before the district court, the School Board never
admitted a mistake and instead claimed that Collins requested
the transfer. Before us, the School Board admitted that it
would have been wrong to designate the transfer as voluntary,
and at one point suggested that the adverse employment action
was an involuntary reassignment designed to resolve personal
friction between D’Anna and Collins and remove a malcontented
employee from the school.
Taken together, this evidence may not inexorably lead a
jury to find discriminatory animus, but there is certainly
something amiss with the School Board’s shifting explanations
for reassigning Collins. A jury could find that the School
Board was negligently but genuinely mistaken, but it could just
as easily “infer from the falsity of the explanation that the
21
employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.”
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
My colleagues are correct that a genuine mistake is not
evidence of pretext. See Price, 380 F.3d at 215 n.1. But
because the majority is plainly wrong to proclaim the School
Board’s rationale “uncontradicted,” Maj. Op. at 10, it is for a
jury, not the majority, to resolve whether a bona fide mistake
was indeed the reason for the reassignment. It is worth
remembering that Collins’s burden at summary judgment “is one of
production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility
assessment.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (internal quotations
omitted)). By improperly crediting the School Board’s side in
this dispute, my colleagues have failed in their charge to “view
the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to [Collins], as the nonmoving party.”
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir.
2012) (internal quotations omitted).
This case is not about whether the evidence offered by
Collins establishes liability, but rather whether the evidence
provides a legally sufficient basis for a jury to find for
Collins on her ADEA claim. Reeves merely provides Collins with
her day in court. The trier of fact may still choose to believe
the School Board’s asserted rationale, or may even conclude that
the explanation was pretext for something other than unlawful
22
discrimination. But because Collins has provided sufficient
evidence that the School Board’s explanation for reassigning
Collins was “unworthy of credence,” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147,
she is entitled to a trial on her ADEA claim. I respectfully
dissent from that portion of the majority’s decision holding
otherwise.
23