Northstream Investments, Inc. v. 1804 Country Store Co.

#24232, 24257-rev&rem-JENSEN, Circuit Judge
2007 SD 93

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

NORTHSTREAM INVESTMENTS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

1804 COUNTRY STORE CO., Defendant and Appellee.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
HUGHES COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

HONORABLE MAX A. GORS
Judge

* * * *

TIMOTHY M. ENGEL and
BRITTANY L. NOVOTNY of
May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson Attorneys for plaintiff
Pierre, South Dakota and appellant.

JAMES E. CARLON of
Carlon Law Office Attorney for defendant
Pierre, South Dakota and appellee.

* * * *

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
ON MARCH 21, 2007

OPINION FILED 8/29/07
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JENSEN, Circuit Judge

[¶1.] This is the second appeal by Northstream Investments Inc.

(Northstream) in its action to enforce a secured loan made by Security Bank N.A.

(Security) to the 1804 Country Store Co. (1804 Store). The continuing question is

the validity of a purported assignment of the 1804 Store loan from Security to

Northstream. In Northstream Inv., Inc. v. 1804 Country Store Co., 2005 SD 61,

¶ 23, 697 NW2d 762, 768 (Northstream I), the Court remanded the case for trial

after reversing the trial court's summary judgment decision determining the

assignment was invalid. This appeal is from the trial court's decision on remand

invalidating the assignment following trial. We reverse and remand to the trial

court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Northstream.

FACTS

[¶2.] In September 1991 the 1804 Store executed two promissory notes

evidencing a loan obligation to Security. The notes were secured by a real estate

mortgage, security agreement and stock pledge agreement. On June 10, 1992,

Security's shareholders voted to voluntarily liquidate the bank's assets. The

shareholders appointed Paul Nordstrom (Nordstrom) as liquidating agent for the

bank and authorized Security's board of directors to continue their duties until the

bank's assets were liquidated. Nordstrom controlled the majority interest in

Security as the majority shareholder of Northstream, the bank's holding company.

The shareholders also approved the sale of substantially all of Security's assets to

First National Bank of Pierre (First National) as a part of the liquidation. First

National chose not to purchase the 1804 Store loan and a number of other loans

from Security.
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[¶3.] After the sale to First National was completed, Security held its final

directors meeting on December 22, 1992. Security continued to hold the loans

rejected by First National, including the 1804 Store loan, at the time of the meeting.

The directors unanimously approved the following resolution at the meeting:

A motion was made by Gaylord Norman to appoint Paul
Nordstrom to serve as liquidating agent to transfer the
remaining assets of [Security] to the bank's holding
company, Northstream Investments, the sole remaining
shareholder, for exchange of stock.

[¶4.] The December 22, 1992 Minutes (Minutes) were typewritten and

contain the typewritten words "Secretary" and "Marcie Nordstrom" at the bottom of

the Minutes. No handwritten signature appears on the Minutes. Marcie

Nordstrom was the corporate secretary for Security at this time. She testified that

she did not sign the Minutes, but intended the typewritten name to be her

signature on the document.

[¶5.] Trial testimony was undisputed that Security's directors intended and

believed that they assigned the remaining assets, including the 1804 Store loan, to

Northstream at the December 22, 1992 meeting. Nordstrom testified that

Northstream gave written notice to each borrower, including the 1804 Store, of the

loans transferred from Security to Northstream. A written notice purportedly sent

to all such borrowers was introduced into evidence, but no documentation was

introduced to show that the notice was actually sent to the 1804 Store.

[¶6.] Harvey Wald (Wald), the sole shareholder of the1804 Store, testified

that the 1804 Store did not receive written notice of the assignment. Wald testified

that the 1804 Store was aware of Security's liquidation and began making

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payments to First National in January 1993 believing the loan was included in the

First National sale. The 1804 Store was subsequently notified by phone that its

loan had been transferred to Northstream and that loan payments should be made

to Northstream. The 1804 Store then began making monthly payments to

Northstream and continued to do so for more than six years.

[¶7.] The 1804 Store defaulted on its monthly payments in October 1999

and Northstream commenced this action for foreclosure of the mortgage; replevin of

the personal property; and a judgment on the notes. Following a trial on remand

from the first appeal, the trial court determined that the 1804 Store loan was a

valid loan, but Northstream had no right to enforce the loan obligation because it

was not properly assigned to Northstream. The trial court entered findings of fact

and conclusion of law and dismissed the action. Northstream appeals the trial

court's decision arguing that Security's directors assigned the 1804 Store loan to

Northstream at the December 22, 1992 director's meeting and that the Minutes

reflect that transfer.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

[¶8.] On appeal the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under the

clearly erroneous standard of review. Myers v. Eich, 2006 SD 69, ¶ 18, 720 NW2d

76, 82 (additional citations omitted). Conclusions of law are reviewed under the de

novo standard of review. Credit Collections Services, Inc. v. Pesicka, 2006 SD 81, ¶

5, 721 NW2d 474, 476. Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo.

Johnson v. Light, 2006 SD 88, ¶ 10, 723 NW2d 125, 127.

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DECISION

[¶9.] The trial court invalidated the purported assignment between Security

and Northstream for three reasons, all of which related to the statute of frauds

defense raised by the 1804 Store. First, the trial court concluded the Minutes did

not satisfy the signature requirement of the statute of frauds because they were not

hand signed by Security's corporate secretary. Second, the trial court reasoned that

the Minutes did not clearly show a present intent by Security to assign the 1804

Store loan to Northstream. Finally, the trial court determined that the subject

matter of the assignment was not sufficiently described in the Minutes.

Northstream claims that the trial court erred as to all of these determinations.

¶10.] The 1804 Store does not contest the validity of its loan obligation in

this litigation. It only disputes the validity of the purported assignment between

Security and Northstream. Neither party has addressed the question of whether

the 1804 Store has standing to assert the statute of frauds defense as it relates to

the purported assignment between Security and Northstream.1

1. Restatement Contracts (Second) § 144 (1981) provides that "[o]nly parties to
a contract and their transferees and successors can take advantage of the
Statute of Frauds." Comment b to Restatement (Second) Contracts § 324
(1981) addressing the "Mode of Assignment in General," states that
assignments required to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds generally may
not be enforced:

against an assignor unless there is a memorandum in
writing or some substitute formality, but under the rule
stated in § 144 of this Restatement they cannot ordinarily
be asserted by third persons, including the obligor of an
assigned right. Notwithstanding non-compliance with the
Statute, therefore, the assignment is effective against the
obligor. Moreover, the obligor discharges his duty by
performing in accordance with the assignment, and the
assignee can keep the benefit of the performance.
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[¶11.] We do not decide this appeal on the standing issue because it has not

been properly raised. Nor do we adopt the authorities discussed in the footnote

below. Nonetheless, the standing issue bears mentioning because it highlights the

difficulty of the 1804 Store as a stranger to the purported assignment relying upon

the statute of frauds defense. "The primary purpose of the statute of frauds is

evidentiary in nature." Northstream I, 2005 SD 61, ¶ 17, 697 NW2d at 766. The

writing requirement of the statute of frauds ensures reliable evidence is presented

before a contract obligation is enforced against one of the parties to the contract.

See SDCL 53-8-2. In this instance, the two parties to the purported assignment,

Security and Northstream, both agree that the 1804 Store loan was assigned to

Northstream on December 22, 1992. This undisputed fact, along with the writing

relied upon by Northstream, is ultimately dispositive of this appeal.

Signature Requirement

[¶12.] The Court concluded in Northstream I that the mortgage assignment

must be in writing because it involves an interest in real estate. 2005 SD 61, ¶¶ 12-

15, 697 NW2d at 765-66. The statute of frauds contained in SDCL 53-8-2 provides

that those contracts required to be in writing are not enforceable "unless the

contract or some memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to

be charged. . . ." (emphasis added). The trial court's decision seems to interpret

the statute of frauds as requiring a handwritten signature on the document. While

See also Fjelland v. Wemhoff, 249 NW2d 634, 638 (Iowa 1977) (stating that if
both parties admit the existence of an oral contract, it is irrelevant that a
stranger objects)(overruled on other grounds).
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the Court has not previously addressed the meaning of the term "subscribed" under

SDCL 53-8-2, the term is inclusive of more than a handwritten signature.

[¶13.] Courts from other jurisdictions have consistently approved of a

typewritten signature to authenticate a memorandum or contract if the party

intended the typewritten name or symbol to be his or her act authenticating the

document. Joseph Denuzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 188 F2d 569 (9th Cir 1951), cert

denied 342 US 820, 72 SCt 37, 96 LEd 620 (1951); Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CalApp3d

10, 223 CalRptr 806, 812 (1986); Irving v. Goodimate Co., 320 Mass 454, 458, 70

NE2d 414, 416 (1946); Hansen v. Hill, 215 Neb 573, 579, 340 NW2d 8, 12 (1983);

Radke v. Brenon, 271 Minn 35, 40, 134 NW2d 887, 891 (1965); Hillstrom v. Gosney,

188 Mont 388, 394, 614 P2d 466, 469 (1980); Weber v. DeCecco, 1 NJSuper 353, 356,

61 A2d 651, 653 (1948); Frohn v. Central Trust Co., 72 NE2d 303, 304 (OhioCtApp

1946); see also Restatement Contracts (Second) § 210 (1932); Restatement (Second)

Contracts § 134 (1981). "The traditional form of signature is, of course, the

handwritten name of the signer. But initials or any symbol may also be used; and

the signature may be written in pencil, typed, printed, made with a rubber stamp or

impressed into the paper." George W. Wadkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho

386, 766 P2d 1267, 1270 (IdahoCtApp 1988). "It is generally held that a

typewritten 'signature' may be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Statute

of Frauds, but only if the party intends to authenticate the instrument by that act."

Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v, First National Bank and Trust Co., 472 NW2d 748,

753 (ND 1991)(citations omitted).

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[¶14.] We hold that the term "subscribed" contained in SDCL 53-8-2 may

include a typewritten name or other symbol of authentication where the party

intends such act to be his or her signature on the document. The trial court

concluded that the corporate secretary's typewritten name "did not satisfy the

signature requirement," but made no finding whether the corporate secretary

intended the typewritten name to be her signature on the Minutes. 2

[¶15.] Marcie Nordstrom testified that she intended the typewritten name to

be her signature on the Minutes. The testimony of the other former officers and

directors of Security involved in the meeting supported her testimony. Security was

the party to be charged with the obligation to assign the 1804 Store loan to

Northstream for the purpose of the statute of frauds. Where the corporate

secretary, authorized to act on behalf of the party to be charged with the obligation,

testifies that she intended the typewritten name to be her signature and

authentication of the document, this satisfies the evidentiary purpose of the statute

of frauds as a matter of law. There is no factual issue on intent in this record and

the Minutes were subscribed by the party to be charged under SDCL 53-8-2. But

see Jerry Harmon Motors, 472 NW2d at 753, (holding by the North Dakota Supreme

Court that a factual issue on intent existed for the jury where the party to be

2. The trial court placed reliance upon the corporate secretary's testimony that
she customarily hand signed the Minutes of the prior directors meeting after
their approval at the next meeting. She testified that she did not hand sign
the Minutes here because there were no further meetings after the Minutes.
It is noteworthy that the corporate Minutes introduced into evidence that
were hand signed in the past all had a line for the signature above the
typewritten name. The Minutes do not have such a line above the
typewritten name.
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charged disputed that a corporate officer's typewritten name below a signature line

was intended to be his signature).

Present Intent to Assign the Loan

[¶16.] The trial court found that the "Minutes do not demonstrate clear

evidence of a present intent to assign the 1804 Store loan." The Court stated in

Northstream I that "it must be clear that the party intended a present transfer of

rights and did not merely bind himself to make a future transfer." 2005 SD 61,

¶ 15, 697 NW2d at 766. "Typically, any language, however informal, will be

sufficient to show the intent of the assignor." Id. The Court in Northstream I

determined from the Minutes that an ambiguity or fact question existed concerning

"whether Security Bank's Board of Directors intended their action to be a present

assignment of their interest, or a statement merely authorizing the assignment to

be carried out at a later date." Id. ¶ 20. Because there was absence from the record

of "any testimony as to the intent of the [directors]" the Court remanded the case for

such evidence to be received and considered. Id.

[¶17.] We have held that where a contract is uncertain or ambiguous, parol or

extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the parties' intent. Kling v. Stern,

2007 SD 51, ¶ 8, 733 NW2d 615, 618; Hanks v. Corson County Board of County

Commissioners, 2007 SD 10, ¶ 10, 727 NW2d 296, 301 (quoting Pauley v. Simonson,

2006 SD 73, ¶ 8, 720 NW2d 665, 668 (citing Jensen v. Pure Plant Food Intern., Ltd.,

274 NW2d 261, 263-264 (SD 1979))). The trial court received parol evidence

consistent with the directive in Northstream I, but did not consider this

uncontroverted testimony on the issue of the intent to assign.

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[¶18.] This evidence shows that December 22 was the final meeting of

Security's directors. Security's directors intended and believed the remaining

assets, including the 1804 Store loan, were assigned from Security to Northstream

at the meeting. Following this meeting, the attorney handling Security's

liquidation sent Nordstrom a letter on January 15, 1993, stating, "I understand you

have completed the transfer of all of the assets of the Bank to the Bank's

shareholders. . . ." This letter directs Nordstrom to send the final report of

Security's liquidation to the Comptroller of the Currency. Nordstrom sent the final

report of liquidation to the Comptroller of the Currency, along with the Bank's

original charter, on January 21, 1993. The final report of liquidation, signed by

Nordstrom as being true and correct, represented that Security had no remaining

assets.

[¶19.] The 1804 Store presented no evidence to dispute this testimony. Wald

testified that he questioned whether an assignment was made to Northstream.

However, the 1804 Store began making monthly payments to Northstream after

being advised that the loan was transferred to Northstream. The 1804 Store

continued to do so for more than six years until the default occurred.

[¶20.] The trial court's findings of fact on the issue of intent are subject to the

clearly erroneous standard of review. Under clearly erroneous review, "[w]e will

overturn the trial court's findings of fact on appeal only when a complete review of

the evidence leaves the Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been made." Hanks, 2007 SD 10, ¶ 9, 727 NW2d at 301. In Hanks, we upheld the

trial court's interpretation of an ambiguous contract where the trial court "properly

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considered the contract language together with extrinsic evidence to determine the

intended scope of the agreement." Id. ¶ 10.

[¶21.] In its memorandum opinion incorporated into the findings of fact and

conclusions of law, the trial court stated that it believed testimony that Security's

directors intended to transfer the remaining assets from Security to Northstream at

the December 22, 1992 meeting. However, the trial court rejected this extrinsic

evidence stating that this "intent must be expressed in writing, which it is not."

The trial court's failure to consider the extrinsic evidence was contrary to the

Court's direction in Northstream I to consider testimony as to the intent of the

directors of Security at the December 22, 1992 meeting.

[¶22.] The Minutes provide satisfactory written evidence under the statute of

frauds to show that Security intended to assign its remaining assets to

Northstream. The undisputed testimony, which the trial court believed, clearly

shows that Security had a present intent at the December 22, 1992 meeting to make

an assignment to Northstream. We are convinced on this record that the trial court

was clearly erroneous in determining otherwise.

Sufficiency of the description of the subject matter

[¶23.] The language of an assignment must "describe the subject matter of

the assignment." Northstream I, 2005 SD 61, ¶ 15, 697 NW2d at 766. The Minutes

provide only a general description of the subject matter of the assignment. The

description consists of the "remaining assets of Security." The trial court found that

the Minutes did not "describe any asset to be assigned or the subject matter of the

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assignment" and concluded that "the remaining assets" language did not satisfy the

statute of frauds.

[¶24.] The weight of authorities suggest that the statute of frauds does not

render a general written description of the subject matter of an assignment

unenforceable where the more specific description is proved through extrinsic

evidence. The description of the subject matter of an assignment "need not be done

with any greater particularity than is actually necessary, with the aid of

surrounding circumstances." 6 AmJur2d Assignments § 117. The sufficiency of the

description of the subject matter of the assignment "var[ies] to some extent with the

facts of an individual case[,]" if the description is sufficiently definite that, "armed

with it and aided by competent extraneous evidence, parol or otherwise, the

property covered may with certainty be identified, the description is sufficient."

Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. A.M. Cameron Co., 212 F2d 484, 485

(1954). However, if the description is "so inherently vague and indefinite" that this

may not be done then extraneous evidence will not "supply the deficiency." Id.

[¶25.] This is consistent with our case law allowing parol evidence to provide

the specific description of the subject matter of a contract required to be in writing.

"A general description of the land which is the subject matter of the contract is

sufficient, and parol evidence may be admitted to provide the more particular

description." Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 2001 SD 33, ¶ 15, 623 NW2d 84, 89 (citing

Amdahl v. Lowe, 471 NW2d 771, 775 (SD 1991)). The Jacobson court further

stated:

The agreement itself need not be the writing relied upon,
a memorandum evidencing the obligation is sufficient.

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SDCL 53-8-2. 'The memorandum serves to furnish
written evidence of the obligation to be enforced against
the party who subscribes his name to the memorandum;
that is, a memorandum is not required to make a contract
but merely to evidence in writing that a contract has been
entered into.' The memorandum need not embody the
exact terms of the contract; 'it is sufficient that the
substance of a contract for the purchase of real property is
inferred from the writing[.]'

Id. (citing Wiggins v. Shewmake, 374 NW2d 111, 114 (SD 1985)).

[¶26.] The Minutes evidence that Security was assigning all its assets to

Northstream. The testimony at trial was undisputed that Security and

Northstream both understood that these assets included the loans which were not

sold to First National, including the 1804 Store loan. This evidence satisfies both

the statute of frauds and the requirement for a valid assignment to adequately

describe the subject matter of the assignment. "There is no fatal ambiguity if the

contract terms are sufficiently certain to make the acts required of each party

clearly ascertainable." Amdahl, 471 NW2d at 775.

[¶27.] The trial court erred in its legal conclusion that the Minutes failed to

"adequately describe the subject matter" of the assignment. Further, there are no

disputed facts as to the specific assets assigned to Northstream to create any issue

of fact, and Northstream is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue.

CONCLUSION

[¶28.] Northstream I stated that on remand the record should be developed

on the issue of the notice of assignment to the 1804 Store. The issue of the notice of

assignment to the 1804 Store is not directly raised by either party on this appeal,

but the trial court's findings and the record show that notice was provided to the

1804 Store, albeit both belated and informal. In Northstream I, the Court stated
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that "no special form of notice is required; any notice is adequate, even if not

formally given." 2005 SD 61, ¶ 18, 697 NW2d at 767. The record establishes the

requisite notice for an assignment and that the 1804 Store loan was assigned to

Northstream. Accordingly, Northstream has a right to enforce the loan against the

1804 Store.

[¶29.] We reverse the dismissal of this action by the trial court and remand

for entry of a judgment in favor of Northstream consistent with its claim for relief

and the evidence presented at trial.

[¶30.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP and

MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.

[¶31.] JENSEN, Circuit Judge, for ZINTER, Justice, disqualified.

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