IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-50709
JOHN DOE, as Next Friend of
Jane Doe, a Child,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HILLSBORO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT, ET AL.,
Defendants,
LARRY ZABCIK, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
April 23, 1996
Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges:
WIENER, Circuit Judge:
After his daughter was assaulted and raped by a Hillsboro
(Texas) Middle School (School) custodian, Plaintiff-Appellee John
Doe (Doe), on behalf of his minor child, Jane Doe (Jane), brought
this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 19721 against Defendants-Appellants Hillsboro
Independent School District (District), as well as its board
members, its supervisor, and the School's maintenance staff
manager, individually. Doe alleged, inter alia, that the District
and the individual defendants (School Officials) hired convicted
criminals and then failed to supervise them adequately. These acts
and omissions, concludes Doe, caused a deprivation of the
constitutional rights of his minor daughter, Jane. The School
OfficialsSQbut not the DistrictSQfiled a motion2 seeking dismissal
for failure to state a claim and, in connection with the § 1983
claims, based on qualified immunity as well. The district court
denied the motion. We dismiss in part; affirm in part; and reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. INTRODUCTION
Doe filed this lawsuit, as next friend of Jane, asserting
§ 1983 and Title IX claims against the District,3 and only § 1983
1
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88.
2
The District was not a party to this motion and is not a
party to this appeal.
3
Title IX reads in pertinent part, as follows:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
2
claims against (1) the District's board members;4 (2) Billy
Sullins, its manager of the Transportation and Maintenance
Department (Manager); and (3) Leon Murdoch, its Superintendent
(Superintendent). In his First Amended Complaint, Doe alleged
facts which, at this early stage in the litigation, we must accept
as true.5
B. THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT
At the time of the relevant events, Jane was 13 years old and
a student at the School. In May 1993 at her teacher's behest, Jane
remained after school for additional academic work. Jane perceived
that she would benefit from this additional work and felt
"compelled to stay after school pursuant to the actual or apparent
(and perceived) authority of her instructors." Jane's after-school
studies were interrupted by her teacher who asked Jane to go
upstairs and retrieve some additional supplies.
During this errand, a male custodian (Custodian) employed by
the District, chased Jane into an empty classroom, locked the
classroom door, and proceeded to assault and rape her. Jane did
not disclose these events to anyone until Christmas, when her
parents demanded that she explain her physical condition: Jane, it
seems, was pregnant. The family went to the police who arrested
4
The members of the Board include Larry Zabcik, James Maass,
Teresa Davis, Carol Beyer, Roy Young, Norman Baker, Richard Sewall.
5
This appeal involves the review of a denial of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. All
well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true and viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Campbell v. City of San Antonio,
43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995).
3
the Custodian. Shortly after his arrest, the Custodian pleaded
guilty to rape.
Even though Texas law requires school districts to investigate
the criminal record of each prospective employee,6 the School
Officials did not investigate the criminal histories of any of its
prospective employees.7 In 1993, the school year in question, at
least one-third of the School's maintenance staff (Staff) had
criminal records. The criminal records of the Staff included
convictions for murder, armed robbery, unlawful weapons possession,
multiple DWIs, drug offenses, failure to ID a fugitive, and cruelty
to animals. The Custodian had a criminal record prior to pleading
guilty to raping Jane, although the precise contents of his record
were unknown at the time the complaint was drafted and filed.
Additionally, during the 1993 school year, the School
Officials received reports that members of the Staff had sexually
abused students at the School. These reports included incidents of
6
The Texas Education Code reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(a) A school district shall obtain criminal history
record information that relates to an applicant to
whom an offer of employment is being considered by
the district . . . .
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.917 (West 1987 & 1995 Supp.)
7
Doe also alleges, in the alternative, that if the Defendants
did check the criminal histories of prospective employees, then
they were deliberately indifferent in hiring known criminals for
the maintenance staff in a middle school. As we review the facts
alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to Doe, we
will assume for the purposes of this appeal that the Defendants
failed altogether to investigate the criminal histories of
prospective employees.
4
"fondling students, voyeurism, and the like." The School Officials
neither verified nor investigated these reports; instead, the Staff
was told to "stay away from the little white girls."
In his complaint, Doe contends that both the inadequate hiring
procedures and the failure to investigate reports of sexual abuse
demonstrate the School Officials' deliberate indifference to Jane's
constitutional rights. Doe concludes that, as a direct result of
the School Officials' acts and omissions, Jane's constitutional
right to bodily integrity was violated: The Custodian, an
unsupervised criminal with the keys to the schoolhouse, had raped
her.
C. THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS
The School Officials (but not the District) responded by
filing motions, under Rule 12(b)(6), requesting the court to
dismiss Jane's Title IX and § 1983 claims. The district court
dismissed Doe's initial complaint without prejudice, but suggested
that he refile his complaint to allege (if possible) that Jane's
assailant had a criminal record. Following the court's suggestion,
Doe amended his complaint to contain allegations that the Custodian
had a criminal record, albeit the details of that record were not
specified.
The School Officials renewed their motions to dismiss all of
Doe's claims. The district court denied the renewed motion to
dismiss the § 1983 claim, stating that "the Court is persuaded
Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for relief." The court
neither commented nor ruled on the Title IX claim. The School
5
Officials timely filed this interlocutory appeal.
II
DISCUSSION
A. JURISDICTION
Before addressing the pleadings complained of in this appeal,
we examine the basis for our jurisdiction.8 On appeal, the School
Officials challenge two aspects of the district court's order:
First, they insist that "this Court must dismiss the Title IX
claims . . . ." In like manner, they contend that the § 1983
claims against them should have been dismissed, based on qualified
immunity. We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to review
any aspect of Jane's Title IX claim; however, we do have
jurisdiction to review the "purely legal" aspects of Jane's § 1983
claim to the extent of the pleadings in Doe's complaints.
1. Title IX Claim
The district court does not appear to have ruled on the School
Officials' motion to dismiss Jane's Title IX claim against them.
The apparent reason for not ruling is that, despite the fact that
Doe never asserted a Title IX claim against the School Officials,9
8
Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir.1987) ("This
Court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction, on its own
motion, if necessary.").
9
Doe has asserted a Title IX claim against the District only.
See Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992)
(holding that Title IX affords the full range of remedies to
plaintiff's suing a school system receiving federal funds). He has
not asserted a Title IX claim against the School Officials in their
individual capacities. Although we have yet to address the issue,
the district courts in this circuit have held that a Title IX claim
may not be asserted against an individual. See Leija v. Cantuillo
Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F.Supp. 947, 953 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Bowers v.
6
they alone moved to dismiss "the Title IX claim against them." In
response, the district court neither granted nor denied their
motion--presumably, it simply ignored the Title IX motion.
Believing erroneously that their motion to dismiss the putative
Title IX claim against them had been denied, the School Officials
appealed to us, insisting that the district court should have
granted that motion. Even though the district court properly
ignored his issue, we address it in the interest of clarity.
As a general matter, we do not have interlocutory jurisdiction
over denials of motions to dismiss: Such pretrial orders are not
"final decisions" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.10 Even if
we assume arguendo that the district court's failure to comment on
the Title IX claim constituted a denial of the School Officials'
motion, we would not have jurisdiction to review such non-final
pretrial orders in the Title IX context.
Baylor University, 862 F.Supp 142, 145-46 (W.D. Tex. 1994)(citing
Doe By And Through Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F.Supp 1560
(N.D.Cal. 1993)); see also Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community
College, 1994 WL 663596, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 1994)("[T]he Court
concludes that an action for individual liability cannot be brought
pursuant to Title IX . . . .); Seamons v. Snow, 1994 WL 560448, at
*3 (N.D. Utah 1994)("Although the Supreme Court has found that
Title IX provides a damages remedy, that remedy is available only
when the suit is brought against an 'education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance,' not in suits against
individuals."(citations omitted)). Moreover, nothing in Jane's
complaint suggests that she is asserting a Title IX violation
against the School Officials through § 1983.
10
See Sorey v. Kellett, 849 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir. 1988)
("Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals have jurisdiction
over 'final decisions' of the district courts. Ordinarily, this
section precludes review of a district court's pretrial orders
until appeal from the final judgment.").
7
Additionally, even if we were to take the next step and assume
further that we have interlocutory jurisdiction to review such an
order in the Title IX context, we would still lack personal
jurisdiction over the relevant party. The only party against whom
Jane has asserted a claim under Title IX is the District, but the
District is not a party to this appeal. Obviously we cannot
dismiss a claim against a party who has not appealed. Thus, we
hold that we lack appellate jurisdiction over both the Title IX
issue and the District as the relevant party. In so doing,
however, we neither express nor imply an opinion on the sufficiency
of Doe's Title IX complaint against the District; we simply dismiss
the Title IX facet of this appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction and remand this particular claim for further
proceedings.
2. Section 1983 Claims
Jane's § 1983 claims are another matter altogether. In
Mitchell v. Forsyth,11 the Supreme Court held that "a district
court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that
it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision'
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence
of a final judgment."12 Recently, in Johnson v. Jones,13 the Supreme
11
472 U.S. 511 (1985).
12
Id. at 530; see also Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 918 (5th
Cir. 1995) ("An appellate court has jurisdiction to review an
interlocutory denial of qualified immunity only to the extent that
it 'turns on an issue of law.' " (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at
530)).
In Mitchell, the Court held that a district court's order
denying a defendant's motion for summary judgment was an
8
Court made clear that our interlocutory jurisdiction under Mitchell
begins and ends with the "purely legal" aspects of qualified
immunity.14 In Johnson, the Supreme Court reiterated the dichotomy
in the grounds for denying a motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity: "(a) a determination about pre-existing
'clearly established' law, or (b) a determination about 'genuine'
issues of fact for trial."15 The Court then held that we have
jurisdiction over the former, a purely-law-based denial of
qualified immunity, but that we have no jurisdiction over the
latter, a genuine-issue-of-fact-based denial of qualified
immunity.16
Unlike Johnson, which was reviewed at the summary judgment-
level, the instant case involves the complaint-level denial of a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In the Rule 12(b)(6)
context, there can never be a genuine-issue-of-fact-based denial of
qualified immunity, as we must assume that the plaintiff's factual
immediately appealable collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., where (1) the defendant was a public official
asserting a defense of immunity, and (2) the issue appealed
concerned whether or not certain given facts showed a violation of
clearly established law. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528.
13
Johnson v. Jones, 115 S.Ct. 2151 (1995).
14
Id. at 2156 (holding that "a defendant, entitled to invoke
a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's
summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or
not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for
trial")(emphasis added).
15
Id. at 2158.
16
Id. at 2159.
9
allegations are true.17 Thus, denials of motions to dismiss on the
basis of qualified immunity are always "purely legal" denials.18
Accordingly, under Mitchell and Johnson, we have interlocutory
jurisdiction to determine whether Jane has stated a claim under
§ 1983. And, if so, whether it is immune to dismissal at this
stage on grounds of qualified immunity.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court's ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is subject
to de novo review.19 A motion to dismiss requires the court to test
the formal sufficiency of the statement of the claim for relief.20
All well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true and viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.21 The issue is not whether
a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether he is entitled to
offer evidence to support his claims. Accordingly, we will not
dismiss a complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
17
See Campbell, 43 F.3d at 975.
18
Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep Sch. Dst., 817 F.2d 303, 304 (5th
Cir. 1987)(holding that the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss based on qualified immunity "poses solely a question of law
. . . .").
19
Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 189 (1994); Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police
Dept., 958 F.2d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1992).
20
5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
And Procedure § 1356, at 294 (1990).
21
Campbell, 43 F.3d at 975.
10
would entitle him to relief.22
C. ELLIOTT V. PEREZ AND THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING REQUIREMENT
Before turning to the sufficiency of Doe's complaint, we must
determine whether any statements therein should be excluded as
conclusionary. The School Officials assert that Doe's complaint is
"a paragon of poetic license" and fails to satisfy the heightened
pleading requirement of Elliott v. Perez.23 We disagree.
The School Officials speciously "cherry pick" paragraphs from
Doe's complaint to quote to us, then assert that the whole
complaint is conclusionary. When examined in isolation, the
particular paragraphs selectively quoted by the School Officials do
appear conclusionary; but when those quoted paragraphs are read in
pari materiae with the factual allegations contained in the
preceding dozen-plus paragraphs of Doe's complaint, it becomes
obvious that the School Officials have self-servingly quoted only
parts of the complaint. In short, the quoted paragraphs do not
fairly represent the complaint as a whole. We conclude that when
Doe's complaint is read in its entirety it is seen to plead Jane's
claims with more than enough particularity to meet the requirements
set forth in Elliott.
22
Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th
Cir. 1994).
23
751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985)(the complaint must "state with
factual detail an particularity the basis for the claim which
necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully
maintain the defense of immunity."). A majority of the Fifth
Circuit has held that the heightened pleading of Elliott survived
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). See Schultea v. Wood, 47
F.3d 1427, 1430 (5th Cir. 1995)(en banc).
11
D. HAS DOE STATED A CLAIM UNDER § 1983?
To state a claim under § 1983, "a plaintiff must (1) allege a
violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law."24 The
District's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, only the
first prong is at issue in this appeal.25 At the Rule 12(b)(6)
level our sole question is whether Doe has alleged a violation of
a right secured by the Constitution.
E. JANE'S RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY
In this circuit, "a supervisory school official can be held
personally liable for a subordinate's violation of an elementary or
secondary school student's constitutional right to bodily integrity
in a physical sexual abuse case," when "the official, by action or
inaction, demonstrates a deliberate indifference to [a student's]
24
Leffall, 28 F.3d at 525 (citations omitted); accord Resident
Council of Allen Parkway Village v. United States Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 980 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
75 (1993).
25
The School Officials insist that the "under color of state
law" element is lacking because either (1) the Custodian did not
act "under color of state law" or (2) because none of the School
Officials actually participated in the rape. Neither of these
contentions has merit. First, the Custodian, a state employee who
was "on the clock" when he raped Doe at the School was a state
actor. Second, the School Officials' hiring policies as well as
their supervisory actions and decisions are "under color of state
law." An official's actions do not cease to be under color of
state law merely because the official acts beyond the scope of the
authority granted by state law. See United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 326 (1941) ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law, is taken 'under color of' state
law.").
12
constitutional rights that results in the molestation of school
children."26 In the complaint, Doe alleges two factually distinct
but legally related claims under § 1983: First, Doe contends that
the School Officials' inadequate hiring procedures--failing to
check criminal histories of prospective Staff employees--led them
to hire criminals, one of whom caused Jane's injuries. Second, Doe
alleges the School Officials' failure to supervise the custodial
staff--ignoring repeated reports that members of the Staff were
sexually abusing school children--led to additional sexual abuse,
specifically Jane's being raped by the Custodian. We will analyze
the elements of each of these types of claims to determine whether,
as a formal matter of pleading, Doe has alleged in his complaint
facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
1. The Hiring Policy: Inadequate?
To prove that a hiring policy violated her rights under
§ 1983, Jane must show that (1) the hiring procedures were
inadequate; (2) the school officials were deliberately indifferent
in adopting the hiring policy; and (3) the inadequate hiring
policy directly caused the plaintiff's injury.27 With the awareness
that stating a claim and proving it present substantially different
tasks, we hold that Doe has stated a claim that the School
Officials' hiring policies and procedures were inadequate and
26
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir.
1994)(en banc), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 70 (1995).
27
Benavides v. County of Wilson, 955 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir.)
(citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 79 (1992).
13
caused a violation of Doe's constitutional rights.
First, Doe's allegations that the School Officials failed to
investigate the criminal records of prospective employees satisfies
the inadequacy element. Common sense recommendsSQand state law
demandsSQthat, in the interest of the safety of school children,
school officials investigate the criminal histories of prospective
school employees.28 The School Officials' total abdication of this
responsibility constitutes a facially inadequate hiring process.
Second, the hiring inadequacies alleged here reveal a
deliberate indifference to Doe's welfare. A hiring process
demonstrates "deliberate indifference," when it constitutes such
recklessness or gross negligence as to amount to conscious
indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.29 The School
Officials cite two cases for the proposition that, at most, their
hiring procedures represent merely negligent hiring practices.30
The School Officials, however, disregard, or at least overlook, the
following footnote in one of those cases:
[I]f a section 1983 claim may arise from egregious hiring
practices . . . we would . . . require a plaintiff to
establish actual knowledge of the seriously deficient
character of an applicant or a persistent, widespread
28
See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.917.
29
See Wassum v. City of Bellaire, Tex., 861 F.2d 453, 456 (5th
Cir. 1988).
30
See Stokes v. Bullins, 844 F.2d 269 (5th Cir.
1988)(questioning prospective police officer on background and
checking local criminal record, but not ordering a National Crime
Center Information Report, was not deliberate indifference in the
hiring process); Wassum, 861 F.2d at 456 (failure to check
employment record for more than five years amounted to negligence,
not deliberate indifference in the hiring process).
14
pattern of hiring policemen, for instance, with a
background of unjustified violence.31
Just as the histories of prospective police officers must be
scrutinized routinely for violence or unlawful conduct in the
interest of the public's safety, the criminal histories of
prospective school employees must be scrutinized in the interest of
students' safety.
Doe has alleged that one-third of the School's Staff in 1993
were convicted criminals, many of them violent criminals. Surely
the District's hiring and giving the schoolhouse keys to even one
convicted murderer constitutes the hiring of an applicant with
"seriously deficient character." When that is multiplied to the
point that a significant fraction of the custodial staffSQhere,
one-thirdSQconsists of convicted criminals, "a persistent,
widespread pattern" of hiring school employees with a background of
crime and violence is manifested. Doe has satisfied the second
element of his hiring claim.
Third, a jury could reasonably conclude that when school
officials hire a staff, one-third of whom are violent criminals,
give those criminals the keys to the schoolhouse, and place them in
constant contact with students, there is a "real nexus" nexus
between the hiring of these criminals-cum-custodians and the
constitutional injuries suffered by victims like Jane.32 We
31
Stokes 844 F.2d at 275 n.9 (emphasis added); see also
Wassum, 861 F.2d at 456 (quoting this passage with approval).
See Doe v. Raines Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1407-08
(5th Cir. 1995).
15
conclude that Doe has alleged a sufficient causal connection
between the hiring process and Jane's injuries to defeat a motion
to dismiss.
In sum, the egregious nature of the criminal records alleged,
and the sheer number of Staff members alleged to have criminal
records, move Jane's inadequate hiring claim beyond mere negligence
and into the realm of a constitutional tort. Although surviving
summary judgment, much less proving these allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence, may be a daunting task, we cannot
say "that it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to
relief."33
2. Supervision: Deliberate Indifference?
To plead a valid failure-to-supervise claim, Doe must allege
facts sufficient to present the following elements: (1) the
defendants learned of facts or a pattern of inappropriate sexual
behavior by subordinates pointing plainly toward the conclusion
that the subordinates were sexually abusing the students; (2) the
defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference toward the
constitutional rights of the student by failing to take action that
was obviously needed to prevent or stop the abuse; and (3) such
failure caused a constitutional injury to the student.34 We
conclude that Doe has alleged facts that, when accepted as true and
33
Leffall, 28 F.3d at 524.
34
See Hagan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 48, 51 (5th
Cir. 1995)(citing Taylor, 15 F.3d at 454).
16
viewed in the light most favorable to Doe, satisfy these three
elements.
First, Doe alleges that the School Officials received repeated
reports that Staff members had sexually abused students. Although
these reports do not appear to have identified individual employees
or students by name, Doe's allegations that the School Officials
responded to these reports with ostrich-like avoidance satisfies
the first element. At this early pleading stage, it is unnecessary
to produce specific names and exact dates. Doe has alleged that
the School Officials received a number of reports plainly pointing
to the inescapable conclusion that Staff members were sexually
abusing students. These allegations are sufficient to merit at
least limited discovery. After limited discovery, however, if the
evidence cannot sustain the weight of these allegations, summary
judgment presents an effective and efficient tool to terminate the
inquiry and the case at a sufficiently early and minimally
burdensome stage. Although Doe has not alleged that "X School
Official" plainly knew that "Y Staff member" was sexually abusing
"Z student," we conclude that allegations that School Officials
ignored repeated reports that Staff members sexually abused
students are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
On the second "deliberate indifference" element, Doe alleges
that the School Officials (1) knew or should have known that one-
third of the Staff members had criminal records, (2) received
reports that Staff members were sexually abusing students, and (3)
did absolutely nothing about it. Such inaction rises to the level
17
of total abdication of the duty to protect school children from
sexual abuse by state actors, and, if proved, would demonstrate
deliberate indifference to Jane's constitutional rights. Moreover,
a jury could reasonably conclude that such deliberate indifference
was the proximate cause of Jane's being raped. Accordingly, with
respect to Jane's failure-to-supervise claim, we conclude that
Doe's complaint sufficiently alleges that the School Officials
caused a deprivation of Jane's constitutional rights "under color
of state law."
3. Other Theories of Liability Only Confuse the Issue
In the process of stating the above described deficient hiring
and failure-to-supervise claims, Doe indiscriminately jumbles into
the complaint the language and elements of two other § 1983
theories of liability: (1) the state-created danger doctrine and
(2) the DeShaney35 special-relationship doctrine. As both of these
doctrines apply only when a third-party inflicts the harm, both of
these theories are legal "dead ends" here.
a. State-Created Danger Doctrine
Regarding the state-created danger theory, other circuits have
held that when a state actor knowingly places a person in danger,
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution renders such state actor
accountable for the foreseeable injuries that result from his
conduct, whether or not the victim was in formal "custody."36 In
35
DeShaney v. Winnebego County Dep't of Social Servs.,
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
36
Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist, 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1361 (1995).
18
attempting to apply this doctrine to the instant case, we encounter
two flaws: First, although at least once in the past we assumed
arguendo that such a claim is recognized in this circuit, we have
yet to recognize this theory of liability squarely.37 Second,
Jane's case does not arise under one of the factual situations in
which other circuits have applied (and we have assumed) this
doctrine. Generally, the state-created danger doctrine applies
only when the state actor creates the dangerous situation in which
a third-party causes the harm.38 In the instant case the custodian
who caused the harm was himself a state actor, not a third party,
so even assuming arguendo that the state-created danger theory were
recognized in this circuit, Doe's effort to employ the state-
created danger doctrine would fail.
b. Special Relationship Doctrine
In like manner, a special-relationship claim under DeShaney39
37
Leffall, 28 F.3d at 530 ("We have found no cases in our
circuit permitting § 1983 recovery for a substantive due process
violation predicated on a state-created danger theory . . . .");
see also Johnson 38 F.3d 198.
In Johnson, the court assumed arguendo, that such a cause of
action existed to determine whether a student, who was killed by a
stray bullet shot by a non-student during a school fight, had
stated a claim under § 1983 against the school principal and the
school district. Ultimately, the court held that these facts,
albeit tragic, are not an example of when "deliberate, callous
decisions to interpose a [student] in the midst of a criminally
dangerous environment."
38
Johnson, 38 F.3d at 201 ("[T]he environment must be
dangerous; they must know that it is dangerous; and to be liable,
they must have used their authority to create an opportunity that
would not ave otherwise for the third party's crime to
occur.")(emphasis added).
39
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
19
is applicable only to harm inflicted by third parties. In Leffall,
we stated that "[t]he special relationship doctrine is properly
invoked in cases involving harms inflicted by third parties, and it
is not applicable when it is the conduct of a state actor that has
allegedly infringed on a person's constitutional rights."40 Again,
the Custodian was a state actor; consequently, the special
relationship doctrine is unavailable to Doe.
F. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The School Officials assert that even if Doe has stated a
claim against them, they can invoke qualified immunity to require
the dismissal of Jane's § 1983 claims. We disagree. Qualified
immunity shields public officials from exposure to extensive
discovery, trial, and liability for alleged constitutional torts if
their questioned conduct does not violate clearly established law
effective at the time of the alleged tort.41 The qualified immunity
determination requires a two-step analysis: (1) whether the
plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right,42 and
(2) whether the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly
established at the time the events in question occurred.43 As the
preceding analysis demonstrates that Doe's pleadings are sufficient
40
28 F.3d at 529. (emphasis added).
41
Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1992)
(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
42
Id. at 305 (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232
(1991)).
43
Id. at 305-306 (citing Creighton v. Anderson, 483 U.S. 635,
641 (1987)).
20
to satisfy the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, we
need only address the second.
At least since 1987, the law has been clearly established that
(1) school children do have a liberty interest that is protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) physical
sexual abuse by a school employee violates that interest.44 As the
events here in question occurred in 1993, the School Officials
cannot avail themselves of the shelter of qualified immunity, at
least not at the pleadings stage. Accordingly, we affirm the order
of the district court to the extent that it held that Doe has
stated an inadequate-hiring claim and a failure-to-supervise claim
under § 1983 against the School Officials.
III
THE DISSENT
In closing, we feel constrained to address briefly our
colleague's dissent. We begin by noting his candid acknowledgment
that the roots of his disaffection run deeper than this case, i.e.,
that his larger disagreement derives from this court's en banc
holding in Taylor.45 There is little that we can say or do to
address this concern; for, as the dissent also acknowledges, Taylor
is the law in this circuit and we are bound to follow it, like it
44
Taylor, 15 F.3d at 455 ("The 'contours' of a student's
substantive due process right to be free from sexual abuse and
violations of her bodily integrity were clearly established in
1987.").
45
See Dissent, infra at -- n.2. (school children have a
constitutional right to bodily integrity and sexual abuse violates
a school child's right to bodily integrity).
21
or not.
Turning to issues that we can address today, we perceive a
fundamental error in the dissent's "state action" inquiry when it
mistakenly focuses on the rapist (Custodian), rather than on the
defendant School Officials who instituted and conducted the process
that put Doe in harm's way, in the person of the Custodian. This
circuit held as early as 1981 that "[t]he right to be free of
state-occasioned damage to a person's bodily integrity is protected
by the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process."46 By
inquiring whether rape falls within the Custodian's scope of
employment, the dissent misperceives the fundamental question that
we must address in this appeal: Was the violation of Doe's right
to bodily integrity occasioned by state action? In this opinion,
we hold nothing more than that Doe has adequately pled that the
School Officials (as distinguished from the Custodian, who is not
even a defendant in this action) acted under color of state law
when, over time and with deliberate indifference, they inadequately
hired and indifferently supervised a custodial staff one-third of
whom are criminals. We do not, as the dissent suggests by its
"parade of horribles," implySQmuch less holdSQthat "every
intentional tort committed by a state official or employee could
result in a constitutional violation, actionable under § 1983."
In this Rule 12(b)(6) appeal, we examine the pleadingsSQand
only the pleadingsSQto determine whether, by (1) ignoring state law
that mandates pre-hiring background checks, (2) hiring a custodial
46
Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981).
22
staff of whom one-third are criminals, and (3) ignoring or
suppressing prior reports of sexual molestation and other crimes by
members of that staff, the School Officials were deliberately
indifferent to Doe's constitutional right to bodily integrity.
Then, as the dissent agrees, we determine whether there was a "real
nexus" between the activity out of which the violation occurred and
the duties and obligations of the School Officials.47
We have done precisely that. The relevant activities out of
which the violations occurred were the hiring and supervision
practices of the School Officials, not the janitorial and
maintenance activities of the Custodian. The Officials' duties
comprise the hiring and supervision of the District's employees,
including the custodial staff. Thus, the correct color-of-law or
state-actor inquiry in this case is whether there was a "real
nexus" between the School Officials' hiring and supervising
practices and the violation of Doe's rights. In other words, were
the violations state-occasioned? To focus on whether the Custodian
raped Doe in the course of his employment is to follow the
proverbial red herring.
It is in the foregoing framework that we respectfully but
strongly disagree with the dissent: It is not a "far leap"SQif
indeed it is a leap at allSQfrom Taylor to hold that the hiring of
a custodial staff rife with criminals, giving them the keys to the
schoolhouse, and authorizing them to roam the halls when and where
vulnerable students are likely to be encountered, and, despite
47
Raines, 66 F.3d at 1407-08.
23
prior reports of sexual abuse, to do so in the absence of adequate
supervision, obviously does create a "real nexus" between the rape
of Doe and the deliberately indifferent performances of the School
Officials' duties and obligations.
Certainly, the set of school personnel who are potential state
actors is not so narrowly limited, as the dissent would instruct,
that it includes only classroom teachers and athletic coaches;
rather that set circumscribes the entire spectrum of school
employees, and even independent contractors, whom the School
Officials through their hiring, contracting, and supervising
responsibility, place on a collision course with public school
students. We neither hold nor imply the ludicrous conclusion that
the course and scope of a school custodian's employment could ever
include rape; we do, however, hold that when a school employee is
rightfully on the premises, during school hours, ostensibly
performing his assigned duties, andSQpredictablySQfinds himself
alone with a student, constitutional deprivations perpetrated by
that school employee on the person of that student might be found
to have occurred in the course of employment.
But, again, that simply is not the pertinent question; rather,
the question is whether the School Officials who hired and then
failed to supervise the Custodian, thereby creating the
circumstances that brought him in contact with Doe, did so under
color of state law. At this threshold pleading phase of the case,
Doe's allegations are more than sufficient to demonstrate that they
did, thereby stating a cause of action sufficient to avoid a
24
qualified immunity dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
IV
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the School Officials' interlocutory
appeal of the district court's putative refusal to dismiss Jane's
Title IX claim is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. The district
court's order denying the School Officials' motion to dismiss
Jane's § 1983 claims, however, is affirmed and those claims are
remanded for further proceedings.
DISMISSED, in part; AFFIRMED, in part; and REMANDED.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Today we are faced with yet another tragic case involving the
sexual assault of a child by a school employee. Despite the
horrific nature of this case, I dissent from the majority's holding
that the school officials are not entitled to qualified immunity.48
The question before us is not whether a school janitor should be
punished for committing rape))clearly he should. Rather, we are
confronted with the question of whether he is a state actor
pursuant to Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451-52
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 70, 130 L. Ed.
2d 25 (1994). The majority argues that it is irrelevant whether
the custodian was a state actor when he raped Jane. Instead, the
majority concludes that the school officials violated Jane's right
to bodily integrity because they "instituted and conducted the
I concur in Parts I, II. A., B., and E.3a. and b. of the majority
opinion.
-25-
process that put [Jane] in harm's way." The majority's decision
creates a new cause of action and an unwarranted expansion of Doe
v. Taylor, from which I dissent.
Doe alleges that the Hillsboro Independent School District and
several school officials are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the
violation of her right to bodily integrity under a supervisory
theory of liability. Doe v. Taylor held that "a supervisory school
official can be held personally liable for a subordinate's
violation of an elementary or secondary school student's
constitutional right to bodily integrity in a physical sexual abuse
case," when "the official, by action or inaction, demonstrates a
deliberate indifference to [a student's] constitutional rights that
results in the molestation of school children." Id. at 454. The
school officials counter that they are entitled to qualified
immunity for their actions. "The defense of qualified immunity
protects a public official from liability in the performance of his
duties unless he violates a clearly established statutory or
constitutional right of another known to or knowable by a
reasonable person." Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817
F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987). Therefore, the first step in
analyzing whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, is
to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional
violation. Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402,
1404 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 301
(5th Cir. 1994)).
Before determining whether a supervisory official can be held
liable under § 1983, we must first find that (1) a rights violation
occurred (2) under color of state law. Doe v. Rains County Indep.
Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1407 (5th Cir. 1995). Jane Doe alleges
that her Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity was
violated. She relies on our decision in Taylor, 15 F.3d 443, which
stated that "bodily integrity is necessarily violated when a state
actor sexually abuses a schoolchild." (emphasis added).49
Therefore, to state a claim under § 1983 based on a violation
Although bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, I note that the Supreme
Court has yet to rule on whether the right to bodily integrity includes the right
to be free from sexual assault. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, ___ U.S. ___,
___, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806, 127 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1994) (citing cases defining the
contours of the substantive due process right to bodily integrity). I find this
troubling because the Court has stated on several occasions that it "has always
been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and
open-ended." Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, ___, 112
S. Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1992); Albright v. Oliver, ___ U.S. ___,
___, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1994).
I also note that only one other circuit has definitively held that the
substantive due process right to bodily integrity includes the right to be free
from sexual abuse or rape. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d
720, 727 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[A] student's right to bodily integrity, under the Due
Process Clause, [encompasses] a student's right to be free from sexual assaults
by his or her teachers.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044, 110 S. Ct. 840, 107 L. Ed.
2d 835 (1990); cf. Doe By and Through Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d
1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Taylor, 15 F.3d 443 with approval but as
inapplicable to the case before the court).
Recently, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, commented on our conclusion
that the right to bodily integrity includes the right to be free from sexual
assault. The court stated:
All of these civil decisions, rather than pointing to precedent
establishing the right, make assertions such as: "surely the
Constitution protects a schoolchild from physical abuse . . . by a
public schoolteacher," Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443,
451 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); or "the notion that individuals have
a fundamental substantive due process right to bodily integrity is
beyond debate," Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir.
1995) (Parker, J., concurring). These broad statements are not
supported by precedent indicating that a general constitutional
right to be free from sexual assault is part of a more abstract
general right to "bodily integrity."
United States v. Lanier, 1996 WL 21177, *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) (en banc)
(concluding that "sexual assaults may not be prosecuted as violations of a
constitutional substantive due process right to bodily integrity" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242).
-27-
of her Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity, Jane must
establish (1) that a state actor (2) sexually abused her (3) under
color of state law. However, "in § 1983 suits alleging a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we have
collapsed the state action and color of state law inquiries into a
single" step because the inquires are identical. Rains, 66 F.3d at
1406; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929, 102 S. Ct.
2744, 2749, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982) (stating that the "color of
state law" requirement under § 1983 and the "state action"
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical). Therefore,
Jane will simply have to prove that she was deprived of her
protected liberty or property interest, here her right to bodily
integrity, under color of state law. Rains, 66 F.3d at 1406. This
will require us to determine whether the custodian was acting under
color of state law when he sexually assaulted Jane. If we find
that the custodian did not act under color of state law when he
sexually assaulted Jane, then Jane will not have been deprived of
a constitutional right, and the school officials cannot be liable
as supervisors under § 1983. See id. at 1407 ("After finding that
(1) a rights violation occurred (2) under color of state law, only
then do we ask a third and final question: Who are the state actors
responsible for the constitutional violation" other than "the
immediate perpetrator?").
The majority fails to adequately address the color of state
law requirement, despite its conclusion that Doe has alleged a
-28-
violation of a constitutional right. The majority first states
that the "color of state law" requirement is not at issue in this
appeal,50 but nevertheless, concludes that the plaintiff satisfied
the "color of state law" requirement under § 1983, because the
Custodian was a state employee who was "on the clock" when he raped
Jane Doe. Even more confusing, the majority opines that to focus
on whether the Custodian was a state actor is "to follow the
proverbial red herring." Instead, the majority concludes that once
we find that the school officials acted under color of state law,
then they are liable for violations that were proximately caused by
their actions. This has never been the law of the Fifth Circuit.
See Rains, 66 F.3d at 1407 (noting that there must be an underlying
constitutional violation before a court can consider who besides
"the immediate perpetrator" can be held liable under § 1983).
I can perceive of no difference between the majority's
analysis and that employed under the state-created danger theory,
which the majority specifically rejected in Part E.3.a.51 The
In making this assertion, the majority relies on the fact that
although the district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim and qualified immunity, only the qualified immunity defense is
subject to interlocutory appeal. Jefferson v. Ysleta Independent School Dist.,
817 F.2d 303, 304 (5th Cir. 1987). However, the majority's approach ignores the
fact that to establish a constitutional violation, Doe must prove state action
which is identical to proving "color of state law" under § 1983. Rains, 66 F.3d
at 1406.
The majority's analysis is also similar to that employed under
the special relationship theory of liability. The special relationship theory
imposes on the state "affirmative obligations of care and protection . . . when
the state "'takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his
will.'" Johnson, 38 F.3d at 202 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of
Social Serv's., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005-06, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249
(1989)). Where a special relationships exists, the state can be liable for harm
inflicted by a private party. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 S. Ct. at
-29-
state-created danger theory holds state actors liable for the
foreseeable injuries that result from their conduct when they
"knowingly place a person in danger." Johnson v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1994). To be liable under
this theory, the state actor must create a dangerous environment;
"they must know it is dangerous; and . . . they must have used
their authority to create an opportunity that would not otherwise
have existed for the third party's crime to occur. Put otherwise,
the defendants must have been at least deliberately indifferent to
the plight of the plaintiff." Id. at 201. The Fifth Circuit has
not "yet predicated relief on a state-created danger theory."
Johnson, 38 F.3d at 201.
In this case, the majority concludes that because the school
officials were deliberately indifferent in instituting and
conducting the process that "put Doe in harm's way," they are
liable for her injuries under § 1983. In reaching this conclusion,
1005-06 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 73 L. Ed. 2d
28 (1982) as holding that Fourteenth Amendment requires state to use reasonable
measures to protect involuntarily committed mental patients from themselves and
others). The majority explicitly rejects the special relationship theory in this
case, stating that the doctrine only applies in cases where third parties inflict
the harm. Since the custodian was a state actor, the majority concludes, the
special relationship theory is not applicable in this case. However, as
indicated earlier, this conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the majority's
assertion in Part III that "In this opinion, we hold nothing more than that Doe
has adequately pled that the School Officials (as distinguished from the
Custodian, who is not even a defendant in this action) acted under color of state
law." To the extent that the majority opinion does not hold that the custodian
was a state actor or acting under color of state law, yet the state is still
liable for the harm he inflicted, this is similar to the duty of care and
protection required in special relationship cases. However, this is disturbing
since neither the Fifth Circuit nor the majority opinion has ever held that a
special relationship exists between the state and public school students.
Johnson, 38 F.3d at 2003; see also Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1305 (5th
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that there is no "special relationship" when a
student voluntarily resides at a state school).
-30-
the majority focuses on the dangerous environment that the school
officials were deliberately indifferent in creating. The majority
alleges that the officials created this environment by inadequately
hiring and indifferently supervising a custodial staff one-third of
whom were criminals, "giving them the keys to the schoolhouse, and
authorizing them to roam the halls when and where vulnerable
students are likely to be encountered, and despite prior reports of
sexual abuse, to do so in the absence of adequate supervision."
Given this dangerous environment, the majority concludes that there
is "obviously" a "'real nexus' between the rape of Doe and the
deliberately indifferent performances of the School Officials'
duties and obligations." According to the majority, the school
officials, therefore, acted under color of state law and are liable
under § 1983 for the harm that Doe suffered regardless of whether
the person who raped her was a state actor. The majority, in
essence, concludes that the school officials, not the custodian,
violated Jane's right to bodily integrity.
This interpretation is a complete abrogation of Doe v. Taylor.
On the one hand, the majority accepts Taylor's bodily integrity
theory, but on the other hand, it rejects the premise))that to
constitute a constitutional violation, it must be an employee state
actor who sexually assaults the student. Taylor specifically found
that the Taylor Doe's right to bodily integrity was violated by a
person acting under color of state law. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 452
n.4. The court stated that a "real nexus" existed between the
-31-
teacher's duties and obligations as a teacher and the activity out
of which the violation occurred. Id. It was only after the court
established that Doe had suffered a violation of her right to
bodily integrity by a person acting under color of state law, the
teacher/coach, that the court proceeded to address which, if any,
supervisory officials could also be liable to Doe under § 1983.
The majority today skips this first step, implicitly creating a new
cause of action similar to the state-created danger theory.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on this issue
and would hold that because the custodian was not a state actor
when he raped Jane, there is no underlying constitutional violation
for which to hold the supervisory officials liable under § 1983.
Not all unlawful actions taken by state officials are taken under
color of law. When acting pursuant to a general grant of
authority, a state official acts under "color of state law" either
when he acts within that general grant of authority or when he
exceeds the general grant of authority given. See id. at 485
(Garza, J. dissenting) (citing relevant case law). However, a
state official does not act under "color of state law" when he acts
in the complete absence of any authority. Id.; see Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961) (searches of
homes); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.) (classroom
discipline), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S. Ct. 279, 112 L. Ed.
2d 233 (1990); see also Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430,
433-38, 24 S. Ct. 502, 503, 48 L. Ed. 737 (1904) (holding that
-32-
there is no state action when the offending act was not authorized
by the state and was forbidden by the state legislature).
The Supreme Court has employed different standards for
determining state action, but has emphasized that it is necessarily
a fact intensive inquiry. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939, 102 S. Ct. at
2755. In determining state action and color of state law in the
context of public schools, federal courts have focused on whether
there was a "real nexus" between the school employee's duties and
obligations to the school and the activity out of which the
violation occurs. Rains, 66 F.3d at 1406-07; Taylor, 15 F.3d at
452 n.4; D.T. by M.T. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176,
1188 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879, 111 S. Ct. 213, 112
L. Ed. 2d 172 (1990). It is a far leap from the school teacher in
Taylor, who used his position and authority as a teacher to
sexually abuse a student, to a custodian who, lacking any authority
over the students, commits an atrocious crime on the school
premises. In Taylor, the school district established the
relationship between the teacher and the student which the teacher
used to coerce the Taylor Doe into having sexual relations with
him. See Taylor, 15 F.3d at 452 n.4 (describing ways in which
teacher/coach used his position to effectuate the sexual assault);
id. at 461-62 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (explaining why the
teacher's actions were under color of state law). In this case,
the school district did not establish a relationship between the
custodian and Jane Doe which he was able to use to sexually assault
-33-
her. The school district neither placed the custodian in a
position of authority over Doe, nor did the district grant him any
official influence over her that he could use to coerce her into
having sexual relations with him. In raping Jane Doe, the
custodian committed an act of violence which was completely outside
the scope of any authority he may have held in his position as a
custodian at the school. Despite the fact that the custodian may
have been legitimately on the school premises, nothing about the
crime that he committed bore any relation to his status as a state
employee.
If the custodian's actions constitute state action, then every
intentional tort or criminal act committed by a state official or
employee could result in a constitutional violation, actionable
under § 1983. The Supreme Court has rejected this approach. See
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 1917, 68 L.
Ed. 2d 420 (1981) (concluding that the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not intend the Amendment to be "'a font of tort law
to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be
administered by the States'") (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
701, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1160, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976)); Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433
(1979) ("Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights
protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care
arising out of tort law."). By shifting the focus from the
individual state actor to the supervisory officials, the majority
-34-
has made the school officials liable for private conduct that
proximately results from the officials' actions. The Supreme Court
has also rejected this approach. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197,
109 S. Ct. at 1004, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (stating that "a State's
failure to protect an individual against private violence simply
does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause").
Because the actions of the custodian in this case fall
completely outside of the scope of his employment with the school
district, and are proscribed by the state of Texas, I would hold
that the custodian was not a state actor when he raped Doe.
Therefore, Doe has not alleged a constitutional violation, and the
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.52
For the foregoing reasons, I would also dissent from the majority's
opinion in Part II. C holding that Doe's amended complaint meets the heightened
pleading requirement of Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985). The
complaint states that the custodian was a state actor because he was a school
employee and because he was able to accomplish the assault solely because of the
actions and omissions of the School Officials. This does not constitute
"detailed facts supporting the contention that the plea of immunity cannot be
sustained." Id. at 1482. I would therefore hold that Doe also failed to satisfy
the heightened pleading requirement, and thus that her complaint should be
dismissed.
-35-