#24409-rev & rem-JKK
2007 SD 70
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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COUNTRYSIDE SOUTH
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CRAIG NEDVED, Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
* * * *
HONORABLE A. P. FULLER
Judge
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JASON M. SMILEY of
Gunderson, Palmer, Goodsell &
Nelson Attorneys for plaintiff
Rapid City, South Dakota and appellee.
RICHARD E. HUFFMAN
MICHAEL V. WHEELER of
DeMersseman Jensen Christianson
Stanton & Huffman, LLP Attorneys for defendant
Rapid City, South Dakota and appellant.
* * * *
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
ON MAY 21, 2007
OPINION FILED 07/11/07
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KONENKAMP, Justice
[¶1.] A homeowner sought to build a storage shed in a community governed
by restrictive covenants. His request was denied, not because the proposed shed
violated any specific provision of the covenants, but because it violated size
limitation rules enacted by the homeowners’ association committee. In circuit court,
the decision was upheld and an injunction was issued. Because the committee
exceeded its powers when it adopted the new rules and denied the homeowner’s
request based solely on those rules, we reverse and remand.
Background
[¶2.] Craig Nedved purchased a home on April 30, 1996. The home is
located in the Countryside South Subdivision, Pennington County, South Dakota.
On March 18, 1994, the Countryside South Homeowners Association, Inc.
(Association) adopted the “Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions,
Countryside South Subdivision” (Covenants). They were recorded on April 4, 1994,
with the Pennington County Register of Deeds. At some point after Nedved
purchased his home, the Association’s Architectural Control Committee
(Committee) adopted its “Architectural Control Committee Additional Rules,
Regulations and Guidelines” (Rules and Regulations). These Rules and Regulations
state that they apply to Article VII of the Covenants. They were adopted “to provide
the Architectural Control Committee and Homeowners additional information and
guidelines regarding interpretation of the covenants.”
[¶3.] The rule pertinent to this case provides:
Several homeowners have requested approval of yard sheds.
The covenants provide little in the way of guidance to the
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Architectural Control Committee and homeowners regarding
sheds. Sheds shall not exceed a footprint dimension of 10’ x 12’.
The finish and roof [sic] the shed shall be consistent with the
color, style and materials used on the home. The walls shall not
exceed 7’ in height and the shed shall have a typical 4/12 pitch in
the roof. All sheds constructed prior to August 15, 1999 have
been approved and are hereby grandfathered.
Nothing in these rules indicates when they were adopted.
[¶4.] On February 28, 2006, Nedved submitted a request to the Committee
to build an L-shaped 16’x18’ shed on his property. The minutes from the committee
meeting state that “[t]he Board immediately took the position that the size of [the]
structure was not in compliance with the covenants of the development. . . . It
would not be approved unless modifications were made to his proposal to bring the
size . . . into compliance with established guidelines.” Jay Hoffman, the president of
the Association, wrote to Nedved informing him that the Committee considered his
request and had no “choice but to deny it as inconsistent with the covenants and
architectural control guidelines. It is simply too big. . . . The board has already
decided via the architectural control guidelines that a shed larger than 10’x12’ does
not satisfy these standards.” On May 24, 2006, board member and attorney,
Pamela Snyder-Varns, wrote to counsel for Nedved stating, “The Board stood by its
decision to deny [Nedved’s] request. The shed is simply too big. Please consider
this written notice of the Board’s decision.”
[¶5.] In July 2006, the Association learned that Nedved had leveled a
building site for his proposed shed, spread gravel, and placed forms to pour a slab.
Because the Association believed that Nedved intended to build in violation of its
decision, the Association sought a temporary restraining order. The circuit court
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granted the order and set the matter for a hearing on whether a permanent
injunction should issue.
[¶6.] The parties submitted stipulated facts along with briefs in support of
their respective positions. The Association argued that under the Covenants and
subsequently adopted Rules and Regulations, Nedved’s proposed shed was “too big.”
The Association claimed that under Article VII, section 5, for Nedved to be
permitted to build his shed the Committee must approve the “quality of
workmanship and materials, harmony of external design with existing structures
and . . . location with respective topography and finished grade elevation.” Because
the Rules and Regulations required that the shed not exceed 10’x12’, the
Association asserted that Nedved’s request violated the Covenants.
[¶7.] Nedved, on the other hand, averred that the Association rejected his
proposal only because the shed exceeded the 10’x12’ requirement in the Rules and
Regulations, not because it violated the Covenants. And because the Association
exceeded its powers when it adopted the Rules and Regulations, the Association’s
decision to deny his request was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.
[¶8.] In the court’s memorandum decision, later incorporated into its
findings and conclusions, it ruled that there was nothing in the Covenants
restricting the Committee from adopting the Rules and Regulations. Specifically,
the court stated, “As the Board of Directors changes from time to time and as the
Architectural Control Committee changes from time to time, the interpretation of
this covenant may well change from time to time.” In granting a permanent
injunction, the court concluded that the Committee could rightfully adopt new rules
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and the Association’s decision to deny Nedved’s request was not unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious.
[¶9.] Nedved appeals asserting that the court erred when it granted the
permanent injunction because (1) the Committee exceeded its authority when it
adopted the Rules and Regulations, (2) the decision to deny his request was
unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, and (3) his shed satisfied the Covenants as
it was in harmony with the external design of existing structures. Since the court’s
decision was based on stipulated facts and because covenants are essentially
contracts, we review these questions de novo. Harksen v. Peska, 1998 SD 70, ¶11,
581 NW2d 170, 173 (citing Spring Brook Acres Water Users Ass’n, Inc. v. George,
505 NW2d 778, 780 (SD 1993) (citing Baker v. Wilburn, 456 NW2d 304, 306 (SD
1990))).
Analysis and Decision
[¶10.] The primary question here is whether the Committee exceeded its
authority when it adopted the Rules and Regulations without following Article X of
the Covenants. Article X requires a 75% vote of the members before the Covenants
can be amended. It also requires that any approved amendment be recorded. 1 The
Association asserts that there exists an inherent power to adopt these rules.
Specifically, it contends that because Article VII allows the Association to establish
1. Article X of the Covenants states, “This Declaration may be amended during
the first twenty (20) year period by an instrument signed by not less than
seventy-five percent (75%) of the Lot Owners, and thereafter by an
instrument signed by not less than sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66-2/3%)
of the Lot Owners. The Amendment must be recorded.”
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the Committee, implicit in that is a power to promulgate guidelines “to flesh out the
language of the Covenants by limiting the size of sheds, among other things.”
According to the Association, “[i]t is important for a body such as this, with a
membership that changes from time to time, to have an aid such as the [Rules and
Regulations] to help apply the restrictive Covenants on a fair and consistent basis.”
[¶11.] A covenant is a contract between the governing authority and
individual lot owners. Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 633 SE2d 78,
84-85 (NC 2006) (citations omitted); see also Wilson v. Playa de Serrano, 123 P3d
1148, 1150 (ArizCtApp 2005) (citations omitted). It “represents a meeting of the
minds and results in a relationship that is not subject to overreaching by one party
or sweeping subsequent change.” Armstrong, 633 SE2d at 84-85 (citations omitted).
Because restrictive covenants are contractual in nature, we ascertain the intent of
the parties at the time they contracted. Prairie Hills Water & Dev. Co. v. Gross,
2002 SD 133, ¶26, 653 NW2d 745, 751 (citation omitted); Piechowski v. Case, 255
NW2d 72, 74 (SD 1977); see also Villas West II of Willowridge v. McGlothin, 841
NE2d 584, 597 (IndCtApp 2006) (citation omitted); Riss v. Angel, 934 P2d 669, 675
(Wash 1997).
[¶12.] From the language of the 1994 Covenants, the parties clearly intended
for the Committee to have the power to amend Article VII, section 5. However, this
power exists only when the Committee obtains a 75% vote of the lot owners and the
amendment is properly recorded. 2 Therefore, absent the 75% vote of the lot owners
2. There is only one provision in the covenants that allows for the power of
enacting rules. It is under Article VII, section 10. That provision relates only
(continued . . .)
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and proper recordation, lot owners are bound only by the restrictions contained in
Article VII, section 5 of the Covenants. See Wilson, 123 P2d at 1150; see also
Raman Chandler Properties, L.C. v. Caldwells Creek Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 178
SW3d 384, 391 (TexCtApp 2005) (if the power to amend exists in the covenants, “the
amendment of a restrictive covenant must be in the precise manner authorized by
the dedicating agreement”) (citation omitted); Barris v. Keswick Homes, L.L.C., 597
SE2d 54, 57 (VA 2004) (express language of the covenants prevents interpretation
otherwise).
[¶13.] When the Committee adopted the Rules and Regulations without a
75% vote of the lot owners, it improperly amended the Covenants. It is immaterial
that the Board and Committee members change from time to time or need guidance
in applying and interpreting the language of the Covenants. There is nothing in the
Covenants that gives the Committee or Association the power to unilaterally adopt
new rules and regulations simply to aid in interpreting and applying Article VII,
section 5. See Johnson v. Dick, 281 SW2d 171, 175 (TexCtApp 1955) (the existing
authority is found in the written instrument). If we were to adopt the Association’s
position that it had an inherent power to amend Article VII, section 5, we would
have to ignore the express language of the Covenants and disregard the lot owners’
right to vote. Had the Association desired the Committee to have the power to
__________________
(. . . continued)
to “Landscaping” and gives the Committee the power to adopt rules and
regulations for the “preservation of natural resources, trees, and grass. . . .”
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adopt new rules and regulations to aid in interpreting Article VII, section 5, it
certainly could have provided for such, as it did with Article VII, section 10.
[¶14.] The Committee exceeded the authority granted to it by the Covenants
when it failed to comply with Article X before amending Article VII, section 5, to
restrict shed size to 10’x12’. Therefore, the circuit court erred when it held that the
language of the Covenants did not prohibit “the Architectural Control Committee
from enacting rules or guidelines to assist it, and future Architectural Control
Committees, in their interpretation of the covenant.”
[¶15.] The Association also argues that its denial was not based solely on the
Rules and Regulations, but that Nedved’s request was denied because it was not in
harmony with the external design of existing structures. Based on our review of the
record, the Association’s argument cannot be sustained. Nedved and the
Association submitted stipulated facts to the court indicating that Nedved’s request
was denied because the shed was larger than 10’x12’. There was no stipulation that
the Committee rejected Nedved’s request based on the language of the 1994
Covenants. Moreover, there was no stipulation that the request was denied because
it was not in harmony with the external design of existing structures. The 10’x12’
language clearly comes from the Committee’s Rules and Regulations. The denial
was based solely on the Committee’s conclusion that the request failed to conform to
the Rules and Regulations.
[¶16.] As we stated, the Rules and Regulations were not properly adopted
and the Committee was only empowered to approve or disapprove Nedved’s request
based on the language of the 1994 Covenants. The 1994 Covenants permitted the
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Committee to evaluate Nedved’s shed proposal to determine if it satisfied the
“quality of workmanship and materials, harmony of external design with existing
structures and . . . location with respective topography and finished grade
elevation.” This evaluation the Committee has not done. 3 Thus, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶17.] Reversed and remanded.
[¶18.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, ZINTER, and
MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.
3. In his brief to this Court, Nedved correctly points out that the Committee was
required to assess his proposal to determine whether it was in harmony with
the external design of existing structures and that it “never engaged in any
such analysis.”
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