Kurtz v. Squires

#24692-a-JKM

2008 SD 101

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

SUSAN JEAN KURTZ, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

AARON LEE SQUIRES, Defendant and Appellant.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

HONORABLE STUART L. TIEDE
Judge

* * * *

N. DEAN NASSER, JR. of
Nasser Law Offices, PC Attorneys for plaintiff
Sioux Falls, South Dakota and appellee.

ERIC C. SCHULTE
MARK F. MARSHALL of
Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz
& Smith, LLP Attorneys for defendant
Sioux Falls, South Dakota and appellant.

* * * *
ARGUED ON AUGUST 27, 2008

OPINION FILED 10/29/08
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MEIERHENRY, Justice

[¶1.] Aaron Squires appeals a jury verdict that found him liable to Susan

Kurtz for damages resulting from an automobile accident. We affirm.

[¶2.] On August 24, 2001, Squires rear-ended Kurtz. Although Squires

admitted that he was negligent and that Kurtz was not contributorily negligent, he

denied that the collision resulted in any injury to Kurtz. Kurtz, however, claimed

that the collision caused her permanent injuries consisting of persistent severe neck

and shoulder pain and constant headaches that often became unmanageable and

frequently required chiropractic treatment. A jury found Squires liable to Kurtz in

the amount of $100,000. Squires moved for a new trial. The circuit court denied

the motion. Squires appeals and raises three issues.

ISSUES

1) Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by
denying the motion for a new trial because the
subject of liability insurance was raised in voir
dire.

2) Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by
overruling Squires’ chain of custody objection to
the bumper cover.

3) Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by
curtailing Squires’ ability to inquire into Kurtz’s
previous claim of permanent disability.

[¶3.] The three issues that Squires raises on appeal all involve an abuse of

discretion standard of review. “We review denials of motions for a new trial under

an abuse of discretion standard.” City of Brookings v. Ramsay, 2007 SD 130,

¶14, 743 NW2d 433, 438 (citation omitted). “We afford broad discretion to [circuit

courts] in deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence.” State v. Packed, 2007 SD

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75, ¶24, 736 NW2d 851, 859 (citations omitted). “However, ‘[w]hen a [circuit] court

misapplies a rule of evidence, as opposed to merely allowing or refusing

questionable evidence, it abuses its discretion.’” Id. (quoting State v. Guthrie, 2001

SD 61, ¶30, 627 NW2d 401, 415 (citing Koon v. United States, 518 US 81, 100, 116

SCt 2035, 2047, 135 LEd2d 392 (1996))). “Although we have repeatedly invoked

stock definitions, the term ‘abuse of discretion’ defies an easy description. It is a

fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices, a

decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.” Arneson v.

Arneson, 2003 SD 125, ¶14, 670 NW2d 904, 910 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

Subject of Liability Insurance Raised in Voir Dire

[¶4.] First, Squires claims that he should have been granted a new trial

because the subject of liability insurance was injected into the trial during voir dire

in violation of a motion in limine. Prior to trial, the circuit court granted Squires’

request for an order in limine requiring: “[Kurtz], her counsel, and all witnesses, to

refrain from making any reference to the fact that Defendant may be insured

against liability.” See also SDCL 19-12-13 (stating generally that evidence of a

party’s liability insurance status “is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted

negligently or otherwise wrongfully”). During voir dire, Squires made two motions

for mistrial. Squires claimed that Kurtz had violated the order by erroneously

discussing liability insurance. The circuit court denied both motions. After the jury

returned a verdict adverse to Squires, he moved for a new trial based on these same

complaints.

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[¶5.] Mention of insurance arose when Kurtz’s counsel initially asked jurors

if they had any preconceived notions about whether a particular type of car accident

would produce large or small injuries. Counsel’s question followed the remarks of a

medically trained juror who opined that patients quite often exaggerate the severity

of their injuries. A different juror, in response to counsel’s inquiry, explained that

she had been at fault in what she considered a minor accident that resulted in

injuries to the 16-year-old driver of the other car. She explained that she originally

questioned the legitimacy of the other driver’s injuries but ultimately changed her

mind when the injuries resulted in surgery. The juror interjected that “they had

settled out of court.” Kurtz’s counsel then asked the juror, “Okay. So how did you

feel about them having settled that on your behalf?” The juror answered that she

was glad she did not have to go to court. Kurtz’s counsel followed up, “[a]nd were

you glad in your case that somehow through your company that helped you with it

you were made accountable to take care of this boy.”

[¶6.] Later in voir dire, Kurtz’s counsel again generally asked the jurors’

opinions concerning accountability, and the difficulty of holding sympathetic

persons accountable, such as children. One juror responded as follows: “There are

so many variables. What is her background? What is her insurance? What is his

insurance? We should take into account everything they’ve taken into consideration

for being responsible too.” Kurtz’s counsel then asked the circuit court if he wanted

to address the juror’s response. The circuit court then gave the following

admonition:

Yes. Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, whether or not a party
has insurance against liability is completely irrelevant to any

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issue in this case. You should not consider it at all. You are to
decide this case based solely upon the evidence that is received
here in open court under the instructions given by the [c]ourt as
to the law. And whether or not a party has insurance is
irrelevant and should not be considered by you.

Kurtz’s counsel concluded voir dire with a general question to the jurors if they had

any other responses or concerns. The juror, who had previously explained that her

accident was settled out of court, volunteered additional information about the

driver who had been injured, his surgery, and her ultimate conclusion that he had

been injured. Kurtz’s counsel then asked, “You felt the need to be accountable when

you realized that this was a real injury?” She answered, “yeah.” Counsel concluded

his voir dire by asking the jurors, “Do you feel it’s all right when you make a

mistake to step up to the plate? Okay.”

[¶7.] Squires argues that the circuit court should have granted a new trial

because of the queries of Kurtz’s counsel. Squires claims that counsel’s follow up

questions and comments to jurors were cleverly veiled attempts to link defendant’s

personal accountability to the existence of insurance coverage and the insurance

companies’ accountability. Squires argues that “whether one is ‘glad’ that his

‘company’ ‘made him feel accountable’ or ‘stepped up to the plate’ or would have felt

‘bad’ if the person was ‘not accountable’ simply should play no role in voir dire.”

Squires further argues that this line of questioning is unrelated to a juror’s ability

to be impartial and injects prejudicial concepts into the trial process. Specifically,

Squires argues that counsel’s questioning violated the court’s order forbidding

reference to defendant’s liability insurance.

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[¶8.] In Atkins v. Stratmeyer, we said,“‘[s]tatements of witnesses implying

that the defendant carried liability insurance, not responsive to questions asked but

in the nature of voluntary statements that could not have been anticipated, are not

deemed to be reversible error if they are excluded from consideration by the jury

under proper instructions of the court.’” 1999 SD 131, ¶13, 600 NW2d 891, 896

(quoting Schuetzle v. Nash-Finch Co., 72 SD 588, 594, 38 NW2d 137, 140 (1949)).

Here, the circuit court consistently sustained Squires’ objections and admonished

the jury that insurance was “irrelevant” and “should not be considered.” We have

consistently “presume[d] that juries understand and abide by instructions.”

Gettysburg Sch. Dist. 53-1 v. Helms & Assoc., 2008 SD 35, ¶11, 751 NW2d 266,

271 (citation omitted). The record also reflects that the circuit court was concerned

that counsel had “gone too far” with some of the questioning and admonished

counsel. The circuit court, however, denied a motion for mistrial. The circuit court

acknowledged that “most people are aware of [insurance]” and that he “[did] not

believe that the inquiry has gone so far as to unfairly taint these jurors.” The

circuit court noted that “[b]ased upon the responses that I heard in the courtroom I

believe the jury has indicated that they are prepared to listen to this case and to

decide this case based upon the evidence and the law given to them under the

instructions of the [c]ourt.”

[¶9.] In denying the motion for new trial, the circuit court reasoned that the

jurors’ spontaneous references to insurance did not “arise during the evidence

portion of the trial,” they were entirely unrelated to the questions asked by Kurtz’s

counsel, and “[n]one of the references to liability insurance were the result of an

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intentional or even negligent attempt by counsel to inject the issue of liability

insurance into the proceeding.” The circuit court found “nothing to indicate bad

faith on the part of Plaintiff’s counsel or any attempt or design by Plaintiff’s counsel

to advise the jury that an insurance company was defending the Defendant.” The

circuit court further found that Kurtz’s counsel’s follow-up questions of the juror

were a “legitimate and good faith effort to ascertain whether or not [the juror] could

be fair and impartial in light of her prior experience.” Finally, the court concluded,

based on its observation of the voir dire and the trial, that Squires received a fair

trial and that the jury’s verdict was not the result of passion, prejudice or

sympathy. A review of the record supports the circuit court’s ruling. Squires has

failed to show that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying a motion for a

new trial.

Squires’ chain of custody objection to the bumper cover

[¶10.] Second, Squires claims that the circuit court abused its discretion by

admitting photographs of the front bumper cover of Squires’ vehicle because the

bumper cover had not been properly preserved and because Kurtz had “failed to

meet the requirements set forth in SDCL 19-17-1 (Rule 901) for authentication.” 1

1. SDCL 19-17-1 (Rule 901) states:
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. By
way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following
are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the
requirements of this section:
(1) Testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is
claimed to be.
(continued . . .)
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[¶11.] We only reverse a circuit court’s ruling regarding authentication if we

find an abuse of discretion. We have said, “The [circuit] court has great discretion

in regard to the competency of chain of custody evidence.” State v. Brings Plenty,

490 NW2d 261, 265 (SD 1992) (citation omitted); see also State v. Lownes, 499

______________________
(. . . continued)
(2) Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based
upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation.
(3) Comparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with
specimens which have been authenticated.
(4) Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.
(5) Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through
mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based
upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it
with the alleged speaker.
(6) Telephone conversations, by evidence that a call was made to the
number assigned at the time by the telephone company to a
particular person or business, if:
(a) In the case of a person, circumstances, including self-
identification, show the person answering to be the one called;
or
(b) In the case of a business, the call was made to a place of
business and the conversation related to business reasonably
transacted over the telephone.
(7) Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed
and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from
the public office where items of this nature are kept.
(8) Evidence that a document or data compilation, in any form,
(a) Is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its
authenticity;
(b) Was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely be; and
(c) Has been in existence twenty years or more at the time it is
offered.
(9) Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result
and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.
(10) Any method of authentication or identification provided by a
statute or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority.
Id.

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NW2d 896, 901 (SD 1993) (citations omitted). In addition, the chain of custody need

not be absolutely perfect, but it must “‘strongly suggest the exact whereabouts of

the exhibit at all times.’” State v. Serl, 269 NW2d 785, 789 (SD 1978) (quoting

Butler v. State, 154 IndApp 361, 289 NE2d 772 (1972)). An advocate for evidence

need only “demonstrate with reasonable probability that no tampering or

substitution has occurred, however it need not negate every possibility of tampering

or substitution.” Lownes, 499 NW2d at 901 (citations omitted). “Mere suspicion or

speculation is insufficient to establish a break in the chain of custody.” Id. (citation

omitted). Moreover, “[e]ven if error is found, [ ] ‘it must be prejudicial in nature

before this Court will overturn the [circuit] court’s evidentiary ruling.’” State v.

Williams, 2006 SD 11, ¶8, 710 NW2d 427, 430 (citations omitted).

[¶12.] Kurtz traced the chain of custody of the bumper cover through multiple

witnesses. Kurtz testified that Squires sold his damaged vehicle to Aamco

Transmission shortly after the accident. One of the co-owners of Aamco

Transmission, Troy Thompson, testified that Squires brought the vehicle to him for

transmission repair around September of 2001 and described the damage to the

bumper at that time. Thompson then testified that he sold the car to Nordstrom’s

Auto Service in the same condition he received it from Squires, except with a

working transmission.

[¶13.] A co-owner of Nordstrom’s Auto Service, Shannon Nordstrom,

identified the bumper cover and testified as to its condition. He testified that the

bumper cover was structurally the same as when he received it from Thompson. He

indicated that exposure to sun and weather while in his possession had caused some

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deterioration to the cosmetic appearance of the bumper. Nordstrom also testified

that he sold the bumper cover to David Rowe, an employee of Kurtz’s lawyer.

[¶14.] Rowe then testified that he took photographs of the bumper cover

when he purchased it from Nordstrom and took the bumper cover to the law office.

Later, Thompson visited the law office to examine the bumper cover. He concluded

that it was “in substantially the same physical and structural condition as it was

when [he] saw it [last].” However, he did note that “there was a little more paint

missing on the edges.”

[¶15.] The evidence traced the location and condition of the bumper cover

from the accident to the time of trial. The bumper cover was sufficiently identified

and described to demonstrate with reasonable probability that no tampering or

substitution had occurred. Based on this chain-of-custody testimony, the circuit

court admitted the photographs of the bumper cover. Even had the photographs of

the bumper cover been inadmissible, Kurtz’s proof of damages did not turn on its

admission. The more pertinent evidence of damage came from the testimony of both

Kurtz and Squires, who testified about the condition of Squires’ car after the

accident and the resulting damage to the bumper. Kurtz testified that the front of

Squires’ vehicle “looked really bad” and that “there [were] dents.” Squires testified

that after rear-ending Kurtz his license plate was bent and the bumper cover’s paint

was chipped. Also, the investigating officer testified that Squires’ vehicle had

approximately $1,500 in front end damage and that this damage constituted more

than just a “bent license plate.” These testimonies largely corroborate the physical

evidence of the structural and surface damage to the vehicle. Therefore, even if

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Squires had been able to show that the photographs of the bumper cover were

inadmissible, he did not show prejudice.

Admissibility of Kurtz’s Pleading in another Lawsuit

[¶16.] Finally, Squires claims that the circuit court erred by not admitting

into evidence a complaint Kurtz filed in another lawsuit. The other lawsuit resulted

from a 2003 automobile accident involving Kurtz and Violet Lucille Kumlien.

Squires claims that the other pleading should have been admitted as an admission

against interest under SDCL 19-16-3 (Rule 801(d)(2)) and to impeach Kurtz under

SDCL 19-14-25 (Rule 613(b)).

[¶17.] Kurtz alleged in her complaint against Kumlien that she had suffered

“permanent bodily injury.” However, her claim of permanent injury from the 2003

Kumlien accident ultimately changed, and she settled that lawsuit. Kurtz moved

for an order in limine barring discussion of her other litigation. The circuit court

granted the motion, in part, but permitted Squires to question Kurtz about her

“claim” of permanent injuries on cross-examination. The circuit court ruled that if

Kurtz answered that she had not previously claimed permanent injury, the pleading

would be admissible. The circuit court, however, noted that he thought “the

pleading [was] somewhat ambiguous because it allege[d] both permanent disability

or injury and it also allege[d] aggravation of previous or existing injuries.” Abiding

by the circuit court’s ruling, Squires’ counsel asked Kurtz at trial whether she had

previously claimed permanent injury from the Kumlien accident. She answered, “I

thought – I didn’t know. I thought I was. I didn’t know. Yes. I didn’t know.”

When asked again she answered, “Yes, I didn’t know.” Squires’ counsel then asked,

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“Ms. Kurtz, now you say you did previously claim that you were permanently

injured because of this accident. Do you know when you made that claim?” Kurtz,

answered, “I think – I don’t know for sure what you mean. I think right at the --.”

Counsel interrupted with another question, “Any idea when you made that claim?

Can you share that with the jury?” Kurtz then answered as follows: “Right – I

guess right after, you know. I don’t know I’m kind of confused.”

[¶18.] Squires claims that the complaint was admissible under SDCL 19-16-3

(Rule 801(d)(2)), which provides that “a statement is not hearsay if it is offered

against a party and is: . . . 2) A statement of which he has manifested his adoption

or belief in its truth[.]” We have previously said “controlling precedent in this state

barred receipt of the complaint as direct evidence against the plaintiff. . . .” Raverty

v. Goetz, 82 SD 192, 201, 143 NW2d 859, 864 (1966). “In the absence of an

affirmative showing by defendant that the proffered allegation was inserted under

the personal direction of the plaintiff or had since knowingly received his sanction

or ratification, it was not competent evidence as an admission against interest.” Id.

(citing Kuhn v. Watertown Cement Prod. Co., 75 SD 491, 68 NW2d 241 (1955)).

Even though Raverty was decided before South Dakota adopted SDCL 19-16-3 (Rule

801(d)(2)), its analysis is still applicable. The party offering a party-opponent

pleading as a statement against interest must be able to show that the party

knowingly sanctioned or ratified the admission.

[¶19.] Clearly, Squires has not shown that Kurtz personally directed or

knowingly ratified the allegation of permanent injury in the Kumlien lawsuit.

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Kurtz’s answer or explanation was that the prior claim of permanent injury was

that she thought she was permanently injured but did not know. 2

[¶20.] Squires cites several federal decisions that have applied Rule 801(d)(2)

to allow a pleading as substantive evidence against a plaintiff. One of the federal

cases Squires relies on is Arnold v. Groose. 109 F3d 1292 (8thCir 1997). Arnold

involved a pro se prisoner litigant’s 42 USC § 1983 action against prison officials.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling denying

admission of portions of Arnold’s handwritten pro se complaint from an earlier

lawsuit involving the same facts. The eighth circuit ruled that the prior pleading

should have been admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) as an admission by a party

opponent because the facts alleged in the prior pleading were inconsistent with his

later pleading and his trial testimony was “his own handwritten statements,” and

the “entire case depended on the credibility of Arnold’s testimony.” Arnold, 109 F3d

at 1296-97.

[¶21.] The Arnold case is distinguishable from the case before us in several

respects. Arnold’s pleadings were pro se in his own handwriting. Arnold’s

allegations that prison officials conspired to kill him depended entirely on Arnold’s

credibility involving a taped recording he made containing “two benign

conversations” and a “log of the conversations the tape had allegedly contained.” Id.

at 1296. In contrast, Kurtz’s pleadings were prepared by an attorney and were not

2. Squires’ counsel admitted to the trial court that he had received
correspondence from Kurtz’s counsel that the report from Kurtz’s expert was
that Squires’ accident had caused the permanent injuries. Because Kurtz’s
expert concluded that Squires’ accident was the cause, Kurtz decided to settle
the other lawsuit.

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pro se handwritten pleadings. Kurtz’s case did not rely solely on her credibility and

involved other witnesses and expert testimony. Additionally, the circuit court

allowed Squires to use the content of the prior pleading for impeachment. The other

cases cited by Squires are similarly distinguishable. 3

[¶22.] Although Squires claims that he was prejudiced by the circuit court’s

ruling because he was not able to impeach Kurtz with the Kumlien pleading, the

record does not support his claim. The circuit court originally granted the motion in

limine but allowed admission of the pleading if Kurtz denied her prior claim. At

trial, Squires was able to cross-examine Kurtz and specifically inquired if she had

made a previous claim for permanent injury and the timing of that claim. In

response, Kurtz admitted that she had previously claimed to have been

permanently injured. In addition, Squires’ counsel reminded the jury of Kurtz’s

admission in his closing argument as follows:

. . . Ms. Kurtz says that she was doing significantly better prior
to that 2003 accident. And when I questioned her she said, yes,
at one point in time she was claiming that she was permanently
injured because of that accident. I think that’s something that’s
not insignificant and we should keep in mind when we look at
the evidence of this particular case.

3. In Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that the prior allegations were properly admissible under both
Rule 801(d)(2) and Rule 403. 790 F2d 552, 556 (6thCir 1986). The court
found no unfair prejudice in allowing the prior allegations. Id. The Williams
court did not consider that the prior allegations would be too confusing to the
jury. See id. Similarly, in Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., the court held
that an ancillary complaint was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) as an
admission against interest and under Rule 403 as more probative than
prejudicial. 915 F2d 1428, 1434-35 (10thCir 1990).

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In denying Squires’ motion for a new trial, the circuit court explained that the other

pleading merely duplicated Kurtz’s testimony and was more prejudicial than

probative. The circuit court further explained its concern that admitting the

pleading would have violated the collateral source rule and risked tainting the jury

because the jurors would have wanted to know if Kurtz was compensated from the

other lawsuit. See Moore v. Kluthe & Lane Ins. Agency, Inc., 89 SD 419, 434, 234

NW2d 260, 269 (1975) (recognizing that compensation from a collateral source,

independent of the wrongdoer, will not reduce the damages recoverable from the

wrongdoer).

[¶23.] Squires’ main complaint is that he could not adequately impeach Kurtz

without admission of the pleading itself. The circuit court’s ruling, however,

allowed Squires to impeach Kurtz by referring to the content of the pleading and

her previously claimed permanent injury. The court also provided for introduction

of the actual pleading had Kurtz denied her prior claim. Squires has not shown

that the circuit court abused its discretion.

[¶24.] Squires argues that the circuit court’s errors, standing alone and

cumulatively, deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. We disagree. Since we

find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s rulings, we affirm on all issues.

[¶25.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS and KONENKAMP,

Justices, concur.

[¶26.] ZINTER, Justice, concurs specially.

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ZINTER, Justice (concurring specially).

[¶27.] I join the opinion of the Court and write only to supplement the Court’s

discussion of Kurtz’s counsel’s comments regarding liability insurance during voir

dire. The Court’s opinion does not fully set forth what occurred. Furthermore, in

my view, counsel’s statements violated the circuit court’s ruling on Squires’s motion

in limine prohibiting any mention of insurance. Nevertheless, I concur because, as

the Court explains, the circuit court sustained objections to the comments, gave a

cautionary admonition, and was in the best position to determine whether counsel’s

remarks prejudicially tainted the jury.

[¶28.] As the Court observes, Squires argues that he was entitled to a new

trial because Kurtz’s counsel injected the subject of liability insurance in violation of

Squires’s motion in limine. In determining whether Kurtz’s counsel violated the

circuit court’s ruling on this motion, however, this Court mentions only the first

sentence of the motion that prohibited references “to the fact that Defendant may be

insured against liability.” See supra ¶4 (emphasis added). Although counsel’s

statements did not violate that sentence, the last sentence further prohibited any

“references to liability insurance . . . at all times during this trial, including voir

dire. . . .” Counsel’s statements clearly violated this prohibition, which is not

mentioned by this Court.

[¶29.] The violation is not apparent because this Court does not fully disclose

the extent and context of counsel’s statements. The problem started when a juror

voluntarily disclosed that she had previously been involved in an auto accident “and

our insurance handled it.” (Emphasis added.) After the juror then revealed “they

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settled out of court,” counsel gratuitously interjected: “Okay. So how did you feel

about them [the insurance company] having settled that on your behalf?” After the

juror responded that she was glad she did not have to go to court, counsel pursued

the insurance matter even further inquiring, “and were you glad in your case that

somehow through your company [the insurance company] that helped you with it

you were made accountable 4 to take care of [the injured party]?” In my view, these

intentional statements relating to a tortfeasor’s insurance and accountability

violated that portion of the court’s ruling that prohibited any references to

insurance. Certainly, whether a juror was glad that she had liability insurance to

make her accountable in an unrelated proceeding had nothing to do with selecting

fair and impartial jurors to determine liability and damages in this case. Counsel

improperly interjected the subject of insurance accountability into voir dire, see

generally Atkins v. Stratmeyer, 1999 SD 131, ¶13, 600 NW2d 891, 896, and the

Court’s opinion should not be read to implicitly approve such statements.

[¶30.] Nevertheless, as the Court notes, the circuit court sustained objections

to the questions, admonished the jury, and was in a better position to determine

prejudice. I concur on that basis.

4. Squires points out that Kurtz’s counsel made numerous references to
accountability. Squires also argues that prejudicial error was created by the
references to insurance coupled with the references to being “accountable” for
one’s actions. I also defer to the circuit court’s trial rulings and prejudice
determination on this issue.

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