#25238, #25239-a-JKK
2010 SD 19
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
* * * *
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGE
OF SANDRA M. WILLIAMS, Appellant,
v.
SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, Appellee.
* * * *
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
HUGHES COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
* * * *
HONORABLE JOHN BROWN
Judge
* * * *
CASEY N. BRIDGMAN of
Bridgman and Adel
Wessington Springs, South Dakota Attorneys for appellant.
ROBERT B. ANDERSON of
May, Adam, Gerdes and Thompson, LLP
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for appellee.
* * * *
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
ON JANUARY 13, 2010
OPINION FILED 02/24/10
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KONENKAMP, Justice
[¶1.] This is a consolidated appeal by an employee who was discharged for
unsatisfactory work performance. Believing that she was fired in retaliation for
making a complaint about sexual harassment, the employee brought a claim
against her employer with the South Dakota Department of Labor, Division of
Human Rights, and also filed a grievance with the Career Services Commission.
Both agencies ruled against the employee, and the circuit court affirmed. We also
affirm.
Background
[¶2.] Sandra Williams began employment on September 9, 2004, as a
secretary for the South Dakota Department of Agriculture. On October 5, 2007, her
employment was terminated for unsatisfactory work performance. Williams filed a
charge of discrimination against the Department of Agriculture with the South
Dakota Division of Human Rights (Division). She alleged that she was subjected to
a sexually hostile work environment and that she was retaliated against by being
discharged after complaining about it. The Division conducted an independent
investigation and accepted documentary evidence from Williams and the
Department of Agriculture. Thereafter the Division concluded that probable cause
did not exist to support either claim and dismissed the charges.
[¶3.] Williams also filed a grievance with the Career Services Commission
(CSC). She claimed that the Department of Agriculture did not have just cause to
terminate her employment, but rather fired her in retaliation for making or
reporting a sexual harassment claim. The CSC held a hearing. Williams, her
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supervisors, and several coworkers testified. After the hearing, the CSC issued a
memorandum decision and findings of fact and conclusions of law ruling that the
Department of Agriculture had good cause to end her employment for unsatisfactory
work performance.
[¶4.] Williams appealed both decisions to the circuit court. The appeals
were consolidated and a hearing was held. The circuit court affirmed both rulings.
Williams now appeals to this Court. She asserts that the Division abused its
discretion by performing a cursory investigation of her claims, issued clearly
erroneous findings of fact, and erred when it concluded her employment was
terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Williams further claims that the CSC
erred when it concluded that she was properly discharged for unsatisfactory work
performance and that her employment was not affected by the sexual comments
made. We granted the Department of Agriculture’s motion to consolidate the
appeals.
Standard of Review
[¶5.] Contrary to both parties’ contentions, we no longer review whether
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the agencies’ decisions. That
invalid standard was rectified more than ten years ago in Sopko v. C&R Transfer
Co., Inc., 1998 SD 8, ¶7, 575 NW2d 225, 228-29. Rather, our standard of review is
controlled by SDCL 1-26-36, requiring us to give great weight to the findings of the
agency and reverse only when those findings are clearly erroneous in light of the
entire record. When the record before the agency consists entirely of documentary
evidence, our review is de novo. Vollmer v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., 2007 SD 25, ¶12,
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729 NW2d 377, 382 (citations omitted). Similarly, when the issue is a question of
law, our review is de novo. Id. (citation omitted).
Analysis and Decision
[¶6.] Although the claims and evidence presented by Williams in both
proceedings were substantially similar, the CSC held a hearing and accepted live
testimony and the Division considered only documentary evidence. This distinction
requires the application of different standards of review. See Vollmer, 2007 SD 25,
¶12, 729 NW2d at 382 (citations omitted). We give great weight to the findings of
fact of an administrative body, except when evidence was presented in documentary
form, which we review de novo. Id. Therefore, we address the administrative
appeals separately.
1. Division of Human Rights Appeal
[¶7.] In her claim against the Department of Agriculture that she was
subjected to a sexually hostile work environment and retaliated against by being
discharged, Williams presented evidence that a co-employee, Darwin Kurtenbach,
made multiple sexually-motivated remarks in July 2006 in her presence, although
not directed at her. One such comment was from Kurtenbach to another employee,
in which he said that the employee should put a “CH” after the “BIT” initials on her
shirt. Williams also heard Kurtenbach say “secretaries do not do anything and that
is why the pay is low” and “women are only good for one thing.” She told a
coworker, Tammy McGill-Bennett, that she was offended by the comments.
Eventually, the fact Williams was offended traveled through the office to her
supervisor, Kevin Fridley. According to Williams, after Fridley discussed the
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incident with her, she was badgered daily and her work was increasingly
scrutinized. Williams claimed that from October 2004 until July 2006 there were no
complaints about her performance. As support, she offered an email from December
2005, in which she was informed by her supervisor, LaDonna Holm, that everything
was good regarding her work performance.
[¶8.] The Department of Agriculture responded through written statements.
These statements recounted the nature of the secretarial position Williams held and
the history of her errors. The Department of Agriculture claimed that Williams was
making mistakes shortly after being hired, but conceded that no documentary
support existed proving that Williams was making errors in the first six months of
her employment. Fridley explained, however, that because of how the database
system was set up, errors sometimes would not be noticed until later. The
Department of Agriculture further claimed that the learning curve for a secretary’s
position was approximately six to twelve months, and, after six months, Williams
was still not performing at the level she should have been. Fridley and Holm
attested that Williams was verbally informed of her performance deficiencies and
continued to receive on-the-job training. Her progress remained slow and errors
continued.
[¶9.] In October 2006, Williams was formally reviewed through a
Performance Planning and Review, which review the Department of Agriculture
submitted as evidence. The review indicated that Williams “[n]eeds to work on
understanding the basic program. Has a tendency to forget what needs to be done
when certain violations occur. . . . Needs to work on trying to remember program
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functions or maybe write down what needs to be done for future reference. Will
continue to work with [Williams] to maintain efficiency and accuracy in the dairy
program.” Ultimately, the Department of Agriculture concluded that her work
performance did not sufficiently improve and terminated her employment in
October 2007.
[¶10.] Whether Kurtenbach’s “CH” and other comments were made in 2005
or 2006 became a pivotal issue. To prove that the comments were made in 2006,
Williams relied on her recitation of the facts and her claim that Tammy McGill-
Bennett could corroborate her version of the harassment. Moreover, Williams
asserted that the event occurred in 2006 because Fridley sent her an email in
September 2006, in which he wanted her to follow up on her reported harassment. 1
This email message asked Williams to identify the date the sexually inappropriate
comments were made, and to whom, where, by whom, and what exactly was said.
In Williams’s email response, she stated that Kurtenbach made the “CH” comment
and another comment regarding himself as God to two other employees in
Williams’s presence. She explained that she did not know when the statements
were made. To support her retaliation claim, she later contended that the “CH”
statement was made in July 2006, and if it had in fact been made in 2005, then why
1. Tammy McGill-Bennett did not submit a statement to the Division, although
the Division requested her to submit one. She did testify before the CSC,
however, and in affirming the Division’s order, the circuit court had before it
McGill-Bennett’s testimony. We too have the record of her testimony. We,
therefore, will consider it in reviewing the Division’s order. McGill-Bennett
was asked when Darwin made the “CH” comment. She testified that she was
unsure, but thought it could be 2006.
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would Fridley have sent her an email in 2006 asking her to follow up on her recent
claim of harassment.
[¶11.] Fridley explained that his 2006 email to Williams was sent to address
her recent complaints, which he did not realize included what was already
addressed and what he believed he resolved in 2005. To support its assertion that
the harassment was handled in 2005, the Department of Agriculture offered a copy
of an email generated through the State’s email system dated September 23, 2005,
from Fridley to his superiors, Nick Roseland and Larry Gabriel. In the email,
Fridley referred to a discussion he had with Kurtenbach on September 1, 2005. The
email was sent in response to a coworker’s claim that Williams told another
coworker that she “had the goods on [Kurtenbach] for a sexual harassment case.”
Fridley averred that he conducted an informal investigation during which Williams
indicated that she did not wish to take action because the comments were not made
to her. Kurtenbach was counseled by Fridley about appropriate workplace
behavior.
[¶12.] The Division reviewed all the evidence submitted by Williams, the
Department of Agriculture, and the information taken in its independent
investigation. It concluded that the harassment occurred and was handled in 2005,
and that Williams was properly discharged for unsatisfactory work performance,
not in retaliation for complaining about Kurtenbach’s sexually inappropriate
comments. Williams now asserts several claims of error. She contends that the
Division failed to conduct a reasonable investigation and that it should have held a
hearing to determine whether probable cause existed.
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[¶13.] The Division of Human Right’s power to investigate alleged
discriminatory actions by an employer against an employee is controlled by SDCL
ch. 20-13. When presented with a charge by an employee, the Division may
“receive, investigate, and pass upon charges alleging unfair or discriminatory
practices.” SDCL 20-13-28. “If the Division of Human Rights determines there is
no probable cause to support the allegations of a charge after an investigation of the
charge in accordance with § 20-13-28, the division shall issue an order dismissing
the charge.” SDCL 20-13-28.1. In its investigation, the Division may hold an
evidentiary hearing. SDCL 20-13-32. There is, however, nothing to mandate a
hearing. Since conducting a hearing was discretionary, we find no abuse of
discretion in the manner the Division investigated Williams’s charges.
[¶14.] Williams next claims that the Division’s findings of fact were clearly
erroneous. As we earlier indicated, because the Division based its decision solely on
documentary evidence, our review is de novo. Williams alleges two types of
discriminatory conduct. She asserts (1) that she was subjected to a sexually hostile
work environment and (2) that she was retaliated against by being discharged. To
prove that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment, Williams must
establish that
(1) she belongs to a protected group, (2) she was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment was based on
sex, (4) the harassment affected a ‘term, condition or privilege’ of
employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have known
of the harassment in question and failed to take proper remedial
action.
See Huck v. McCain Foods, 479 NW2d 167, 170 (SD 1991) (citation omitted). To
prevail on a claim of retaliation, Williams must establish that she (1) engaged in a
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statutorily protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse action against her, and
(3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action.
See Coleman-Santucci v. Sec, US Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 754 FSupp 209,
216 (DDC 1991) (citation omitted).
[¶15.] Considering the elements essential to her claims, Williams must first
establish that there was probable cause to show that she was discriminated
against. 2 See SDCL 20-13-1.1. Probable cause is defined as:
a determination that it is more likely than not that the charging
party and members of a class, or both, were discriminated
against based on a violation of this chapter. The likelihood that
discrimination occurred is assessed based upon evidence that
establishes a prima facie case, and if the respondent has
provided a viable defense, whether there is evidence of pretext.
SDCL 20-13-1.1. Using this definition, we first decide whether Williams
established a prima facie case. If she satisfied that low threshold, then we examine
whether the Department of Agriculture provided a viable defense. If a viable
defense was presented, we then determine whether there was evidence of pretext.
[¶16.] Williams clearly established a prima facie case for a sexually hostile
work environment. She belongs to a protected group. Kurtenbach’s comments were
unwelcome sexual harassment, based on sex. Her employer knew of the comments,
and viewing only Williams’s evidence, the employer failed to take proper remedial
action. Finally, Williams’s evidence established that the sexually inappropriate
2. Contrary to the assertion made by Williams, we do not review whether
probable cause existed based on the definition in Erdahl v. Groff, 1998 SD 28,
¶16, 576 NW2d 15, 18. A different definition for probable cause was applied
in Erdahl because SDCL 20-13-1.1 had not been enacted at the time of the
case. See id. ¶¶17-21.
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comments were made in 2006, after which her supervisors began to more closely
scrutinize her work, placed her on a work improvement plan, and in October 2007,
discharged her. Williams also established a prima facie case for retaliatory
discharge. Reviewing only her evidence, she complained about sexual harassment,
her employer terminated her employment, and the termination occurred after she
complained about the harassment.
[¶17.] A prima facie case existing, we then decide whether the Department of
Agriculture provided evidence of a viable defense, and if so, whether there was
evidence of pretext. See SDCL 20-13-1.1. We first review the evidence related to
whether Williams was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment. Lori
Butler, an employee who Kurtenbach called “peaches,” said she was not offended by
Kurtenbach’s comments. Delphine Vavra, another coworker, stated that she
observed no conduct she believed would rise to the level of sexual harassment and
that Kurtenbach’s behavior toward Williams and other female employees was
unremarkable. The Department of Agriculture does not dispute that Kurtenbach
made inappropriate comments at work, but argues that because the issue was
investigated, resolved, and ceased to exist, the work environment was not hostile.
[¶18.] Although it was undisputed that Kurtenbach made the “CH” comment,
as well as calling Butler “peaches,” and that the Department of Agriculture was
aware of Kurtenbach’s behavior, there was insufficient evidence to show that it was
more likely than not the comments had “the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile or offensive working environment.” See Huck, 479 NW2d at 169-70 (quoting
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Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 US 57, 65, 106 SCt 2399, 2404-05, 91
LEd2d 49, 58-59 (1986)). Whether the conduct created a sexually hostile work
environment depends on whether that environment “would reasonably be perceived,
and is perceived, as hostile or abusive[.]” See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
US 17, 22, 114 SCt 367, 371, 126 LEd2d 295 (1993). Here, there was evidence that
the Department of Agriculture investigated Williams’s claims, counseled
Kurtenbach, and the behavior stopped. Moreover, two coworkers submitted
statements that no such sexually inappropriate comments were observed or noticed.
We find no error in the Division’s conclusion that probable cause did not exist to
support this charge.
[¶19.] We next review the evidence related to Williams’s retaliatory discharge
claim. The crux of this issue depends on when the comments by Kurtenbach were
made. A successful retaliatory discharge claim requires a nexus between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. If the comments were made
in 2005, and no other such sexually inappropriate behavior occurred, then there was
an insufficient nexus between the time Williams complained about sexual
harassment and the adverse action taken against her in 2007. If, however, the
comment was made in 2006, there was a heightened likelihood of probable cause to
support Williams’s complaint of retaliatory discharge.
[¶20.] To prove the comments were made in July 2006, Williams placed
considerable weight on Tammy McGill-Bennett’s testimony and an email sent by
Fridley in September 2006. But a review of McGill-Bennett’s testimony does not
establish conclusive corroboration. She was asked, “Okay, what time period, month
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and year, if you can remember, did this take place?” She replied, “It was a long
time ago. I think back in ’06, at the end of the year.” Counsel for Williams then
asked, “Would 2006 sound about right?” McGill-Bennett answered, “Yeah.”
Moreover, after reviewing the email sent by Fridley, the context is not as clear as
Williams contends. Fridley did not specifically refer to the “CH” comment, but
instead inquired about what complaints Williams was making, asking for her to be
more specific by identifying the month and day. In her response, Williams could not
identify the date of the “CH” comment. Fridley’s statement to the Division explains
that the context of the email was to determine what new complaints Williams had,
not to rehash the 2005 issues, which he believed had been resolved.
[¶21.] We find more persuasive the evidence presented by the Department of
Agriculture. The email from Fridley to Nick Roseland and Larry Gabriel, dated
September 23, 2005, sets forth in detail Fridley’s handling of the “CH” comment by
Kurtenbach. In particular, the email outlines Fridley’s investigation into the claim
that “Williams had the goods on [Kurtenbach] for a sexual harassment case.” The
email states,
9/1 at approximately 10:15 am I met with Nick in his office.
Nick informed me that I needed to talk to the people that heard
Sandy make these statements. 9/1 approximately 10:35 am I
talked with Scott. He said he and Deanne Booth were talking at
the counter by Sandy’s work area. Deanne was helping Scott
with some computer things. Deanne was giving Scott a hard
time about his computer abilities and Scott jokingly said to
Deanne watch it I am old and do not give me a hard time about
my computer skills or I will file a harassment claim against you.
Sandy heard this conversation and said that [Kurtenbach] had
better treat her as an equal. Scott then left the area. Deanne
continues to talk with Sandy.
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On 9/8 approximately 2:30 pm I discussed the situation with
Deanne the conversation Sandy and Deanne had. Deanne said
that Sandy was Mad and she thinks that [Kurtenbach] says
things that classify as Sexual harassment. Deanne told Sandy
she should talk to [Kurtenbach]. When Deanne asked Sandy if
she had any documentation, Sandy said no. Sandy told Deanne
that she had gotten someone fired in the past for sexual
harassment.
On 9/8 approximately 2:30 pm I discussed the situation with
Sandy Williams. Comment Made by [Kurtenbach] concerned
her. They are comments about Secretary’s do not doing
anything and why the pay is so Low. Women are good for only
one thing. [Kurtenbach] made a comment to Deanne about her
shirt that had BIT on it, just add CH to that. This comment was
heard by Sandy and she found it offensive. Comments about
[Kurtenbach’s] wife. Sandy does not want to pursue Sexual
harassment unless comments are said directly to her. Not to
that point now. She can not see how others take some of the
comments said by [Kurtenbach]. Sandy said she is a proud
person and people should not degrade her. She is considering
other employment. I talked briefly about comments she makes
about [Kurtenbach] if found not to be true, he has rights against
her.
On 9/12 approximately 9:15 am I reviewed with Nick what had
taken place. Nick told me that I need to warn [Kurtenbach] not
to make comments that others may find offensive, even if he is
only joking around. I will follow up with Nick.
On 9/12 approximately 3:45 pm I reviewed with [Kurtenbach]
comment and concerns Sandy Williams has. [Kurtenbach] say
he did not say women are only good for one thing. He said that
Man is on the downhill slide since Adam gave up a rib. Other
statements were maybe made but not directly to Sandy and
always in a joking manner. I warned [Kurtenbach] to not make
comments that others may find offensive.
I have reviewed and notified all people involved and find no
wrong doings at this time.
[¶22.] Considering this email message, we conclude that Williams first
complained about the “CH” comment and Kurtenbach’s sexually inappropriate
behavior in 2005. We further conclude that no adverse employment action was
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taken against Williams until January 2007, when she was placed on a work
improvement plan. In view of the date of the first complaint and that no new
sexually inappropriate comments or behavior were shown thereafter, there was
insufficient evidence of a nexus between the protected activity and adverse
employment action. The Division’s finding of no probable cause is affirmed.
2. Career Services Commission Appeal
[¶23.] Williams filed a grievance with the CSC. She claimed that the
Department of Agriculture did not have just cause to terminate her employment,
but rather fired her in retaliation for complaining about sexually inappropriate
comments made by a coworker. A hearing was held on April 17, 2008, in which
Fridley, Holm, and Williams testified. Other witnesses included Lynne Valenti
from the Bureau of Personnel, Karen Webber-Boyer, Tammy McGill-Bennett,
Marjorie Gregg, and three of Williams’s coworkers. In addition to the live
testimony, the CSC accepted documentary evidence. On July 17, 2008, the CSC
issued a memorandum decision finding that the Department of Agriculture had just
cause to fire Williams. The CSC recognized that inappropriate comments were
made in the workplace, but noted that “such crudeness does not eliminate the need
for accuracy and reliability.” Findings of fact and conclusions of law were issued on
September 5, 2008.
[¶24.] Williams claims that the CSC’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous.
She further contends that the CSC erred when it concluded that Kurtenbach’s
comments did not affect her employment and that she was discharged for
unsatisfactory work performance. The Department of Agriculture, on the other
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hand, claims that there was “substantial evidence” in the record to support the
CSC’s decision. As mentioned earlier, we no longer apply the “substantial evidence”
test in reviewing agency decisions. See Sopko, 1998 SD 8, ¶7, 575 NW2d at 228-29.
SDCL 1-26-36 requires us to give great weight to the factual findings of the agency
and only reverse if such findings were clearly erroneous in light of the entire record.
Here, the CSC heard live testimony.
[¶25.] The CSC has the power to “act as [a] grievance review board for career
service employees[.]” SDCL 3-6A-37. In doing so, the CSC may hold an evidentiary
hearing and pass on whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support the
claimed grievance. SDCL 3-6A-38. “In resolving grievances involving the discipline
of an employee, the career service commission shall determine and decide whether
the action was made for good cause.” SDCL 3-6A-38.1.
[¶26.] From our review of the testimony and documentary evidence, the
CSC’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and it did not err when it
concluded that there was just cause to support Williams’s termination. Fridley and
Holm testified that errors were noticed in Williams’s work at the end of her six-
month probationary period and that Williams was informed of these errors. She
continued to receive on-the-job training, but to Fridley and Holm her progress
remained slow and errors continued to be noticed beyond what they considered
acceptable in the learning period. Fridley also testified concerning a Performance
Planning and Review prepared for Williams on October 20, 2006, and the review
was offered as evidence. It mentioned concerns regarding Williams’s knowledge of
the job, her need for improvement, and noted that she had trouble understanding
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basic program knowledge. Because her work performance did not improve after the
review, Williams was placed on a work improvement plan in January 2007. As a
result of this plan, Fridley met with Williams weekly and discussed ways she could
improve her work. At the conclusion of the plan’s duration, Fridley and the
Department of Agriculture were not satisfied with Williams’s performance and
advised her in writing that disciplinary action could be taken. Ultimately, her
employment was terminated based on unsatisfactory work performance.
[¶27.] Williams does not claim her work was error free. Rather, she
maintains that Fridley and Holm only scrutinized her work to set her up for
termination after she complained of certain sexually inappropriate comments made
by Kurtenbach. Similar to her complaints to the Division, Williams argued to the
CSC that Kurtenbach’s comments were made in July 2006, and the retaliatory
actions of the Department of Agriculture began shortly thereafter. But these
comments were actually made in 2005. Thus, we find no error in the CSC’s ruling
that Williams was not retaliated against by being discharged after she complained
about Kurtenbach’s comments. The evidence supports the CSC’s findings that her
employment was terminated for unsatisfactory work performance.
[¶28.] Affirmed.
[¶29.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and MEIERHENRY, and SEVERSON,
Justices, and KERN, Circuit Judge, concur.
[¶30.] KERN, Circuit Judge, sitting for ZINTER, Justice, disqualified.
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