UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1492
In Re: CALS C. IFENATUORA,
Petitioner.
On Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis.
(1:90-cr-00480-1)
Submitted: May 22, 2013 Decided: June 14, 2013
Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Writ denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lawrence D. Rosenberg, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C.; Stephanie D.
Taylor, JONES DAY, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Petitioner.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Jonathan Biran,
Appellate Chief, William Moomau, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cals Ifenatuora, a native and citizen of Nigeria, filed
this writ of coram nobis, seeking relief from a 1992 conviction
in the District of Maryland for mail fraud. For the following
reasons, we deny the writ.
I.
In 1992, Ifenatuora was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment
and 24 months of supervised release after pleading guilty to
committing mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
Ifenatuora did not file a direct appeal or a petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. In 1996, following his release from prison,
Ifenatuora was indicted in the Eastern District of California
for unauthorized use of an access device, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2) and (b)(1), and possession of five or more
false identifications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(3).
Ifenatuora pled guilty to both counts and received a sentence of
37 months imprisonment. 1
Ifenatuora has been in immigration proceedings since 1993,
when the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) first
issued a show cause order contending that he was deportable for
committing two crimes involving moral turpitude. A second
1
The false identification count was vacated on appeal.
United States v. Ifenatuora, 133 F.3d 930, 1998 WL 10359 (9th
Cir. 1998) (unpublished).
2
notice was issued in 1998, alleging that Ifenatuora was also
deportable because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony
(the California conviction). Ifenatuora received a deferral of
his removal in 1999. The INS subsequently moved to cancel that
deferral, and his administrative proceedings remain ongoing.
In 2010, nearly two decades after his 1992 conviction
became final, Ifenatuora filed a writ of coram nobis, contending
that his counsel was ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356 (2010), for failing to advise him of the possible
immigration consequences of his guilty plea. He filed similar
actions in the District of Maryland and the Eastern District of
California. We placed Ifenatuora’s writ in abeyance pending
decision in Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013), 2 and
the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing the impact of
2
In Chaidez, the petitioner, a native of Mexico, filed a
writ of coram nobis challenging a 2004 conviction on the ground
that her attorney failed to inform her that she pled guilty to a
deportable offense. Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1105-06. While her
petition was pending, the Court decided Padilla, holding that
“the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal
defendant to provide advice about the risk of deportation
arising from a guilty plea.” Id. at 1105. The district court
and the Seventh Circuit denied the writ on the ground that
Padilla was a “new rule” of constitutional law not retroactive
to cases on collateral review. Id. at 1106. The Court granted
certiorari in Chaidez “to resolve a split among federal and
state courts on whether Padilla applies retroactively.” Id. at
1107.
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that decision. In light of Chaidez, we deny Ifenatuora’s
request for the writ.
II.
The writ of coram nobis is a “remedy of last resort” and is
“granted only where an error is ‘of the most fundamental
character’ and there exists no other available remedy.” United
States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988)).
It “provides a way to collaterally attack a criminal conviction”
for an individual who is out of custody “and therefore cannot
seek habeas relief” under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Chaidez, 133 S.Ct.
at 1106 n.1.
Ifenatuora claims that he is entitled to the writ because
of Padilla. Padilla, however, was decided nearly two decades
after Ifenatuora’s conviction became final, and, under Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), an individual whose conviction has
become final “may not benefit” from a new rule of constitutional
law “in a habeas or similar proceeding.” Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at
1107. In Chaidez, the Court held that Padilla is such a new
rule and “defendants whose convictions became final prior to
Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its holding.” Id. at
1113.
Seeking to avoid Chaidez, Ifenatuora makes two arguments:
that Teague does not apply to federal convictions and that, even
4
assuming Teague applies, Padilla falls within one of Teague’s
exceptions. We disagree.
Regarding Ifenatuora’s first argument, we have already held
that Teague applies to federal convictions. In United States v.
Martinez, 139 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 1998), we held that, although
Teague “itself involved a challenge to a state conviction, the
decision applies to federal prisoners’ actions for collateral
relief,” id. at 416. We explained that the “concern for the
finality of criminal convictions” that animated Teague was
equally applicable to federal convictions. Id. Accordingly,
Teague applies to Ifenatuora’s writ. 3
Ifenatuora’s second argument fares no better. Ifenatuora
contends that, even assuming Teague applies to his petition,
Padilla is a watershed rule of criminal procedure and thus
applicable to cases on collateral review. As mentioned, under
3
Ifenatuora makes an additional argument on this point,
contending that Teague does not apply to ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. This argument, however, is inconsistent with
Teague itself, which created two limited exceptions—watershed
rules of criminal procedure and substantive rules. Teague, 489
U.S. at 311. We will not create a third exception, particularly
given Teague’s emphasis on ensuring that retroactivity
principles would not vary from rule to rule. See e.g., United
States v. Ruiz, 2013 WL 1363765, at *2 (10th Cir. 2013)
(unpublished) (noting Teague retroactivity applies to
ineffective assistance claims) (citing United States v. Chang
Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 2011)); Berry v. United
States, 884 F.Supp.2d 453, 461-63 (E.D. Va. 2012) (applying
Teague to ineffective assistance claim).
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Teague, when the Court announces a “new rule,” a “person whose
conviction is already final may not benefit from the decision in
a habeas or similar proceeding.” Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1107.
One exception to this rule exists for “watershed rules of
criminal procedure.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. Like
Ifenatuora’s first argument, this one is also controlled by
binding circuit precedent. In United States v. Mathur, 685 F.3d
396 (4th Cir. 2012), we held that Padilla is not a watershed
rule because it does not relate to the “accuracy of the
factfinding process,” and in fact “has little, if anything,” to
do with that process, id. at 400 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, Padilla is not a watershed rule, and the
Teague exception does not apply to Ifenatuora’s petition.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for writ of
coram nobis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
WRIT DENIED
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