United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 11-1887, 11-1928
ELAINE JOYCE,
Plaintiff, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
TOWN OF DENNIS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Ripple,* and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Laura R. Studen, with whom Lawrence P. Murray, Jack S. Gearan,
and Burns & Levinson LLP were on brief, for appellant/cross-
appellee.
Leonard H. Kesten, with whom Deidre Brennan Regan and Brody,
Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, LLP were on brief, for appellees/cross-
appellants.
Jonathan J. Margolis, Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz LLP, Ellen J.
Messing, James S. Weliky, and Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. on
brief for amicus curiae Massachusetts Employment Lawyers
Association.
Anne L. Josephson, Kotin, Crabtree & Strong, LLP, Sarah
Wunsch, and ACLU of Massachusetts on brief for amici curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defenders, the Jewish Alliance for Law and Social
*
Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
Action, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Economic
Justice, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, and the National
Police Accountability Project.
June 17, 2013
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. In May 2007, three days before
plaintiff Elaine Joyce ("Joyce") expected to play golf with her
father in a tournament at a town course in Dennis, Massachusetts,
Joyce's father was told he would have to find another partner
because women were not allowed in that "men's" tournament. The
Town Administrator declined to reverse the course officials'
decision, and Joyce subsequently brought federal and state claims
alleging gender discrimination against the Town, the golf course,
and several individuals. The district court granted summary
judgment in her favor and thereafter held a trial on damages. This
appeal addresses only the nature and extent of her remedy. Joyce
claims that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury on punitive damages, denying injunctive relief, and awarding
attorney's fees in an amount substantially less than her request.
The defendants claim that the court erred in concluding that Joyce
was a prevailing party entitled to any attorney's fees.
We find no error in the court's treatment of punitive
damages, but must remand for further proceedings on injunctive
relief and attorney's fees. We reject the defendants' contention
that the court should not have awarded any attorney's fees and
instead conclude that the court erred in reducing the requested
award based on, inter alia, Joyce's rejection of a settlement
offer. The district court also must revisit the issue of
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injunctive relief and explain its decision to grant or refuse such
relief.
I.
We recount in some detail the circumstances underlying
Joyce's complaint of gender discrimination, as well as the
procedural history of the case. Although appellees do not
challenge the district court's finding of liability, the court's
rulings on punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees
must be reviewed in the context of the litigation as a whole.
A. The Events at Dennis Pines
Elaine Joyce is an avid and proficient golfer who signed
up with her father in April 2007 to play in a tournament at the
Dennis Pines Golf Course the first weekend in May.1 The tournament
was listed on the course schedule as a men's members-only event.
Both Joyce and her father, Patrick, are members of the course and,
in the fall of 2006, had been assigned a tee time for a similar
tournament that was rained out.2
On May 2, 2007 -- three days before the start of the
tournament -- the Town's head golf pro, Russell Champoux, called
Patrick Joyce and told him that the Golf Advisory Committee
1
Dennis Pines is one of two public golf courses in the Town
of Dennis.
2
Joyce testified about the 2006 event, but there is no
documentary evidence of either the Joyces' registration or the
circumstances of the tournament's cancellation.
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("GAC"), a volunteer group responsible for course policy, had
decided that his daughter could not play in the Dennis Pines men's
tournament because of her gender. Joyce was never contacted
directly by Dennis Pines, but after her father relayed the news to
her, she sent an email to the Town Administrator, Robert Canevazzi,
seeking his help "to make certain that this discriminatory practice
is not condoned by the Town of Dennis or any of its committees."
In her message, sent early on May 3, Joyce asked Canevazzi to "act
promptly to get the current decision reversed" so that she could
play in the weekend tournament. Joyce contacted Canevazzi because
she had had a similar experience at a golf course in another town.
After a prolonged effort to persuade club officials in that town to
allow her to join a men's league, she was finally able to secure a
policy change through the town administrator.
Canevazzi replied to Joyce later the same day. He
reported that he had spoken to Champoux and members of the GAC, and
he had decided to uphold Joyce's exclusion from the tournament
because changing the rules so late "would not be fair to the 1600
plus members of the Dennis Golf Courses who may either desire or
not desire to play in such a tournament." In addition, he noted
that the Tournament Committee (a subcommittee of the GAC) had
sought to schedule more women's tournaments "to allow greater
opportunities for women to have such competitive events." He
stated that he did not view the club's tournament policies to be
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discriminatory, but nonetheless had asked the chairman of the GAC
to include discussion of the criteria for tournament participation
at its May 14 meeting. Canevazzi did not expressly invite Joyce to
attend that meeting, but he told her its time and location.
The GAC's chairman, Jim Horvath, sent Joyce an email on
May 4, in which he apologized for "any confusion and inconvenience
that you encountered in how you learned about your non-
participation in this weekend's golf event." He explained that the
GAC had voted in December to approve the schedule of tournaments
set up by the Tournament Committee and the head golf professional.
He wrote that, "[t]o me, it was clear then that there were balanced
opportunities for both men and women to play in the first 3 events
of this year," and noted, "I think that is still the case."3 He
continued:
As chairman of the GAC, I welcome open
discussion on this matter and have placed it
on the May 14 Golf Advisory Committee agenda
(as Bob Canevazzi indicated to you yesterday).
The meeting is at 5pm at Dennis Highlands. I
hope that you can attend. Please don't
hesitate to contact me in the interim.
3
Dennis Pines' 2007 schedule listed five men's-only
tournaments and two women's-only tournaments, for a total of ten
men's-only tournament days and two women's-only tournament days.
In addition, there were seven tournaments in which both men and
women were scheduled to play in separate divisions, for a total of
thirteen days (twelve for women). At least one of the tournaments
included a mixed gender division, in which men and women played
together on teams.
-6-
Horvath then thanked Joyce "for bringing this issue to our
attention."
Joyce did not contact Horvath or attend the May 14
meeting. At that meeting, the GAC voted to ask the Tournament
Committee to make a recommendation on the gender-based tournament
policy and report back to the GAC "as soon as possible." At its
next meeting, on June 11, the GAC accepted the Tournament
Committee's recommendation that no changes be made to the 2007
schedule and that, beginning in 2008, every tournament would have
a women's field.4 Creating separate divisions was consistent with
the opinion of Town Counsel as reported by Canevazzi at the
meeting. According to Canevazzi, counsel had expressed "alarm[]"
that the course policy "could be perceived as discriminatory" and
stated that "it must be made more gender-neutral offering more
women['s] divisions within the Tournaments." But Champoux, the
club pro, observed at the meeting that the change would not resolve
Joyce's complaint, which stemmed from her desire to play with the
men -- and not in a parallel division for women. At the GAC's July
meeting, the "Gender Based Policy" issue was tabled because "no
additional information ha[d] been received."
4
The meeting minutes indicate that the Tournament Committee
at that time had an equal number of men and women. Horvath
testified in 2011 that it had seven members, four of whom were
women.
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B. The Administrative Complaint and Aftermath
Frustrated by the response to her concerns, Joyce filed
a pro se complaint in July 2007 with the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination ("MCAD") against the Town of Dennis and
Canevazzi. After the filing, an attorney representing the Town,
Kristin Harris, called Joyce twice and left messages asking her to
call to discuss the dispute. Joyce did not respond. She also did
not respond to a letter Harris sent her referencing the MCAD's
mediation process, though Joyce asked the Commission if she was
obliged to talk to the Town and was advised to wait until the Town
filed its position statement.5
The GAC again acted on the gender policy at its October
2007 meeting. After Horvath reported that the United States
Golfing Association ("USGA") allows women to play in all events "as
long as they play exactly the same as a man," the GAC voted
unanimously to instruct the Tournament Committee to follow the USGA
rules for all 2008 tournaments. This was the tournament policy
that Joyce originally had sought, allowing women to play alongside
men.6 Although no general announcement of the change in policy was
5
Canevazzi testified that after receiving the MCAD complaint
he instructed the Town's attorney to try to schedule mediation,
which he understood to be the MCAD's recommendation.
6
Joyce asserts that no change in policy in fact was adopted
in October 2007, but the record does not support that contention.
We agree with the district court that the record, consisting of
deposition and trial testimony and exhibits, can only reasonably be
read to show that the GAC at its October 22 meeting "formally
-8-
communicated to members,7 the 2008 Tournament Information Packet
included a statement (which did not appear in the 2007 Packet)
advising that "[a]ll tournaments will follow USGA guidelines for
participation."8 Canevazzi acknowledged that he would not have
understood from that statement that a change in gender policy had
occurred, although -- in another revision of the 2007 Packet -- the
2008 tournament schedule eliminated the gender labels in the
listings of members-only tournaments.
The Town filed its MCAD position statement on November 2,
2007, without mentioning the October vote. Canevazzi, who signed
the document, testified that the statement had been prepared weeks
earlier, and he had failed to realize that it did not reflect the
October meeting when he signed it. The MCAD statement denied that
the facts showed "discrimination of any kind," and noted that "once
agreed to allow women to play in men's tournaments, as Joyce had
originally requested." Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 705 F. Supp. 2d
74, 79 (D. Mass. 2010); see also Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 802 F.
Supp. 2d 285, 290 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting that defendants changed
the tournament policy before Joyce filed her complaint).
7
Eric Oman, GAC chair in October 2007, testified about an
email announcement sent by the assistant director of golf in April
2008 to some members of the Town's golf clubs "restat[ing] the
change in policy adopted by the Town of Dennis golf courses on
October 22, 2007." The announcement stated that "[a]ll men's golf
tournaments are open to women competitors." Joyce testified that
the announcement also was posted on the "men's bulletin board" and,
at least as of 2009, on "the website" -- which we presume to mean
t h e D e n n i s G o l f w e b s i t e . S e e
http://www.dennisgolf.com/guidelines.php.
8
The statement was added, in bold type, at the top of a list
of "General Tournament Information."
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the Complainant's concern was brought to the Respondents'
attention, the Respondents[] immediately evaluated the tournament
schedule with the Golf Advisory Committee and agreed to modify the
schedule, such that all tournaments would include a men's and
women's division beginning in 2008."
Joyce then hired an attorney, who filed a rebuttal to the
defendants' statement in early January 2008. After receiving the
rebuttal, Harris, the Town's attorney, placed a call to Joyce's
attorney and left a message requesting an opportunity to discuss
the matter. Joyce's attorney later reported that she was unaware
of that message.
C. The Litigation
On February 15, 2008, Joyce filed a complaint in federal
court against the Town, its golf courses, Canevazzi, and three
course professionals,9 alleging, inter alia, gender discrimination
under federal and state law.10 A media relations consultant hired
by Joyce's counsel notified the news media of the lawsuit, which
was filed on the Friday before a three-day holiday weekend. The
suit quickly generated national publicity, including an article in
The New York Times on February 19. See Marcia Chambers, Barred
9
The three were Dennis Penner, Golf Director during part of
2007; Michael Cummings, the Head Golf Course Superintendent at the
time the complaint was filed; and Champoux, the Head Golf
Professional.
10
By this time, Joyce had withdrawn her MCAD complaint.
-10-
From Men's-Only Event, Woman Sues Public Golf Club,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/sports/golf/19links.html?_r=0.
The article reported that neither Canevazzi nor Harris returned the
reporter's phone calls on February 18, which was the Presidents'
Day holiday.11
A few days later, an attorney for the Town called Joyce's
attorney and noted that, as a result of the GAC vote the previous
October, Joyce could play golf at Dennis Pines whenever and with
whomever she chose. In a follow-up letter in mid-March, defense
counsel suggested trying "to resolve this matter in the best
interests of our clients" and stated that the Town was "prepared to
notify all members explicitly that women are welcome to play in all
events, as long as they play from the same tees as the other
competitors and have their handicaps adjusted accordingly." The
letter solicited reaction from Joyce and her attorney on the Town's
proposals. Defense counsel also pledged to investigate Joyce's
allegation that she had been intimidated by "defendants and other
male members" when playing at Dennis Pines after lodging her MCAD
complaint, stating that "[m]y clients and I want to ensure that Ms.
Joyce has a pleasant experience participating in all golfing events
11
Oman, by then the GAC Chair, testified that he learned about
the lawsuit from "phone messages left at [his] place of business
from various TV stations, newspapers, talk-show hosts throughout
the country regarding wanting statements about the pending
lawsuit."
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in the Town of Dennis." Joyce's counsel's lengthy response, dated
March 31, concluded as follows:
[N]either Ms. Joyce nor the Club membership
has received a clear and unequivocal statement
against gender discrimination, and the
affirmative duty is upon the Defendants to
propose a plan that addresses the issues that
will otherwise be sought in a court ordered
permanent injunction. Be assured that Ms.
Joyce intends to pursue her damages, including
punitive damages. If the Defendants wish to
make a settlement proposal at this juncture it
may be prudent given that the attorneys' fees
continue to escalate, and these are also
recoverable by Ms. Joyce. Once we have
received your answer, I would like to schedule
depositions.
Defendants filed their answer to the complaint on May 28,
2008, and the litigation proceeded.
D. The District Court's Decision on the Merits
In March 2010, the district court granted summary
judgment for Joyce against the Town and its golf courses on her
federal equal protection claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but
granted judgment for the individual defendants on that claim.
Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 705 F. Supp. 2d 74, 81 (D. Mass. 2010).
The court noted that the tournament policy excluding women from
certain events expressly discriminated based on gender, and thereby
established a suspect classification that required justification.
The defendants did not meet that requirement, the court held,
having attempted to do so with a single "conclusory statement":
"[T]he defendants offer that the justification for the men's only
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tournaments is the existence itself of equal opportunity for women
golfers in terms of the women's only tournaments and the mixed
gender tournaments." Id. at 80 (internal quotation mark omitted).
The court further stated:
Indeed, [defendants' statement] is not a
justification at all but a reiteration of the
question already answered (i.e., whether the
treatment of women was unequal) . . . . Nor,
for that matter, is an exceedingly persuasive
justification as obvious with respect to the
game of golf as opposed to football or some
other contact sport. In any event, the burden
lies with the defendants, not the Court, and
they have not met it here.
Id. The court emphasized, however, that "the holding in this case
results from defendants' failure to advance a persuasive
justification for their acts, not necessarily because no such
justification exists." Id. at 82.
The court thus took pains to limit its finding of
unlawful discrimination under federal law. Following the statement
above, the court continued as follows in a footnote:
To that end, the Court carefully limits
its holding to the circumstances of this case.
What is critical here is that the burden lies
with the defendants to justify their conduct
and they have not done so. This decision does
not require all public golf courses to have
all mixed-gender tournaments. Instead, it
establishes that when the defendants draw a
clear distinction based upon gender and their
only explanation is to deny that any
distinction existed, they will not prevail.
Id. at 82 n.1.
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The court also ruled for Joyce against all defendants on
her state law gender discrimination claim, see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98,12 and granted judgment for the defendants on
a state law consumer protection claim, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A.
The court reached three significant conclusions about
Massachusetts public accommodations law: (1) there is no "'separate
but equal' exception to the statute's otherwise clear prohibition
of gender distinctions or discrimination," 705 F. Supp. 2d at 84,
and, hence, (2) the plaintiff does not bear the burden to show
differential treatment; and (3) a tournament at a public golf
course is a public accommodations. Id.13
12
Section 98 prohibits "any distinction, discrimination or
restriction" on account of gender in "any place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement," and further states, in part:
All persons shall have the right to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of
any place of public accommodation . . . subject only to
the conditions and limitations established by law and
applicable to all persons.
Section 92A defines "[a] place of public accommodation" to include
"any place . . . which is open to and accepts or solicits the
patronage of the general public."
13
Technically, in rejecting the defendants' argument that the
May 2007 tournament was a "non-public enclave" within the golf
course, the court held only that the specific tournament at issue
here was a public accommodation. See Joyce, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
Defendants' argument, however, swept more broadly. They noted that
"[a] public accommodation can have a non-public enclave," and
stated that "the holding of a non-public event in an otherwise
public forum creates a private enclave, and takes the event out of
the scope of being a place of 'public accommodation.'" Defs.' Mem.
in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. and in Supp. of Defs.'
Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., at 10. Defendants relied on these
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The court thus held that the defendants had violated
Joyce's right to equal protection under federal law when they
excluded her from the men's only tournament in May 2007 and, in
effect, ruled that women may not be barred from similar tournaments
on the basis of gender without justification. As described above,
the court also held that the defendants unlawfully discriminated
against Joyce under Massachusetts law.
The court left for the jury the determination of Joyce's
damages.
E. Damages, Fees and Injunctive Relief
In January 2011, in advance of the damages trial, the
district court ruled that Joyce could recover attorney's fees under
both federal and state law. The court delayed setting an amount
until after the damages verdict, however, because it viewed "the
degree of success obtained" as "[a] major factor" in determining a
reasonable fee. Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 770 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427
(D. Mass. 2011). At the same time, the court rejected Joyce's
request that the jury be instructed on punitive damages. The court
principles in asserting that, because Dennis Pines did not allow
the public to use the golf course during members-only tournament
weekends, and tournament participants had to meet certain
qualifications, "the golf tournaments thus were not a place of
'public accommodation.'" Id. at 10-11; see also id. at 11
("[D]uring such tournaments, the golf course was not a place of
public accommodation.").
Given these arguments, the court's ruling surely constitutes
precedent for the general proposition that, absent some reason for
an exception, tournaments at public golf courses are public
accommodations.
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explained that an instruction on punitive damages "would be
inappropriate because there is no evidence of 'evil motive or
intent' or awareness of a risk that the [golf course] rules were in
violation of federal law." Id. at 428.
In February 2011, the defendants offered Joyce a
settlement of $35,001, inclusive of costs and attorney's fees. She
did not respond, and a jury subsequently awarded her $15,000 in
compensatory damages.14 Following the verdict, Joyce requested more
than $170,000 in attorney's fees and costs under state law, see
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 9, as well as an injunction
ordering the defendants, inter alia, to adopt a policy barring
gender-based discrimination. In a ruling issued on June 30, 2011,
the district court awarded $30,000 in attorney's fees, and $4,600
in costs. The court denied injunctive relief.
On attorney's fees, the district court endorsed the
defendants' contention that any award of fees would be unjust in
the circumstances of the case, but it nonetheless concluded that
Joyce was entitled to "modest" fees as the prevailing party. Joyce
v. Town of Dennis, 802 F. Supp. 2d 285, 288 (D. Mass. 2011). Among
the factors cited by the court to support the sharply reduced award
was the rejection of what the court considered a reasonable
settlement offer. Although the court acknowledged that the
14
After both sides presented their evidence, the court
declined to change its ruling on punitive damages.
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defendants shared the blame for prolonging the case, it considered
Joyce and her counsel as primarily responsible for the length of
the proceedings. The court thus found it "fair and reasonable" to
substantially reduce plaintiff's requested fee award. Id. at 291.
On appeal, Joyce challenges the district court's
attorney's fee award and also claims error in the court's handling
of punitive damages and injunctive relief.15 The defendants filed
a cross-appeal asserting that the court erred in awarding any
attorney's fees.
II.
Joyce argues that the district court improperly refused
to give a punitive damages instruction. We review de novo whether
the evidence was sufficient to warrant such an instruction. See
McDonough v. City of Quincy, 452 F.3d 8, 23 (1st Cir. 2006).
Under Massachusetts law, punitive damages may be awarded
in the context of a discrimination claim "only where the
defendant's conduct is outrageous or egregious." Haddad v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 59, 75 (Mass. 2009); see also Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 9 (stating the availability of punitive
damages for discrimination claims).16 Such an award "requires a
15
Although this appeal is brought by the Town, the golf
courses, and the individual defendants, we at times refer to "the
Town" to signify all appellees.
16
The Massachusetts public accommodation provisions have been
integrated into the anti-discrimination scheme governed by chapter
151B, and the same remedial provisions apply. See Currier v. Nat'l
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heightened finding beyond mere liability and also beyond a knowing
violation of the statute." Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at 75. Determining
whether punitive damages are warranted requires consideration of
"all of the factors surrounding the wrongful conduct," which may
include whether there was "a conscious or purposeful effort to
demean or diminish the class of which the plaintiff is a part,"
whether the defendant recklessly disregarded the likelihood of
serious harm, the nature of "the defendant's conduct after learning
that the initial conduct would likely cause harm," and "the actual
harm to the plaintiff." Id.
In rejecting the instruction in its January 2011 pre-
trial ruling, the district court observed that gender separation in
sports had been upheld by federal courts, and it pointed to the
policy change made by the GAC in October 2007, before the lawsuit
was filed, to allow women to play with men, not only in separate
divisions, but in all tournaments starting in 2008. It also cited
the defendants' invitation to Joyce to participate in discussions
about changing the rules. The court concluded that the defendants'
"rapid and considered response to the plaintiff's complaint"
foreclosed a jury finding that punitive damages were justified.
Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 965 N.E.2d 829, 842 (Mass. 2012). Joyce
sought punitive damages under chapter 151B, and we accordingly
analyze this issue solely as a matter of state law. Indeed, the
only defendant against whom Joyce prevailed on her federal claim
under section 1983 was the Town, which is immune from punitive
damages under federal law. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
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Joyce, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 428. As noted above, the court
reaffirmed that decision after hearing the evidence presented at
trial.
We detect no error in the district court's ruling. It is
of course undisputed at this point in the litigation that the
defendants acted improperly. The district court found that they
unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender when they refused
to let Joyce play in the May 2007 tournament. A jury reasonably
could have concluded as well that the GAC acted indefensibly when
it chose to delay implementing its newly adopted tournament
policies until 2008. Moreover, the first change that was approved
-- to add women's divisions in tournaments that previously were
designated for men only -- did not eliminate the gender disparity
challenged by Joyce. A jury also could condemn the defendants'
failure to communicate their new gender-neutral policy to golf club
members in a clear and timely way, and could infer from their
grudging behavior a resistance to the change.
We must take into account, however, "all of the factors
surrounding the wrongful conduct." Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at 75.
Though the defendants did not immediately change their gender-based
tournament policy, they did immediately move to reconsider it. As
a result, they took action to increase gender equality twice within
six months and ultimately adopted Joyce's desired policy, months
before she filed her lawsuit. In so doing, the GAC went beyond
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what Town Counsel had told Canevazzi was necessary: "offering more
women['s] divisions within the Tournaments." Indeed, Joyce
acknowledged in her summary judgment memorandum that the Town's
obligation to allow women to play in a tournament designated as
"men's only" appeared to be a question of first impression.17 In
addition, the Town made repeated efforts to communicate informally
with Joyce and her attorney; each contact, however, was rebuffed.18
Among those efforts was an attempt in March 2008, shortly after
Joyce filed suit, to solicit Joyce's reaction to the Town's
proposed plan to notify all golf club members that "women are
welcome to play in all events, as long as they play from the same
tees as the other competitors."
Viewed against the backdrop of the actions the defendants
did take in response to Joyce's objection to their gender policy,
17
Joyce also noted in her Response and Reply Brief on appeal
that "this case was the first case to have directly addressed th[e]
issue" of women seeking to play in a men's only tournament at a
public golf course. Brief at 4; see also id. at 18 (noting that
"none of the cases ever addressed the issue of the lawfulness of
single sex tournaments at a public golf course").
18
We recognize that the conflict in this case began with a
communications gaffe when Champoux, the club pro, called only
Joyce's father to report the decision that she could not play in
the May 5 tournament. Certainly, calling only Joyce's father was
objectionable behavior and disrespectful to Joyce as a member of
the course. Nonetheless, the failure to notify both members of a
team, where Champoux's purpose was in part to tell the elder Joyce
that he could select a new partner, cannot reasonably be viewed --
in the context described above -- as sufficiently "outrageous or
egregious" to support an award of punitive damages. Haddad, 914
N.E.2d at 75.
-20-
their censurable conduct cannot properly be characterized as "so
offensive that it justifies punishment and not merely
compensation." Id. Although the defendants arguably should have
moved more quickly and more transparently to effectuate a policy
change -- rather than waiting until 2008 -- they demonstrated a
willingness from the outset to address Joyce's concern and conform
to the law. In arguing to the contrary, Joyce relies heavily on
her assertion that the GAC did not in fact vote in October 2007 to
open all men's tournaments to women, a contention we have rejected
based on our review of the record. See supra note 6. She also
asserts that the defendants had understood for years before her
objection that their tournament policy was discriminatory, citing
minutes from a GAC meeting in August 2005. According to those
minutes, a couple who spoke during a "Public Input" session
observed that "this being 2005 it was very difficult to justify
holding only 'Men's' tournaments and not including women." The
husband of the couple also noted that his club in Lowell allowed
women to play in any club event "as it is discriminatory to exclude
women."
There is more to this story, however. Both Horvath, the
GAC chair in 2005, and Oman, his successor, testified that as a
result of the 2005 discussion more women's tournaments and women's
divisions were added to the schedule. Until Joyce challenged the
gender restriction on men's-only tournaments in 2007, there was no
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other complaint. Particularly when viewed in light of the advice
the GAC later received from Town Counsel, the Committee's response
in 2005 -- adding tournament opportunities for women -- could have
been thought sufficient to meet the concern expressed.19 On this
record, a jury could not reasonably conclude that the defendants'
failure to open all tournaments to women following the 2005
discussion established "a conscious or purposeful effort to demean
or diminish the class of which the plaintiff is a part" or any
other factor justifying punitive damages. Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at
75.
We thus find no error in the district court's refusal to
instruct the jury on punitive damages.
III.
Joyce's petition for injunctive relief asked the district
court to order the defendants to take five actions: (1) issue an
19
Indeed, it appears that the defendants could have understood
that unequal opportunities for tournament play remained a focus
even after Joyce complained. As reported in the minutes, Joyce's
father raised that concern at the GAC's meeting on May 14, 2007,
when the Committee first addressed her complaint:
Mr. Patrick Joyce, father of Elaine who had submitted the
letter concerning the fact that she was not allowed to
play in the men's event stated that he felt the men have
far more tournaments than the women and it was not an
equal mix of tournaments.
Oman, the GAC chair after Horvath, also testified that Mr. Joyce
"voiced his concerns and opinions [at the meeting] that the
committee should have . . . equal tournaments between men and women
and more opportunities for women to play."
-22-
"affirmative directive" that play at the Dennis golf courses will
be based solely on qualification and golf handicap, not gender; (2)
issue a directive that, pursuant to state and federal law, "there
shall be no distinction, restriction or discrimination on the basis
of sex"; (3) adopt reasonable steps to insure that the golf courses
"maintain[] an environment that is neither uncomfortable nor
emotionally taxing for Ms. Joyce"; (4) adopt and disseminate a
written policy advising golf course members that it is unlawful to,
inter alia, retaliate against anyone for supporting the exercise of
protected rights; and (5) conduct staff training sessions on gender
discrimination, including the obligation to maintain a comfortable
environment for all golfers. The district court denied the
petition with little comment, stating only that the defendants had
"gotten the message" and that any future conduct to the contrary
would be met with severe sanctions.
In asserting that the district court erred in denying
injunctive relief, Joyce emphasizes her view that the defendants
had not changed the tournament rules by the time she filed her
lawsuit. More fruitfully, she also complains that the court failed
to perform the analysis prescribed by our precedent for assessing
the need for injunctive relief. Under that four-part inquiry,
injunctive relief may be ordered where (1) the plaintiff has
prevailed on the merits, (2) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable
injury in the absence of injunctive relief, (3) the harm to the
-23-
plaintiff would outweigh the harm to the defendants from an
injunction, and (4) the injunction would not adversely affect the
public interest. See Asociación de Educación Privada de P.R., Inc.
v. García-Padilla, 490 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007).
We review denials of injunctive relief for abuse of
discretion, considering any underlying legal issues de novo.
Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 623 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2010).
Here, the absence of explanation by the district court hampers our
review. It is possible that the court concluded that injunctive
relief was unnecessary because the defendants had already adopted
and disseminated the policy that Joyce had demanded, giving her
equal access to all tournaments for which she has the requisite
skills. However, despite the change in their tournament policy in
October 2007, the defendants vigorously litigated the case, raising
various legal arguments in asserting that they bore no obligation
to include women in men's-only tournaments. Their initial
dissemination of the October 2007 action was limited and, insofar
as the change was presented as an adoption of the USGA guidelines,
likely inscrutable to many of Dennis Pines' members. In addition,
the hostile reaction Joyce received from some male members after
she filed her MCAD complaint suggests that discriminatory behaviors
may remain at Dennis Pines, notwithstanding the change in
tournament policy. The court's reference to the possibility of
-24-
contrary behavior in the future suggests some doubt on its part
about the permanence and scope of the defendants' actions.
If the court in fact was concerned about grudging
compliance with the October 2007 policy and thus perceived a risk
of ongoing discrimination at the Dennis golf courses, its refusal
to grant equitable relief would be less defensible because Joyce
easily satisfies three of the four prerequisites for injunctive
relief. She prevailed on the merits, no apparent harm would befall
defendants from disseminating and following a policy that they
already have adopted, and barring discrimination would plainly have
no adverse impact on the public interest. Moreover, it is unclear
how sanctions could be imposed in the event of future misconduct
absent injunctive relief, unless Joyce or some other party filed a
new lawsuit. Joyce should not bear the burden of initiating
another action to protect the right to equal treatment that she won
in this case.
Hence, the key issue here in assessing the need for
injunctive relief is the prospect of irreparable future harm. We
have stated that, "[t]o be entitled to a forward-looking remedy, a
plaintiff must satisfy the basic requisites of equitable relief --
'the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury,
and the inadequacy of remedies at law.'" Steir v. Girl Scouts of
the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)); see also Lopez v. Garriga,
-25-
917 F.2d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that "an injunction-seeker
must show either that some past unlawful conduct has continuing
impact into the future, or else he must show a likelihood of future
unlawful conduct on the defendant's part" (citation omitted)). We
decline to uphold the district court's rejection of injunctive
relief in the absence of its considered evaluation of that factor.
It should address that deficiency in its analysis by conducting on
remand, on the basis of the existing record, the four-factor
inquiry set out by our precedent.20
IV.
Both parties challenge the district court's award of
$30,000 in attorney's fees. Joyce complains that the court
considered improper factors in awarding less than one-fourth of the
fees that she requested, and the Town argues that the court should
not have awarded any fees at all. Before addressing these
contentions, we review the pertinent legal principles and the
district court's rulings.
20
The district court noted that Joyce's complaint did not
request the specific types of injunctive relief that she later
sought in her petition and instead requested "only an Order
enjoining the defendants from discriminating on the basis of
gender." Joyce, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 292. The defendants have cited
no precedent that would bar a plaintiff from making a more specific
request for equitable relief after she has prevailed on the merits.
-26-
A. Legal Framework
Although Joyce prevailed on both federal and state
discrimination claims, she sought fees only under Massachusetts
law. The applicable fee-shifting provision states:
If the court finds for the petitioner it
shall, in addition to any other relief and
irrespective of the amount in controversy,
award the petitioner reasonable attorney's
fees and costs unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9. The amount of a reasonable fee
under section 9 is "largely discretionary with the judge."
Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp., 613 N.E.2d 881, 890 (Mass. 1993). Hence,
our review of the district court's award of fees under the
provision is for legal error or "manifest abuse of discretion."
Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 704 F.3d 150, 153 (1st Cir. 2012).
In evaluating reasonableness, we may consider both
federal and Massachusetts precedent, as "attorney's fees available
in both fora should, for the most part, be calculated in a similar
manner." Fontaine, 613 N.E.2d at 891. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court ("SJC") has adopted the "lodestar" method commonly
used by federal courts, observing that "[a] fair market rate for
time reasonably spent preparing and litigating a case is the basic
measure of a reasonable attorney's fee under State law as well as
Federal law." Id.; see also Torres-Rivera v. O'Neill-Cancel, 524
F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir. 2008) (describing the lodestar method of
"multiplying the number of hours productively spent by a reasonable
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hourly rate" as the typical starting point for calculating a fee).
The calculation may be adjusted up or down to reflect a variety of
factors:
In determining the amount of a reasonable fee,
we consider "the nature of the case and the
issues presented, the time and labor required,
the amount of damages involved, the result
obtained, the experience, reputation and
ability of the attorney, the usual price
charged for similar services by other
attorneys in the same area, and the amount of
awards in similar cases."
Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 920 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Mass. 2010)
(Rescript) (quoting Linthicum v. Archambault, 398 N.E.2d 482, 488
(Mass. 1979), overruled in part on other grounds by Knapp Shoes,
Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp., 640 N.E. 2d 1101, 1104-1105
(Mass. 1994));21 see also Torres-Rivera, 524 F.3d at 336.
The United States Supreme Court has identified "results
obtained" as "a preeminent consideration in the fee-adjustment
process," Coutin v. Young & Rubicam P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 338
(1st Cir. 1997) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 432,
440 (1983)), but that factor has multiple facets:
21
The Massachusetts SJC has noted that the lodestar method
need not be applied as "a two-step approach of lodestar and
adjustments," which it described as "unnecessarily complex."
Stratos v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 439 N.E.2d 778, 786 (Mass. 1982).
As that court pointed out, some of the "adjustment[]" factors are
properly subsumed within the calculation of reasonable hours and
rates. Id. The SJC thus concluded that "fair market rates for
time reasonably spent should be the basic measure of reasonable
fees, and should govern unless there are special reasons to depart
from them." Id.
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It can refer to a plaintiff's success claim by
claim, or to the relief actually achieved, or
to the societal importance of the right which
has been vindicated, or to all of these
measures in combination. We think that the
last meaning is the best choice, and that, as
a consequence, all three types of "results"
potentially bear upon the amount of an ensuing
fee award.
Id. Consistent with this broad notion of the lawsuit's outcome,
Massachusetts precedent emphasizes the need to consider, inter
alia, "the interests that the statute in question is designed to
protect and the public interest in allowing claims under that
statute to proceed with competent counsel." Haddad, 920 N.E.2d at
281. Thus, "when a plaintiff's victory, although 'de minimis as to
the extent of relief[,] . . . represent[s] a significant legal
conclusion serving an important public purpose,' the fee award need
not be proportionate to the damages recovered." Killeen v. Westban
Hotel Venture, LP., 872 N.E.2d 731, 738 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007)
(alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Díaz-Rivera
v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 377 F.3d 119, 125 (1st Cir. 2004)); see also
De Jesús Nazario v. Morris Rodríguez, 554 F.3d 196, 207 (1st Cir.
2009) (noting Supreme Court's rejection of the proposition that fee
awards should be proportionate to the amount of damages recovered).
Indeed, section 9's explicit statement that the award of
fees shall be made "irrespective of the amount in controversy"
confirms the limited significance of a plaintiff's modest monetary
success, including when the plaintiff had sought substantial
-29-
damages. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9; see also Olmstead v.
Murphy, 489 N.E.2d 707, 709 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) ("When the public
. . . has a particular interest in the vindication of a legal
right, the market value of legal services . . . should not be
automatically discounted because that value is high in relation to
the amount recovered."). Moreover, even "[t]he fact that . . . the
suit did not confer broad benefits on the public[] should not
result automatically in major restrictions on compensable hours."
Stratos, 439 N.E.2d at 787. At the same time, however,
"compensable hours may be reduced if the time spent was wholly
disproportionate to the interests at stake." Id. at 786.
B. District Court's Rulings
The district court's rulings on attorney's fees are
briefly described in the procedural background section of this
opinion. For the reader's convenience, we reprise that background
here, with additional detail pertinent to our analysis.
1. The Pre-Trial Ruling
In January 2011, in a written decision issued before the
jury took up the question of compensatory damages, the district
court ruled that it would award Joyce "reasonable attorney's fees"
because she was a prevailing party. Joyce, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
The court rejected the defendants' argument that Joyce had not
prevailed because they had changed the tournament rules before her
suit was filed. Although agreeing with the defendants that Joyce's
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success was "very limited and pyrrhic in nature," the court held
that she was entitled to fees based on its finding that she had
been a victim of discrimination. Id. The court stated that "[n]o
special circumstances which would foreclose the award of fees are
readily apparent and the defendants do not raise any." Id.
The court emphasized, however, that it would link the
amount of fees to the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded
by the jury, "if any." Id. The judge explained that, "[i]f only
nominal or limited damages are awarded, the reasonable fee will be
correspondingly limited." Id.
2. The Post-Trial Ruling
After the jury awarded Joyce $15,000 in compensatory
damages, she sought reimbursement for $167,855 in attorney's fees
and $4,993 in other costs. The Town objected on the ground that
the amount sought was unreasonable and excessive, and it again
asserted that special circumstances rendered any award of fees
unjust. In arguing for a finding of special circumstances, the
Town cited Joyce's last-minute notice of her desire to play in the
May 2007 men's tournament and her failure to engage with the
defendants about her concerns.22
22
The defendants specifically noted Joyce's refusal to attend
the GAC meetings at which her complaint was discussed and her
failure to respond to either defense counsel's phone calls or the
Town's settlement offer in February 2011.
-31-
Although the district court found the defendants'
arguments "compelling," it concluded that Joyce was entitled to
"modest attorney's fees . . . commensurate with the results she
obtained and mitigated by the factors present in this case."
Joyce, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 288. In its analysis, the court
described the degree of success obtained as "[t]he 'most critical
factor' in determining the reasonableness of a fee." Id. at 289
(quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992)). It reiterated
its view that Joyce had achieved limited results and stated that
the lawsuit "could have easily been avoided or resolved well before
trial." Id. at 290. The court deemed the results of the lawsuit
"minimal" because the Town had changed its policy for 2008 before
Joyce filed suit and because the court had "limited its summary
judgment ruling to this case only." Id. Against this backdrop,
the court concluded that "the requested fee of more than ten times
the jury award is excessive and unreasonable." Id.
The court also criticized the plaintiff and her counsel
for refusing the defendants' "reasonable" settlement offer of
$35,001, which, in the court's view, "obviated the need for a jury
trial[,] which alone accounted for 60 hours billed by plaintiff's
counsel." Id. at 291.23 The court invoked Federal Rule of Civil
23
The court stated that "the refusal by plaintiff's counsel
to accept the settlement offer was unreasonable." Joyce, 802 F.
Supp. 2d at 291. We do not understand this statement as an
assertion that counsel made the settlement decision without
consulting Joyce -- a violation of ethical rules, see Mass. R.
-32-
Procedure 68, which requires a plaintiff who recovers less at trial
than was offered in a formal pre-trial settlement proposal to pay
the opposing party's post-offer costs, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d),
and prevents shifting of post-offer attorney's fees and other
costs, see Bogan v. City of Boston, 489 F.3d 417, 430 (1st Cir.
2007). The court noted that Rule 68 did not technically apply, but
concluded that its purpose "to promote settlement and avoid the
expense of trial" made it reasonable to award Joyce none of the
costs or fees that accrued after the defendants' offer on February
4, 2011.24 Joyce, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 291. The court observed that
imposing on the defendants the full burden of this "avoidable
litigation" would "encourage similarly situated plaintiffs to
refuse all reasonable settlement offers and proceed to trial." Id.
at 292.
The court also found that the number of hours claimed by
plaintiff's counsel was excessive for the case as a whole and for
Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.4 -- but we instead construe the court's
unfortunate phrasing to reflect the view that counsel had advised
Joyce against accepting the offer.
24
It is undisputed that the defendants made a formal offer
under Rule 68. The court presumably, and correctly, characterized
the rule as inapplicable because, based on the ruling it was about
to issue, Joyce would be recovering an amount well in excess of the
$35,001 offer, which was inclusive of attorney's fees and costs.
She was awarded a total of $49,600: $15,000 in compensatory
damages, $30,000 in attorney's fees, and $4,600 in other costs.
See Bogan, 489 F.3d at 431 (stating that the calculation under Rule
68 "includes only the jury award and the pre-offer fees and costs
actually awarded by the court," not the amount requested).
-33-
particular tasks, and it speculated that "a significant portion of
the hours enumerated relate to the bickering between counsel over
media coverage." Id. In the court's view, many of the hours spent
on the litigation were unjustified because the "case involved a
relatively simple and straightforward fact pattern and . . . an
uncomplicated legal theory." Id. at 291.
The court acknowledged that the defendants shared the
blame for prolonging the case, noting that they had opposed summary
judgment and failed to offer a formal settlement until just before
the trial's start date. Nonetheless, the court placed most of the
responsibility for the length of the proceedings on Joyce and her
counsel:
[T]he Court finds that a fair and reasonable
solution is to reduce plaintiff's requested
fee award substantially, taking into account
not only the limited results obtained but also
the fact that the plaintiff was largely
responsible for the unnecessary protraction of
this litigation. For the reasons already
elucidated, the Court finds that the number of
hours spent and the costs incurred by
plaintiff's counsel were wholly unreasonable
given the interests at stake and the benefit
gained.
Id. The court thus concluded that there were "abundant reasons for
substantially reducing the requested fees and expenses," and it
determined that $30,000, plus $4,600 in costs, was a reasonable
award. Id. at 292.
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C. No Fees At All?
On appeal, the Town continues to insist that Joyce was
not a prevailing party and that, even if we conclude otherwise, the
statutory "special circumstances" qualifier applies to render an
award of attorney's fees "unjust" in this case. See Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 151B, § 9. The Town again relies primarily on the fact
that the tournament policy was changed consistently with Joyce's
demands before the lawsuit was filed, rendering the litigation
unnecessary and largely inconsequential. It contends that Joyce
insisted on proceeding with the case in the hope of obtaining "a
financial windfall."
As an initial matter, we may not lightly disregard the
district court's judgment that, despite its concerns about how the
case was litigated, some award of fees was appropriate. Indeed,
Joyce succeeded on her primary claims,25 and the litigation plainly
produced results that inured to the benefit of Joyce and others.
In finding that the defendants discriminated against Joyce in
violation of federal and state law, the court rejected multiple
defenses offered by the defendants in an attempt to show that her
claim was not remediable under either regime. In rulings not
challenged on appeal, it held that the tournament from which Joyce
25
Neither the defendants nor the district court suggested that
Joyce's fees should be limited because she prevailed on only some
of her claims. Most of the unsuccessful claims were against the
individual defendants and dismissed on the basis of qualified
immunity.
-35-
was excluded was a "place of public accommodation" under
Massachusetts' law, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 92A, that
plaintiffs do not bear the burden of proving a denial of "full and
equal accommodations" to establish discrimination under the state
public accommodations law, see id. § 98, and that "separate but
equal" facilities do not satisfy that law. Moreover, the jury
determined that Joyce suffered compensable harm as a consequence of
the defendants' actions.
Joyce's litigation victory was thus neither "'purely
technical [n]or de minimis,'" Coutin, 124 F.3d at 339 (quoting
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).26 Particularly
given the statutory mandate that fees be awarded unless it would be
"unjust" to do so, we agree with the district court that Joyce is
entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees. Whether the
district court properly determined that fee is our next inquiry.
D. Calculating a Reasonable Fee
Joyce asserts that the court made two legal errors in
awarding her only $30,000 of the nearly $170,000 in fees that she
requested: (1) linking the amount of compensable fees to the amount
of damages, and (2) factoring in her refusal to accept the Town's
settlement offer. We agree that the court's reduction of the fee
award based on those rationales was improper and, hence, an abuse
26
Of course, even "obtaining only nominal damages does not
negate the possibility of a fee award." Coutin, 124 F.3d at 339
n.6.
-36-
of the court's discretion. See Coutin, 124 F.3d at 336 (stating
that an abuse of discretion occurs, inter alia, "'when a material
factor deserving significant weight is ignored [or] when an
improper factor is relied upon'" (quoting Foster v. Mydas Assocs.,
Inc., 943 F.2d 139, 143 (1st Cir. 1991))).
The court began its discussion by describing at length
the well established principle that a fees award should reflect the
plaintiff's level of success, obliging the court to trim the base
fee generated by the hours-times-rate calculation when the
litigation has achieved only modest results. The district court
also recognized that the "results" of litigation embrace more than
the amount of damages awarded by the jury.
The court's application of these principles, however, was
flawed in multiple respects. First, in assessing the benefits
achieved by the litigation, the court emphasized the Town's pre-
litigation change of policy and its own "limited" finding of
unlawful discrimination that it had declared applicable to "this
case only." The court overlooked, however, the potential impact of
its state-law rulings characterizing the golf tournament as a place
of public accommodation, rejecting a "separate but equal" exception
to the public accommodation law, and clarifying the plaintiff's
burden of proof. It thus appeared to treat the damages award as
the only significant result obtained. Indeed, it stated that,
"[i]n accordance with the substantial body of case law cited
-37-
herein, the award of attorney's fees here will be correspondingly
circumscribed by the jury award of damages." Joyce, 802 F. Supp.
2d at 290. This limited view of the litigation's impact was
incorrect.
Relatedly, as the authorities described above make clear,
even if Joyce's lawsuit had achieved nothing other than
compensatory relief for her, it would have been an error of law for
the district court to link the amount of recoverable attorney's
fees solely to the amount of her damages. Fee-shifting provisions
in general reflect a legislative judgment that "'the public as a
whole has an interest in the vindication of the rights conferred by
the statutes . . . over and above the value of a . . . remedy to a
particular plaintiff.'" City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561,
574 (1986) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 444 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). With respect to § 9
in particular, the Massachusetts Attorney General has stated that
"an 'appropriate award of attorney's fees promotes Chapter 151B's
policy of enlisting the help of private attorneys general in the
fight against discrimination.'" Borne v. Haverhill Golf & Country
Club, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 903, 917 n.17 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (quoting
brief filed by Attorney General as intervenor); see also Stratos,
439 N.E.2d at 786 (noting the purpose of fee-shifting provision "to
encourage suits that are not likely to pay for themselves, but are
nevertheless desirable because they vindicate important rights").
-38-
The district court appeared to recognize that the amount
of damages is only "one element in the constellation of factors"
that must be considered in determining a reasonable fee. Coutin,
124 F.3d at 338. As we have described, the court discussed a
number of reasons for its decision. Yet its pre-trial ruling on
fees expressly stated that it would correlate the fee award to the
jury's damages award: "If only nominal or limited damages are
awarded, the reasonable fee will be correspondingly limited."
Joyce, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 427. The court confirmed its intent to
draw such a link in its post-trial ruling, noting that it
previously had advised the plaintiff that "any award of attorney's
fees would be proportionate to her recovery at trial." Joyce, 802
F. Supp. 2d at 291. Whether or not the district court ultimately
relied exclusively on the amount of the damage award to calculate
the appropriate fee, it is apparent that it gave too much weight to
that element.
The other substantial problem with the court's
calculation is that it unequivocally took into account Joyce's
rejection of the settlement offer. Although the court recognized
that Rule 68 did not apply because Joyce's total award (damages,
costs, and attorney's fees) exceeded the Town's offer, it
nonetheless repeatedly pointed to her refusal to settle. It
observed that the settlement offer was reasonable, that the offer
"obviated the need for a jury trial," and that the refusal to
-39-
accept the offer was unreasonable. Id. The court stated that, in
keeping with "the principle" of Rule 68, it would be reasonable to
award no costs or fees incurred after the offer was made on
February 4, 2011. Id. Indeed, it deleted from Joyce's requested
costs the expenses incurred after that date. Finally, the court
concluded its fees discussion by commenting that placing the full
cost of the litigation on the defendants "would encourage similarly
situated plaintiffs to refuse all reasonable settlement offers and
proceed to trial instead." Id. at 292.
We have held that "it is a mistake of law to reduce an
award of attorneys' fees in a civil rights case in response to a
plaintiff's rejection of a defendant's settlement offer when the
subsequent judgment exceeds that offer." Coutin, 124 F.3d at 341;
see also id. (noting that the higher judgment amount "validates the
appellant's rejection of the tendered settlement and immunizes her
from detrimental consequences based upon that rejection"). It is
plain that the district court committed such an error in this case
and, hence, for that reason alone the fees must be recalculated.
The court did not quantify the reduction it made on account of the
rejected settlement, though it did not appear to entirely exclude
payment for the post-offer fees.27 Hence, we cannot remedy this
error by directing the court to add a specific amount or percentage
27
The court reported that plaintiff's counsel invoiced $48,254
in attorney's fees after February 1, 2011.
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to Joyce's fee award. Instead, the court should calculate a new
award on remand that eliminates as a factor Joyce's refusal to
settle, and also rectifies its undervaluation of Joyce's success
and its over-emphasis on the amount of the damages award.
Moreover, the court should clearly and fully explain the
basis for its recalculation. See id. at 337 ("[T]he order awarding
fees, read against the backdrop of the record as a whole, must
expose the district court's thought process and show the method and
manner underlying its decisional calculus."). That recalibration
will not necessarily produce a fees award at or near the amount of
Joyce's request. The district court referred to a number of
factors that it could properly consider in evaluating the
reasonableness of the time expended. These include "a relatively
simple and straightforward fact pattern and . . . an uncomplicated
legal theory," Joyce, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 291, and the attendance of
two experienced litigators throughout the damages trial
(representing sixty hours of billable time).
We emphasize that we are not endorsing these factors as
justifications for the court's substantial reduction of the fee
request, but note them only as considerations the court properly
could take into account. On the other hand, the court could not
properly ignore the Town's vigorous defense of the case. Although
the court recognized that the defendants bore some responsibility
for the nature and length of the litigation, its incorrect focus on
-41-
the rejected settlement plainly colored its attitude toward the
defendants' strategy. Not only did the defendants oppose summary
judgment on multiple (unsuccessful) grounds and propose settlement
at the last minute -- factors noted by the district court -- they
also repeatedly argued against any award of attorney's fees for
Joyce (including in a cross-appeal). In deciding whether, and how
much, to adjust the baseline lodestar calculation, the court should
not overlook Joyce's need to respond to such defense positions.
As we have observed, "the trial court is in the best
position to gauge the bona fides of a request for fees." Spooner
v. EEN, Inc., 644 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 2011). So long as the
court relies on proper factors, and "offer[s] reasonably explicit
findings . . . to spell out the whys and wherefores," Coutin, 124
F.3d at 337 (internal quotation marks omitted), we will not second-
guess its judgment on the "time reasonably spent preparing and
litigating [the] case," Fontaine, 613 N.E.2d at 891. Here, because
the court's calculation incorporated multiple mistakes of law, we
have no choice but to remand for reconsideration of a reasonable
fee.
V.
For the reasons stated, we find no error in the district
court's denial of Joyce's request for a jury instruction on
punitive damages. We vacate the denial of injunctive relief and
the award of attorney's fees, and remand both of those issues to
-42-
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered. Costs to appellant.
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