Filed 6/19/13 Steffan v. Steffan CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
TINA STEFFAN et al., D060895
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. (Super. Ct. No.
37-2008-00079136-CU-PO-CTL)
KERRY STEFFAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ronald S.
Prager, Judge. Affirmed.
Kerry Steffan, in Pro. Per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Kenneth H. Stone, Kenneth H. Stone and Rebecca Reed for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
The court, after hearing the evidence, entered a judgment awarding compensatory
and punitive damages and attorney fees against defendant Kerry Steffan (Kerry) and in
favor of plaintiffs Tina Steffan, Jessica Steffan and Joshua Steffan (collectively
plaintiffs). Kerry appeals.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed an action alleging Kerry, who was married to Tina and was
stepfather to Jessica and Joshua, committed numerous acts of assault and battery on them
over many years, and also intentionally inflicted emotional distress on them. They also
alleged that, after they obtained a restraining order to stop the abuse, Kerry violated the
order and continued stalking them.
The matter was tried to the court. After hearing the testimony of plaintiffs and
Kerry, the court found against Kerry and in favor of plaintiffs, and entered a judgment
awarding compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees against Kerry and in
favor of plaintiffs. Kerry timely appealed.
II
ANALYSIS
Kerry appears to contend the trial court erred by awarding damages because the
judgment was not supported by the evidence and the statute of limitations had expired on
plaintiffs' causes of action. However, because Kerry has not complied with established
rules for appellate briefing, we conclude he has waived or forfeited his contentions.
A trial court's judgment or order is presumed to be correct. In Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, the court stated:
"[I]t is settled that: 'A judgment or order of the lower court is
presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged
to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error
must be affirmatively shown [by the appellant]. This is not only a
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general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' " (Id. at p. 564.)
"The burden of affirmatively demonstrating error is on the appellant."
(Fundamental Investment etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 966, 971.)
"An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions.
This burden requires more than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong. 'Issues do
not have a life of their own: If they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to
authority, [they are] . . . waived.' [Citation.] It is not our place to construct theories or
arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. When
an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived." (Benach v. County of
Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)
"Where a point is merely asserted by [appellant] without any [substantive]
argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be without foundation and
requires no discussion." (People v. Ham (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 768, 783, disapproved on
another ground in People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60, fn. 3; see also Landry v.
Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700 ["[w]hen an issue is
unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and
discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary"]; Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1488, fn. 3 [contention was deemed waived because
"[a]ppellant did not formulate a coherent legal argument nor did she cite any supporting
authority"]; Colores v. Board of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1301, fn. 2
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["[t]he dearth of true legal analysis in her appellate briefs amounts to a waiver of the
[contention] and we treat it as such"]; Bayside Auto & Truck Sales, Inc. v. Department of
Transportation (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 561, 571.) An appellant acting in propria persona
is held to the same standards as those represented by counsel. (See, e.g., City of Los
Angeles v. Glair (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 813, 819.)
We conclude Kerry has waived his appellate contentions because he has not
presented any coherent, substantive arguments or analyses, supported by citations to the
record and legal authorities, showing the trial court erred by finding some or all of the
causes of action were filed within the applicable limitations period. To the extent Kerry
attempts to make other contentions on appeal, his briefing is incoherent and
incomprehensible and we cannot discern their substance. The only other appellate claim
that approaches coherence is an apparent claim that there was no evidence to support the
judgment. However, that claim is waived because Kerry has not provided this court with
a reporter's transcript. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 668, p. 739.)
Accordingly, we need not discuss the merits of each contention and conclude Kerry has
waived his appellate contentions. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 149
Cal.App.4th at p. 852; Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99; Landry v.
Berryessa Union School Dist., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 699-700; Ochoa v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488, fn. 3; Colores v. Board of Trustees,
supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1301, fn. 2 ; Bayside Auto & Truck Sales, Inc. v.
Department of Transportation, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 571; cf. In re Marriage of
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Green (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 14, 29 ["[f]rom the point of view of grammar and syntax
as well as logic, [appellant's] briefs are almost impenetrable"].).)
We further note Kerry's opening brief contains a rambling statement of facts
supported by almost no citations to the record on appeal, violating California Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C). Statements of fact not part of, nor supported by citations to,
the record on appeal are improper and cannot be considered on appeal (ibid.; Pulver v.
Avco Financial Services (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622, 632; Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197
Cal.App.3d 619, 625), and we disregard any statements of fact set forth in Kerry's brief
that are outside of the record on appeal. (Pulver, at p. 632; Kendall, at p. 625; Gotschall
v. Daley (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 479, 481, fn. 1.) Furthermore, to the extent his assertions
of fact and procedure ostensibly refer to matters within the record on appeal, his brief
does not contain adequate citations to the appellate record in violation of California Rules
of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).
As in Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, at page 1246, Kerry's brief is,
in large part, "devoid of citations to the [record on appeal] and [is] thus in dramatic
noncompliance with appellate procedures." "It is the duty of a party to support the
arguments in its briefs by appropriate reference to the record, which includes providing
exact page citations." (Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1203,
1205.) "If a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record,
that portion of the brief may be stricken and the argument deemed to have been waived."
(Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856; see also City of
Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239; Guthrey v. State of California
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(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115.) To the extent Kerry's contentions do not contain
adequate supporting citations to the record on appeal, we consider those contentions to
have been waived. (Nwosu, at p. 1247; City of Lincoln, at p. 1239; Duarte, at p. 856;
Guthrey, at p. 1115.)
In any event, assuming arguendo Kerry has not waived his appellate contentions,
we conclude his appellate arguments are so incoherent, incomprehensible, vague and
conclusory that he has not carried his burden on appeal to present persuasive substantive
argument and analysis showing the trial court prejudicially erred. (Denham v. Superior
Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68,
105 [conclusory claims did not persuade appellate court].) Kerry's obligations to present
legal analysis and relevant supporting authority for each point asserted with appropriate
citations to the record on appeal, and to support references to the record with a citation to
the volume and page number in the record where the matter appears, are not merely
technical requirements. Instead, these are important rules of appellate procedure
designed to alleviate the burden on the court by requiring litigants to present their cause
systematically, so that the court "may be advised, as they read, of the exact question
under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass." (Landa v.
Steinberg (1932) 126 Cal.App. 324, 325.)
The incomprehensible nature of Kerry's brief makes it impossible for this court to
discern what precise errors he is claiming were made by the trial judge, and how any
errors were prejudicial, and we are not required to search the record on our own seeking
error. (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) Indeed, as another
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court observed in describing a similarly incomprehensible brief, the brief filed by Kerry
"is strongly reminiscent of those magazine puzzles of yesteryear where the reader was
challenged to 'guess what is wrong with this picture.' " (People v. Dougherty (1982) 138
Cal.App.3d 278, 280.) Kerry's in propria persona status may explain the deficiencies in
his briefs but does not excuse them. (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267 [" ' "the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive
rules of procedure as an attorney" ' "]; Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-
985.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs on appeal.
McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
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