FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID L. TOMBLIN, No. 11-56157
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-02450-PJW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, LOS
ANGELES SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
THOMAS LUU, DANILO R.
CASTANEDA, JR. and ROMEO
PASCUAL,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 4, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: TROTT and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and STEIN, District Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Sidney H. Stein, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Appellant David Tomblin appeals from a grant of summary judgment in
favor of appellees Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputies Thomas Luu and Danilo
Castaneda. Tomblin sued the deputies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon his
2009 arrest, which Tomblin claims violated his Fourth Amendment rights in
various ways. He now challenges the district court’s holding that the deputies’
approximately 35-minute detention of Tomblin was a lawful arrest supported by
probable cause, despite the fact that the officers ultimately determined that
Tomblin had no connection to the crime being investigated. Because the totality of
the circumstances that existed at the time of Tomblin’s arrest objectively
demonstrate that the deputies had probable cause to arrest, we affirm. Tomblin
does not contend in this appeal that probable cause dissipated after arrest.
This Court “review[s] a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo.” Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009). “A
determination of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact which this
[C]ourt reviews de novo.” United States v. Potter, 895 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.
1990). In addition, “[t]he district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear
error.” United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam).
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To prevail in a § 1983 suit based on a Fourth Amendment claim of unlawful
arrest, a plaintiff must show that “there was no probable cause to arrest him.”
Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998). “Probable
cause is a practical, nontechnical concept.” Potter, 895 F.2d at 1233. It “exists
when the police know ‘reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a
prudent person in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an
offense.’” United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d at 1296). In making such a determination, courts
look to “the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers.” United
States v. Morgan, 799 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This is an objective inquiry at the time of arrest. Id.
Here, Sherriff’s Deputies Luu and Castaneda arrested Tomblin based upon a
number of facts that indicated that he had stolen a car. Those facts, as determined
by the district court, are as follows. On the afternoon of February 6, 2009, during a
routine patrol, the deputies received a signal from the Lojack monitoring device
located in their police vehicle. Using the code provided by the Lojack monitor, the
deputies determined they were in the vicinity of a blue, four-door Jaguar with
chrome wheels that had earlier been reported stolen. A police helicopter in the area
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located a vehicle matching this description and observed the car turning into an
apartment complex in what the deputies characterized as a low-income
neighborhood. The air unit also saw a man exit the suspect vehicle and stand
outside it, seemingly talking on a cell phone. By the time Luu and Castaneda
arrived at the apartment complex, the signal on their Lojack device had increased
to its maximum intensity, indicating they were very close to the stolen car. The
blue, four-door Jaguar with chrome wheels that the helicopter had observed was
parked there. The man the air unit had seen standing outside the suspected stolen
vehicle—Tomblin—was still there. The deputies further observed in the parking
lot a man on foot and a person in a vehicle attempting to exit the driveway, whom
they suspected could be a getaway driver. With weapons drawn, Luu and
Castaneda ordered all three men to their knees, handcuffed them, and secured the
area.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that, based on the totality of the
circumstances known to the deputies at the time, they had probable cause to arrest
Tomblin. See, e.g., Del Vizo, 918 F.2d at 827 (“In considering whether the
investigating officers . . . had probable cause to believe that [the defendant] was
participating or had participated in the commission of a crime, we are not swayed
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by the presence or absence of any particular observation alone.”). We also find no
reason to disturb the district court’s factual findings.
Tomblin bases his argument that probable cause was not established
primarily on information the deputies acquired after the arrest—which Tomblin
conceded at oral argument occurred at the moment he was handcuffed.
Specifically, Tomblin points out that, although his car was similar to the stolen
vehicle, the year, make, and model were different, as were the license plate and
VIN numbers. The suspect vehicle was also registered to Tomblin. In addition,
Tomblin is the owner of the apartment complex in which the deputies found the
vehicle, which explains his presence there. The true stolen blue, four-door Jaguar
with chrome wheels was approximately 250 yards away. Tomblin contends in
essence that because the deputies did not conduct the investigation necessary to
elucidate these facts prior to arresting him, the arrest was not supported by
probable cause.
Although these facts are undisputed, Luu and Castaneda were not aware of
them at the time of the arrest. Therefore, they are irrelevant to the probable cause
inquiry. Based on the information actually known to the deputies when they
arrested Tomblin, we agree that probable cause existed and affirm on this ground.
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Tomblin also challenges as improper the deputies’ reliance on their
assessment that his car was out of place in a low-income neighborhood and the
district court’s finding that the act of turning into the parking lot could have been
an evasive move. Because the matching vehicle description, the maximum Lojack
signal, and the helicopter’s observance of Tomblin exiting the vehicle were
sufficient to provide probable cause to support the deputies’ arrest of Tomblin, we
need not address these arguments.
AFFIRMED.
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