United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 95-50462.
Carlos ARMENDARIZ-MATA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; Michael
Quinn, DEA Special Agent; Robert Hernandez, DEA Special Agent,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
Alfredo Juarez, DEA Special Agent; Guadalupe Gomez-Gamez, DEA
Agent, Defendants.
May 15, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
Before LAY,* HIGGINBOTHAM and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
LAY, Circuit Judge:
Carlos Armendariz-Mata ("Mata"), a federal prisoner, filed
suit against the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA"), and four individual law enforcement
officers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-04, complaining of wrongful
seizure and forfeiture of currency and property. The district
court, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation, granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants. Mata contends the
district court erroneously determined (1) that his equitable claim
concerned only the seized currency, and (2) that the notice of
*
Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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forfeiture was adequate. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand
in part.
Facts
On May 14, 1988, DEA agents arrested Mata for the attempted
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.1 On arrest, an
address book and $839 were taken from his person. Agents also
seized Mata's 1987 Chevrolet Suburban, $7980 in cash, a pistol with
ammunition, and allegedly, an export-import manual.2 DEA did not
institute forfeiture proceedings regarding the vehicle, but rather,
pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.101(c), released it to the lienholder,
General Motors Acceptance Corporation. The handgun and ammunition
were turned over to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
("ATF") and destroyed by ATF after Mata's criminal conviction. The
address book was destroyed by DEA in December 1992, at the time
Mata's case was closed.3
On June 7, 1988, the government sent a notice of forfeiture of
1
On appeal from his conviction, Mata unsuccessfully
challenged the propriety of the initial search and seizure which
resulted in the seizure of the currency and property. See United
States v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 153-54 (5th Cir.1991),
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 945, 112 S.Ct. 2288, 119 L.Ed.2d 212
(1992).
2
Counsel for DEA in the forfeiture proceedings averred that
no seizure of an import-export manual was effected and indicated
there is no reference to such book in any seizure or
investigative file.
3
The summary evidence reveals no declaration of forfeiture
or a final decree and order of forfeiture resulting in the
vesting of title in the United States for Mata's interest in the
1987 Chevrolet Suburban, the address book, the Browning handgun,
or the export-import manual. The gist of Mata's claim for these
items, therefore, is not wrongful forfeiture, but a claim for
wrongful destruction or wrongful conveyance.
2
the currency to Mata's home. Mata's sister, Blanca Mata, received
the notice and signed the return receipt on June 17, 1988. On the
same date that it sent notice to Mata's residence, the government
also sent an identical notice to Mata at his place of incarceration
at the Guadalupe County jail. For unknown reasons, that notice was
returned to DEA marked "Attempted RLW—5510 6/13/88" and marked
"Return to Sender." Gov't Ex. 4. Thereafter, DEA made no other
attempts to notify Mata of the forfeiture proceedings, except to
publish notice in USA TODAY. The period for contesting forfeiture
expired without a claim being filed, and on September 13, 1988, the
currency was administratively forfeited.
In district court, Mata raised a due process claim, alleging
defective notice of the forfeiture. Relying on the APA, Mata also
sought equitable relief, namely, the return of the currency and
property seized. The court determined it had jurisdiction to hear
Mata's equitable claim, but that the claim extended to the $8,819
in currency only. The district court held that the applicable
limitations period for Mata's equitable claim was six years
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a); thus, the equitable claim
implicating due process was not time barred. On the merits, the
district court also determined the forfeiture notice was
constitutionally adequate. Mata timely appeals.
Jurisdiction
The defendants initially challenge the district court's
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jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's claims.4 The United States
is immune from suit except as it waives its sovereign immunity.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct.
996, 1000, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). The terms of those waivers are
set forth by Congress and courts may not exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over a claim against the federal government except as
Congress allows. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814, 96
S.Ct. 1971, 1976, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976). Furthermore, such waivers
of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed. Wilkerson v.
United States, 67 F.3d 112, 118 (5th Cir.1995).
The APA, which creates a right of review regarding actions by
federal agencies, provides:
[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking relief
other than money damages ... shall not be dismissed ... on the
ground that it is against the United States.... Nothing
herein ... affects the limitations on judicial review or the
power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny
relief on any other appropriate ... ground....
5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added). Congress intended to broaden the
avenues for judicial review of agency action by eliminating the
defense of sovereign immunity in cases covered by § 702, Bowen v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 891-92, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 2731, 101
L.Ed.2d 749 (1988), but when the substance of the complaint at
issue is a claim for money damages, the case is not one covered by
§ 702, and, hence, sovereign immunity has not been waived. Drake
v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 907 F.2d 532, 535 (5th Cir.1990).
4
Mata brought Bivens claims against the individual DEA
officers. The district court dismissed the claims based on
qualified immunity and expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations. This ruling is not challenged on appeal.
4
Mata asserts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 seeking
federal court review, under the APA, of DEA's seizure and
forfeiture determination. He claims the district court erred in
deciding the only property over which it had jurisdiction was the
$8,819.00 in United States currency. Specifically, Mata contends
that the relief sought for the vehicle, weapon, and address book
was also equitable in nature, citing Marshall Leasing, Inc. v.
United States, 893 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir.1990), for the proposition
that the return of forfeited property or its monetary equivalent is
equitable relief.
Mata's claim is unpersuasive. He prayed for either the
return of his property or its value, and $120,000 in compensatory
and punitive damages. Further, Mata ascribed a monetary value for
his property; specifically, $8,083 for the Suburban, $100 for the
address book, and $500 for the pistol and ammunition. All the
property has either been destroyed or possession thereof
relinquished by DEA. It was not forfeited, and cannot be returned;
thus, any relief can only be in the form of monetary damages. The
APA's § 702 waiver of the government's sovereign immunity does not
apply to monetary damages. Marshall Leasing, 893 F.2d at 1100;
see also A. & S. Council Oil Co. v. Lader, 56 F.3d 234, 238
(D.C.Cir.1995). Thus, the district court properly determined the
only claim over which it had subject-matter jurisdiction was Mata's
equitable claim for the return of $8,819 in currency.
Adequacy of Notice
In forfeiture proceedings, in addition to at least three
5
weeks of publication of the intention to forfeit, "[w]ritten notice
... shall be sent to each party who appears to have an interest in
the seized article." 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a); Torres v. $36,256.80
U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1160 (2d Cir.1994). In Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94
L.Ed. 865 (1950), the Supreme Court held that notice must be
"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at
657. Mata argues the notice sent by DEA was inadequate. We agree.
Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual
notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding
which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of
any party. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800,
103 S.Ct. 2706, 2712, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983). Under most
circumstances, notice sent by ordinary mail is sufficient to
discharge the government's due process obligations. See Weigner v.
City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1005, 109 S.Ct. 785, 102 L.Ed.2d 777 (1989). When the
government sends notice by mail, however, the proper inquiry is not
simply whether the government sent the notice, but whether it acted
reasonably under all the circumstances in relying on the mail as a
means to apprise the interested party of the pending action. Id.
at 649.
Given the government's knowledge of Mata's whereabouts, the
notice sent to Mata's home residence was not adequate to apprise
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Mata of the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings. Mata "was
residing at a place of the government's choosing, not his own."
Torres, 25 F.3d at 1161; see Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38,
40, 93 S.Ct. 30, 31, 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972) (holding notice
inadequate when "the State knew that [the owner] was not at the
address to which the notice was mailed and, moreover, knew also
that [the owner] could not get to that address since he was at that
very time confined").
The notice sent to the Guadalupe Jail was also inadequate.
This is not a case where DEA made the reasonable assumption that
the notice sent to the jail had reached its destination; on the
contrary, the notice to Mata was returned undelivered. DEA knew
that its letter had not succeeded in notifying Mata, and made no
additional efforts to inform Mata of the forfeiture proceeding. It
is unreasonable for DEA to ignore information that reveals that a
method of notice is inadequate to provide an interested party with
notice, when that party is known to be in jail and can be easily
located by DEA in the jail or determined to not be there. A letter
to such a prisoner returned unclaimed is not enough. Some
additional inquiry is required.
The purpose of the law is to allow forfeitures of the profits
and instruments of drug crimes while protecting innocent owners of
such property. Where the government seeks the traditionally
disfavored remedy of forfeiture, due process protections ought to
be diligently enforced, and by no means relaxed. United States v.
Borromeo, 945 F.2d 750, 752 (4th Cir.1991). In light of the
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serious nature of forfeitures, and the tendency to view them with
disfavor, Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392, 1400 (2d
Cir.1992), DEA's actions under these circumstances cannot be
condoned. Forfeitures should only be enforced if they fall within
both the letter and spirit of the law. United States v. One Ford
Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226, 59 S.Ct. 861, 864-65, 83 L.Ed. 1249
(1939). Mullane counsels us to consider all of the circumstances.
339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657. By failing to provide Mata with
adequate notice, DEA did not act within either the letter or spirit
of the law, and thereby deprived Mata of his right to due process.
Therefore, the judgment of the district court granting summary
judgment in favor of the government on the administrative
forfeiture is reversed. The case is remanded with instructions to
vacate DEA's administrative forfeiture for lack of adequate notice.
AFFIRMED IN PART, and REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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