Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 19-2128; 21-1510
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JUAN A. BAUZA-SAEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Kayatta, Thompson, and Gelpí,
Circuit Judges.
Carmen L. Soto-Tellado on brief for appellant in No. 19-2128.
Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney,
W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-
Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
Jorge L. Gerena-Mendez for appellant in No. 21-1510.
Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney, with
W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-
Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, and Maarja T. Luhtaru,
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
December 1, 2022
GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. After pleading guilty to aiding
and abetting carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) and (2),
Juan A. Bauza-Saez ("Bauza-Saez" or "Appellant") was sentenced in
November 2014 to 41 months of imprisonment and three years of
supervised release under standard conditions, including that he
not commit another offense. Little did he learn from said
experience. In August 2018, approximately a year and a half after
his release from prison, and while serving his supervised release
term, Appellant and an accomplice committed another carjacking.
Armed with a firearm, they kidnapped the driver of the carjacked
vehicle and demanded that she take them to her residence. There,
they assaulted her husband and threatened the couple with further
violence. Ultimately, the two men looted valuables and drove away
in the vehicle.
The preceding facts are not in dispute. Nor is the fact
that Appellant was arrested and indicted for his new criminal
conduct, to wit, carjacking, kidnapping, and firearms offenses.
As a result, the United States Probation Office also filed a motion
notifying that Appellant had violated the conditions of his ongoing
supervised release. In July 2019, pursuant to a plea agreement,
Appellant pled guilty in criminal case 3:18-cr-00697-1(FAB)
("Case No. 1") to carjacking under 18 U.S.C. 2119(1) and (2), as
well as possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). In October
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2019, the district court sentenced him to 204 months of
imprisonment, 120 months for the carjacking count and 84 months
for the firearm count, to be served consecutively. Subsequently,
in June 2021, the district court, in case 3:14-cr-00217(JAG)
("Case No. 2"), revoked his supervised release term from the first
carjacking case and sentenced him to 12 months' imprisonment to be
served consecutively to the sentence imposed in Case No. 1.
Appellant now challenges both sentences -- arguing that
each is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We
consolidate the appeals in this opinion. "Writing solely for the
parties -- who know the facts, procedural history, and arguments
presented," United States v. Vega La-Torres, No. 20-1888, 2022 WL
2758271, at *1 (1st Cir. July 14, 2022), we address each case
seriatim.
Appeal 19-2128, Case No. 3:18-cr-00697-1(FAB) ("Case No. 1")
At the outset we note that Bauza-Saez did not preserve
his procedural reasonableness claim by objecting during his
sentence. As such, we review for plain error. United States v.
Arroyo-Maldonado, 791 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 2015). Because
Bauza-Saez requested a lower sentence in the district court, he
nonetheless preserved his substantive reasonableness claim.
Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020).
We review the same under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at
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766-67; United States v. Rijos-Rivera, No. 21-1721, 2022 WL
17090378, at *3 (1st Cir. Nov. 21, 2022).
After following the mandated procedures -- determining
the advisory guideline range, hearing from the parties as to
the appropriate sentence, and weighing the Section 3553(a)
factors1 -- the district court sentenced Bauza-Saez. The
district court judge considered the parties' sentencing
recommendations -- Bauza-Saez's request at the low end of the plea
agreement range (138 months) and the Government's request at the
high end (181 months). However, it disagreed that even the high
end of 181 months was an appropriate sentence, noting that this
was Bauza-Saez's second carjacking offense. Next, it took into
consideration the conduct of the current offense, that is,
carjacking and kidnapping the victim, assaulting her husband and
causing bodily injury, and further stealing and pawning their
belongings. In sum, the district court understood that a variant
sentence of 204 months more appropriately reflected the
seriousness of the offense, promoted respect for the law, protected
the public from further crimes by Bauza-Saez, and provided adequate
deterrence and punishment.
We fail to see just how the district court plainly erred
under our procedural-reasonableness caselaw. Bauza-Saez claims
1 The parties did not lodge any objections to the presentence
report.
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that the district court did not properly weigh his mitigating
circumstances (like, for example, his substance-abuse issues),
only alluding to the same, and suggests that "[t]houghtful
consideration of the circumstances of this case in light of the
[Section] 3553(a) factors would have resulted in a lower
sentence." The record evidences otherwise. "[I]t is incorrect to
assume -- as [Bauza-Saez] does -- that his failure to persuade the
court to impose a more lenient sentence implies that the mitigating
factors he cites were overlooked." United States v. Santa-Soler,
985 F.3d 93, 99 (1st Cir. 2021). Plus, a sentencing court need
not address every factor "one by one, in some sort of rote
incantation." United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir.
2006). And contrary to what Bauza-Saez suggests, the district
court's explanation satisfies the requirements of procedural
reasonableness, given how there is enough there to show us that it
"considered the parties' arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis" for
the sentence. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).2
As to the substantive reasonableness of the upward
variance, the district court clearly did not abuse its discretion,
Bauza-Saez claims that the district court erred by saying
2
he has no dependents when he has two daughters. An unobjected-to
portion of the presentence report mentioned the daughters but added
that they are not his dependents. And the district court could
rely on that unobjected-to part. United States v. Delgado-López,
837 F.3d 131, 135 (1st Cir. 2016). Moreover, it is evident that
the district court was aware of this fact at the sentencing
hearing.
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even if the variance is indeed steep. United States v. Díaz-Lugo,
963 F.3d 145, 157 (1st Cir. 2020). Rather than being arbitrary,
the district court's upward variance was justified as the court
explicitly emphasized the violent offense conduct displayed by
Bauza-Saez following his release from prison for his first
carjacking conviction.3
Finally, Bauza-Saez, without much ado, claims that the
interests of justice require his sentence to be vacated, as he
faithfully entered a plea agreement. Not respecting the sentence
recommendation, in turn, violates the "fairness, integrity and
reputation of judicial proceedings," he posits without any
elaboration. Such assertion does not find any support in our
jurisprudence. See United States v. Díaz-Rivera, 957 F.3d 20, 30
(1st Cir. 2020) ("To the extent [Defendant] argues that the
sentence is substantively unreasonable simply because the court
varied upwardly from the sentences the parties proposed in the
plea agreement and at sentencing, he is wrong."); United States v.
Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d 277, 294 (1st Cir. 2017) (noting that a
district court is not bound by the parties' recommendations);
United States v. Bermúdez-Meléndez, 827 F.3d 160, 165 (1st Cir.
2016) (finding that a district court need not explain its rejection
of the parties' recommendations).
3 Bauza-Saez's sentencing-disparity and sentence-stacking
suggestions are inadequately briefed and thus waived.
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Thus, we uphold the district court's sentence as we find
it both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Appeal 21-1510, Case No. 3:14-cr-00217(JAG) ("Case No. 2")
Bauza-Saez's second appeal challenges the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of his 12-month revocation sentence,
imposed consecutively to that in Case No. 1. But his arguments do
not persuade.
Bauza-Saez admits in his brief that he failed to preserve
his procedural error claim, and we note that the district court in
fact followed the required sentencing procedure. Moreover, and
contrary to Bauza-Saez's assertion, the record below does not
reflect that the district court erroneously felt bound by the
sentencing guidelines, which we presume experienced judges to
know. United States v. Vega-Salgado, 769 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir.
2014). Nor does the record show that the district court primarily
punished Bauza-Saez for his new criminal conduct. Rather, the
record shows that the district court -- when balancing the
Section 3553(a) factors -- properly relied on Bauza-Saez's major
breach of trust in committing serious violations on supervised
release. See United States v. Tanco-Pizarro, 892 F.3d 472, 481
(1st Cir. 2018) (discussing "breach of trust"). As for his claim
that the district court did not consider any mitigating evidence,
he did not discuss any in his revocation sentencing memorandum or
during his revocation sentencing. See United States v. Van Anh,
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523 F.3d 43, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that "[t]he district
court can hardly be faulted for not adequately considering an
argument that was never made to it"). And despite what he
contends, the record also shows that the district court gave him
a chance to allocute. See United States v. Pacheco, 727 F.3d 41,
49 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing allocution).
Insofar as substantive reasonableness is concerned, we
-- for the reasons already given -- reject Bauza-Saez's claim that
the district court failed to consider mitigating evidence. We
note too that the district court explicitly stated that it
considered the factors set forth in Section 3553(a). Such a
statement is "entitled to significant weight." United States v.
Márquez-García, 862 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United
States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 229, 233 (1st Cir. 2014)).
Moreover, the district court referred to the factors it understood
to carry greater weight, to wit, Bauza-Saez's violent recidivism,
the seriousness of his supervised release violation, and the need
to promote respect for the law. The district court was hence not
required to explicate Appellant's supervised release revocation
sentencing decision in further detail. See United States v.
Butler-Acevedo, 656 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir. 2011). In sum, none of
these matters come even close to plain error.
Ultimately, Bauza-Saez's challenge rests upon the
preserved claim that his revocation sentence should run
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concurrently to his new criminal sentence in Case No. 1. Neither
statute nor sentencing guidelines require, nor even suggest, that
result. Indeed, the guidelines provide that a revocation sentence
should run consecutively to any other sentence being served, even
if the other sentence gave rise to the supervised release
revocation. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). The district court here
specifically noted that a consecutive sentence was necessary "to
comply with the purposes of . . . Section 3553 and to lend some
meaning to revocation of supervised release." Given this, we fail
to find any abuse of discretion on the district court's behalf.
To the contrary, the district court well recognized that punishment
for supervised release violations serves an independent purpose
than that of ordinary punishment for an offense itself.
Affirmed.
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