FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 24 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAVON JONES, No. 11-56713
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-07402-ODW-RZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 18, 2013**
Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Ravon Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations in connection with
his arrest and prosecution for armed robbery. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jones’s Fourth
Amendment false arrest and imprisonment claim because Jones failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants had probable cause for
his arrest and prosecution. See United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th
Cir. 2007) (defining probable cause and explaining that it is an objective standard);
Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) (a plaintiff must show there was no probable cause in order to prevail on a
section 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment); cf. McSherry v. City of Long
Beach, 584 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2009) (a judicial decision to hold a defendant
to answer after a preliminary hearing is prima facie evidence of probable cause,
which can only be rebutted by evidence that “the criminal prosecution was induced
by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct
undertaken in bad faith”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jones’s Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim because Jones failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether “enforcement had a discriminatory effect and
[defendants] were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Lacey v. Maricopa
County, 693 F.3d 896, 920 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks
2 11-56713
omitted) (identifying the requirements for an equal protection claim).
Jones’s contentions that the district court overlooked evidence and failed to
take into account his pro se status are unsupported by the record.
AFFIRMED.
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