UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4554
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BONNIE FRANCIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:09-
cr-00012-RWT-1)
Submitted: June 20, 2013 Decided: June 25, 2013
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
David I. Schoen, DAVID I. SCHOEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Montgomery,
Alabama, for Appellant. Christen Anne Sproule, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Bonnie L.
Francis pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 100
or more kilograms of marijuana. In the plea agreement, Francis
agreed to waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence,
except to the extent that his sentence exceeds the Guidelines
range for offense level 28 if he meets the criteria set forth in
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 5C1.2(a)(1)-(5), or the
Guidelines range for offense level 30 if he does not. The
district court found that Francis did not meet the § 5C1.2(a)
criteria, but sentenced him to a term of 78 months’
imprisonment, which represented the low end of the Guidelines
range for offense level 28.
On appeal, Francis’ attorney filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning the
validity of the guilty plea and the reasonableness of the
sentence. Francis was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but has not done so. The Government has
moved to dismiss Francis’ appeal based on the appellate waiver
provision in his plea agreement. We dismiss in part and affirm
in part.
2
We review a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights de
novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.
2005). “A defendant may waive his right to appeal if that
waiver is the result of a knowing and intelligent decision to
forgo the right to appeal.” United States v. Amaya-Portillo,
423 F.3d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th
Cir. 2002) (providing standard). Generally, if the district
court fully questions the defendant about the waiver during the
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 plea colloquy, the waiver is valid and
enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th
Cir. 2005). We will enforce a valid waiver so long as “the
issue being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” Blick,
408 F.3d at 168.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Francis’ waiver of appellate rights was knowing and intelligent.
Turning to the scope of the waiver, we conclude that the
sentencing issue raised in the Anders brief falls within the
scope of the appellate waiver provision. Francis was sentenced
to 78-months’ imprisonment, a sentence within the range in which
Francis waived his right to appeal. Thus, we grant the
Government’s motion to dismiss Francis’ appeal of his sentence
and dismiss this portion of the appeal.
3
The waiver provision does not, however, preclude our
review of the validity of Francis’ guilty plea pursuant to
Anders. We have reviewed the plea colloquy for plain error and
have found none. See United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517,
525 (4th Cir. 2002) (providing standard); see also United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing plain error
standard). Further, Francis waived any issues with respect to
suppression of evidence or speedy trial by entering his guilty
plea. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320 (1983) (“[A]
guilty plea results in the defendant’s loss of any meaningful
opportunity he might otherwise have had to challenge the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.”); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)
(“[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events
which has preceded it in the criminal process.”).
In accordance with the dictates of Anders, we have
reviewed the entire record and have found no meritorious issues
that are outside the scope of the appeal waiver. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment as to all issues not
encompassed by Francis’ valid waiver of his right to appeal his
conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel
inform Francis, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Francis
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
4
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Francis. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
5