IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 95-20728
Summary Calendar
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WENDY WRIGHT, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
WENDY WRIGHT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees,
STATE OF TEXAS; PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF HOUSTON AND SOUTHEAST TEXAS,
INC.; HOUSTON WOMEN'S CLINIC, INC.; WOMEN'S PAVILION INC.; WOMEN'S
MEDICAL CENTER OF NORTHWEST HOUSTON; AAA CONCERNED WOMEN'S CENTER,
INC.; AARON'S FAMILY PLANNING CENTER OF HOUSTON, INC.; DOWNTOWN
WOMEN'S CENTER, INC.; WEST LOOP CLINIC; MEDICAL CENTER WOMEN'S
CLINIC; SUBURBAN WOMEN'S CLINIC; O'CONNOR & COMPANY, doing business
as Adkins Architectural Antiques; BRIAN G. MARTINEZ, D.D.S.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
USDC No. CA-H-94-2755
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May 14, 1996
Before JOLLY, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Wendy Wright, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of her
complaint, which was dismissed on the basis that her claims were
res judicata because they had been adjudicated in state court.
Wright contends that the state court judgment was void because the
state court judge conspired with the defendants against her and the
other district court plaintiffs. She also contends that the
district court action was not res judicata because there was no
final judgment on the merits of the state court action; because the
state court grant of summary judgment did not dispose of claims as
to which there were material factual issues; because new claims
were raised in the federal action that could not have been raised
in the state court action; and because the plaintiffs raised claims
in their federal action that were new and independent from their
state court action.
We will not consider the allegations Wright makes for the
first time on appeal about the state court judge’s personal and
professional relationships with the attorneys for the defendants.
Resolution of those allegations would require us to make factual
determinations. Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir.
1991). The allegations that the state court judge conspired with
the defendants solely because she favors legalized abortion are
conclusional and are insufficient to support a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir.
1992).
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With the exception of her conspiracy argument, Wright does not
brief her res judicata contentions beyond merely stating them; she
has failed to brief those contentions and has therefore abandoned
them. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).
However, because the following issues were raised by the appellees
and responded to by Wright, we will proceed to address them.
Stephens v. C.I.T. Group/Equipment Financing, Inc., 955 F.2d 1023,
1026 (5th Cir. 1992).
First, Wright was a party to the state court action when the
state court granted summary judgment on most of the plaintiff’s
claims. Wright’s contention that her later dismissal from the
lawsuit rendered the summary judgment against her without effect is
incorrect.
Second, assuming that the plaintiffs’ state court malicious
prosecution and § 1983 claims were nonsuited without prejudice, as
they alleged in the district court, those claims would not be
barred as res judicata in a federal action. See KT Bolt Mfg. Co.
v. Texas Elec. Coops., 837 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
Because the plaintiffs’ conspiracy allegations against the state
court judge were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim, they are
insufficient to support claims of state action against the
remaining defendants, none of whom are otherwise state actors.
Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 480 (5th Cir. 1992). Additionally,
the plaintiffs’ state law malicious prosecution action was barred
by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Patrick v.
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Howard, 904 S.W.2d 941, 943-44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); Guaranty
County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 700 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.002(a)(West supp. 1996).
Finally, the appellees’ motions for sanctions against Wright are
DENIED.
The judgment of the district court is therefore
A F F I R M E D.
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