IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0067
Filed December 21, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MAURICE OLANDERS LOYD,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County,
Christopher C. Polking, Judge.
Maurice Olanders Loyd appeals his conviction for third-degree sexual
abuse. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Maurice Olanders Loyd appeals his conviction for third-degree sexual
abuse. The sole issue is whether the complaining witness’s statements to a deputy
sheriff, captured in a body camera video, are inadmissible hearsay. Because the
trial court did not err by admitting the evidence under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule, we affirm.
A jury found Loyd guilty of third-degree sexual abuse for performing a sex
act on M.W. against her will in July 2021. Loyd was a guest in M.W.’s home on
that night. After falling asleep alone in her bedroom, M.W. awoke with Loyd on top
of her. Loyd was undressed, and his fingers were inside M.W.’s vagina.
M.W.’s roommate heard noises coming from M.W.’s bedroom and went to
investigate. When he arrived, he saw that M.W. was “clearly visibly upset” while
Loyd was shirtless with his pants unzipped. The roommate removed Loyd from
the bedroom before contacting several people about what happened, including
Loyd’s uncle.1 The uncle arrived at the home and struck Loyd, prompting a
neighbor to call law enforcement.
Deputy Preston King of the Boone County Sheriff’s Department was the first
officer to respond to the call. M.W. approached Deputy King to explain what
happened to her. Deputy King described M.W. as “very visibly upset,” “sobbing,
crying hysterically,” and “looked to be in general great distress.” The deputy said,
“Tell me what happened.” M.W. replied, “I woke up because I was getting like
1 Loyd was introduced to M.W. through his uncle, who worked with M.W. and her
roommate. The roommate called Loyd’s uncle after he removed Loyd from M.W.’s
bedroom.
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jostled around. And when I like—I think I was like half asleep and he was like—
like fingering me. And I like came forward, and he had like some of it like inside
me.”
At trial, the State introduced video recorded by Deputy King’s body camera
showing M.W.’s statements. Loyd objected to the evidence as hearsay, but the
trial court admitted it under the exception for excited utterances. See Iowa R. Evid.
5.803(2). Loyd challenges that ruling on appeal. We review the admissibility of
hearsay for correction of errors at law. See State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590,
597 (Iowa 2021).
An excited utterance is any statement “relating to a startling event or
condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it
caused.” Id. at 601 (quoting Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(2)). Excited utterances are an
exception to the general rule that hearsay is not admissible because “when a
declarant makes a statement under the stress of the excitement, the declarant is
less likely to fabricate than if the statement was made under reflection or
deliberation.” Id. The court considers five factors in determining whether a
statement falls under the exception:
(1) the time lapse between the event and the statement, (2) the
extent to which questioning elicited the statements that otherwise
would not have been volunteered, (3) the age and condition of the
declarant, (4) the characteristics of the event being described, and
(5) the subject matter of the statement.
Id. (quoting State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Iowa 1999)). Loyd challenges
the admissibility of M.W.’s statements as excited utterances based on the first
three factors.
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The district court did not err by admitting the statements under the excited
utterance exception. Witnesses estimated that the assault occurred between 9:00
and 10:30 p.m. M.W. began speaking to the deputy at 10:40 p.m. “While time-
lapse is important, statements made hours and even days after the event have
been admissible,” with statements “on the high end of the range” more likely to be
permitted when a child makes them. Id. Although M.W. was twenty-five years old,
a lapse of one and one-half hours between the event and her statements would
not, alone, bar their admission as excited utterances given the nature of what
happened. Awakening to vaginal penetration by a near-stranger qualifies as a
“startling event.” It is believable that M.W. would be under the stress of excitement
that it caused even if it occurred at the far end of the estimated range. It is also
evident that M.W. was still in that excited state when she approached the deputy
to state what happened to her.
Even so, Loyd cannot show that the video’s admission affected his
substantial rights. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a) (“A party may claim error in a ruling
to admit . . . evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party . . . .”).
The State called M.W. as a witness at trial, and she testified that she awoke to find
Loyd on top of her and penetrating her vagina. Although M.W. was “not 100
percent” certain that Loyd had penetrated her with his penis, she knew “for a fact”
that his fingers were in her vagina.2 The video of her statements was merely
2Loyd argues that M.W.’s statement to the deputy “implied” his penis penetrated
her vagina and only claimed it was his fingers “when they found no semen in her
underwear.” Setting aside the fact that the lack of semen evidence does not rule
out penile penetration, M.W. tells the deputy that Loyd was “fingering” her and
some of “it” penetrated her. Whether “it” referred to Loyd’s fingers or his penis is
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cumulative to her testimony. See State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Iowa
1998) (stating that “we will not find prejudice if the admitted hearsay is merely
cumulative”).
Because the court did not err by admitting the video of M.W.’s statements
to the deputy at trial, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
immaterial as the definition of “sex act” encompasses both. See Iowa Code
§ 702.17 (2021).
State of Iowa v. Maurice Olanders Loyd
Combined Opinion