USCA4 Appeal: 21-4021 Doc: 40 Filed: 12/22/2022 Pg: 1 of 3
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PHILIP STEPHEN STALLINGS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:19-cr-00635-WO-1)
Submitted: December 20, 2022 Decided: December 22, 2022
Before NIEMEYER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Seth A. Neyhart, LAW OFFICE OF SETH A. NEYHART, Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States Attorney, Eric L.
Iverson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4021 Doc: 40 Filed: 12/22/2022 Pg: 2 of 3
PER CURIAM:
Philip Stephen Stallings pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
transporting child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), (b)(1). The
district court sentenced Stallings to 150 months’ imprisonment, a sentence below the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Stallings argues that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a criminal sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the Guidelines range,” for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); see United States v. Blue, 877
F.3d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 2017). This review requires consideration of both the procedural
and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Blue, 877 F.3d at 517. In determining
procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court properly calculated the
defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an
appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently
explained the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51. We have confirmed that
Stallings’ sentence is procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d
213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019).
If there are no procedural errors, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, evaluating “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A
sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the statutory
purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “Any sentence that is within or below a
properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a
2
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4021 Doc: 40 Filed: 12/22/2022 Pg: 3 of 3
presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d
295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Stallings argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district
court did not give adequate weight or consideration to several of the relevant factors in
Stallings’ background. However, the record shows that the district court considered the
sentencing factors raised by defense counsel and engaged defense counsel in an extensive
discussion of these factors. Ultimately, the court granted a downward variance but noted
that it would not vary as far as defense counsel requested because it weighed defense
counsel’s arguments differently. Our review convinces us that the district court carefully
evaluated the § 3553(a) factors and gave due consideration to Stallings’ mitigating
arguments when imposing its sentence. In light of the “extremely broad” discretion
afforded to a district court in determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors in imposing sentence, United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011),
Stallings fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded his below-Guidelines
sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that Stallings’ sentence is substantively reasonable.
We therefore affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3