USCA4 Appeal: 21-4187 Doc: 18 Filed: 01/04/2023 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4187
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER RAEKWON ALLEN MILES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:20-cr-00229-WO-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2022 Decided: January 4, 2023
Before WYNN and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States
Attorney, Mary Ann Courtney, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Christopher Raekwon Allen Miles appeals the 66-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). On appeal, Miles challenges the district court’s imposition
of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with
another felony offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2018).
He also argues that his sentence, which is above the high end of the advisory Guidelines
range, is substantively unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the
Guidelines range,” for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first evaluate the sentence
for significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,
insufficiently considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or inadequately explaining the
chosen sentence. United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020). We then
consider whether the sentence is substantively reasonable; that is, we examine whether the
sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to “satisf[y] the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
When considering a challenge to the district court’s application of the Guidelines,
we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear
error. United States v. Allen, 909 F.3d 671, 677 (4th Cir. 2018). If the district court’s
factual findings are “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” we “may not
reverse” for clear error. Butts v. United States, 930 F.3d 234, 238 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal
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quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[u]nder the clear error standard, we will only reverse
if left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United
States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 225 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) directs a four-level enhancement if the defendant “used or
possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” USSG
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). A firearm is possessed “in connection with” another felony offense “if
the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony
offense.” USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A); see United States v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160, 162
(4th Cir. 2009). “[T]his standard is not especially burdensome: We will find it satisfied
when a firearm has some purpose or effect with respect to the other offense, including cases
where a firearm is present for protection or to embolden the actor.” United States v.
Bolden, 964 F.3d 283, 287 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). To impose
the enhancement, a district court must find the underlying facts by a preponderance of the
evidence; that is, the court must “believe that the existence of [the] fact[s] is more probable
than [their] nonexistence.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court found that Miles possessed a firearm in connection with the
drug trafficking offense of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Miles concedes
that the evidence supports that he engaged in a felony drug trafficking offense, but he
argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he possessed the firearm in
connection with that offense. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence from which the court could find that it was more likely than not that the
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firearm emboldened Miles or was present for the protection of his drug trafficking activity.
Accordingly, the court did not clearly err in imposing the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)
sentencing enhancement.
Turning to Miles’ challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, * a
sentence is substantively reasonable only if it is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,”
to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Accordingly, in
reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, we consider “the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in
concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Nance,
957 F.3d at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a sentence outside the
Guidelines range, we “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the
extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Miles’ sentence of 66 months’ imprisonment was 15 months above the high end of
the advisory Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months’ imprisonment. However, the district
court thoroughly discussed how the § 3553(a) factors justified the sentence imposed,
reasoning that this variance was necessary to serve the statutory purpose of deterrence
given Miles’ persistent recidivism, disregard for others’ safety, and overly lenient prior
*
Although Miles does not dispute the procedural reasonableness of his sentence on
grounds other than the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement, we conclude that the
sentence is otherwise procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d
213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that court must ensure sentence’s procedural
reasonableness before addressing defendant’s challenge to substantive reasonableness).
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sentences. The court also emphasized that Miles had fired the illegal firearm into the air
eight times on one occasion, seriously endangering the public, and that this conduct was
not incorporated in the calculation of his advisory Guidelines range. In light of the court’s
thorough explanation, we conclude that Miles’ sentence is substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm Miles’ criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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