Susan Ronnfeldt v. Shelby County Chris A. Myrtue Memorial Hospital d/b/a Myrtue Medical Center and Shelby County Medical Corp.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 22–0365

Submitted November 16, 2022—Filed January 6, 2023

SUSAN RONNFELDT,

Appellant,

vs.

SHELBY COUNTY CHRIS A. MYRTUE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL d/b/a
MYRTUE MEDICAL CENTER and SHELBY COUNTY MEDICAL
CORPORATION,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Shelby County, Richard H.

Davidson, Judge.

The plaintiff appeals from the district court’s order vacating the plaintiff’s

prior voluntary dismissal of her medical malpractice action without prejudice

and dismissing the plaintiff’s case with prejudice. REVERSED.

Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all participating

justices joined. Christensen, C.J., took no part in the consideration or decision

of the case.

David J. Cripe of Hauptman O’Brien Wolf & Lathrop, Omaha, Nebraska,

for appellant.

Frederick T. Harris, Bryony J. Whitaker, Theodore T. Appel, and Agnieszka

Gaertner (until withdrawal) of Lamson Dugan & Murray, West Des Moines, for

appellees.
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OXLEY, Justice.

In 2017, the Iowa General Assembly enacted Iowa Code section 147.140,

tightening the expert witness requirements for plaintiffs in medical malpractice

actions. Section 147.140 requires the plaintiff to file a certificate of merit affidavit

within sixty days of the defendant’s answer; failure to do so “shall result . . . in

dismissal with prejudice.” Iowa Code § 147.140(6) (2021). The fighting issue in

this case is whether that statute’s dismissal requirement trumps a plaintiff’s

right under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943 to voluntarily dismiss her case,

once, without prejudice. The defendants contend that it does since their section

147.140 motion to dismiss was filed before the plaintiff’s rule 1.943 dismissal.

They also argue that the statute and rule are irreconcilable, meaning section

147.140 should control. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the two can be

harmonized and the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of her case was without

prejudice.

I. Factual and Procedural History.

In May 2016, Ronnfeldt underwent a hernia repair surgery at Myrtue

Medical Center in Shelby County. A CT scan revealed a “significant enlargement

of [her] uterus” which, according to the notes in the medical records, warranted

follow-up discussions and investigation. But Ronnfeldt was never informed of

the results of the scan or referred for further treatment. Four years later,

Ronnfeldt returned to Myrtue Medical Center complaining of abdominal pain.

Another CT scan revealed the mass had “significantly increased in size” and was
 3

now a tumor. After surgery to remove the tumor, Ronnfeldt was diagnosed with

stage IV uterine cancer.

Ronnfeldt sued Myrtue Medical Center alleging medical negligence; she

added Shelby County Medical Corporation as a defendant in her amended

petition (both will be collectively referred to as “Myrtue” in this opinion). Myrtue

filed its answer on July 1, 2021, giving Ronnfeldt sixty days to file a certificate of

merit affidavit. See Iowa Code § 147.140(1)(a). On October 27—118 days after

Myrtue’s answer—Ronnfeldt had yet to file such a certificate, so Myrtue moved

to dismiss her petition with prejudice. See id. § 147.140(6) (providing dismissal

with prejudice as the remedy for “[f]ailure to substantially comply with” the

certificate of merit requirement).

The same day, Ronnfeldt voluntarily dismissed her petition. See Iowa R.

Civ. P. 1.943 (“A party may, without order of court, dismiss that party’s own

petition . . . . [The first] dismissal under this rule shall be without prejudice.”).

The district court entered an order noting that a review of the file revealed the

voluntary dismissal, that the clerk of court had closed the file, and that Myrtue’s

motion to dismiss was now moot. Myrtue moved the court to reconsider, arguing

that dismissal with prejudice was mandatory under section 147.140, and

Ronnfeldt could not avoid that statutory mandate by filing a rule 1.943 voluntary

dismissal. The court agreed that it retained jurisdiction to consider Myrtue’s

motion to dismiss, which it then granted, dismissing Ronnfeldt’s claims with

prejudice.
 4

Ronnfeldt appealed, arguing her voluntary dismissal terminated the case

in the district court and that, if section 147.140 does trump rule 1.943, “the

legislature usurped the authority of the judiciary when it enacted [section]

147.140,” violating the separation-of-powers doctrine. We retained the appeal.

We hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Myrtue’s

motion to dismiss. Ronnfeldt’s voluntary dismissal was self-executing and ended

the case, leaving nothing for the district court to dismiss.

II. Error Preservation and Standard of Review.

As Myrtue notes, Ronnfeldt’s appellate brief fails to identify where in the

record her separation-of-powers argument was raised and decided in the district

court. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(1) (providing that the argument section of

appellate briefs “shall include . . . [a] statement addressing how the issue was

preserved for appellate review, with references to the places in the record where

the issue was raised and decided”). We generally will not do a party’s work for

them, particularly if that “require[s] us to assume a partisan role and undertake

the [party’s] research and advocacy.” Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins.,

215 N.W.2d 239, 239–40 (Iowa 1974) (en banc); see also State v. Stoen,

596 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Iowa 1999) (“[W]here a party’s failure to comply with the

appellate rules requires the court ‘to assume a partisan role . . .,’ we will dismiss

the appeal.” (quoting Inghram, 215 N.W.2d at 240)).

On our review of the record, we do not see where Ronnfeldt’s separation-

of-powers argument was preserved for appeal. “Generally, we will only review an

issue raised on appeal if it was first presented to and ruled on by the district
 5

court.” State v. Mitchell, 757 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Iowa 2008). This includes

constitutional issues. See id. To preserve a challenge to the constitutional

validity of a statute, litigants must raise the issue “at the earliest available time

in the progress of the case.” State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Iowa 1999)

(quoting State v. McCright, 569 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1997)). Ronnfeldt did not

raise a constitutional challenge to section 147.140 in her resistance to Myrtue’s

motion to reconsider, or indeed, based on our review of the record, at any point

in the district court proceedings. Because Ronnfeldt’s brief fails to identify

anything in the record to the contrary, we agree with Myrtue that the

constitutional challenge is not properly preserved for our review. Myrtue

concedes, however, that Ronnfeldt’s statutory and jurisdictional arguments were

preserved by her resistance to Myrtue’s motion to reconsider, where she first

made these arguments.

We review both a motion to dismiss and a district court’s statutory

construction for correction of errors at law. Struck v. Mercy Health Servs.-Iowa

Corp., 973 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Iowa 2022).

III. Analysis.

This case presents an issue of statutory construction: can section 147.140

and rule 1.943 coexist, or do those provisions irreconcilably conflict? Our rules

of civil procedure “have the force and effect of statute,” Helland v. Yellow Freight

Sys., Inc., 204 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Iowa 1973) (en banc) (quoting Johnson v. Iowa

State Highway Comm’n, 134 N.W.2d 916, 917 (Iowa 1965)); see also City of Sioux

City v. Freese, 611 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (“[T]he
 6

rules of civil procedure . . . have the force and effect of law.” (citation omitted)),

and “are subject to rules of statutory construction,” State v. Luckett,

387 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Iowa 1986). In the event of an apparent conflict between

statutes, “they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both.”

Iowa Code § 4.7. We do not apply one statute over another unless the conflict

between the provisions is irreconcilable. See id. §§ 4.7–.8. “If more than one

statute relating to the subject matter at issue is relevant to the inquiry, we

consider all the statutes together in an effort to harmonize them. Harmonization

of the applicable statutes evidences the true intent of the legislature.” State v.

Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (citations omitted).

Turning to the provisions at issue, we hold they are not irreconcilably conflicting.

As always, “we start with the language of the statute.” Beverage v. Alcoa,

Inc., 975 N.W.2d 670, 680 (Iowa 2022). In 2017 the Iowa General Assembly

enacted Senate File 465, titled “AN ACT relating to medical malpractice claims,

including noneconomic damage awards and expert witnesses, and including

applicability provisions.” 2017 Iowa Acts ch. 107 (codified at Iowa Code § 135P.1

(2018); id. §§ 147.136A, .139–.140). As its name implies, the act was limited to

medical malpractice legislation. It imposed stricter requirements on the

qualifications for expert witnesses in medical malpractice suits, id. § 3 (codified

at Iowa Code § 147.139 (2018)), and adopted a certificate of merit requirement

for plaintiffs to keep their claims in court, id. § 4 (codified at Iowa Code section
 7

147.140 (2018)).1 Pursuant to these new provisions, in a cause of action against

a healthcare provider that requires expert testimony, the plaintiff must, “prior to

the commencement of discovery in the case and within sixty days of the

defendant’s answer, serve upon the defendant a certificate of merit affidavit

signed by an expert witness with respect to the issue of standard of care and an

alleged breach of the standard.” Iowa Code § 147.140(1)(a). “Failure to

substantially comply with [the certificate of merit requirement] shall result, upon

motion, in dismissal with prejudice of each cause of action as to which expert

witness testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie case.” Id. § 147.140(6).

Our appellate courts have addressed this statute by published opinion

only twice. In Struck v. Mercy Health Services-Iowa Corp., we held that a plaintiff

did not get another opportunity to flesh out any “ordinary negligence” claims that

might not need an expert after missing the certificate of merit deadline. 973

N.W.2d at 541 (“By alleging only ‘professional negligence’ claims and not filing a

certificate of merit, [Struck] effectively pleaded herself out of court. If Struck

really has ordinary negligence claims that don’t require expert testimony, she

should have alleged them in her petition or moved for leave to amend to add

them, neither of which she did.” (citation omitted)). And in McHugh v. Smith, the

court of appeals held that a plaintiff could not meet the certificate of merit

requirement with discovery responses, which were themselves provided well

1Iowa is not unique; “[a]t least twenty-eight other states have enacted certificate or
affidavit of merit statutes.” Struck, 973 N.W.2d at 541 (citing John D. North, Tort Reform—
Certificate of Merit, 9 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts. § 103:31 (5th ed. 2021)).
 8

beyond the sixty-day deadline. 966 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021). Both

cases reveal that the sixty-day dismissal rule is strict.

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.943, on the other hand, is of much older

vintage; not to mention the pedigree of the rule it codifies. Colloquially referred

to as the two-dismissal rule, the current rule provides:

A party may, without order of court, dismiss that party’s own
petition . . . at any time up until ten days before the trial is scheduled
to begin. . . . A dismissal under this rule shall be without prejudice,
unless otherwise stated; but if made by any party who has
previously dismissed an action against the same defendant, . . . such
dismissal shall operate as an adjudication against that party on the
merits, unless otherwise ordered by the court, in the interests of
justice.

Id. Originally numbered as rule 215 prior to the 2001 restyling, the rule was

included with our first enactment of a unified body of civil procedure rules in

1943. See Iowa Code, Rule of Civil Procedure No. 215 (1946); Lawson v.

Kurtzhals, 792 N.W.2d 251, 256 (Iowa 2010) (“In 1943, Iowa Rule of Civil

Procedure 215, now renumbered as rule 1.943, was enacted.”). Prior to that,

statutes allowed voluntary dismissals “any time up to the moment before ‘final

submission to [the] jury or court.’ ” Lawson, 792 N.W.2d at 256 (alteration in

original) (quoting Jeffords v. Stockton, 117 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1962)); see

also Iowa Code § 1803 (1851) (“When there is no counter-claim to be considered

the plaintiff may at any time before the jury return with their verdict submit to

a non-suit at his own cost.”). The dismissal was both automatic and without

prejudice to refiling. See Marsh v. Graham, 6 Clarke 76, 77 (Iowa 1858) (“The

submitting to the non-suit is [the plaintiff’s] own act, and not the act or decision

of the court, and does not prevent the commencement of a new suit, for the same
 9

cause of action. This rule we understand to be well settled, where, as in this

case, the plaintiff is voluntarily non-suited.”). When rule 215 was enacted, the

cutoff for a voluntary dismissal was moved up to the start of trial, apparently in

an effort to mirror the parallel federal rule as it existed at that time. See Iowa R.

Civ. P. 1.943 official comment enactment 1943 (noting rule 215 “adopted the

substance of Federal Rule 41”). In 1990, the cutoff was again moved up, this

time in response to concerns about fairness to defendants when plaintiffs

dismissed their cases “at the last minute before trial or when the plaintiff could

not obtain a continuance of the trial.” Id. official comment amendment 1990.

Rather than move in lock-step with the federal rule like it had before, however,

finding that rule had become “too harsh for plaintiffs,” the cutoff date was only

moved up to the last ten days before trial. Id. It remains there today.2 Id. r. 1.943.

Throughout the rule’s history, its purpose has been “primarily . . . to give a

litigant a right to dismiss without the consent of the court or the opposing party,

and to define when [the litigant] may do this.” Jeffords, 117 N.W.2d at 500

(quoting Mensing v. Sturgeon, 97 N.W.2d 145, 148–49 (Iowa 1959)).

We have characterized the plaintiff’s right to dismiss under this rule as

“absolute.” See Valles v. Mueting, 956 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Iowa 2021) (noting that

2This timing continues to distinguish rule 1.943 from its federal counterpart—Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41—and federal cases cited by Myrtue applying that rule. See, e.g.,
Morrow v. United States, 47 F.4th 700, 703–04 (8th Cir. 2022). Under the federal rule, a plaintiff’s
right to unilaterally dismiss without prejudice is cut off once the defendant “serves either an
answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B). Thereafter,
plaintiffs must obtain either the defendants’ agreement or the court’s permission to dismiss their
case. Id. R. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(2); see also Morrow, 47 F.4th at 704 (“Because [the Plaintiffs] moved
for voluntary dismissal after [the government] filed its answer, the action could be dismissed
‘only by court order, on terms the court considers proper.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting
Graham v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 998 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2021))).
 10

under rule 1.943, the plaintiff “had the absolute right to dismiss the . . .

defendants when she did”); Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Iowa 1994)

(“Under rule [1.943], a party has an absolute right to dismiss the action” within

the time window provided); Smith v. Lally, 379 N.W.2d 914, 916 (Iowa 1986)

(“[P]laintiffs’ [voluntary] dismissal of their action in Scott County was absolute

and deprived the court of jurisdiction of the case.”). By “absolute,” we refer to the

rule’s “self-executing” nature—a voluntary dismissal does not require a court

order for it to take effect, see Valles, 956 N.W.2d at 484 (noting plaintiff had the

right to dismiss “without court approval,” meaning her “dismissal was self-

executing”), and courts do not have discretion to deny it, Lawson, 792 N.W.2d at

256 (“The phrase ‘without order of court’ indicates that this may be done at the

will of the party; thus, the court retains no discretion to prevent such

dismissal.”), as long as it is filed before the ten-day-before-trial cutoff. Once

properly filed, “a dismissal without prejudice under rule [1.943] ordinarily

deprives . . . court[s] of jurisdiction,” in the sense that it eliminates a live case or

controversy for the court to exercise authority over. Venard, 524 N.W.2d at 167.

Looking to the plain text of these provisions it is clear that they do not

intersect, except in the broad sense that both provide mechanisms for dismissing

cases; otherwise, section 147.140 says nothing about voluntary dismissals, and

rule 1.943 says nothing about compliance with a certificate of merit requirement.

Compare Iowa Code § 147.140 (2021), with Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943. The narrow

issue we face, then, is whether the requirement for dismissal with prejudice in

section 147.140 directly conflicts with a voluntary dismissal without prejudice
 11

under rule 1.943. We believe both may be given effect without placing them at

odds: a rule 1.943 dismissal ends the case, leaving nothing to dismiss under

section 147.140; absent a rule 1.943 dismissal, section 147.140 continues to

govern the case. See State v. Peters, 525 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Iowa 1994) (“Statutes

covering the same ground are not irreconcilable if they can be read ‘in pari

materia.’ ”).

The provisions only directly conflict if Myrtue is correct that section

147.140 effectively created a vested right to dismissal with prejudice—i.e., upon

filing its motion to dismiss for failing to timely file a certificate of merit affidavit,

section 147.140 immediately and automatically entitled Myrtue to that outcome.

As the legislature drafted it, however, section 147.140 is not self-executing. Filing

a motion to enforce the statute is only the first step in the process of dismissing

a cause of action with prejudice under section 147.140. The district court must

then determine: whether the case “includes a cause of action for which expert

testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie case,” thereby triggering section

147.140 to begin with, Iowa Code § 147.140(1)(a); whether the “substantial

compliance” standard was met, see id. § 147.140(1)(b), (6); and whether the case

includes any causes of action not requiring an expert, since dismissal applies

only to “each cause of action as to which expert witness testimony is necessary

to establish a prima facie case,” id. § 147.140(6). These are substantive decisions

the district court must make after a defendant files a motion under section

147.140. See, e.g., Struck, 973 N.W.2d at 541 (addressing whether any of the

allegations in plaintiff’s petition asserted ordinary negligence claims not subject
 12

to the certificate of merit requirement that could survive dismissal after the

plaintiff failed to file a timely certificate of merit); McHugh, 966 N.W.2d at 291–

92 (concluding that “the timing of the certificate of merit affidavit is material”

and holding that “[e]ven if the interrogatory answers were equivalent to the

certification of merit affidavit,” the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with

the requirements of section 147.140 where the answers were not completed until

118 days after the defendant’s answer). As long as there is a live case, the district

court can address a defendant’s section 147.140 challenge.

But dismissal under rule 1.943 is self-executing. Once the plaintiff

voluntarily dismisses her case under rule 1.943, the district court lacks

jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the case, including the section 147.140

motion to dismiss, see Venard, 524 N.W.2d at 167, leaving nothing left to

dismiss with prejudice. Nothing in section 147.140 suggests it survives an

otherwise proper dismissal to support Myrtue’s claim to a vested right to a ruling

on its motion to dismiss. We will not read a conflict into the statute that is not

there. See Taschner v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 86 N.W.2d 915, 920 (Iowa

1957) (“An act is not impliedly repealed because of conflict, inconsistency, or

repugnancy between it and a later act unless the conflict, inconsistency, or

repugnancy is plain, unavoidable and irreconcilable.” (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes

§ 291(b) (1953))).

The statute’s use of the mandatory “shall” directive does not change this

analysis. We have rejected this argument in the related context of a summary

judgment motion, where the governing rule of civil procedure uses similar
 13

mandatory language: “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the

[record] show[s] . . . that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3) (emphasis added). Despite this mandatory

language, a pending motion for summary judgment does not foreclose a plaintiff

from dismissing her case without prejudice and refiling the same lawsuit. See

Sorensen v. Shaklee Corp., 461 N.W.2d 324, 324–25 (Iowa 1990) (en banc). In

Sorensen v. Shaklee Corp., the plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal of their

products liability case after the defendant moved for summary judgment and the

district court had held a hearing on that motion. Id. at 325. We relied on the

express language of rule 1.943 to reject the district court’s conclusion “that

plaintiffs were without authority to dismiss their suit” while the summary

judgment motion was pending. Id. The only textual limitation on a plaintiff’s right

to unilaterally dismiss her case was (at that time) the start of trial, and nothing

in the summary judgment rule, including the mandatory “shall,” negated that

right. Id. The pending summary judgment motion did not cut off the plaintiffs’

right to voluntary dismissal; rather, the dismissal mooted the summary

judgment motion. Id. at 325–26; see also Venard, 524 N.W.2d at 168 (holding

that plaintiff had an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss his action even to avoid

a pending summary judgment motion).

Likewise, that section 147.140’s dismissal remedy is explicitly provided for

in the statute, and that it is “with prejudice” rather than without, does not reveal

the legislature intended an implicit exception to rule 1.943. Myrtue argues we

anticipated such an outcome in Venard, when we held that section 668.11 and
 14

rule 1.943 did not conflict because, inter alia, “[s]ection 668.11 says nothing

about dismissal of any lawsuit.” 524 N.W.2d at 167. Therefore, Myrtue argues,

a statute that does say something about dismissal is in conflict with rule 1.943.

Although that distinction factored into our analysis in Venard, it did so only as

further evidence in support of our holding that those provisions were not related,

and therefore did not conflict; not as an implicit holding unto itself. See id. at

167–68. The lack of a dismissal remedy in section 668.11 solidified the

conclusion that there was no relationship between that statute and rule 1.943,

but that does not mean a statute which does provide for dismissal necessarily

creates an irreconcilable conflict with rule 1.943. Cf. Sorensen, 461 N.W.2d at

325–26 (confirming, despite mandatory language in the summary judgment rule,

and despite summary judgment rulings requiring dismissal with prejudice, that

a pending motion for summary judgment does not preclude a voluntary

dismissal). Rather, the more natural implication of section 147.140’s explicit

“dismissal with prejudice” remedy is that it cabins the district court’s discretion

to craft remedies other than dismissal or to dismiss without prejudice when a

plaintiff fails to substantially comply with the section 147.140 requirements. See

Alvarez Victoriano v. City of Waterloo, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2022) (construing

the phrase “shall result in dismissal with prejudice” in Iowa Code § 670.4A(3) to

“limit[] the dispositions available to the district court, i.e., when ruling on a

motion to dismiss, the district court must dismiss the case . . . and must do so

‘with prejudice.’ The word ‘shall’ in no way limits the plaintiff’s long-established

pleading rights.” (citation omitted)).
 15

If the legislature intended section 147.140 to operate as an immediate and

inexorable end to a plaintiff’s case from the moment a defendant files a motion

to enforce the statute, “it could easily have said so.” Venard, 524 N.W.2d at 167.

“We assume ‘when a legislature enacts statutes it is aware of the state of the

law.’ ” Simon Seeding & Sod, Inc. v. Dubuque Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 895 N.W.2d 446,

467 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 446 (Iowa 2016)).

The legislature undoubtedly was aware of rule 1.943 when it enacted section

147.140, particularly in light of our holding in Venard that a plaintiff who missed

the deadline in section 668.11 for certifying experts in a medical malpractice

claim could dismiss under rule 1.943 and refile. See Venard, 524 N.W.2d at 167–

68. Section 668.11 was “designed to require plaintiffs to have their proof

prepared at an early stage in the litigation in order to protect professionals from

having to defend against frivolous suits,” Nedved v. Welch, 585 N.W.2d 238, 240

(Iowa 1998) (per curiam), very much like the purpose of section 147.140, see

Struck, 973 N.W.2d at 542 (recognizing that “the certificate of merit requirement

serves to ‘identify and weed non-meritorious malpractice claims from the judicial

system efficiently and promptly’ ” (quoting Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 275

(Pa. 2006))). Yet, we also said in Venard that if “the legislature intended a

relationship between rule [1.943] and section 668.11, it could easily have said

so.” 524 N.W.2d at 167. We will not read more into the statute than it says. Cf.

Chi. Pro. Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir.

1992) (“When special interests claim that they have obtained favors from

Congress, a court should ask to see the bill of sale. Special interest laws do not
 16

have ‘spirits,’ and it is inappropriate to extend them to achieve more of the

objective the lobbyists wanted. What the industry obtained, the courts enforce;

what it did not obtain from the legislature—even if similar to something within

the exception—a court should not bestow.” (citations omitted)).

Here, it is not just the difference between a dismissal with or without

prejudice. The import of rule 1.943 is that it is self-executing and ends the case

as soon as the dismissal is filed by the plaintiff. No action is needed by the district

court, and indeed, any further action on the merits of the case following the

dismissal is of no effect. Had the general assembly intended to avoid the

dismissive effect of rule 1.943 when it enacted section 147.140, we expect it

would have been explicit.

Finally, we note that the district court’s reliance on Darrah v. Des Moines

General Hospital, 436 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1989), is misplaced, as section 147.140

does not provide a collateral consequence that survives dismissal of a lawsuit.

In Darrah, we recognized that district courts “retain[] the . . . authority to

adjudicate the collateral problem created by prior wrongful conduct of the

dismissing party warranting rule 80(a) [(now rule 1.413(1))] sanctions,” as an

exception to “the general rule that voluntary dismissal divests the court of

jurisdiction.” Id. at 55. Reasoning that “the ultimate sanction is dismissal” with

prejudice, the district court here relied on that holding to conclude Myrtue was

entitled to a ruling on its motion to dismiss despite Ronnfeldt’s voluntary

dismissal of the case.
 17

Darrah did not turn on the fact that what is now rule 1.413(1) involved

imposition of some type of “sanction,” writ large. Rather, it recognized the district

court’s authority to address issues that are collateral to the merits of a lawsuit

even after the lawsuit, and with it the court’s jurisdiction over it, has ended. Id.;

see Schettler v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 509 N.W.2d 459, 464 (Iowa 1993) (“[W]e think our

discussion in [Darrah] makes it clear that a motion for sanctions is a collateral

matter, . . . ‘[and does] not decide any issue in the main suit. The issue of sanctions

[is] a separate, collateral and independent issue to plaintiff’s lawsuit.’ ” (quoting

Bd. of Waterworks Trs. v. City of Des Moines, 469 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Iowa 1991))).

Rule 1.413(1) authorizes a court to sanction a party or her attorney for filing

pleadings or motions that are not well grounded in fact and supported by law, or

that are filed for an improper purpose, such as to harass or needlessly increase

the costs of litigation. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.413(1). Although the conduct arises

directly from a lawsuit, the rule subjects a party to sanctions independent from

the adjudication or resolution of the case, and as we held in Darrah, a plaintiff

cannot avoid those collateral consequences by voluntarily dismissing her case.

436 N.W.2d at 55.

In the one case where we have extended Darrah, the statute at issue

there—Iowa Code section 657.11—similarly involved sanctions for conduct

collateral to the merits of the underlying suit. See Merrill v. Valley View Swine,

LLC, 941 N.W.2d 10, 16–17 (Iowa 2020); see also Iowa Code § 657.11(5) (“If a

court determines that a claim is frivolous, a person who brings the claim as part

of a losing cause of action . . . shall be liable to the person against whom the
 18

action was brought for all costs and expenses incurred in the defense of the

action.”). In Merrill v. Valley View Swine, LLC, we applied Darrah to conclude that

the plaintiffs’ second voluntary dismissal, which was deemed an adjudication on

the merits under rule 1.943, was a “losing cause of action” within the meaning

of section 657.11(5) authorizing an award of sanctions by the court. See Merrill,

941 N.W.2d at 16–17. Under either of these scenarios, when a plaintiff dismisses

her “own petition,” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943 (emphasis added), there still exists an

independent, collateral controversy for the court to decide. The court’s

continuing jurisdiction in these situations is analogous to a district court’s

authority to rule on posttrial motions for costs and fees even after a notice of

appeal has otherwise stripped it of jurisdiction over the merits of the case. See,

e.g., Iowa State Bank & Trust Co. v. Michel, 683 N.W.2d 95, 110 (Iowa 2004)

(“Although the filing of a notice of appeal generally deprives the district court of

jurisdiction, the court ‘retains jurisdiction to proceed as to issues collateral to

and not affecting the subject matter of the appeal.’ The issue of attorney fees is

such a collateral matter.” (citation omitted) (quoting Landals v. George A. Rolfes

Co., 454 N.W.2d 891, 897 (Iowa 1990))).

Section 147.140, on the other hand, does not subject plaintiffs or entitle

defendants to consequences that are collateral to the underlying lawsuit—both

its directives and its remedy for noncompliance are inextricably tied to the

existence of a case over which to govern. And, like the case itself, they evaporate

once the lawsuit no longer exists. See Lawson, 792 N.W.2d at 255 n.2 (“After

voluntary dismissal, the case is considered ‘nonexistent’ and the matter usually
 19

deemed ‘unreviewable.’ ”). At that point, there is nothing more for the court to

adjudicate; the issue is moot. See State ex rel. Turner v. Midwest Dev. Corp.,

210 N.W.2d 525, 525–26 (Iowa 1973) (per curiam) (recognizing that “[a]n action

is moot if it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues

involved have become academic or nonexistent,” (quoting Cooley v. Ensign–

Bickford Co., 209 N.W.2d 100, 102 (1973)), and dismissing the appeal when the

plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal after the appeal was perfected). In short,

sanctioning parties for wrongful conduct is a natural incident of courts’ inherent

authority over the parties appearing before it; section 147.140, on the other

hand, is concerned solely with the merits of the lawsuit. Once the lawsuit is

disposed of, there is nothing for the court’s order to apply to.

Further, unlike the rule 1.413(1) sanctions at issue in Darrah that would

have been entirely evaded absent an exception to rule 1.943, allowing a plaintiff

to dismiss an action without prejudice does not undermine the purpose of

section 147.140, which is to promptly “identify and weed [out] non-meritorious

malpractice claims.” Struck, 973 N.W.2d at 542 (quoting Womer, 908 A.2d at

275). Rule 1.943 allows only one voluntary dismissal without prejudice; a second

dismissal would be with prejudice. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943; see ACC Holdings, LLC

v. Rooney, 973 N.W.2d 851, 852 (Iowa 2022) (stating that “[rule] 1.943 allows

plaintiffs to dismiss their petitions without prejudice and start over—once,” as a

matter of right). Thus, even if a plaintiff dismisses and then refiles a malpractice

action when she fails to timely provide a certificate of merit, she still has just

sixty days after the defendant’s answer in the refiled case to comply. Importantly,
 20

the plaintiff is precluded from conducting any discovery prior to serving the

certificate of merit affidavit, Iowa Code § 147.140(1)(a), so the defendant is

largely protected from the expense and burden of litigation even if the initial case

is dismissed and refiled. And the plaintiff would be subject to dismissal with

prejudice under both rule 1.943 and section 147.140 if she was unable to comply

with the certificate of merit requirement in the refiled case.

Myrtue’s concern about plaintiffs using rule 1.943 to “avoid [the] adverse

consequences of noncompliance with” section 147.140 is best made to the

legislature. If that concern warranted a different result here, we would also have

had to reach a different conclusion in Venard after recognizing that our holding

might allow a level of “gamesmanship” for plaintiffs to avoid the consequences of

the statute. See Venard, 524 N.W.2d at 167–68. But instead, we reached the

exact opposite conclusion—that “it would not matter” if Venard were

intentionally trying to avoid section 668.11’s consequences by dismissing under

rule 1.943, since “[t]he motive of the dismissing party plays no part in a voluntary

dismissal under rule [1.943].” Id. at 168. A plaintiff is “entitled to dismiss the

first action without prejudice for any reason.” Id. If the legislature wanted to

avoid application of our rule 1.943 jurisprudence in the section 147.140 context,

it needed to make that explicit in the statute.

Absent more specific directives from the legislature, we hold that

Ronnfeldt’s rule 1.943 voluntary dismissal effectively ended this case before the

district court ruled on Myrtue’s motion to dismiss under section 147.140. The

dismissal mooted Myrtue’s pending motion, and the district court lacked
 21

jurisdiction to posthumously resurrect and rule on it. The court’s subsequent

ruling on the motion to reconsider is void and must be reversed. See Klinge v.

Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Iowa 2006) (“If a court enters a judgment without

jurisdiction over the subject matter, the judgment is void . . . .”).

IV. Conclusion.

The district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Myrtue’s motion to dismiss

under section 147.140 after Ronnfeldt voluntarily dismissed the case. Its order

on that motion is hereby reversed.

REVERSED.

All justices concur except Christensen, C.J., who takes no part.