IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 21–1211
Submitted October 12, 2022—Filed January 6, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN G. TRANE,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, Mark Kruse,
Judge.
The defendant appeals the district court’s conclusion on remand that he
failed to show that an alleged victim had made false accusations of sexual abuse
against the victim’s adoptive or foster parents. AFFIRMED.
May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
Alfredo Parrish (argued) of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Gentry Brown
Bergmann & Messamer L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller (argued) (until
withdrawal) and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
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MAY, Justice.
The State charged Benjamin Trane with crimes toward certain minors,
including sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of a female victim, K.S. A jury
found Trane guilty of three crimes, including assault with intent to commit
sexual abuse toward K.S. The district court sentenced Trane to prison. Trane
appealed. This court remanded with instructions for the district court to hold a
“rule 5.412 hearing to determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence,”
K.S. made certain “false allegations of sexual abuse.” State v. Trane (Trane I), 934
N.W.2d 447, 466 (Iowa 2019). If so, Trane would be entitled to a new trial.
Following a hearing, the district court concluded Trane had not carried his
burden and, therefore, Trane was not entitled to a new trial. Now Trane appeals
again. He argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for recusal, by considering certain evidence, and by concluding that Trane failed
to prove K.S. made false allegations of sexual abuse.
Following our review, we conclude that Trane has failed to show any abuse
of discretion by the district court. So we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History.
In our prior opinion, Trane I, we described the facts and history of this
case. See id. at 450–55. We decline to repeat all of it here. But the following facts
are relevant for this appeal.
In 2003, Trane and his wife started a school for troubled youth in Keokuk,
Iowa. In 2015, there were allegations of sexual abuse toward a female, K.S., as
well as physical abuse toward two males. The State charged Trane with (1) sexual
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abuse in the third degree, (2) sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist, and
(3) child endangerment. A jury found Trane guilty of three charges: (1) assault
with intent to commit sexual abuse; (2) pattern, practice, or scheme to engage in
sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist; and (3) child endangerment.
Trane moved for a new trial. Among other things, Trane argued the district court
should have allowed evidence that K.S. had previously made false allegations of
sexual abuse against her adoptive and foster parents.
On May 10, 2018, the court heard evidence and argument on Trane’s
motion for a new trial. Ultimately, the court denied the motion. The same day,
the court sentenced Trane to prison.
Trane appealed. Among other things, Trane argued that the district court
should have conducted a rule 5.412 hearing before deciding whether to exclude
evidence that K.S. had previously made false allegations of sexual abuse. We
agreed and remanded with these directions:
For the foregoing reasons, we conditionally remand. The
district court should conduct an in camera rule 5.412 hearing to
determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, K.S. made
false allegations of sexual abuse against her adoptive or foster
parents. If false allegations were made, then Trane is entitled to a
new trial. The new trial would extend to all counts, including the
child endangerment count, because of the risk that all three verdicts
could have been affected by the limits on Trane’s ability to present
a defense on the sex-related counts. If Trane does not make this
showing, then his convictions and sentence should be affirmed.
Id. at 466; see generally Iowa R. Evid. 5.412(c) (establishing procedure to
determine admissibility of other sexual behavior in criminal proceedings
involving alleged sexual abuse).
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Consistent with our remand instructions, the district court scheduled a
rule 5.412 hearing. Prior to that hearing, Trane filed a motion for recusal of the
judge who was scheduled to preside. As the motion noted, that same judge had
presided over Trane’s May 2018 new trial hearing and sentencing. And,
according to Trane, “[a] fair and even reading of the transcript from [that] hearing
makes it apparent that serious issues exist that [would] challenge [the judge’s]
ability to serve as an impartial and neutral arbiter.” Trane claimed the judge
engaged in combative dialogue towards his counsel, assumed the role of
prosecutor, threatened to eject attendees supporting him, made impermissible
statements during sentencing, and more. The State resisted. Following a hearing,
the court denied the motion.
Soon after, the district court held the mandated rule 5.412 hearing. K.S.’s
adoptive parents both testified. Both denied any physical or sexual abuse. K.S.
also testified. She described physical and sexual abuse by her adoptive father.
Also, Trane offered a transcript of K.S.’s deposition. In it, K.S. described physical
abuse by both adoptive parents as well as sexual abuse by her adoptive father.
In a written ruling, the court concluded that “[b]ased on the totality of the
evidence, the court d[id] not find that, by a preponderance of the evidence, K.S.
made false allegations of sexual abuse against her adoptive parents or the foster
parents.” So the court declined to grant a new trial. Trane filed a notice of appeal.
We retained the case.1
1The State argues that we lack jurisdiction because the order following remand was not
a final judgment of sentence. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1) (2015). But the State does not deny that
a final judgment of sentence was entered prior to Trane’s first appeal, Trane I. And the State
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II. Analysis.
A. Recusal Motion. Trane claims that the court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to recuse. We disagree.
“We review a judge’s decision on a motion to recuse for abuse of
discretion.” Carter v. Carter, 957 N.W.2d 623, 631 (Iowa 2021). “The court abuses
its discretion when its decision is based on untenable grounds or it has acted
unreasonably.” State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Iowa 2005). In applying
this standard, we bear in mind that “[t]here is as much obligation for a judge not
to recuse when there is no occasion for [the judge] to do so as there is for [the
judge] to do so when there is.” State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994)
(first alteration in original) (quoting Hinman v. Rodgers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam)).
A judge should recuse when the “judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(D)(1)). This is
acknowledges that—when we remanded in Trane I—we had authority to authorize a future appeal
following remand. The State claims, though, that because our opinion in Trane I did not expressly
mention the possibility of a future appeal, we must not have “intended to authorize an appeal”
following remand. We disagree. As Trane correctly notes, we regularly remand criminal cases for
specific proceedings. We do so with the understanding that a postremand appeal will be available
if needed. See, e.g., State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 340 (Iowa 2019) (conditional affirmance and
remand), aff’d, 972 N.W.2d 728, 737 (Iowa 2022) (appeal following remand ruling); State v.
Williams, 929 N.W.2d 621, 638 (Iowa 2019) (conditional affirmance and remand), aff’d, 972
N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2022) (appeal following remand ruling); State v. Lilly, 930 N.W.2d 293,
309 (Iowa 2019) (conditional affirmance and remand), aff’d, 969 N.W.2d 794, 800 (Iowa 2022)
(appeal following remand ruling); State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 829 (Iowa 2017) (conditional
affirmance and remand), aff’d, 969 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Iowa 2022) (appeal following remand
ruling). In some opinions, we have expressly mentioned the defendant’s right to a postremand
appeal. E.g. State v. Johnson, 272 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Iowa 1978); State v. Hall, 235 N.W.2d 702,
731 (Iowa 1975) (en banc) (“Of course, defendant’s right to appeal from the trial court’s In camera
determination is preserved.”). More often, though, authorization for a postremand appeal is
implied by the fact that we are remanding for further proceedings—which, of course, may lead
to new issues that require appellate review. That is what occurred in this case.
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an objective test. Id. “Actual prejudice must be shown before recusal is
necessary, and speculation is not sufficient.” Carter, 957 N.W.2d at 644.
A judge’s impartiality might be questioned when the judge “has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 602.1606(1)(a)).
But “[o]nly personal bias or prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source
constitutes a disqualifying factor.” Millsap, 704 N.W.2d at 432. “Judicial
predilection or an attitude of mind resulting from the facts learned by the judge
from the judge’s participation in the case is not a disqualifying factor.” Id.; see
also State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1976) (“[E]vidence presented in
the trial of a prior cause, or definite views on the law, create no personal bias
since they do not stem from an extrajudicial source.”).
Applying these principles here, we find no grounds for reversal. We have
considered all of Trane’s arguments, including his claims that the judge engaged
in combative dialogue towards Trane’s counsel, assumed the role of prosecutor,
threatened to eject attendees supporting Trane, and made impermissible
statements during sentencing. From our review of the record, however, we find
no statements or actions suggesting that the judge acted from “personal bias or
prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source.” Millsap, 704 N.W.2d at 432.
We note also that the judge issued a written order explaining his reasons for
declining to recuse. In that order, we find no reasons to think that the court’s
decision was “based on untenable grounds” or that the court “acted
unreasonably.” Id. Rather, the judge carefully considered Trane’s arguments—
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and also “examine[d his] own conscience”—before concluding there was “no basis
for the recusal motion.”
“The burden of showing grounds for recusal is on the party seeking it.”
State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002). Trane has not shown that the
district court abused its “sound discretion” by denying his recusal motion.
State v. Kolbet, 638 N.W.2d 653, 664 (Iowa 2001) (“Disqualification is committed
to the sound discretion of the judge.”). So we decline to grant relief on this basis.
B. Evidence Considered. Trane also argues that the district court abused
its discretion by conducting the rule 5.412 hearing contrary to the Iowa Rules of
Evidence and the directions for remand in Trane I. Specifically, Trane argues that
the district court should not have considered (1) evidence about K.S.’s
allegations of physical abuse, (2) evidence that the adoptive mother lacked
knowledge of K.S.’s allegations against Trane, and (3) whether K.S.’s testimony
was consistent with her testimony in other proceedings.
Before we can reach the merits of these complaints, though, we must
consider the State’s concerns about error preservation. “It is a fundamental
doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and
decided by the district court before we decide them on appeal.” State v. Bynum,
937 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856,
862 (Iowa 2012)). We will not consider an evidentiary complaint unless the
complaining party made their “specific objection” to the evidence “known” in the
district court, and the court had the “opportunity to pass upon the objection and
correct any error.” State v. Brown, 656 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Iowa 2003). When an
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evidentiary concern is “not adequately raised by proper specific objection” before
the district court, we consider it “waived.” State v. Ware, 338 N.W.2d 707, 712
(Iowa 1983). And even when an objection is properly raised, failure “to obtain a
ruling on the[] objection” generally “constitute[s] a waiver of any error.” Bahnsen
v. Rabe, 276 N.W.2d 413, 415–16 (Iowa 1979); see Linge v. Ralston Purina Co.,
293 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Iowa 1980) (en banc) (“A trial court may not be put in error
unless the issue was presented for ruling, and the failure to obtain a ruling is
inexcusable unless the court refuses or fails to rule after a ruling is requested.”).
Applying these principles here, we conclude Trane waived any error as to
the court’s consideration of both physical and sexual abuse, as opposed to just
sexual abuse alone. In fact, during the 5.412 hearing, Trane was the first party
to introduce evidence about physical abuse. During Trane’s direct examination
of the adoptive father and mother, Trane asked them both whether K.S.’s
allegations of sexual or physical abuse were true. And Trane introduced the
transcript of K.S.’s deposition—in which she testified about physical abuse by
the adoptive parents. Also, during the State’s direct examination of K.S., the
State asked her about physical abuse by her adoptive parent—but Trane did not
object.
Likewise, Trane also waived any error in the introduction of evidence that
the adoptive mother lacked knowledge of K.S.’s allegations against Trane. Trane
never objected to this testimony.
Finally, Trane waived any error in the district court’s consideration of
K.S.’s testimony from before the 5.412 hearing itself. Trane did not raise this
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objection below. Indeed, Trane introduced K.S.’s testimony from her deposition,
which occurred long before the 5.412 hearing.
But Trane asks us to take a different view of K.S.’s trial testimony. No
transcript of that testimony was introduced at the 5.412 hearing. So, Trane
claims, he had no reason to object to the district court’s possible consideration
of K.S.’s trial testimony.
We notice, though, that Trane brought up K.S.’s trial testimony during the
5.412 hearing. When Trane’s counsel began his cross-examination of K.S., he
put K.S. on notice that he had “read [her] trial transcript.” Later, counsel asked
K.S. whether a specific statement that she had made during her “testimony . . .
in the first trial” was true. Arguably, these references waived any objection to the
court’s consideration of K.S.’s trial testimony.
In any event, once the district court issued its written ruling, Trane
became aware that the court had indeed considered K.S.’s trial testimony. At
that point, Trane could have filed a motion to reconsider. By doing so, Trane
could have informed the district court of his objection and—crucially—given the
court an “opportunity to pass upon the objection and correct any error.” Brown,
656 N.W.2d at 361. But Trane did not. As a result, the district court never
learned of Trane’s objection and (of course) the court had no chance to rule on
it. Under these facts, we cannot find that Trane preserved error. See In re Det. of
Anderson, 895 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Iowa 2017) (“In order for error to be preserved,
the issue must be both raised [below] and decided by the district court.”).
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Because Trane’s evidentiary arguments were not preserved below, we
decline to consider them now. See State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590, 598 (Iowa
2021) (noting error preservation “is rooted in principles of fairness where neither
the state nor the defendant can raise a new claim or defense on appeal that could
have been, but failed to be, raised at trial”).
C. Substantial Evidence. Finally, Trane argues the district court abused
its discretion by concluding Trane failed to meet his burden of proving K.S. made
false accusations of sexual abuse. We disagree.
We review rule 5.412 determinations “for abuse of discretion. Reversal is
warranted only upon showing the ‘court exercise[d] its discretion on grounds or
for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’ ” State v.
Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 407–08 (Iowa 2006) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 497 (Iowa 1997)). “A ground
or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence . . . .”
Fortune v. State, 957 N.W.2d 696, 703 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Gomez
Garcia, 904 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Iowa 2017)).
Here, Trane argues substantial evidence did not support the district
court’s conclusion that Trane failed to meet his burden of proving K.S. made
false accusations of sexual abuse against her adoptive parents. We disagree. At
the 5.412 hearing, K.S. testified that—indeed—she was sexually abused at the
hands of her adoptive father. Likewise, in her deposition, K.S. had also testified
to sexual abuse at the hands of her adoptive parents. And, as noted, Trane
offered the deposition transcript as an exhibit at the 5.412 hearing.
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K.S.’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence that her allegations of
sexual abuse were not false. The district court was entitled to believe her.
Note also that the district court did not consider K.S.’s testimony in a
vacuum. Rather, as its order shows, the court carefully considered the testimony
of the adoptive parents, who denied K.S.’s allegations. Certainly the district court
could have found their denials were more persuasive. In that case, the court
could have concluded that Trane carried his burden. But the court was under
no obligation to reach that conclusion.
Trane responds that K.S.’s testimony was so “highly unreliable,
contradictory and inconsistent” that it could not be trusted. For instance, Trane
asks us to find that K.S. cannot be believed because she’s made very similar
claims of sexual abuse against multiple abusers. Trane compares this case to
State v. Smith, in which “the court of appeals found the testimony of a sexual
abuse victim was ‘inconsistent, self-contradictory, lacking in experiential detail,
and, at times, border[ed] on the absurd’ and held the testimony was insufficient
as a matter of law to support the conviction.” State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514,
518 (Iowa 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101,
103 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)). But in our recent State v. Mathis decision, we strongly
criticized Smith:
Smith is an outlier case. It has been criticized in the commentary,
and it has not been followed in any sexual abuse case in Iowa since.
The primary flaw in Smith is that it is inconsistent with the standard
of appellate review of jury verdicts, which requires that the evidence
be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict and which
requires deference to the jury’s resolution of disputed factual issues.
Id.
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Likewise, we believe Smith is inconsistent with our appellate standard in
this case, which permits reversal only if the district court has abused its
discretion, and which requires deference to the district court’s resolution of the
disputed factual issue. See State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Iowa
2021) (“We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence under the rape shield
law, Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.412, for abuse of discretion.”); see also State v.
Wells, 629 N.W.2d 346, 356 (Iowa 2001) (en banc) (“[W]e defer to the fact finder’s
determinations concerning witness credibility.”); State v. Hickman, 576 N.W.2d
364, 367 (Iowa 1998) (citing United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 885 (8th Cir.
1996), noting that “district court’s findings regarding witness’ credibility are
virtually unreviewable on appeal”). In any event, as in Mathis, we find no fatal
deficiencies in K.S.’s testimony that would have required the district court to find
her unbelievable.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Trane
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that K.S. had made prior false
claims of sexual abuse.
III. Disposition.
In Trane I we conditionally affirmed the defendant’s conviction and
remanded with directions to conduct a rule 5.412 hearing. We now conclude
Trane has shown no abuse of discretion by the district court in the rule 5.412
hearing or its subsequent ruling. So we grant Trane no relief.
AFFIRMED.