(dissenting).
I dissent. I believe the Subpoena Powers Act (the “Act”) is unconstitutional on its face. The United States Supreme Court has observed, in language which I believe is applicable to this Act, “A general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial, compulsory investigation, conducted by a commission *660without any allegations, upon no fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law, or of evidence, and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice, is unknown to our constitution and laws; and such an inquisition would be destructive to the rights of the citizen, and an intolerable tyranny.” Jones v. S.E.C., 298 U.S. 1, 27, 56 S.Ct. 654, 662, 80 L.Ed. 1015 (1935) (quoting In re Pacific Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241 (C.C.Cal.1887)). This language applies in essential respects to the powers the Legislature has sought to confer on county prosecutors and the Attorney General. The Subpoena Powers Act vastly extends the compulsory inquisitorial power of state and county prosecutors over both citizens and government officials. Anglo-American history is fraught with examples of abuses of similar powers by government officials.
The majority opinion fails to address the central flaw in the Act. It simply rewrites the Act and even then does not remedy the infirmities. In rewriting the Act, the Court embarks upon the extraordinary course of reading into the Act a host of new provisions which were not put there by the Legislature and which render the statute a different creature than that enacted by the Legislature. I submit that the Court goes far beyond legitimate judicial power in doing so. The Court’s task is to declare whether the Act is constitutional as it was written, subject to reasonable construction of its actual terms,1 rather than “implying” a host of new terms into it.
The new provisions superimposed by the majority upon the statute in its attempt to uphold the statute are numerous and extensive. So-called Miranda -type warnings imposed by the majority are nowhere mentioned in the Act itself and, in fact, are not required by the policy that underlies Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because the witness is not “in custody” or in a particularly coercive atmosphere. Nor is the warning required by the Court much like a Miranda warning; the warning is in fact made up out of whole cloth. A witness is not told that he may remain quiet altogether, as Miranda requires; nor is the witness informed that counsel will be appointed if the witness cannot afford counsel.2 In addition, the target warnings created by the majority are not required by the Act. Likewise, the record-keeping requirements have no basis in the language of the Act. Finally, the restrictions upon secrecy orders find no basis in the language of the statute or constitutional law. In my view, Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 107 Utah 502, 505, 155 P.2d 184, 185 (1945), which held that “the court has no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an intention not expressed,” should govern here. See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690, 88 S.Ct. 1298, 1306, 20 L.Ed.2d 225 (1968); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 430, 63 S.Ct. 409, 412, 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943).
*661More significantly, I believe that the Act as initially written and as construed by the Court is unconstitutional because prosecu-torial inquisition by compulsory process without judicial approval prior to issuance of the process violates the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, sections 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution and circumvents the protections provided by a grand jury.
Section 77-22-2 of the Subpoena Powers Act provides:
(1) In any matter involving the investigation of a crime, the existence of a crime or malfeasance in office or any criminal conspiracy or activity, the attorney general or any county attorney shall have the right, upon application and approval of the district court, for good cause shown, to conduct an investigation in which the prosecutor may subpoena ■witnesses, compel their attendance and testimony under oath before any certified court reporter, and require the production of books, papers, documents, recordings and any other items which constitute evidence or may be relevant to the investigation in the judgment of the attorney general or county attorney.
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the names of possible defendants and need only contain notification that the testimony of the witness is sought in aid of criminal investigation and state the time and place of the examination, which may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform the party served that he is entitled to be represented by counsel. Witness fees and expenses shall be paid as in a civil action.
(3) The attorney general or any county attorney may make written application to any district court and the court may order that interrogation of any witness shall be held in secret; that such proceeding be secret; and that the record of testimony be kept secret unless and until the court for good cause otherwise orders. The court may order excluded from any investigative hearing or proceeding any persons except the attorneys representing the state and members of their staffs, the court reporter and the attorney for the witness.
An investigation under the Act involves two steps. First, a prosecutor must file a “good cause” statement with the district court. That statement needs only to allege that there is good cause to engage in an investigation of “a crime,” “malfeasance in office,” or any “criminal ... activity.” The prosecutor need not even allege that a particular crime has been committed. Nor need he prove, by affidavits or otherwise, even an articulable basis for believing that anyone has committed a crime, malfeasance, or criminal conduct. Nor do any names of putative defendants need to be alleged. And the court need not make any findings.
Second, on that flimsy basis, subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum may issue from the clerk of the court on the simple request of the prosecutor. The actual issuance of the subpoena depends solely on the good faith of the prosecutor that the evidence sought, whether testimonial or documentary, is relevant to the good cause statement “in the judgment” of the prosecuting attorney.
The subpoena may order a person to produce documents or to testify, or both, either in secret or in public, essentially as the prosecutor chooses. A prosecutor need not show that there is probable cause or an articulable suspicion, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), or any other legal cause to detain and compel a witness to testify or to produce private papers and physical evidence.
Once a subpoena is served, a person subject to it may move to quash. But that is not protection under the Act. There is, in fact, little that a trial judge can do to prevent abuse on a motion to quash since the prosecutor need only show relevancy to the investigation based on the “good cause” statement, and that is virtually no protection, especially when a prosecutor alleges “good cause” on the basis of “criminal activity,” a term of extraordinary elas*662ticity. That term is so broad as to virtually nullify whatever protection the relevancy limitation may offer. Furthermore, many witnesses will undoubtedly not be represented by counsel, and those who are not will not likely find their way to a trial judge to seek relief from prosecutorial overreaching. Cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 219, 66 S.Ct. 494, 510-11, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Even those who do have counsel will find it difficult to demonstrate abuse either in the detention itself because of the extraordinarily vague standards established by the Act or in the conduct of an interrogation.
The majority asserts that the protections granted to a witness under the Act are no less than those afforded by a grand jury and that the powers given to prosecutors are no greater than those given to a grand jury. It is true that a prosecutor has all the power of a grand jury, but he has it without any of the restraint that comes from the grand jurors. The members of a grand jury should bring to bear the conscience of the community in restraining the conduct of an overzealous prosecutor with respect to all witnesses. In effect, the grand jury system substitutes the grand jurors for the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, a prosecutor elected by one political party can use the powers conferred by the Act to rummage through the affairs of political enemies to harass and embarrass them on the flimsiest of pretexts. All kinds of private matters of individual citizens can be explored and exposed. Children can be interrogated under oath about activities of their parents, and parents interrogated under oath about the activities of their children. Husbands and wives can be interrbgated about the activities of each other, neighbors interrogated about neighbors, and reporters and editors interrogated about activities and conversations with news sources. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972).
In truth, the power of the prosecutor to intrude upon the right to be left alone, the right “most valued by civilized man,” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Bran-déis, J., dissenting), is formidable and fearsome. And it is made all the more so by the prosecutor’s freedom to decide which interrogations may be made public, a power that does not exist with respect to grand jury proceedings. The destruction of reputation, employment, and family life by forced public exposure of private matters that took place in the infamous McCarthy era on a vast scale ought not to be forgotten. Overly zealous people who act in the name of some “higher” principle and run roughshod over the rights of others are to be found in every generation. “The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning, but without understanding.” Id. at 479.
The majority fails to recognize that it deals with grand jury powers without the restraining effect of grand jurors. The grand jury is a constitutional body, expressly established in the Utah Constitution by Article I, section 13 and in the Federal Constitution by the Fifth Amendment. To the grand jury is committed power to employ compulsory process to investigate criminal conduct. Grand jurors can provide a significant restraint on prosecuto-rial abuse. They come together for one purpose. They have no concern with being reelected or complying with the wishes of a supervisor. The United States Supreme Court has stated: “The most important function of the grand jury is not only to examine into the commission of crimes ... but ‘to stand between the prosecution and the accused.’ ” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). Justice Marshall described the role and function of the grand jury in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 45-46, 93 S.Ct. 764, 788, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting):
Certainly the most celebrated function of the grand jury is to stand between the government and the citizen and thus to protect the latter from harassment and unfounded prosecution. See e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, [82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569] (1962); Hoff *663 man v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485, [71 S.Ct. 814, 817, 95 L.Ed. 1118] (1951); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11 [7 S.Ct. 781, 786-87, 30 L.Ed. 849] (1887). The grand jury does not shed those characteristics that give it insulating qualities when it acts in its investigative capacity. Properly functioning, the grand jury is to be the servant of neither the Government nor the courts, but of the people. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S., [43] at 61 [26 S.Ct. 370, 373, 50 L.Ed. 652]. As such, we assume that it comes to its task without bias or self-interest. Unlike the prosecutor or policeman, it has no election to win or executive appointment to keep. The anticipated neutrality of the grand jury, even when acting in its investigative capacity, may perhaps be relied upon to prevent unwarranted interference with the lives of private citizens and to ensure that the grand jury’s subpoena powers over the person are exercised in only a reasonable fashion. Under such circumstances, it may be justifiable to give the grand jury broad personal subpoena powers that are outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment, for — in contrast to the police — it is not likely that it will abuse those powers. Cf. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 [76 S.Ct. 406, 408, 100 L.Ed. 397] (1956); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 [80 S.Ct. 270, 273-74, 4 L.Ed.2d 252] (1960).
Whatever the present day validity of the historical assumption of neutrality that underlies the grand jury process, it must at least be recognized that if a grand jury is deprived of the independence essential to the assumption of neutrality — if it effectively surrenders that independence to a prosecutor — the dangers of excessive and unreasonable official interference with personal liberty are exactly those that the Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent.
Even if it is conceded, as some argue, that grand juries have too often been mere instrumentalities of prosecutors and have not adequately served to prevent abuse, that does not justify imposing still fewer restraints on prosecutors by entirely removing the grand jury as a buffer against abuse. Yet, that is precisely what the Subpoena Powers Act does and the majority condones.
The fear of prosecutorial use of subpoenas to question citizens about criminal violations of law outside the control of a grand jury has led courts to hold such interrogations unlawful. In United States v. O’Connor, 118 F.Supp. 248, 250-51 (D.Mass.1953), the court held that a government law enforcement agent could not circumvent the grand jury by using a subpoena to compel a person to testify concerning a possible criminal violation. The court stated, “The Constitution of the United States, the statutes, the traditions of our law, the deep rooted preferences of our people speak clearly. They recognize the primary and nearly exclusive role of the Grand Jury as the agency of compulsory disclosure.” Id. That same principle has been applied by a number of other courts. See In re Melvin, 546 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 913, 97 S.Ct. 1323, 51 L.Ed.2d 591 (1979); Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d 520 (D.C.Cir.1954); In re Grand Jury Proceedings/Subpoenas, 593 F.Supp. 92 (S.D.Fla.1984); see also United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 508 F.2d 588, rev’d on other grounds, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976); 8 Moore’s Federal Practice H 17.06 (1975).
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has enunciated a similar principle that also applies here. The court stated that the constitution, statutes, and traditions “do not recognize the United States Attorney’s office as a proper substitute for the grand jury room and they do not recognize the use of a grand jury subpoena, a process of the District Court, as a compulsory administrative process of the United States Attorney’s office.” Durbin, 221 F.2d at 522; see In re Melvin, 546 F.2d at 5. Indeed, it is widely established that prosecutors cannot use subpoenas, whether a grand jury subpoena without grand jury authorization or some other type of subpoena authorized by law, solely to investigate criminal activities. E.g., In re Melvin, 546 F.2d 1; United States v. Keen, 509 F.2d *6641273 (6th Cir.1975); Durbin, 21 F.2d 520; United States v. O’Kane, 439 F.Supp. 211 (S.D.Fla.1977); O’Connor, 118 F.Supp. 248; see also United States v. Smith, 687 F.2d 147 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1116, 103 S.Ct. 752, 74 L.Ed.2d 970 (1983); United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1109, 103 S.Ct. 737, 74 L.Ed.2d 959 (1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings/Subpoenas, 593 F.Supp. at 95.
The majority places great weight on pre-compliance supervision of subpoenas by motions to quash but does not require preissuance judicial authorization of each subpoena issued as a means of assuring some protection under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 14. Precompliance supervision of subpoenas has always been available on a motion to quash, even of grand jury subpoenas, but it is not a sufficient protection when prosecutors conduct criminal investigations by compulsory process, independent of the grand jury.
Even if the Legislature could circumvent the constitutional function of the grand jury, the statute would also violate the Fourth Amendment, Article I, section 14, and due process under both constitutions. As construed by the majority, the Act requires a citizen to take affirmative action to prevent the state from intruding on his or her liberty. Except for grand jury subpoenas, see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, the general rule is that until a criminal charge is formally made, the state bears the burden of first establishing that its intrusion upon a citizen’s liberty is lawful. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). The point is not trivial. There is a great difference between allowing the government to curtail personal liberty until a citizen obtains a court order commanding the government to cease and requiring the government to first justify its intrusion on personal liberty before it actually does so. See State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533 (1975) (requiring an initial court order). The point deals with a fundamental aspect of the relationship of citizens to the government. The majority’s position turns that fundamental proposition on its head.
Many persons, given the air of authority which a subpoena carries by virtue of a court seal and its formal and official service, will assume that the subpoena is legally authorized and will comply with it, no matter how invasive it is.3 Cf. Walling, 327 U.S. at 219, 66 S.Ct. at 510-11 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Some will not be able to afford an attorney and will comply with the order to appear, even though they could lawfully refuse. All such persons risk waiving their rights against unreasonable searches and their rights not to give testimonial or documentary evidence that may tend to incriminate them. These persons, and even persons represented by counsel, may be misled as to the scope of the interrogation and inadvertently waive their constitutional rights because no putative defendant is named in the good cause statement and because the good cause statement may be too vague. All these difficulties are accentuated by the ambiguous standards established by the Act for commencing an investigation. Indeed, the majority candidly observes that the loose standards in the Act might “tempt the state to poke ‘about in the speculation of finding something chargeable.’ 8 Wig-more, Evidence § 2250, at 271 (McNaughton rev. 1961).”
I recognize that every citizen has a duty to provide testimony in criminal proceedings when called upon by a court to do so for a judicial proceeding or when called upon by a grand jury to do so. But I know of no rule requiring citizens to appear before prosecutors to testify or give documentary evidence.
*665The majority relies on Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 769, 78 L.Ed.2d 567 (1984), for the proposition that precompliance judicial review of the lawfulness of a subpoena, rather than preis-suance judicial review, is sufficient. That reliance is misplaced. Lone Steer involved enforcement of a civil subpoena, not a subpoena issued in a criminal investigation. The difference between civil and criminal investigations lies at the very foundation of much of our procedural law, in part because of the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has relied upon the distinction invariably in cases involving subpoenas issued by administrative agencies and special commissions and challenged on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds.
The flexible standards applicable to administrative subpoenas should not apply to subpoenas issued by a state’s prosecuting attorney in the context of a criminal investigation. To apply those standards would result in weakening personal liberties protected by the Bill of Rights. The point is illustrated in See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967), which upheld a flexible probable cause standard for entry and search of commercial premises by an administrative agency, based on area inspection standards, even though the-Court has consistently recognized that the Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials must have a warrant backed by probable cause to conduct a search in a criminal investigation. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 117, 106 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 3302-03, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-106, 85 S.Ct. 741, 744-45, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized that the government’s deliberate use of administrative subpoenas to gather evidence in a criminal case impermissibly disregards the “safeguards and restrictions of the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 80 S.Ct. 683, 690, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960). In other words, the Court has impliedly determined that the safeguards appropriate in civil administrative procedures are inadequate to protect the constitutional rights of individuals in criminal law proceedings. Consequently, the standards governing administrative subpoenas do not apply to subpoenas issued under the Act in question. Nor do those standards undermine the conclusion that the Subpoena Powers Act violates the Fourth Amendment because subpoenas are issued without prior judicial authorization. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873, 96 S.Ct. 141, 46 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975) (holding that a suspect may be detained temporarily to give evidence after a court has entered an order authorizing the detention, although on a lesser showing than probable cause).
In addition to the distinction between administrative and criminal procedures suggested by See v. Seattle, the Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between the investigatory and accusatory functions sufficient to warrant different procedural standards within the context of administrative procedure. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960). In Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969), the Court clarified the distinction between the investigative and accusatory functions of administrative agencies. Jenkins involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute authorizing a labor-management commission, upon referral from the governor, to investigate alleged criminal violations in the field of labor-management relations. The commission was given authority to hold public hearings to determine whether probable cause existed to believe that criminal violations had occurred, to make public findings, and to recommend to appropriate authorities that criminal prosecutions be commenced. Id. at 414-17, 89 S.Ct. at 1845-47. Observing that “everything in the Act points to the fact that it is concerned only with exposing violations of criminal laws by specific indi*666viduals,” id. at 427, 89 S.Ct. at 1852, a plurality opinion of the Court concluded that the commission’s functions were not merely investigatory but also accusatory and that greater procedural safeguards were required, including the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and presentation of evidence. Id. at 428-30, 89 S.Ct. at 1852. That, of course, might apply here if a public deposition were taken.
Unlike the nonprosecutorial administrative agencies involved in Hannah and Jenkins, prosecuting attorneys are specifically authorized to prosecute subjects of a criminal investigation conducted under the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1(1) (1987) (county attorneys); Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1(1) (1986) (attorney general). Accordingly, abbreviated administrative-type proceedings are constitutionally insufficient in the context of criminal investigations by the state’s prosecutors. Dilution of citizens’ rights by a strained analogy to administrative subpoenas and procedures simply ignores the fundamental safeguards that the law has always recognized in criminal procedure for the protection of individual liberties.
It is noteworthy that although the Act at issue is similar to statutes enacted in other states, it is different in one significant respect (except for Delaware’s Act, Delaware, D.C.A. tit. 24 § 2508 (1974)). Other statutes require judicial approval prior to issuance of an investigative subpoena. Iowa, I.C.A. § 813.2, rule 5, subd. 6 (1979); Louisiana, La. Code Cr.Proc. art. 66 (Supp. 1984); Kansas, K.S.A. § 22-3101 (1981); Montana, M.C.A. § 46-4-301 (1987). Under these statutes, the prosecutor’s authority is subject to a court’s discretion to order the issuance of a subpoena. Before the prosecutor may intrude into the liberty of a citizen, he must first make some showing that the intrusion is warranted. Even then, that may not be sufficient to pass constitutional muster, in my view. Significantly, the Delaware statute does not authorize secret interrogations.
Finally, the Act allows prosecutors to engage in criminal discovery even after a formal charge has been filed, as was done in this case. Defendants have no correlative right to engage in discovery. In my view, that raises serious constitutional issues under the Utah constitutional provision requiring uniform operation of the laws or equal protection of the laws. Article I, section 24.
In sum, I submit that the Act is unconstitutional on its face, as the trial court ruled, because it authorizes unreasonable searches and seizures by prosecutors, because it violates due process, and because it circumvents the institution of the Utah grand jury.
. I believe the majority’s view of the pertinent standard of review is patently erroneous. A determination that a statute has a reasonable basis cannot resolve its constitutionality when the statute trenches on fundamental personal liberties. Furthermore, it is extraordinary for the Court to assert that it "must supply omitted procedural elements that are necessary to implement legislation consistent with constitutional requirements.” The cases cited by the majority do not support that. Of course, we construe statutes to be constitutional, when that is possible. But I know of no case where this Court, or any other court, has added a virtual code of procedure to a statute, as this Court does.
. The Court in effect decides sub silento one significant issue with respect to the privilege. The Court allows the privilege against self-incrimination to be interposed to particular questions. But this Court has never decided whether the Utah privilege against self-incrimination would permit a putative defendant to refuse to testify at all in a procedure such as this. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not permit a putative defendant to refuse to testify altogether in a grand jury proceeding. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed. 2d 212 (1976). The issue is an important one that should be fully briefed and appropriately decided. Furthermore, I note that the Supreme Court has held that Miranda warnings need not be given in grand jury proceedings, even to target defendants. That Court has also held that no warning must be given of one’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a grand jury proceeding. United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 97 S.Ct. 1823, 52 L.Ed.2d 231 (1977).
. In holding that the Act was unlawfully applied, the Court states that the subpoenas issued misstated the law. The Court is in error. A subpoena is a court order to appear and testify or produce physical evidence, and disobedience is punishable as contempt. 81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses § 9 (1976). See generally Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-14 (1982). Of course a hearing must first be held before one may be held in contempt. However, failing to tell a subpoenaed person that disobedience is punishable as contempt would deprive a person of notice of the possible consequences of disobedience.