C.L. v. Weiler

[Cite as C.L. v. Weiler, 2023-Ohio-13.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

C.L., :

Petitioner-Appellee, :
No. 111474
v. :

SHAWN WEILER, :

Respondent-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 5, 2023

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-17-881338

Appearances:

Shawn Weiler, pro se.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:

Respondent-appellant Shawn Weiler appeals from a judgment of

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas that found him in contempt for violating

a civil stalking protection order (“CSPO”). The CSPO prohibited him from having

any contact with C.L., a former coworker. While the CSPO was in effect, Weiler filed

a lawsuit against her; among the causes of actions he raised in the complaint was his

claim that her petition for a protection order against him constituted malicious
prosecution. While the terms of the CSPO prohibited Weiler from any written

contact with C.L., he sent multiple mailings to her directly in connection with the

lawsuit, among them a copy of the summons and complaint, even though she was

served with the summons and complaint by the clerk’s office upon his request and

in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court found him in

contempt for violating the CSPO by sending correspondence and documents to C.L.

Because the record contains competent credible evidence to support the trial court’s

determination, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding Weiler

in contempt.

Background

C.L. and Weiler were employed by the same company in 2017. On June

6, 2017, C.L. filed a “Petition for Civil Stalking Protection Order or Civil Sexually

Oriented Offense Protection Order” pursuant to R.C. 2903.214. The petition alleged

that Weiler “sent threatening email over the work email,” which she reported to her

employer, and that after he was terminated, he “continued to threaten [her] several

times from multiple emails, beginning April 30, 2017.” On the same day the petition

was filed, the trial court granted a temporary CSPO and set the matter for a hearing.

On July 3, 2017, the court held a full hearing on the petition. C.L. was

represented by counsel, and Weiler appeared pro se. Both provided testimony, as

well as C.L.’s father. After the hearing, the trial court issued a CSPO against Weiler

for the maximum term of five years, to expire on July 3, 2022. The court found

Weiler “engaged in a pattern of conduct that knowingly caused petitioner to believe
that respondent would cause her physical harm and caused mental distress to

petitioner.” The terms and conditions of the protection order include the following:

“The subject is restrained from making any communication with the protected

person, including but not limited to personal, written, or telephone contact[.]” No

appeal was taken from the order.

On June 1, 2018, Weiler sent a lengthy email about C.L. to employees

of the company where Weiler and C.L. worked together. As a result, on June 4, 2018,

C.L. filed a criminal complaint against Weiler. He was found guilty of violating the

CSPO after a jury trial.1

On June 4, 2021, Weiler filed a civil complaint against C.L., asserting

claims of civil malicious prosecution, criminal malicious prosecution, and

constructive fraud, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-17-881338.2 The lawsuit was

subsequently dismissed by the trial court upon C.L.’s motion to dismiss pursuant to

Civ.R. 12(B)(6), and this court affirmed the dismissal in Weiler v. C.L., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 111657, 2022-Ohio-4212.3 This court found the dismissal proper

1The conditions of the CSPO included a prohibition against making any communication
with the protected person’s “employer, employees, or fellow workers, or others with
whom the communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm the victim.”

2 The civil prosecution referred to
C.L.’s petition for a CSPO, and the criminal prosecution
referred to the criminal complaint filed by C.L. on June 4, 2018.

3 In the opinion, this court recited verbatim a portion of the lengthy email about C.L. sent
by Weiler on June 1, 2018. The email detailed Weiler’s allegation that C.L. was sexually
interested in him and “purposely — but nonverbally — offered herself to [Weiler] to have
sexual relations with [sic] at [the workplace] during work hours.” Id. at ¶ 4, citing
paragraph eight of Weiler’s amended complaint.
because neither the civil protection order proceeding nor the criminal proceeding

regarding his violation of the protection order ended in his favor, and therefore, on

the face of the complaint, he cannot prevail on either a civil or criminal malicious

prosecution claim. Id. at ¶ 12.

The instant appeal arose from Weiler’s conduct communicating with

C.L. regarding the malicious prosecution lawsuit. The trial court docket of that prior

case is not part of the record before us, but we are able to discern the following from

the record in this appeal.

On December 28, 2021, Weiler filed a “Notice of Change of Address” in

the malicious prosecution lawsuit, notifying the court that C.L.’s address has been

changed. He provided the court with her new address in Texas and requested that

“the Clerk change Defendant’s address of record and provide all notices” to C.L.’s

new address. On December 29, 2021, the clerk’s office sent the summons and

complaint to C.L.’s new address. However, Weiler also sent the court papers to C.L.

himself on December 29, 2021.

On February 8, 2022, C.L., through her attorney, filed a motion to

show cause, requesting a hearing on why Weiler should not be held in contempt for

violating the CSPO. She alleged that Weiler violated the protection order by directly

corresponding with her and by filing a fraudulent lawsuit against her. Attached to

her motion was the “Notice of Change of Address” filed by Weiler on December 28,

2021, and a photocopy of an envelope showing a mailing dated December 29, 2021,

from Weiler at his Lakewood Ohio address to C.L. at her Texas address.
 In response, Weiler filed a “Motion to Strike Sham.” He alleged that

there is no prohibition in the CSPO against “serving process” on C.L.4

The trial court held a show-cause hearing on April 1, 2022. C.L.’s

counsel cited the harassing conduct Weiler himself described in great detail in the

email he sent to his former coworkers on June 1, 2018; counsel described Weiler as

“delusional” and “unhinged.” Counsel also reported that since C.L. filed the show

cause motion, Weiler mailed her “an additional I think five or six pleadings” in the

malicious prosecution lawsuit. Counsel also reported Weiler had called C.L. recently

and she immediately hung up on him.

C.L. testified that in 2018, she went to law enforcement after she

learned that over 70 of her coworkers received a very lengthy email from Weiler

about her. She immediately filed a police report, and Weiler was subsequently found

guilty of violating the civil stalking protection order.

C.L. further testified that, in December 2021, she began to receive mail

from Weiler’s personal address to her at her out-of-state address. She received a

total of nine mailings in the course of several months. She did not open the first

three mailings and instead sent them to her attorney. She opened the remaining

mailings, which all contained court documents. These mailings were initially

addressed to her in her maiden name, but the last mailing was addressed to her in

4 Weiler attached to his motion a copy of email exchanges on February 14, 2022, between
him and an employee in the clerk’s office. In the email exchange, he asked, “[W]as the
summons included along with the complaint[?]” and the employee answered, “Yes, the
summons is with the complaint.” In the motion, Weiler stated that the exhibit shows “the
lawsuit was not fraudulent.”
her new last name, Weiler having apparently found out she was married and has a

new last name. C.L. testified that she was fearful because she did not know how he

found out her new location or new last name. Among the court papers she received

was the lengthy email about her he sent to her former coworkers.

Weiler maintained that he could not be found guilty of violating of

CSPO by filing a legitimate lawsuit, but he otherwise provided no testimony or

evidence in his defense. The trial court denied Weiler’s “Motion to Strike Sham” and

granted C.L.’s motion to show cause. The court found that “by sending letters,

correspondence, and documents” to C.L., Weiler violated the CSPO and it imposed

a fine of $1,000.

Weiler filed a “Motion for Reconsideration.” He acknowledged that

on December 29, 2021, the summons and the complaint were mailed by the Clerk of

the Courts of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. He alleged that he “served all

court documents that [he] believed were required to be served pursuant to the Rules

of Civil Procedure.” He claimed that his communication with C.L., whom he alleged

was unrepresented, could not be a violation of the protection order. Attached to the

motion was his affidavit, which acknowledged that he filed a request on

December 28, 2021, for service of his complaint against C.L. The court denied the

motion for reconsideration, and this appeal follows.5

5 Appellee C.L. did not file an appellee brief in this appeal.
Appeal

On appeal, Weiler raises the following assignments of error:

I. The Court of Common Pleas erred in granting the Petitioner-
Appellee’s Motion to Show Cause.

II. The Court of Common Pleas erred in finding Respondent-Appellant
in contempt of court.

III. The Court of Common Pleas erred in denying Respondent-
Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration.

We address the first and second assignments jointly because they

involve the same issue.

In reviewing this appeal, we bear in mind that pro se litigants are

presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and they are held to

the same standard as litigants represented by counsel. State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel,

100 Ohio St.3d 352, 2003-Ohio-6448, 800 N.E.2d 25, ¶ 10. “‘Pro se litigants are

not entitled to greater rights, and they must accept the results of their own

mistakes.’” Fazio v. Gruttadauria, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90562, 2008-Ohio-

4586, ¶ 9, quoting Williams v. Lo, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-949, 2008-Ohio-

2804, ¶ 18.

R.C. 2903.214 governs protection orders to protect victims of

menacing by stalking. A person who violates a protection order issued under this

statute is subject to the following sanctions: “(a) Criminal prosecution for a violation

of section 2919.27 of the Revised Code, if the violation of the protection order
constitutes a violation of that section; (b) [p]unishment for contempt of court.”

R.C. 2903.214(K)(1).

In this case, C.L. filed a motion to show cause alleging Weiler’s

violation of the CSPO and the trial court found him in contempt pursuant to

R.C. 2903.214(K)(1)(b). The standard of review of a trial court’s finding of contempt

is abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Ventrone v. Birkel, 65 Ohio St.2d 10, 11, 417

N.E.2d 1249 (1981).

Weiler argues he would be effectively denied access to the court if he

is found in violation of the CSPO by filing a lawsuit against C.L. We first note that

“‘[d]espite the paramount importance placed on the ability to access the courts for

redress of injuries, the right is not absolute.’” Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc.,

133 Ohio St.3d 366, 2012-Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d 832, ¶ 223, quoting Greer-Burger

v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324, 2007-Ohio-6442, 879 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 11. More

importantly, the record here indicates that the trial court did not find Weiler in

violation of the CSPO by filing a lawsuit against C.L. Rather, the court found him in

violation of the CPSO by “sending letters, correspondence, and documents” to C.L.,

which is prohibited under the terms of the protection order. Weiler claims his

correspondence with C.L. should not be a violation of the protection order because

he was required to serve court documents on her pursuant to the Rules of Civil

Procedure. Our review of the record indicates Weiler’s claim lacks merit.

Pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, upon the filing of a

complaint, the clerk shall issue a summons for service on the defendant. Civ.R. 4(A).
The methods of service of the process and complaint are set forth in Civ.R. 4.1. There

are three methods: (1) service by the clerk by certified or express mail or commercial

carrier service; (2) personal service; and (3) residence service. Civ.R. 4.1(A), (B), (C).

Furthermore, Civ.R. 5(A) requires that “every pleading subsequent to the original

complaint * * * shall be served upon each of the parties.” Service should be made

either to a party not represented by counsel or the attorney of record. Civ.R. 5(B)(1).

The record of the malicious prosecution case is not part of this appeal,

and the instant record does not clearly reflect whether or not C.L. was represented

by counsel when Weiler mailed court papers to her. At the hearing, C.L. testified she

forwarded the first three mailings from Weiler to her attorney. Weiler did not refute

that testimony or provide evidence to show she was unrepresented when he mailed

the court documents to her.

Regardless of whether she was represented by counsel at the time,

however, the record before us indicates that Weiler notified the court of C.L.’s

change of address on December 28, 2021, and requested that the clerk’s office

“provide all notices” to her at her new address. The clerk’s office sent the summons

and complaint to C.L. at her Texas address on December 29, 2021. Yet, Weiler

personally mailed the summons and complaint to C.L. on the same day. At that

time, he was subject to the CSPO in which he was barred from having any

communication with C.L. Weiler’s conduct was in violation of the terms of the CSPO

because he was not required by the Rules of Civil Procedure to send the summons

and complaint directly to C.L.
 The circumstances of this case can be contrasted with Toledo v.

Hughes, 174 Ohio App.3d 598, 2007-Ohio-7098, 883 N.E.2d 1104 (6th Dist.). In

that case, after a protection order was filed against the appellant, he filed suit against

the protected person in small claims court regarding a property dispute. The

appellant objected to the magistrate’s decision, and he was instructed by the clerk’s

office to mail a copy of his objections to the opposing party. The appellant was

subsequently charged with violating the protection order. On appeal, the Sixth

District reversed his conviction of violating the protection order because he acted in

accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the directives of court personnel.

The appellate court noted specifically that the appellant was required to sign a

certificate verifying that he would mail the court document to the other party. Id. at

¶ 14-15.

In contrast, here, Weiler requested the service of the summons and

complaint to her new address and the clerk sent them accordingly. Contrary to

Weiler’s claim, he was not required to send these court papers to her directly.

Consequently, we conclude that the record before us contains competent credible

evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Weiler violated the CSPO

and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion finding him in contempt.

The first and second assignments of error are without merit.

Finally, we summarily overrule the third assignment of error because

the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a motion for reconsideration
and such a motion is considered a nullity. Pitts v. Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d

378, 423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981).

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR